In the Matter of Tamorra A. Boyd

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 7, 2023

S22Y0940. IN THE MATTER OF TAMORRA A. BOYD.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is back before the Court following a

remand for a hearing on the issue of whether respondent, Tamorra

A. Boyd (State Bar. No. 201382), who was admitted to the Georgia

Bar in December 2014, was in default as to the Bar’s previously filed

formal complaint, which charged her with violations of Rules 1.4, 1.5

(b), 7.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

(“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). See In the Matter of Boyd, 315

Ga. 390 (882 SE2d 339) (2022) (“Boyd I”) (vacating order granting

the Bar’s motion for default and report and recommendation

imposing a six-month suspension and remanding for a hearing on

default). On remand, special master LaVonda Rochelle De Witt held

a hearing and once again found Boyd to be in default, after which
Boyd, through new counsel, timely requested a hearing for

consideration of matters in aggravation and mitigation of discipline.

Before that hearing could be set, however, Boyd filed a petition for

voluntary discipline, and the State Bar responded, agreeing that a

public reprimand is the appropriate discipline given new

information that Boyd provided in that petition. The special master

then issued a new final report and recommendation, agreeing that a

public reprimand was the appropriate discipline and recommending

that the Court accept Boyd’s petition. We agree.

Procedural History Following Remand

After this Court’s remand in Boyd I, the special master

scheduled a hearing on the issue of whether Boyd had defaulted on

the formal complaint and/or had shown a proper case to open the

default. A hearing was set for March 14, 2023, and, although neither

Boyd nor her then-counsel were present at the hearing, the Bar

presented its case on default and argued that opening the default

would cause prejudice to the Bar’s mission and purpose by making

it appear that the Bar was trying to protect its members at the

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expense of the public and by delaying justice. Following the hearing,

the special master issued a thorough and well-reasoned order again

granting the State Bar’s motion for default and denying Boyd’s

motion to set aside the default, which the special master found had

been willfully abandoned in any event. The special master gave the

parties time to file a proposed report and recommendation or to

request an evidentiary hearing on any remaining issues, including

aggravation and mitigation. Through new counsel, Boyd requested

an evidentiary hearing, but, before that hearing could be set, Boyd

negotiated with the Bar to resolve the issue via a petition for

voluntary discipline, which she filed in July 2023.

In the petition, Boyd acknowledged that the special master not

only found her to be in default, twice, but also previously determined

that a six-month suspension was the appropriate discipline based on

her application of the American Bar Association’s Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”). Nevertheless, Boyd

requested that the special master reconsider that prior

recommendation based on a reevaluation of her conduct in light of

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new information which Boyd provided in the petition and

consideration of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.

Boyd contended that a public reprimand or a suspension shorter

than six months would be more appropriate in this case. The Bar

responded, offering its assent to Boyd’s petition and declining to

contest the accuracy or relevance of the additional averments and

documents offered by Boyd in the petition, including that she did not

act knowingly or intentionally to mislead or harm anyone; that she

had mental health issues and other personal and emotional

problems that may have clouded her judgment; that she has since

obtained the proper diagnosis and treatment for those issues; that

she has refocused her career in a way that is conducive to dealing

with those issues; that she paid full restitution; that she expressed

remorse; and that she provided evidence of her good character and

reputation as a lawyer. Ultimately, the Bar agreed that Boyd

violated GRPC Rules 1.4, 1.5 (b), and 7.1 and stated that, in light of

the additional information provided by Boyd, it had elected not to

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proceed with the prosecution of any Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation at this

time.

Facts Deemed Admitted by Boyd’s Default

In her new report and recommendation, the special master

acknowledged both Boyd’s concession that she is in default and the

Bar’s assent to Boyd’s petition requesting a public reprimand. The

special master noted that, due to Boyd’s default, the following facts

were deemed admitted pursuant to Bar Rule 4-212 (a): Olympia Law

Group (“OLG”) is a California law firm that purports to assist

homeowners in distress with seeking solutions to their mortgage

situations. According to its website, OLG offered its services

nationwide “through its Of Counsel attorneys,” and it marketed and

advertised its mortgage services in Georgia. Boyd signed a contract

with OLG, pursuant to which she was identified as “Of Counsel” for

OLG matters in Georgia and was listed on the “Our Attorneys”

webpage of OLG’s website. In the contract, Boyd agreed “to

represent [OLG] in [Georgia] with respect to [OLG’s] Law Practice

located within [Georgia]” and to provide services as an attorney to

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OLG’s clients, including contacting those clients and providing legal

representation as to any OLG client, case, or matter assigned to her.

In 2018, a Georgia couple contacted OLG for help negotiating

a mortgage loan modification to stop foreclosure of the wife’s home.

On April 11, 2018, the couple signed a contract permitting OLG to

withdraw $750 per month from their bank account in return for

OLG’s help with their mortgage modification. By July 11, 2018, OLG

had withdrawn a total of $3,000 from the couple’s bank account. On

July 26, 2018, the couple’s mortgage servicing company, Select

Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), contacted the wife directly, and

learned of the couple’s retention of OLG. SPS informed the wife that,

although it had not had any contact with OLG or Boyd, SPS had

approved her on July 20, 2018, for a loan modification based on the

application the couple made prior to retaining OLG. The wife

immediately checked the “client portal” on OLG’s website, which

showed that the representation had been “opened,” but did not show

the submission of any information to SPS on her behalf, and she e-

mailed OLG, directing that it stop all loan modification proceedings

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on her behalf, cease all withdrawals from her bank account, and

return the fees it had already withdrawn.

Boyd contacted the wife for the first time on July 28, 2018, and

advised her not to cancel the contract with OLG. The wife again

requested a refund in light of the fact that neither Boyd nor OLG

had performed any of the services promised. That same day, the wife

checked the client portal again and noticed that it now showed that

OLG had submitted the couple’s documents to SPS on July 27, 2018,

even though she had terminated OLG’s services on July 26. The wife

immediately wrote to OLG, again demanding reimbursement. In

September 2018, after some back and forth between the wife and

OLG about the refund, it became clear that no refund would be

coming, and the wife filed a grievance against Boyd.

During the Bar’s investigation of this matter, Boyd advised the

Bar that the couple were clients of OLG; that she was “Of Counsel”

for OLG for Georgia cases but did not directly work on the couple’s

case or consult with the couple as she was not required to by her “Of

Counsel” agreement with OLG; that she only reviewed the couple’s

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submitted information and approved them as clients for OLG; that

she was paid $75 for doing so; and that she never collected funds

from the couple and had no authority to return funds to them. Boyd

provided a copy of the retainer agreement signed by the couple and

herself, as a representative of OLG, pursuant to which she agreed to

oversee and supervise any OLG employees that may assist her with

the representation. Nevertheless, Boyd saw her role as an

“employee” of OLG in its representation of the couple and she

suggested that it was OLG who bore the responsibility for setting

fees and communicating with the couple. Eventually, however, Boyd

provided to the State Bar a certified check in the amount of $3,000

made payable to the wife.

Additional Facts Offered by Boyd

Noting that Boyd provided additional facts to provide context

to her case and that the Bar did not contest the accuracy or relevance

of those facts, the special master accepted the following as fact.

During law school, Boyd sought mental health treatment and was

misdiagnosed with a particular mental health condition by a

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psychiatrist. She obtained treatment appropriate for that diagnosis

and disclosed her condition, and the fact that she was receiving

treatment for it, in her application for admission to the practice of

law in Georgia. After graduating from law school, Boyd started a

solo practice but had difficulties managing her practice.

In 2016, Boyd sought additional mental health care and began

seeing a Georgia Licensed Professional Counselor. In 2019, a year

after Boyd’s conduct that is the subject of this disciplinary matter,

Boyd’s counselor determined that Boyd had been misdiagnosed and

helped to properly diagnose Boyd with a different mental health

disorder. Immediately after receiving the new diagnosis, Boyd went

to her primary care physician and received prescriptions to help

manage her newly-diagnosed condition. Since then, Boyd has filled

the prescriptions regularly and has implemented a regime of

strategies to permit her to meet her deadlines and other work

responsibilities in light of her condition. For example, she ceased

operating a solo practice and reoriented her practice so that she is

working in an environment in which she is more likely to thrive.

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 Regarding the events underlying the grievance leading to this

disciplinary matter, Boyd explained that while she was working as

a solo practitioner, she was approached by a representative of OLG.

The representative told her OLG was working to reduce mortgages

for individuals who were unable to make their existing payments,

that OLG had recently expanded to cover numerous states, and that

OLG was fully bar-compliant in each state. Because she needed the

money, Boyd accepted a position with OLG. Boyd asserts that she

had no knowledge that OLG may have been developing relationships

with attorneys outside of California for any purpose other than the

legal expansion of its business and that she believed, at the time,

that she was an employee of OLG. Her belief was based on OLG’s

representations to her, her low level of access to client files, and

OLG’s assertion that this process was fully bar-compliant. Under

their arrangement, OLG paid Boyd $75 per file to perform title and

bankruptcy searches for each client referred to her, but without

Boyd’s knowledge or permission, OLG, through non-attorney

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employees, apparently used Boyd’s name on various documents and

represented to its clients that she was doing loan modification work.

Rules Violated

The special master accepted the conclusions of the Bar and

Boyd that she violated Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall reasonably consult

with the client about the client’s objectives and the means by which

they are to be accomplished; shall keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the matter; and shall explain a matter

to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make

informed decisions regarding the representation) by her interactions

(or lack thereof) with the couple; that she violated Rule 1.5 (b)

(lawyer shall communicate to the client the scope of the

representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses) by

failing to explain to the couple anything about the rate or basis of

her fee or about the limitations of the scope of her representation;

and that she violated Rule 7.1 (“lawyer shall not make a false or

misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s

services,” in relevant part, in advertising or marketing materials) in

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that Boyd bore the ultimate responsibility to ensure that OLG’s

communications concerning its services in Georgia complied with

the GRPC and that, instead, she permitted OLG to “rent” her law

license to market its mortgage modification services in Georgia

through false and misleading statements, including that it was

authorized to practice law in Georgia and that Boyd would act as

local counsel for OLG’s “clients” in Georgia and actually work on

those clients’ matters. The special master also acknowledged and

accepted the agreement between the Bar and Boyd pursuant to

which the Bar agreed to refrain from pursuing its allegation that

Boyd violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4). The special master recited that the

maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 1.4 and 1.5 is a public

reprimand, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 7.1 is

disbarment.

Application of ABA Standards

The special master recognized that this Court relies on the

ABA Standards for guidance in determining punishments in

disciplinary cases, and that those Standards require consideration

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of: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the

potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct; and (d) the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The special master

stated, in relevant part, that a reprimand is generally appropriate

when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of

a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury

to a client, the public, or the legal system and that a suspension is

generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in such

conduct. The special master found reason to reconsider Boyd’s

mental state at the time of the violations based on her mental health

and circumstances that affected or could have affected her

judgment. The special master, therefore, accepted Boyd’s

characterization of her conduct as primarily negligent rather than

knowing or intentional, agreeing that while Boyd should have paid

more attention to the red flags that were present in her agreement

with OLG, she did not have actual knowledge of OLG’s alleged

misconduct as it was occurring. Thus, the special master accepted

Boyd’s assertions that, even though she maybe should have known

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she was participating in a deceptive scheme that could lead to

significant losses to Boyd’s and OLG’s clients, she never set out to

deceive anyone. With regard to the client’s “injury or potential

injury,” the special master agreed that Boyd paid full restitution to

the couple even though she was not the party who received their

payments. Ultimately, the special master agreed with Boyd and the

Bar that the presumptive level of discipline after applying the ABA

Standards would be a public reprimand.

The special master found that the penalty could be aggravated

by the fact that Boyd has one prior disciplinary matter and by her

initial refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct.

See ABA Standards 9.22 (a) and (g). In deciding not to apply the

“dishonest or selfish motive” factor, the special master noted that

Boyd had acknowledged the special master’s prior finding that she

should not have accepted OLG’s “too-good-to-be-legitimate”

arrangement, but concluded, in light of Boyd’s recent disclosure of

her mental health issues at the time of the violation, that Boyd’s

judgment was likely clouded by her personal and emotional

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problems and mental disability to the point that her motives were

not as dishonest or selfish as the special master had previously

found. The special master further found that Boyd’s discipline

should be mitigated by the fact that she was inexperienced in the

practice of law, having only practiced for two years before signing

the OLG “Of Counsel” Agreement and fewer than four years when

the underlying grievance was filed. See ABA Standard 9.32 (f). The

special master further agreed to accept as additional mitigating

factors that Boyd made a good faith effort to make restitution by

repaying the couple all of the money OLG received despite having

only received $75 of that money, see ABA Standard 9.32 (d); that

Boyd was suffering from personal or emotional problems and/or a

mental disability, which the special master noted seemed to satisfy

the requirements of ABA Standards 9.32 (c) and (i) (1) – (4); that

Boyd expressed remorse, albeit delayed, in a written letter

submitted to the Bar, see ABA Standard 9.32 (l); and that Boyd had

submitted evidence of her good character and reputation as a lawyer

in that she has been recognized as providing pro bono services to

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eligible clients and engaging in other volunteer activities and has

demonstrated growth in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.32

(g).

Ultimately, the special master concluded that Boyd had

participated in a deceptive marketing scheme which threatened the

public, undermined public trust in the legal profession, and actually

harmed the couple; that her participation was a product of her

negligence and bad judgment as described above; and that the

mitigating factors in this case offset the aggravating factors in a way

that justified a reconsideration of her prior recommendation (i.e., a

six-month suspension). The special master gave credence to Boyd’s

argument that her case is very similar to In the Matter of Paxton,

311 Ga. 363 (857 SE2d 695) (2021) (granting petition for voluntary

discipline and imposing Review Board reprimand for Paxton’s

violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 (b) in failing to work diligently

for a client obtained through her relationship with a nationwide loan

modification company), and that close examination of the

aggravating and mitigating factors in this case suggests a similar, if

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slightly more severe, penalty than what was imposed in Paxton

would be appropriate. Therefore, the special master recommended

that this Court accept Boyd’s petition for voluntary discipline and

impose a public reprimand.

Having reviewed the record in this case, we agree that the

special master’s decision to reevaluate the aggravating and

mitigating factors in this case was appropriate given the new

information provided by Boyd. Further, we agree that Boyd appears

to have acted out of negligence and naivete in her dealings with OLG

and the couple and that the aggravating factor of dishonest and

selfish motive does not apply to Boyd’s conduct. In terms of the

proper level of discipline, the parties are correct that the facts of

Paxton are somewhat similar to this case, although it involved the

violation of different Rules and Paxton had no prior disciplinary

history. Nevertheless, we previously have imposed a public

reprimand for violations of Rules 1.4 and 1.5. See In the Matter of

Scott, 313 Ga. 618 (872 SE2d 279) (2022) (accepting petition for

voluntary discipline and imposing Review Board reprimand for

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violations of Rules 1.4 and 1.5 in separate client matters where

attorney had no prior disciplinary history); In the Matter of Gantt,

305 Ga. 722 (827 SE2d 683) (2019) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline and imposing Review Board reprimand for violations of

Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 in separate client matters where attorney

was cooperative throughout the disciplinary proceedings but had

one prior disciplinary matter). And, while we recently have imposed

a suspension for a Rule 7.1 violation, that case involved active

involvement by the attorney in the Rule 7.1 violation and also

included a Rule 8.4 violation. See In the Matter of Palazzola, 310 Ga.

634 (853 SE2d 99) (2020) (accepting lawyer’s petition for voluntary

discipline and imposing nunc pro tunc a suspension of indeterminate

length but not less than three nor more than six months for

violations of Rules 1.16 (d), 5.3, 7.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) in his law firm’s

advertisements and in his dealings with three clients). Ultimately,

notwithstanding her initial disengagement from the disciplinary

proceedings, we agree that a public reprimand is an appropriate

punishment under the circumstances of this case.

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 Therefore, the Court hereby accepts Boyd’s petition for

voluntary discipline and directs that Tamorra A. Boyd be

administered a public reprimand in open court pursuant to Bar

Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for her admitted violations of GRPC

1.4, 1.5 (b), and 7.1.

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public Reprimand.
All the Justices concur.

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