Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 507
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. E-22-411
BRITTANY TAUNTON Opinion Delivered November 8, 2023
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE
V. ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW
[NO. 2022-BR-00350]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES AFFIRMED IN PART AND
APPELLEE REMANDED IN PART FOR
FURTHER FINDINGS
BRANDON HARRISON, Chief Judge
In December 2021, the Division of Workforce Services issued a notice of nonfraud
overpayment determination to Britany Taunton telling her that she had to repay $9,765 in
benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(1) (Supp. 2023). Brittany appealed
the decision to the Appeal Tribunal, and a telephone hearing was conducted in January
2022. Soon thereafter, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Division’s determination that
Brittany was liable for the overpayment. The Tribunal stated that benefits must be repaid
“unless the claimant was not at fault in causing the overpayment, if the overpayment was a
direct result of error by the Division, and if it would be against equity and good conscience
to require repayment.” Yet the Tribunal found only that the determination was not
attributable to Division error; it failed to make findings on whether Brittany was at fault for
causing the overpayment. Without taking further evidence, the Board of Review affirmed
the Tribunal’s decision and stated that Brittany was liable to repay $9,765 to the fund.
Brittany appealed that decision to this court.
We remand the case to the Division and direct it to make the required findings to
complete the federal-waiver analysis.
In appeals of unemployment-compensation cases, we review the evidence and all
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings.
Keener v. Dir., 2021 Ark. App. 88, at 1, 618 S.W.3d 446, 448. The findings of fact made
by the Board are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence; even when there is
evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of
judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably
reached its decision on the evidence presented. Id., at 1–2, 618 S.W.3d at 448. Substantial
evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Issues of credibility of witnesses and weight to be afforded their testimony are
matters for the Board to determine. While our role in these cases is limited, we are not
here to merely ratify the decision of the Board. Instead, our role is to ensure that the
standard of review has been met. Id.
Here, the Board of Review found that the $9,765 benefit overpayment was due to
a final disqualifying determination, not based on an agency error. The “Review Claims
Transactions” shows that a portion of benefits were state benefits and a portion were Federal
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) benefits. When a claimant receives both
state- and federal-unemployment benefits—and the state attempts to recover nonfraud
overpayments—the Board must conduct a different waiver analysis for the state-
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unemployment benefits received and the federal-unemployment benefits received. Hill v.
Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 418, at 2, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. The state benefit overpayment must
have been caused as a direct result of the Division’s error; and it must be against the principles
of equity and good conscience to require repayment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2);
see also King v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 182, at 3, 664 S.W.3d 439, 442. We find that substantial
evidence supports the Board’s findings as to the state benefits.
But neither the Appeal Tribunal nor the Board of Review performed the required
federal-waiver analysis to determine whether the FPUC benefits must be repaid.
Consequently, as to the federal waiver analysis, we remand for findings on this question
based on this court’s decisions in Rush v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 276, 668 S.W.3d 520,
and Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d 852.
Affirmed in part; remanded in part for further findings.
GRUBER and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Brittany Taunton, pro se appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
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