FILED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
OCTOBER 11, 2023
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2023 ND 194
In the Interest of C.K., Jr., a child
Kelley M. R. Cole, Walsh County State’s Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee
v.
C.K., Jr., child, D.A., mother, Respondents
and
C.D.K., Sr., father, Respondent and Appellant
No. 20230293
Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Barbara L. Whelan, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Per Curiam.
Kelley M. R. Cole, State’s Attorney, Grafton, ND, for petitoner and appellee.
Ulysses S. Jones, Devils Lake, ND, for respondent and appellant.
Interest of C.K.
No. 20230293
Per Curiam.
[¶1] C.D.K., the father, appeals from the juvenile court’s corrected findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating his parental rights to the minor
child, C.K. The order also terminates the parental rights of the child’s mother,
D.A. C.D.K. argues the court erred in finding the child is in need of protection,
the conditions causing the need for protection are likely to continue, and the
child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or
emotional harm. C.D.K. does not challenge the court’s finding the child spent
over 450 of the last 660 nights in the care, control, and custody of the human
service zone.
[¶2] The juvenile court found the child spent over 450 of the last 660 nights
in the care, control, and custody of the human service zone and is in need of
protection. The record supports the court’s findings, and they are not clearly
erroneous. We conclude C.D.K. has not shown the court abused its discretion
terminating C.D.K.’s parental rights. We need not address C.D.K.’s challenge
to the court’s other findings. N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2); Interest of R.L.-P.,
2014 ND 28, ¶ 23, 842 N.W.2d 889 (“Because a finding that the children have
been in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights, along with a
finding of deprivation [now, the children are ‘in need of protection’], is sufficient
to terminate parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20-44(1)(c) [now N.D.C.C. §
27-20.3-20(1)(c)], it is unnecessary to address the parents’ challenge to the
finding that the conditions and causes of the deprivation will likely continue.”).
We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).
[¶3] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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