In the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas
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No. WR-94,858-02
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EX PARTE CEDRIC FRIEL WOODS,
Applicant
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On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
In Cause No. 1119817-A
In the 179th Criminal District Court
Harris County
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YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
In 2007, Applicant pled guilty to the offense of possession of a
controlled substance—cocaine—and he was sentenced to ninety days
confinement in the county jail. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
481.115(b) (establishing possession of less than one gram of a penalty
group one controlled substance as a state jail felony); TEX. PENAL CODE
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§ 12.44(a) (permitting state jail felonies to be punished as Class A
misdemeanors in the interests of justice). He did not pursue an appeal.
But over a year later, in September of 2008, the Houston Police
Department issued a report documenting that the evidence in
Applicant’s case tested negative for any controlled substance.
Six years later—and seven years after his guilty plea—the Harris
County District Attorney released a letter to Applicant with the intent
to inform him of the laboratory report. The trial court made findings of
fact reflecting that, while the State sent notice of the lab results to
Applicant on July 29, 2014, Applicant was not made aware of those
results until he was contacted by the Harris County Public Defender in
February of 2023.
In June of 2023, Applicant filed this application for the writ of
habeas corpus in the county of conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
11.07. In his application, he makes two independent claims: that, given
the laboratory results, 1) his conviction violated his due process rights,
and 2) his plea was involuntary. And, today, the Court grants Applicant
relief based on his second claim, that his plea was involuntary.
The Court’s rationale, based on its opinion in Ex parte Mable, 443
S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), is that because Applicant was
unaware at the time of his plea that the substance he possessed actually
contained no controlled substances, his guilty plea was involuntary.
Majority Opinion at 1. But for reasons expressed in Judge Keasler’s
concurring opinion in Ex parte Saucedo, and in my own concurring
opinion in Ex parte Warfield, I disagree that Applicant’s plea was
involuntary. See Saucedo, 576 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)
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(arguing that an applicant’s “ignorance of facts he ‘knew . . . he did not
know’ should not invalidate his otherwise voluntary decision to plead
guilty”) (quoting Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804, 810 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016)); Warfield, 618 S.W.3d 69, 72–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In
my view, the Court should simply overrule Mable. It was wrong then
and it is still wrong today.
However, I do believe Applicant is entitled to relief on due process
grounds, as alleged in his first claim for relief. I recently articulated my
rationale for this conclusion in my concurring opinion in Ex parte
Ohlemacher:
When undisputed new facts that were inaccessible to both
parties at the time of a trial or plea irrefutably demonstrate
that an Applicant is not guilty of the offense for which a
judgment of conviction has been entered, the rights to due
process and due course of law are implicated. But for the
inaccessibility of those newly discovered facts, a rational
jury or judge would not have entered either a finding or a
judgment of guilt. In these circumstances, a court—with
jurisdiction that has been properly invoked—must not
tolerate the perpetuation of the false judgment. The
previous inaccessibility of the evidence definitively
demonstrates the fundamental unfairness of the process
that led to the verdict, regardless of the existence of some
other error. This conclusion is necessary to preserve the
very integrity of our judicial system itself. Otherwise, our
system might improperly preserve, and even honor,
demonstrably false judgments.
666 S.W.3d 528, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (Yeary, J., concurring).
Applicant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and
his plea was not involuntary. But it is now clear that he is truly not
guilty of that offense. In fact, in my view, Applicant has satisfied the
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burden established by Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.
Crim App. 1996) (holding that an applicant is entitled to a new trial if
he can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable fact-
finder—had it been presented with his new exculpatory evidence—
would have convicted him). Indeed, on the facts of this case, I might even
conclude that Applicant has established that he is actually innocent.
See Ex parte Cacy, 543 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Yeary,
J., concurring) (“I would avoid the label of actual innocence—at least in
the absence of evidence that conclusively proves, not just that a
reasonable jury, by clear and convincing evidence, would not
have convicted him, but that the applicant manifestly did not commit
the offense.”).
In any event, I am persuaded that Applicant has at least
adequately established his first claim. His conviction violated due
process, regardless of whether we call it an Elizondo claim or some other
species of due process claim such as “absolute actual innocence.” 1 See Ex
parte Lane, 670 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Yeary, J., dissenting)
(“We should . . . grant relief to Applicant in this case today, whatever
label we choose to append to his due process claim.”); Warfield, 618
S.W.3d at 74–75. I concur with the Court’s decision only in its result.
FILED: November 8, 2023
PUBLISH
1 Despite the delay between Applicant’s conviction and the filing of this
application for writ of habeas corpus, I would not conclude that he is barred by
laches. As explained in this opinion, the trial court’s findings suggest that
Applicant, at least arguably, could not have known to pursue his claim until
he was contacted in 2023 by the Harris County Public Defender’s Office.