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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MATTHEW
AVOLETTA ET AL.
(SC 20723)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.
Syllabus
In 2007, the defendants, a parent and her two children, filed notice of a
claim with the Claims Commissioner, seeking reimbursement from the
plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, for tuition and costs that they incurred
as a result of the enrollment of the children in private school due to
allegedly unsafe and unsanitary conditions in certain of the Torrington
public school buildings, where the children had been students. The
commissioner dismissed the claim as untimely because it was not filed
within the one year statute of limitations (§ 4-148 (a)) applicable to
claims against the state. The defendants sought legislative review of the
commissioner’s ruling pursuant to § 4-148 (b), and the General Assembly
passed a joint resolution in which it vacated that ruling and authorizing
the defendants to file an action for damages against the state in the
Superior Court. The defendants commenced such an action in 2012, but
the court dismissed it, finding that the claim was untimely and that the
joint resolution was an unconstitutional public emolument that violated
article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution insofar as it granted
the defendants a right that was unavailable to other individuals and
failed to identify any public purpose. In 2013, the defendants filed a
second claim with the commissioner, alleging, inter alia, that they were
harmed by the General Assembly’s failure to articulate a public purpose
in the joint resolution and seeking to revive their 2007 claim. The commis-
sioner dismissed the defendants’ second claim, as well. The defendants
subsequently returned to the General Assembly, which ultimately passed
No. 17-4, § 1, of the 2017 Special Acts (S.A. 17-4). Special Act 17-4
authorized the defendants to file a late claim for injuries ‘‘alleged to
have accrued on September 15, 2006,’’ and expressly recognized that ‘‘a
public purpose [was] served by encouraging accountable state govern-
ment through the full adjudication of cases involving persons who claim
to have been injured by the conduct of state actors.’’ Thereafter, the
state initiated the present action, seeking a judgment declaring that S.A.
17-4 constituted an unconstitutional public emolument that violated
article first, § 1, of the state constitution. The trial court granted the
state’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
concluding, inter alia, that the defendants had failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether S.A. 17-4 served a legitimate
public purpose. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
and the defendants, on the granting of certification, appealed to this
court.
Held that S.A. 17-4 conferred an exclusive public emolument on the defen-
dants for which the state bore no responsibility and, accordingly, the
Appellate Court correctly determined that S.A. 17-4 violated article first,
§ 1, of the state constitution insofar as it served no public purpose:
A legislative enactment will withstand a challenge under article first,
§ 1, of the Connecticut constitution only if it serves a legitimate public
purpose, and, although a special act enacted pursuant to § 4-148 (b) will
undoubtedly confer a direct benefit on a particular claimant, a public
purpose may exist if the special act remedies an injustice to that individ-
ual for which the state itself bears responsibility because, in those circum-
stances, the benefit conferred on the private individual may be viewed
as incidental to the overarching public interest that is served in remedying
the injustice caused by the state.
Moreover, if the enactment seeks to remedy a procedural default for
which the state is not responsible, it does not serve a public purpose,
and, when a special act allows a person named therein to bring a lawsuit
based on a statutory cause of action that would otherwise have been
barred for failure to comply with a time limit specified in the statute,
this court ordinarily has been unable to discern any public purpose
sufficient to sustain the enactment.
Although, in the present case, the defendants identified certain public
purposes behind S.A. 17-4, such as ensuring a safe and healthy school
setting for all children and holding government officials accountable,
and S.A. 17-4 itself included express language identifying an ostensible
public purpose, the legislature could not by mere fiat or finding make
public a truly private purpose, and S.A. 17-4 did not excuse other similarly
situated persons, such as other students in the same or different school
districts, from complying with the applicable statutory limitations for
claims or provide circumstances under which such persons could be
excused from compliance therewith.
Furthermore, S.A. 17-4 sought to remedy only the defendants’ procedural
default insofar as it authorized them, and only them, to present their
untimely claim against the state to the commissioner, and the defendants
sought reimbursement from the state only for the private school tuition
costs that they incurred without naming any other schoolchildren or
without seeking any injunctive relief with respect to the conditions in
the public school buildings.
In addition, although the defendants claimed that the state was ultimately
responsible for the health complications of the defendant children caused
by the poor conditions in the school buildings, the defendants did not
contend that the state was responsible for the procedural lapses atten-
dant to the untimely filing of their claim, there was nothing in the record
that distinguished the facts of the present case from the ordinary case
in which a litigant fails to take timely action, and S.A. 17-4 essentially
eliminated for the defendants alone the consequences of their litigation
choice of pursuing their claim against the state only through administra-
tive and judicial proceedings, rather than by filing a claim with the
commissioner in the first instance, without affording relief to anyone else.
Argued February 15—officially released August 22, 2023
Procedural History
Action for a judgment declaring unconstitutional a
special act of the legislature that permitted the refiling
of a certain claim by the defendants that previously had
been dismissed, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where
the defendants filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the court,
Hon. Robert B. Shapiro, judge trial referee, granted the
plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment and to dis-
miss the defendants’ counterclaim and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the defendants appealed to
the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Cradle and DiPen-
tima, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
and the defendants, on the granting of certification,
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Deborah G. Stevenson, for the appellants (defendants).
Michael K. Skold, deputy solicitor general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this certified appeal
is whether No. 17-4, § 1, of the 2017 Special Acts (S.A.
17-4)1 is an unconstitutional public emolument in viola-
tion of article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution.2
The defendants, Joanne Avoletta, Peter Avoletta, and
Matthew Avoletta, appeal, upon our grant of their peti-
tion for certification,3 from the judgment of the Appel-
late Court affirming the trial court’s judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut. See State v.
Avoletta, 212 Conn. App. 309, 312, 339, 275 A.3d 716
(2022). On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appel-
late Court incorrectly concluded that S.A. 17-4, pursuant
to which the General Assembly extended the time limi-
tation under General Statutes § 4-1484 for the defen-
dants to bring their claim against the state for injuries
arising from poor indoor air quality at certain public
schools, constitutes an unconstitutional public emolu-
ment because it does not serve a legitimate public pur-
pose. We disagree with the defendants and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history, much of which is aptly set forth in the opinion
of the Appellate Court.5 In May, 2007, ‘‘the defendants
filed a claim with the [Claims] [C]ommissioner [com-
missioner], alleging that the state [had] failed to main-
tain the Torrington public schools in a safe and sanitary
condition (2007 claim). Specifically, the defendants
alleged that the middle and high school buildings con-
tained water leaks, bacteria, mold, dampness, and poor
indoor air quality, which caused and exacerbated Peter
Avoletta’s and Matthew Avoletta’s respiratory diseases
and conditions. As a result of the poor building condi-
tions, Joanne Avoletta enrolled Peter Avoletta and Mat-
thew Avoletta in private schools and filed a claim with
the commissioner seeking reimbursement from the
state for the tuition and costs of their private education.
Because the defendants’ claim was not timely filed
within the one year statute of limitations set forth in
. . . § 4-148 (a), the commissioner dismissed the claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ (Footnotes
omitted.) State v. Avoletta, supra, 212 Conn. App. 313.
‘‘The defendants subsequently sought legislative
review of the commissioner’s decision pursuant to § 4-
148 (b). In response, the General Assembly passed Sub-
stitute House Joint Resolution No. 11-346 (joint resolu-
tion), which vacated the commissioner’s ruling and
authorized the defendants to file a damages claim
against the state in the Superior Court. Pursuant to the
joint resolution, the defendants commenced an action
against the state [in May, 2012]. See Avoletta v. State,
Docket No. HHD-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2013 WL 2350751
(Conn. Super. May 6, 2013) . . . . The state subse-
quently filed a motion to dismiss. . . .
‘‘The [trial] court, Sheridan, J., granted the state’s
motion to dismiss on the ground that the joint resolution
was an unconstitutional public emolument [that vio-
lated] article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution.
. . . The court found that the defendants’ claim was
untimely, noting that the defendants ‘were clearly aware
of the school conditions far [longer] than [one] year
before the . . . 2007 filing with the . . . commis-
sioner.’ . . . Accordingly, the court [concluded] that
allowing the defendants ‘to file suit directly in this mat-
ter, when [the trial court had] determined that their
action was untimely provides them a right unavailable
to other parties. [Although] the legislature need not
enact a special act when vacating the . . . commis-
sioner’s dismissal of the matter, allowing a plaintiff with
an untimely claim to circumvent § 4-148 (b) without
any explanation or public purpose, constitutes a public
emolument when the action is untimely.’ ’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote in original.) State v. Avoletta, supra,
212 Conn. App. 313–14.
The defendants then appealed to the Appellate Court,
which, in Avoletta v. State, 152 Conn. App. 177, 192–95,
98 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 944, 102 A.3d 1116
(2014), ‘‘affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding
that the defendants’ claim was time barred by the one
year statute of limitations set forth in § 4-148 (a), and
that the joint resolution had failed to identify any com-
pelling equitable circumstances or a public purpose
served by permitting the defendants to bring an
untimely claim against the state. . . . Accordingly, [the
Appellate Court] held that the joint resolution was an
unconstitutional public emolument.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) State v. Avoletta, supra, 212 Conn. App. 315.
In August, 2013, ‘‘the defendants filed a second claim
with the commissioner . . . seeking relief on two dis-
tinct grounds. First, the defendants sought to revive
their 2007 claim for damages stemming from unsafe
conditions at the Torrington public schools (Torrington
schools claim). Second, the defendants alleged that they
were harmed by the legislature’s ‘gross negligence’ in
failing to articulate a public purpose in the joint resolu-
tion and neglecting to appropriately follow the statutory
procedure to authorize such a claim . . . . The state
moved to dismiss both claims, arguing that [they] were
barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and legisla-
tive immunity. The commissioner granted the state’s
motion to dismiss [in May, 2015].
‘‘Following the commissioner’s order, the defendants
again appealed to the General Assembly for legislative
review. [In June, 2017], the General Assembly passed
[S.A. 17-4], authorizing the defendants to proceed before
the commissioner ‘for injuries . . . alleged to have accrued
on September 15, 2006 . . . .’ The commissioner subse-
quently issued a scheduling order requiring that the
parties engage in discovery, file dispositive motions, and
participate in a hearing on the merits of the defen-
dants’ claims.
‘‘[In September, 2017], the state instituted the present
action . . . [in] the Superior Court, seeking a [judg-
ment declaring] that [S.A. 17-4] constituted an unconsti-
tutional public emolument in violation of article first,
§ 1, of the Connecticut constitution. . . .
‘‘[In May, 2018], the state filed a motion for summary
judgment. In its accompanying memorandum of law,
the state claimed that (1) [S.A. 17-4] constituted an
unconstitutional public emolument, and (2) the defen-
dants were collaterally estopped from arguing that their
claims were timely or that there was a legitimate public
purpose for permitting their untimely claims to pro-
ceed.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 315–17.
In October, 2019, ‘‘the court, Hon. Robert B. Shapiro,
judge trial referee, heard argument on the state’s motion
for summary judgment [which it subsequently granted]
. . . . [The court concluded] that the issue of whether
the Torrington schools claim was timely filed was
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because
the claim previously was [found to be] untimely, the
court clarified that the claim could . . . proceed [only]
via special legislation passed pursuant to § 4-148 (b).
The court then . . . determined that the defendants
had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material
fact [as to whether S.A. 17-4] served a legitimate public
purpose . . . [or as to whether S.A. 17-4] constituted
an unconstitutional public emolument.’’ Id., 319.
The defendants subsequently appealed from the judg-
ment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming,
inter alia, that the trial court improperly had granted
the state’s motion summary judgment on the ground
that S.A. 17-4 was an unconstitutional public emolu-
ment. See id., 320, 325. Relying on this court’s decisions
in Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health Center,
290 Conn. 245, 963 A.2d 1 (2009), and Kinney v. State,
285 Conn. 700, 941 A.2d 907 (2008), the Appellate Court
concluded that the trial court correctly had determined
that S.A. 17-4 does not serve a legitimate public purpose
and, therefore, is an unconstitutional public emolu-
ment. See State v. Avoletta, supra, 212 Conn. App. 325–
28. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of
this opinion.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate
Court incorrectly concluded that S.A. 17-4 does not
serve a legitimate public purpose and is an unconstitu-
tional public emolument under the public emoluments
clause of the state constitution. See Conn. Const., art.
I, § 1. The defendants argue that the Appellate Court
failed to consider whether the state met its burden of
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the General
Assembly’s ‘‘sole objective’’ in enacting S.A. 17-4 was
to grant a personal gain or advantage to the defendants.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendants
contend that ‘‘the legislature had multiple, valid public
policy purposes in adopting’’ S.A. 17-4, namely, provid-
ing compensation for the defendants, ensuring a safe
and healthy school setting for all children, holding gov-
ernment officials accountable, and ensuring that similar
claims receive a full adjudication on the merits.
In response, the state argues that a special act that
purports to authorize a party to present an untimely
claim to the commissioner will have a legitimate public
purpose only when the state bears responsibility for
the untimely filing. Because no state actor caused the
defendants’ procedural default, the state contends that
the public purposes identified by the language of S.A. 17-
4 and the defendants are not legitimate public purposes
and, therefore, that S.A. 17-4 provides an exclusive,
private benefit to the defendants that no other similarly
situated litigant may enjoy, in violation of the public
emoluments clause. We agree with the state and,
accordingly, conclude that S.A. 17-4 is an unconstitu-
tional public emolument.
We first address the applicable standard of review
and governing legal principles. ‘‘It is well established
that the state cannot be sued without its consent. . . .
This doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject
matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting
a motion to dismiss. . . . A determination regarding a
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law. When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of
law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether
its conclusions are legally and logically correct and
find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health Center, supra,
290 Conn. 252. ‘‘Moreover, [t]his court has long held
that every presumption will be made in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislative act. . . . Parties chal-
lenging the constitutionality of an act in a proceeding
seeking declaratory relief have the [heavy] burden of
showing its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 257. ‘‘Although
[w]e have taken a broad view of the legislative goals
that may constitute a public purpose . . . [b]ecause
the elements of a public purpose vary as much as the
circumstance in which the term is appropriate, each
case must be determined on its own peculiar facts.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 259–60, 690 A.2d
368 (1997).
It is well established that, ‘‘[t]o prevail under article
first, § 1, of our constitution, the state must demonstrate
that the sole objective of the General Assembly is to
grant personal gain or advantage to an individual. . . .
If, however, an enactment serves a legitimate public
purpose, then it will withstand a challenge under article
first, § 1. . . . The scope of our review as to whether
an enactment serves a public purpose is limited. [W]hat
constitutes a public purpose is primarily a question
for the legislature, and its determination should not be
reversed by the court unless it is manifestly and palpa-
bly incorrect. . . . In determining whether a special
act serves a public purpose, a court must uphold it
unless there is no reasonable ground [on] which it can
be sustained. . . . Thus, if there [is] the least possibil-
ity that [the special act] will be promotive in any degree
of the public welfare . . . we are bound to uphold it
against a constitutional challenge predicated on article
first, § 1 [of the state constitution]. . . .
‘‘In this regard, although a special act passed under
§ 4-148 (b) will undoubtedly confer a direct benefit [on]
a particular claimant, we have found a public purpose
if it remedies an injustice done to that individual for
which the state itself bears responsibility. . . . In such
circumstances, the benefit conferred [on] a private
party by the legislature may be viewed as incidental to
the overarching public interest that is served in remedy-
ing an injustice caused by the state. . . .
‘‘By contrast, we have consistently held that legisla-
tion seeking to remedy a procedural default for which
the state is not responsible does not serve a public
purpose and, accordingly, runs afoul of article first, § 1,
of the state constitution. . . . Thus, legislation cannot
survive a constitutional challenge under article first,
§ 1, if it excuses a party’s failure to comply with a
statutory notice requirement simply because the non-
compliance precludes consideration of the merits of
the party’s claim. . . . Similarly, [when] a special act
has allowed a person named therein to bring a suit based
[on] a statutory cause of action that would otherwise be
barred for failure to comply with a time limit specified
in the statute, we have ordinarily been unable to discern
any public purpose sufficient to sustain the enactment.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Kelly v. University of Connecticut
Health Center, supra, 290 Conn. 257–59.
Our conclusion in the present case is guided by our
decisions in Kinney v. State, supra, 285 Conn. 713,
and Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health Center,
supra, 290 Conn. 259, in which we concluded that the
respective special acts at issue were unconstitutional
public emoluments because they served no public pur-
pose.7 In Kinney, this court held that No. 94-13, § 1, of
the 1994 Special Acts (S.A. 94-13),8 which authorized
the plaintiff, Joan A. Kinney, as administratrix of the
estate of her husband, who was a Superior Court judge,
to present her claim against the state to the commis-
sioner despite her untimely filing, conferred an uncon-
stitutional public emolument on Kinney. See Kinney v.
State, supra, 716; see also id., 704–706. In so concluding,
the court rejected Kinney’s argument that S.A. 94-13
served a public purpose ‘‘by encouraging a work ethic
of a judge, indeed, any employee of the [s]tate of Con-
necticut.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 708.
Rather, we concluded that, ‘‘although well intentioned,
S.A. 94-13 [benefited] no member of the public other
than [Kinney] and remedie[d] a procedural default aris-
ing from [Kinney’s] failure to [timely] file a claim with
the . . . commissioner . . . for which the state itself
bore no responsibility.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id., 708–709.
Subsequently, in Kelly v. University of Connecticut
Health Center, supra, 290 Conn. 245, this court held
that No. 05-4, § 1, of the 2005 Special Acts (S.A. 05-4),9
which specifically authorized ‘‘the plaintiff, and only
the plaintiff,’’ to present his claim against the state to
the commissioner despite his untimely filing, was an
unconstitutional public emolument because it served
no public purpose. Id., 259. The court in Kelly disagreed
with the plaintiff’s argument that, by lengthening the
limitation period within which a medical malpractice
claim [could] be filed against a state hospital, S.A. 05-
4 served the public purpose of remedying the injustice
created by the establishment of different statutes of
limitations for state and private hospitals. Id., 256. The
court’s review of the legislative history of S.A. 05-4
demonstrated that it was enacted to benefit only the
plaintiff. Id., 259. Relying on the then recent decision in
Kinney, the court recognized that ‘‘a mere declaration
within a particular special act that it serves the public
interest is not enough’’ to overcome the emolument
analysis; id., 259–60; and that ‘‘[t]he fact that the legisla-
ture stated that the special act served a public purpose
does not change the pertinent inquiry for the court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 260.
Guided by Kinney and Kelly, we now consider
whether S.A. 17-4 serves a legitimate public purpose,
which would save it from unconstitutionality as a public
emolument. We also are mindful that a ‘‘legislative
enactment need not contain a specific statement of the
public purpose sought to be achieved by it. . . . Legis-
lative findings, however, purporting to establish the
existence of a public purpose should be considered
when the text of the act itself incorporates these find-
ings . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development
Corp., 167 Conn. 111, 116 n.2, 355 A.2d 72 (1974). In
enacting S.A. 17-4, the General Assembly expressly
found that ‘‘there is a public purpose served by encour-
aging accountable state government through the full
adjudication of cases involving persons who claim to
have been injured by the conduct of state actors.’’ S.A.
17-4, § 1. To the extent that S.A. 17-4, § 1, is ambiguous
with respect to the meaning of the phrase ‘‘encouraging
accountable state government,’’ or as to whether it ben-
efits only the defendants, we are guided by our previous
decisions considering the legislative history of special
acts for purposes of the emolument analysis, as well
as General Statutes § 1-2z. See, e.g., Kelly v. University
of Connecticut Health Center, supra, 290 Conn. 259;
Kinney v. State, supra, 285 Conn. 713–14 and n.10.
The defendants contend that the General Assembly
‘‘had multiple, valid public policy purposes’’ for adopt-
ing S.A. 17-4, such as furnishing them compensation
for their injuries, ensuring a safe and healthy school
setting for all children, holding government officials
accountable, and providing a full adjudication on the
merits for similar claims. Indeed, the defendants con-
tended that S.A. 17-4 was consistent with these public
policy goals in their advocacy to the attorney general
and before the Judiciary Committee of the General
Assembly. Senator John A. Kissel acknowledged that
the information that the defendants’ counsel had ‘‘put
on the public record [would] help [the legislature] craft
something that hopefully [could] withstand the emolu-
ment analysis . . . ’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 2017 Sess., p. 1041. Represen-
tative Bruce V. Morris acknowledged that ‘‘this is an
issue—maybe not just in [Torrington] and [other dis-
tricts] where we do have kids at our moldy buildings
or whatever, and districts do not act soon enough . . .
and something needs to be done to remedy that.’’ Id.,
p. 1055; cf. Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health
Center, supra, 290 Conn. 259 (legislative history of S.A.
05-4 revealed that those in favor of passing act believed
that ‘‘ ‘what [they were] doing . . . [was] changing the
rules for one individual in a specific act’ ’’); Kinney v.
State, supra, 285 Conn. 713 (legislative history of S.A.
94-13 failed to support plaintiff’s contention that that
special act ‘‘was based on the public purpose of encour-
aging a work ethic by sending a message ‘to all govern-
ment employees . . . to work above and beyond the
norm’ ’’).
Despite these remarks, the ‘‘legislature cannot by
mere fiat or finding, make public a truly private purpose
. . . . Its findings and statements about what is or is
not public cannot be binding [on] the court.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Kinney v. State, supra, 285
Conn. 712. Although the language of the special act
in Kinney expressly declared that the authorization
‘‘would serve a public purpose by not penalizing a per-
son who exhausts his or her administrative and judicial
remedies before filing a claim against the state’’; S.A.
94-13, § 1; see footnote 8 of this opinion; we neverthe-
less were ‘‘hard pressed to conclude that there [was]
a legitimate public purpose when the beneficial effect
of the special act applie[d] to no member of the public
other than [Kinney] for whom it grant[ed] a personal
privilege.’’ (Emphasis added.) Kinney v. State, supra,
714. Likewise, S.A. 17-4 neither excuses other similarly
situated persons—such as other Torrington public school
students or students in other school districts—from
complying with the statutory limitations nor provides
circumstances under which such persons may be
excused. See id.
In the present case, S.A. 17-4 seeks only to remedy the
defendants’ procedural default, namely, their untimely
filing with the commissioner of their claim against the
state. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Entitled ‘‘An Act
Concerning the Claims Against the State of Joanne Avo-
letta, Peter Avoletta and Matthew Avoletta,’’ S.A. 17-4
authorizes the defendants, and only the defendants,
‘‘who initially filed notice of their claims against the
state . . . on May 2, 2007, for injuries that are alleged
to have accrued on September 15, 2006,’’ to present
their respective claims for money damages against the
state to the commissioner. S.A. 17-4, § 1; see Kelly v.
University of Connecticut Health Center, supra, 290
Conn. 259. Although the defendants claim that they are
seeking justice not only for themselves, but also for
other similarly situated school children, they seek reim-
bursement from the state for the tuition costs of their
private education, no other children were named in the
underlying action against the state, and no injunctive
relief was sought with respect to the conditions of the
public school buildings. It is well established that, when
‘‘a special act has allowed a person named therein to
bring a suit based [on] a statutory cause of action that
would otherwise be barred for failure to comply with
a time limit specified in the statute, we have ordinarily
been unable to discern any public purpose sufficient
to sustain the enactment.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Kinney v. State, supra, 285 Conn. 713; see
Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 213, 558 A.2d 977 (1989).
Furthermore, ‘‘we consistently have determined that
legislation seeking to remedy a procedural default for
which the state is not responsible does not serve a
public purpose and, accordingly, runs afoul of article
first, § 1, of the state constitution.’’ Kinney v. State,
supra, 285 Conn. 715–16 n.11. Although the defendants
argue that the state is ultimately responsible for the
health complications caused by the poor school build-
ing conditions, they do not contend in their brief that
the state is responsible for the procedural lapses atten-
dant to the untimely filing of their claim as a factual
matter.10 See Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health
Center, supra, 290 Conn. 258–59 (‘‘legislation cannot
survive a constitutional challenge . . . if it excuses a
party’s failure to comply with a statutory notice require-
ment simply because the noncompliance precludes con-
sideration of the merits of the party’s claim’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). As in Kinney, ‘‘nothing in
the record of the present case distinguishes its facts
from the ordinary case in which a litigant fails to take
timely action. Rather than filing a claim with the . . .
commissioner as [their] first course of action or concur-
rently with [their] pursuit of administrative and judicial
remedies, the [defendants] chose to pursue [their] claim
against the state only through administrative and judi-
cial proceedings. [S.A. 17-4] essentially would eliminate
for [them] alone the consequences of [their] litigation
choice and would provide no relief to anyone else who
either made a similar erroneous litigation choice or who
mistakenly believed that exhaustion of administrative
and judicial remedies was required before filing a claim
with the . . . commissioner.’’ Kinney v. State, supra,
715; cf. Merly v. State, supra, 211 Conn. 213–15 (special
act did not serve public purpose because it benefited
only plaintiff, and he could not explain how state
employee caused his untimely claim). But see Chot-
kowski v. State, supra, 240 Conn. 261 (special act was
not exclusive public emolument because legislature
expressly found that plaintiff had failed to file timely
claim as result of being misinformed and misled by
state official); Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183,
185, 198 A. 746 (1938) (plaintiff alleged that statutorily
defective notice ‘‘was prepared by an assistant to the
city clerk . . . [on] whom the plaintiff relied for its
preparation and to whom was given all essential facts
[that] were necessary for’’ sufficient notice (emphasis
added)).
Accordingly, because ‘‘we see no basis for sustaining
the validity of a special act creating a privilege for a
particular individual’’; Kinney v. State, supra, 285 Conn.
713; and because it is clear that S.A. 17-4 confers an
exclusive public emolument on the defendants for
which the state bears no responsibility, we conclude
that the Appellate Court correctly determined that S.A.
17-4 violates article first, §1, of the state constitution
insofar as it serves no public purpose. The Appellate
Court, therefore, properly upheld the trial court’s grant-
ing of summary judgment in favor of the state.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1
No. 17-4, § 1, of the 2017 Special Acts provides: ‘‘(a) Notwithstanding
the failure to file a proper notice of a claim against the state with the
clerk of the Office of the Claims Commissioner, within the time limitations
specified by subsection (a) of section 4-148 of the general statutes, Joanne
Avoletta, Peter Avoletta and Matthew Avoletta are authorized pursuant to
the provisions of subsection (b) of section 4-148 of the general statutes to
present their respective claims against the state to the Claims Commissioner.
The General Assembly finds that there is a public purpose served by encour-
aging accountable state government through the full adjudication of cases
involving persons who claim to have been injured by the conduct of state
actors. The General Assembly further finds it just and equitable that the
time limitations provided for in subsection (a) of section 4-148 of the general
statutes be tolled in a case such as this, involving claimants who initially
filed notice of their claims against the state with the Claims Commissioner
on May 2, 2007, for injuries that are alleged to have accrued on September 15,
2006, which allegations, if viewed in a light most favorable to the claimants,
provide notice to the state of their claims within the statute of limitations
for injuries to their person. The General Assembly deems such authorization
to be just and equitable and finds that such authorization is supported by
compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose. Such
claims shall be presented to the Claims Commissioner not later than one
year after the effective date of this section.
‘‘(b) The state shall be barred from setting up the failure to comply with
the provisions of sections 4-147 and 4-148 of the general statutes, from
denying that notice of the claims was properly and timely given pursuant
to sections 4-147 and 4-148 of the general statutes and from setting up
the fact that the claims had previously been considered by the Claims
Commissioner, by the General Assembly or in a judicial proceeding as
defenses to such claims.’’
2
Article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: ‘‘All men
when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of
men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the
community.’’
3
We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal from the
judgment of the Appellate Court, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the
Appellate Court correctly determine that [S.A. 17-4] is an unconstitutional
public emolument?’’ State v. Avoletta, 343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d 433 (2022).
4
General Statutes § 4-148 provides: ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section and section 4-165b, no claim shall be presented under
this chapter but within one year after it accrues. Claims for injury to person
or damage to property shall be deemed to accrue on the date when the
damage or injury is sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered, provided no claim shall be presented
more than three years from the date of the act or event complained of.
‘‘(b) The General Assembly may, by special act, authorize a person to
present a claim to the Office of the Claims Commissioner after the time
limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section have expired if it deems
such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding
that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances
and would serve a public purpose. Such finding shall not be subject to
review by the Superior Court.
‘‘(c) No claim cognizable by the Office of the Claims Commissioner shall
be presented against the state except under the provisions of this chapter.
Except as provided in section 4-156, no claim once considered by the Office
of the Claims Commissioner, by the General Assembly or in a judicial pro-
ceeding shall again be presented against the state in any manner.’’
5
For the sake of brevity, we mention only the facts and procedural history
relevant to the certified issue in this appeal. For a full recitation of the facts
and procedural history of this case, see State v. Avoletta, supra, 212 Conn.
App. 313–20.
6
‘‘Substitute House Joint Resolution No. 11-34, § 2, provides in relevant
part that ‘the decision of the . . . [c]ommissioner . . . ordering the dis-
missal of the claims against the state in excess of seven thousand five
hundred dollars of [the defendants], is vacated and the [defendants] are
authorized to institute and prosecute to final judgment an action against
the state to recover damages as compensation for injury to person or damage
to property, or both, allegedly suffered by the claimants as set forth in said
claims.’ ’’ State v. Avoletta, supra, 212 Conn. App. 314 n.5.
7
We are unpersuaded by the defendants’ repeated assertions that the
Appellate Court ‘‘ignored’’ and ‘‘disregard[ed]’’ relevant legal precedent in
concluding that S.A. 17-4 is an unconstitutional public emolument. Although
the defendants contend that the Appellate Court ‘‘failed’’ to analyze or
apply numerous ‘‘highly relevant and controlling’’ decisions of this court,
the Appellate Court properly analyzed and applied Kinney v. State, supra,
285 Conn. 700, and Kelly v. University of Connecticut Health Center, supra,
290 Conn. 245, which encompass the current state of our public emolument
jurisprudence, to the present case. Many of the decisions cited by the defen-
dants are not relevant because they do not address the constitutionality of
public emoluments enacted to cure a litigant’s procedural default. See, e.g.,
Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn. 641, 643–46, 980 A.2d 845 (2009) (whether
participation in appeal by Connecticut Supreme Court justice who had
reached constitutionally mandated age of retirement affected court’s subject
matter jurisdiction); Serrano v. Aetna Ins. Co., 233 Conn. 437, 447, 664 A.2d
279 (1995) (whether legislative enactment ran afoul of contract clause of
United States constitution); State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 187, 646 A.2d 1318
(1994) (consolidated criminal appeals from imposition of death penalty on
defendant), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095
(1995); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 796–97, 640 A.2d 986 (1994) (facial
vagueness claim under fourteenth amendment to United States constitution);
State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 74–75, 89–90, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991) (fourth
amendment and fourteenth amendment due process clause claims and con-
stitutional avoidance); Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 169–80, 251 A.2d
49 (1968) (numerous constitutional challenges but not under public emolu-
ments clause); Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 381, 161 A.2d 770 (1960)
(discrimination claim for use of public funds for private purpose), appeal
dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1961).
8
No. 94-13, § 1, of the 1994 Special Acts provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
Notwithstanding the failure to file a proper notice of a claim against the
state with the clerk of the office of the claims commissioner . . . within
the time limitations specified by subsection (a) of section 4-148 of the general
statutes . . . Joan A. Kinney is authorized pursuant to the provisions of
subsection (b) of said section 4-148 to present her claim against the state
to the claims commissioner . . . .
‘‘(b) The general assembly finds . . . [that] it would be just and equitable
to authorize Joan A. Kinney to present her claim against the state to the
claims commissioner, that there are compelling equitable circumstances to
support such authorization and that such authorization would serve a public
purpose by not penalizing a person who exhausts his or her administrative
and judicial remedies before filing a claim against the state with the claims
commissioner. . . .’’
9
No. 05-4, § 1, of the 2005 Special Acts provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
Notwithstanding the failure to file a proper notice of a claim against the
state with the clerk of the Office of the Claims Commissioner . . . within
the time limitations specified by subsection (a) of section 4-148 of the general
statutes . . . Robert J. Kelly is authorized . . . to present his claim against
the state to the Claims Commissioner. The General Assembly deems such
authorization to be just and equitable and finds that such authorization is
supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public
purpose. . . .’’
10
The trial court rejected the defendants’ argument, which they renewed
at oral argument before this court, that the state was responsible for their
untimely filing because they detrimentally relied on promises made by the
attorney general relating to the conditions of the school and appropriate
corrective action, stating that ‘‘the attorney general’s statements . . . [did]
not justify the defendants’ decision to wait years to file a claim to recover
damages . . . . Rather, these statements should have indicated to the defen-
dants that they may have had a cause of action, at that time, for negligence.’’
(Footnote omitted.) To the extent that the defendants challenge the correct-
ness of this finding, we consider this claim to be inadequately briefed for
failure to provide any meaningful analysis, and we therefore decline to
address it. See, e.g., Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn.
781, 804–805, 256 A.3d 655 (2021) (courts do not reach inadequately briefed
claims); see also, e.g., id., 797 n.12 (courts do not reach claims raised for
first time at oral argument).