H and H Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Paul Bucco, Esquire

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2913-21

H and H MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a/k/a H&H,
THOMAS TOMEI and
JANNETTE TOMEI,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

PAUL BUCCO, ESQUIRE,
DAVIS BUCCO MAKARA &
DORSEY f/k/a DAVIS BUCCO
f/k/a DAVIS BUCCO & ARDIZZI,
JOSEPH FIORAVANTI, ESQ.,
MARK TOMEI, Individually and as
Guardian ad Litem for VINCENT TOMEI1,
and as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Marie Tomei, ESTATE OF VINCENT
TOMEI2, ESTATE OF MARIE TOMEI,
JAMES FLANDREAU, ESQUIRE, and
PAUL, FLANDREAU & BERGER, LLP,

Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________________

1
We note Vincent Tomei passed away on April 28, 2023 and as a result, Mark
Tomei is no longer his Guardian ad Litem.
2
The Estate of Vincent Tomei was substituted for Vincent Tomei in June 2023.
 Submitted September 18, 2023 – Decided November 13, 2023

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-1537-21.

Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLP,
attorneys for appellants (Matthew A. Green and Lars J.
Lederer, on the brief).

Connell Foley LLP, attorneys for respondents Paul
Bucco, Esquire and Davis Bucco Makara & Dorsey
(Andrew C. Sayles, of counsel and on the brief; Stephen
R. Turano, on the brief).

Narducci, Moore, Fleisher Roeberg & Wolfe, LLP,
attorneys for respondent Joseph Fioravanti, Esq.
(Patrick James Wolfe, Jr., on the brief).

Ciardi Ciardi & Astin, attorneys for respondent Mark
Tomei (Albert Anthony Ciardi, III and Nicole Marie
Nigrelli, on the brief).

Florio Perrucci Steinhardt Cappelli Tipton & Taylor,
LLC, attorneys for respondent Vincent Tomei, join in
the brief of respondent Mark Tomei.

DiMarino, Lehrer & Collazo, PC, attorneys for
respondent Estate of Marie Tomei, join in the brief of
respondent Mark Tomei.

Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, attorneys for
respondents James Flandreau, Esquire and Paul,
Flandreau & Berger, LLP (Robert Alan Berns and
Timothy Mark Ortolani, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

A-2913-21
2
 Plaintiffs H and H Manufacturing Company, Inc. (H&H), Thomas Tomei

(Thomas),3 and Jannette Tomei (Jannette) (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from

an April 12, 2022 Law Division order granting in part, and denying in part, the

individual motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint filed by defendants Paul

Bucco, Esq. (Bucco); Davis Bucco Makara & Dorsey (Davis Bucco); Joseph

Fioravanti, Esq. (Fioravanti); Mark Tomei (Mark), individually, as guardian for

Vincent Tomei (Vincent), and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie

Tomei; Vincent; the Estate of Marie Tomei (Marie); James Flandreau, Esq.

(Flandreau); and Paul, Flandreau & Berger, LLP (collectively, defendants).

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges misconduct by defendants leading up to and during

ongoing litigation between the parties in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.

The court dismissed plaintiffs' ten-count complaint without prejudice

based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Alternatively, it determined

counts one through eight and ten of the complaint were barred by Pennsylvania's

two-year statute of limitations, which it applied after conducting a choice-of-

law analysis and concluding Pennsylvania's interest in this action alleging

misuse of the Pennsylvania court system was greater than New Jersey's interest .

3
We use first names to distinguish the members of the Tomei family, intending
no disrespect.
A-2913-21
3
 We are satisfied the court did not abuse its discretion in determining New

Jersey is an inappropriate forum for this action. We therefore affirm the

dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice based on forum non

conveniens. We also conclude the court erred when it applied the incorrect

choice-of-law analysis to determine plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute

of limitations.

In light of our decision to affirm the court's forum non conveniens

determination, we also conclude the better course of action is to vacate the

court's April 12, 2022 order dismissing all but count nine of the complaint, a

claim under Pennsylvania's Dragonetti Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8351-8354,4

with prejudice based on the statute of limitations. As plaintiffs have refiled their

complaint in Pennsylvania, we find it more appropriate for the Pennsylvania

court to address the choice of law issue in the first instance, in the context of the

refiled action.

I.

4
The Dragonetti Act creates a cause of action against "a person who takes part
in the procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings against
another" who "acts in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause and
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder
of parties or adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based." 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8351.

A-2913-21
4
 We refer to the recitation of facts underlying the parties' dispute set forth

in our previous unpublished opinion, H and H Manufacturing Company v.

Tomei, No A-4209-19 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2021) (slip op.), as follows:

H&H is a corporation that manufactures parts for
industrial turbines and has its principal place of
business in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Vincent
[wa]s a retired certified public accountant who handled
H&H's books and records and other financial corporate
documents and served on its board of directors.

Thomas . . . served on [H&H's] board of directors but
also held the office of president and general manager,
overseeing all aspects of H&H's day-to-day operations.
Since 1984, H&H has been wholly owned by the Tomei
family and affiliated trusts whose beneficiaries are
Tomei family members.

Over the course of their business relationship, Thomas
and Vincent's positions became adverse. On April 8,
2013, H&H held a special meeting of the stockholders.
[Bucco] acted as secretary at the meeting and prepared
the minutes, which indicated, in part, that both Vincent
and Thomas would serve on the board of directors for a
one-year term, and that Davis Bucco would represent
H&H in all legal matters in 2013.

Upon receiving the meeting minutes, Thomas wrote to
. . . Bucco and objected to several aspects of the
proposed minutes, including that Davis Bucco had been
appointed to represent H&H . . .

In May 2013, [Vincent and Thomas had a dispute over
H&H's finances.] . . . [W]ithout approval of the board
of directors or other shareholders, Vincent sent Thomas
a fax purporting to terminate him from his employment

A-2913-21
5
 with H&H. On June 3, 2013, Vincent held an alleged
meeting of the shareholders where he attempted to alter
the board of directors, replacing Thomas with Mark.
Thomas was not provided proper notice of the meeting.

On June 17, 2013, Vincent filed suit in the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Delaware
County . . . in his own name and, ostensibly, on behalf
of H&H, asserting claims of breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, and conversion, and also requesting
equitable relief. Specifically, Vincent claimed to be
owner of all H&H voting stock . . . [while] Thomas was
a minority shareholder who owned only non-voting
shares and who had been terminated from H&H and
removed from its board of directors. He also alleged
that Thomas converted H&H funds for personal use,
wrongfully took possession of and retained H&H books
and records, refused to sell his shares to H&H upon his
termination as required by contract, and failed to pay
Vincent his salary as required by his employment
agreement. The plaintiffs [in the Delaware County
action] were represented by . . . Bucco and the Davis
Bucco firm. Thomas filed an answer with
counterclaims.

[Id. at 3-5.]

In June 2016, Vincent's wife, Marie, represented by Fioravanti, sought and

obtained permission to intervene in the Delaware County action, asserting

claims against Thomas related to her alleged ownership in H&H. Thomas

brought counterclaims against Marie as well. In March 2017, Marie passed

away. The court appointed Flandreau and Paul, Flandreau & Berger to serve as

executor ad litem for Marie's estate in the Delaware County action.

A-2913-21
6
 In addition,

[o]n December 8, 2017, following a bench trial, the
court found in favor of Thomas on all counts in the
complaint [and intervenor complaint]. The court
determined Vincent forged and fabricated H&H's
corporate documents, including shareholder certificates
and meeting minutes to establish his ownership in
H&H. It further found that all outstanding H&H shares
were owned by the Thomas Tomei Trust, of which
Thomas was the sole beneficiary, and the estate of
Marie . . . It also determined that Thomas's alleged
termination and removal from the board of directors
were void, and that Thomas was "authorized to make
all decisions concerning the operations and
management of H&H." . . .

[T]he court also dismissed all claims Vincent asserted
on H&H's behalf, concluding it was "not a proper party
to [the] litigation" as Vincent "lack[ed] standing to sue
on behalf of H&H" because "H&H's board of directors
never approved the filing of [the] lawsuit or ratified its
filing" and Vincent failed to file a proper derivative
suit.

The Pennsylvania appellate court affirmed, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review.
Throughout the Delaware County [a]ction and all
related appeals, . . . Bucco and Davis Bucco represented
Vincent and purported to represent H&H's interests,
signing all pleadings and appellate submissions on its
behalf.

[Id. at 5-6.]

On December 11, 2019, H&H filed a complaint, which is not directly

involved in this appeal, in the Law Division against Mark, individually and as

A-2913-21
7
guardian ad litem for Vincent, and Vincent (first Law Division action). H&H

alleged those defendants breached their fiduciary duty, committed fraud and

corporate waste, converted H&H's property, engaged in a civil conspiracy, were

unjustly enriched, and tortiously interfered with contract in connection with the

events underlying and arising during the Delaware County litigation, and sought,

as declaratory relief, return of corporate records. Before us, plaintiffs maintain

the claims in the first Law Division action "are based, in part, on the damages

sustained by H&H when Vincent . . . sued Thomas . . . on H&H's behalf in the

[Delaware County action] without authority."

In the first Law Division action, H&H moved to disqualify Bucco from

representing Vincent, which the Law Division granted. We granted Bucco leave

to appeal and stayed the litigation pending our disposition. H&H Mfg. Co. v.

Tomei, No. AM-0538-19 (App. Div. July 23, 2020).

Despite our stay order, H&H moved to amend its complaint to add Thomas

and Jannette as plaintiffs and Bucco; Davis Bucco; Fioravanti; Marie; Mark, as

personal representative of Marie's estate; Flandreau; and Paul, Flandreau &

Berger as additional defendants. It also sought to add claims under

Pennsylvania's Dragonetti Act and for abuse of process. In support of its motion,

H&H alleged "[l]eading up to the Delaware County Action, Davis Bucco

A-2913-21
8
inserted itself into the affairs of H&H outside of their role as counsel on limited

matters" and falsified meeting minutes which they later "used as a basis for the

Davis Bucco representation of H&H in the effort to unlawfully wrest control

and ownership of H&H from Thomas."

Plaintiffs ultimately withdrew the motion to amend and filed a new Law

Division complaint, which is the matter at issue before us, on May 21, 2021

(second Law Division action). Plaintiffs' second Law Division action included

the same causes of action as H&H's complaint in the first Law Division action

but added those claims and parties it sought to add by way of their withdrawn

motion to amend. Plaintiffs concede their claims in the second Law Division

action "stem from the same underlying facts and circumstances" as those in the

first Law Division action, but assert they instituted the second action to

"preserve and assert claims which were previously intended for inclusion in the

first action" by way of its motion to amend.

In their May 2021 complaint, plaintiffs identified H&H as a Pennsylvania

corporation and Thomas, Jannette, Mark, Marie, and Vincent as Florida citizens.

They also stated, however, Thomas, Jannette, Marie, and Vincent resided in New

Jersey "during matters complained of herein and maintain[] the same residential

address in New Jersey." In their merits brief before us, plaintiffs clarify that

A-2913-21
9
Thomas and Jannette "reside in New Jersey part-time." Plaintiffs also identified

Bucco, Fioravanti, and Flandreau as Pennsylvania attorneys in the complaint,

with Davis Bucco and Paul, Flandreau & Berger being Pennsylvania law firms.

They also noted Mark was appointed Vincent's guardian pursuant to a New

Jersey court order.

Relevant to their arguments on appeal, plaintiffs alleged certain activities

giving rise to the complaints occurred in New Jersey. For example, they claimed

Vincent falsified minutes of board meetings which took place in New Jersey

between 1998-2000 and again in 2012. They also specifically claimed the April

8, 2013 board meeting at which Bucco fabricated meeting minutes and

"appointed himself and his firm as counsel to H&H" was held in New Jersey.

All defendants moved to dismiss the May 2021 complaint under Rule 4:6-

2(a) and (e). Plaintiffs opposed the motions and moved to consolidate the two

then-pending Law Division actions, arguing they "involve[d] nearly identical

facts related to the Delaware County Action . . . which give rise to the claims

therein." The court stayed the motions in the second Law Division action

pending our disposition of Bucco's appeal in the first Law Division action. On

December 29, 2021, we reversed Bucco's disqualification and remanded for

further proceedings. H&H Mfg. Co., No. A-4209-19 (slip op. at 7).

A-2913-21
10
 The court heard oral argument on plaintiffs' consolidation application and

defendants' motions to dismiss and, after considering the parties' submissions

and arguments, granted in part and denied in part defendants' dismissal motions.

In light of that disposition, it considered plaintiffs' consolidation application

moot.

The court first determined New Jersey had subject matter jurisdiction over

count nine, the Dragonetti Act claim, and plaintiffs had pled a cognizable claim,

at least against Bucco. It also noted none of the defendants had moved to dismiss

count nine on statute of limitations grounds.

The court next dismissed the remaining nine counts with prejudice, based

on Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.

Although plaintiffs conceded their claims would be barred by Pennsylvania's

two-year statute of limitations, they argued the court should apply New Jersey's

six-year limitations period. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Specifically, they argued the

parties were New Jersey residents when Vincent and Bucco initiated the

Delaware County litigation and certain meetings in which the alleged fraud

giving rise to that litigation occurred took place in New Jersey.

The court disagreed and, applying the governmental interest approach to

resolving conflicts of law, concluded Pennsylvania had a superior interest in the

A-2913-21
11
action. Although it recognized some of the litigants were New Jersey residents

during the Delaware County litigation, it concluded "every important thing

occurred in Pennsylvania, not the least of which . . . was a Delaware County

lawsuit." It further stated, "I have no question using the governmental interest

. . . test that New Jersey uses to determine choice of laws . . . issues that

Pennsylvania has a . . . greater interest in the allegation that lawyers and litigants

misused their courts."

Turning to the parties' arguments with respect to forum non conveniens,

the court first rejected plaintiffs' contention there was no adequate alt ernative

forum, because they could bring their claims in Pennsylvania. Next, it applied

the public and private interest factors articulated in D'Agostino v. Johnson &

Johnson Inc. (D'Agostino I), 225 N.J. Super. 250, 263 (App. Div. 1988) (citing

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 508-09 (1947)), and concluded it would be

demonstrably inappropriate for a New Jersey court to adjudicate claims

stemming from "the misuse of the Pennsylvania court system." On this point,

the court found the public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissing

the complaint.

The court noted there were currently four judicial vacancies in Camden

County and it was "drowning in civil cases." While acknowledging some

A-2913-21
12
underlying activity occurred in New Jersey, the court found the case was "not a

localized controversy" and there was no "local interest in the subject matter"

such that community members would wish to view the trial. Further, it found

"New Jersey citizens have no particular interest in adjudicating whether or not

the Pennsylvania court system was appropriately used."

As to the private interest factors, the court found many were inapplicable;

it recognized, however, certain practical problems with continuing the litigation

in New Jersey, including its lack of familiarity with Pennsylvania court

procedure and potential costs associated with additional briefing on

Pennsylvania law. In sum, the court concluded "this case involves a number of

attorney defendants and in particular allegations against attorneys and parties,

[claiming] the misuse of the Pennsylvania court system." The court reasoned it

could not identify "a more compelling reason why it should be the Pennsylvania

court system to do the adjudication."

The parties appeared before the court again on April 6, 2022, to clarify

the language of the court's order. The court then entered an April 12, 2022 order

that (1) dismissed counts one through eight and ten of plaintiffs' complaint with

prejudice "based on the statute of limitations[] for any conduct that occurred on

or before May 20, 2019"; (2) denied defendants' motions to dismiss count nine,

A-2913-21
13
the Dragonetti Act claim, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (3)

granted defendants' motions to dismiss all counts without prejudice based on

forum non conveniens. It also noted "[p]laintiffs would have been granted leave

to file an [a]mended [c]omplaint . . . to clarify facts that support an [a]buse of

[p]rocess cause of action for events that occurred on or after May 21, 2019[,]

except that the issue is moot . . . ."

On May 3, 2022, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the same defendants

in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, alleging the

same causes of action. All defendants accepted service in the Philadelphia

County action. Plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal with respect to the court's

order dismissing the second Law Division action.5

II.

Before us, plaintiffs contend "[t]he trial court erred when it dismissed

[their] [c]omplaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens," on four

bases. First, they argue the court improperly balanced the public and private

interest factors. Relying on Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA, 164 N.J.

5
On September 29, 2022, the court also granted summary judgment to
defendants in the first Law Division action on all counts, except it denied
summary judgment to the extent plaintiff sought a declaration that Vincent was
not currently an owner of H&H stock. That order is not at issue in this appeal.
A-2913-21
14
159, 172 (2000), plaintiffs assert the court improperly considered the

Pennsylvania courts' advantage in "understanding what goes on in Delaware

County, Pennsylvania in regard to civil trial practice" and the complexity of their

Dragonetti Act claim. Additionally, they claim the court incorrectly considered

the current number of sitting judges in Camden County when determining public

interest factor one, administrative difficulties arising in the forum, and failed to

adequately consider New Jersey's interest in "protecting its residents from

frivolous lawsuits."

Second, plaintiffs contend the court "fail[ed] to appreciate the significance

of probative competent evidence and the nexus this matter has with New Jersey."

According to plaintiffs, Thomas, Jannette, Vincent and Marie were New Jersey

residents "at all relevant times during the Delaware County Action," H&H's

corporate activity took place in New Jersey, and many of the depositions, which

took place between 2013 and 2016, were conducted in New Jersey. They also

maintain Thomas "owned 95% of his interest in H&H through a New Jersey

trust," Mark was Vincent's "guardian pursuant to the New Jersey [c]ourt's order,"

and "Thomas and Jannette continue to reside in New Jersey part-time."

Third, plaintiffs assert dismissal of their complaint was improper because

"[d]efendants' motions to dismiss were bereft of any evidence that [d]efendants

A-2913-21
15
would have had any difficulty obtaining discovery in New Jersey." They also

contend, relying on Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 169-70, D'Agostino v. Johnson &

Johnson Inc. (D'Agostino II), 115 N.J. 491, 494 n.1 (1989), and Rippon v.

Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 366 (App. Div. 2017), that the court prematurely

engaged in a forum non conveniens analysis before discovery was completed.

Finally, they allege dismissal was improper because defendants "did not

present any evidence to show that an alternative forum exists to warrant

dismissal of this case." According to plaintiffs, it is therefore "possible that

granting the [d]efendants' motions will leave [p]laintiffs without an adequate

alternate forum to adjudicate the parties' dispute."

III.

We begin with the applicable standards of review which guide our

discussion. An order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is

reviewed "de novo, applying the same standard under Rule 4:6-2(e) that

governed the motion court." Wreden v. Twp. of Lafayette, 436 N.J. Super. 117,

124 (App. Div. 2014). That standard is whether the pleadings even "suggest[]"

a basis for the requested relief. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,

116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989). A reviewing court assesses only the "legal

sufficiency" of the claim based on "the facts alleged on the face of the

A-2913-21
16
complaint." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing

Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746). The court must "search[] the complaint in

depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action

may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being

given to amend if necessary." Printing-Mart Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746

(quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252

(App. Div. 1957)). The facts as pled are considered "true" and accorded "all

legitimate inferences." Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166

(2005).

On the other hand, "[t]he doctrine [of forum non conveniens] is equitable

in nature and, therefore, decisions concerning its application ordinarily are left

to the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . '[We] should not substitute [our]

judgment for that of the trial judge unless there is a showing of clear abuse of

that discretion.'" Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 165 (quoting Civic S. Factors Corp. v.

Bonat, 65 N.J. 329, 333 (1974)). A trial court abuses its discretion when a

decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Lipsky v. N.J. Ass’n

of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 447, 463-64 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting

Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 459 (App. Div. 2018)).

A-2913-21
17
 Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine which "empowers a court

to decline to exercise jurisdiction when a trial in another available jurisdiction

'will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.'" Yousef

v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 205 N.J. 543, 557 (2011) (quoting Gore v. U.S. Steel

Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 305 (1954)). "Ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum will

be honored by a court [with] jurisdiction over a case." Ibid. However, "a court

using its equitable power can decline to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if

that defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff's choice of forum is

'demonstrably inappropriate.'" Id. at 548 (quoting Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 171-72).

"First, . . . the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to preferential

consideration by the court." Id. at 557. "[T]here is a strong presumption in

favor of retaining jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a resident who has chosen

[their] home forum." Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 171 (quoting D'Agostino I, 225 N.J.

Super. at 262). "A nonresident's choice of forum[, however,] is entitled to

substantially less deference." Ibid. (quoting D'Agostino I, 225 N.J. Super. at

262). Regardless, "a plaintiff's choice of forum is not dispositive . . . because

ultimately it is for the court to decide whether the ends of justice will be

furthered by trying a case in one forum or another." Yousef, 205 N.J. at 557

(citations omitted).

A-2913-21
18
 Second, to dismiss a complaint based on forum non conveniens, there

must be an adequate alternative forum for the case where the defendants are

amenable to service of process and the subject matter of the dispute may be

litigated. Varo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 400 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div.

2008). "An alternative forum will be deemed inadequate if 'the remedy offered

by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.'" Yousef, 205 N.J. at 557 (quoting

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981)). The Third Circuit

has held a forum is inadequate "[w]here a plaintiff cannot access evidence

essential to prove a claim," Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v BioAlliance Pharma

SA, 623 F.3d 147, 161 n.14 (3d Cir. 2010), and where systemic backlog issues

would result in "delays of up to a quarter of a century" in a matter involving a

minor child, Bhatnagar by Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas, 52 F.3d 1220, 1228

(3d Cir. 1995).

If an adequate alternative forum exists, the court next must consider and

weigh both public and private interest factors set forth in Gulf Oil Corp., 330

U.S. at 508-09, to determine whether the plaintiff's choice of forum is

appropriate for the matters at issue. Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 165-66. In doing so,

the "test 'should be practicable as well as inherently just,'" D'Agostino I, 225

N.J. Super. at 261 (quoting Starr v. Berry, 25 N.J. 573, 587 (1958)), and should

A-2913-21
19
"avoid a rigid formula," id. at 262. "The value ascribed to any particular factor

may vary depending on the circumstances of each case." Yousef, 205 N.J. at

558. Further, "[a]nalysis of the issue is qualitative, not quantitative." Varo, 400

N.J. Super. at 524.

The public interest factors are as follows:

(1) the administrative difficulties which follow from
having litigation "pile up in congested centers" rather
than being handled at its origin, (2) the imposition of
jury duty on members of a community having no
relation to the litigation, (3) the local interest in the
subject matter such that affected members of the
community may wish to view the trial[,] and (4) the
local interest "in having localized controversies
decided at home."

[Aguerre v. Schering-Plough Corp., 393 N.J. Super.
459, 474 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting D'Agostino I, 225
N.J. Super. at 263).]

The private interest factors are:

(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2)
the availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling witnesses and the cost of obtaining the
attendance of willing witnesses, (3) whether a view of
the premises is appropriate to the action[,] and (4) all
other practical problems that make trial of the case
"easy, expeditious and inexpensive," including the
enforceability of the ultimate judgment.

[Ibid. (quoting D'Agostino I, 225 N.J. Super. at 263).]

A-2913-21
20
 Here, we are convinced the court did not abuse its discretion in finding an

adequate alternative forum available for this action or in weighing the public

and private interest factors. First, we reject plaintiffs' claim that their choice of

forum should be given special deference based on their alleged status as New

Jersey residents as belied by their own complaint. As noted, in their May 2021

complaint, plaintiffs alleged, at the time of filing, Thomas and Jannette were

Florida citizens residing in New Jersey part-time, while Mark and Vincent were

Florida citizens, each of the attorneys were Pennsylvania attorneys at

Pennsylvania firms, and H&H was a Pennsylvania corporation. Even if we

afforded plaintiffs the "strong presumption in favor of retaining jurisdiction

where the plaintiff is a resident who has chosen [their] home forum," Kurzke,

164 N.J. at 171 (quoting D'Agostino I, 225 N.J. Super. at 262), we are convinced

the court did not err in determining it would be demonstrably inappropriate for

a New Jersey court to adjudicate claims alleging "the misuse of the Pennsylvania

court system."

Further, plaintiffs' argument that no adequate alternative forum exists is

wholly undermined by their filing a complaint in Pennsylvania alleging the same

causes of action against the same defendants. As noted, all defendants accepted

service in that action. See Varo, 400 N.J. Super. at 520. Additionally, plaintiffs

A-2913-21
21
have not demonstrated before us how the remedies available to them in

Pennsylvania would be unsatisfactory. See Yousef, 205 N.J. at 557.

Further, the court's findings with respect to the public and private interest

factors were amply supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.

Specifically, the court's balancing analysis was animated largely by its finding

on public interest factor four, that this case is not a "localized controvers[y]" in

New Jersey, see D'Agostino I, 225 N.J. Super. at 263, but rather a dispute about

misuse of the Pennsylvania court system. We agree with defendants and the

court that the factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal.

We also are not persuaded by plaintiffs' claim that the trial court

improperly considered difficulties arising from the New Jersey court's lack of

familiarity with Pennsylvania civil procedure and practice. We do not doubt, as

plaintiffs argue, New Jersey courts are capable of understanding and applying

Pennsylvania law. As Fioravanti's counsel noted, however, additional briefing

or argument on matters specific to Pennsylvania, which would be unnecessary

before a Pennsylvania court, would likely increase the cost of litigation. Private

interest factor four contemplates "all other practical problems that make trial of

the case 'easy, expeditious and inexpensive.'" Aguerre, 393 N.J. Super. at 474

(emphasis added) (quoting D'Agostino I, 225 N.J. Super. at 263). Further, as

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the United States Supreme Court stated in Gulf Oil Corp., public interest factors

weigh toward dismissal where the court must "untangle problems in conflict of

laws, and in law foreign to itself." 330 U.S. at 509.

We find plaintiffs' contention the court improperly considered the number

of available judges in Camden County similarly unavailing. In Yousef, our

Supreme Court characterized public interest factor one as "consideration of trial

delays that may occur because of backlogs in a jurisdiction." 205 N.J. at 558.

While we noted in D'Agostino I "it would be grossly unfair to dismiss cases

having evidential roots in New Jersey simply on the basis of our crowded civil

court dockets," 225 N.J. Super. at 265, this was not the sole basis for the court's

application of forum non conveniens here. It was simply one factor the court

considered which weighed in favor of dismissal.

Most importantly, we agree with defendants and the court the "type of

factual nexus that would [ordinarily] induce a court to retain jurisdiction . . .

manifested by a significant relationship between the issues in the case and the

jurisdiction," Varo, 400 N.J. Super. at 527 (quoting D'Agostino II, 115 N.J. at

495), is simply not demonstrated by the record. Although plaintiffs contend

certain actions giving rise to the Delaware County litigation and relevant to

certain counts in the May 2021 complaint took place in New Jersey, they

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conceded in their motion to amend, consolidation application, and brief before

us that, primarily, defendants' alleged behavior in the Delaware County action

gave rise to their causes of action here.

For example, plaintiffs rely on the fact that certain board meetings took

place in New Jersey, but argued in their motion to amend that falsified minutes

from those meetings were "used as a basis for the Davis Bucco representation

of H&H in the effort to unlawfully wrest control and ownership of H&H from

Thomas." Further, many of the assertions in the complaint directly rely upon

the Delaware County court's factual findings. In addition, certain defendants,

particularly Fioravanti and Flandreau, have no connection to New Jersey.

Indeed, they became involved with the parties only through their representation

of Marie in the Delaware County action.

Similarly, we reject plaintiffs' arguments on public interest factors two

and four that New Jersey and local jurors "have a significant interest in

adjudicating whether one New Jersey resident misused the Pennsylvania court

system against another New Jersey resident." Before us, Mark notes he has lived

in Florida since 1975 and Vincent moved to Florida in 2016. Further, as noted,

H&H as well as each of the attorney and firm defendants are based in

Pennsylvania and events in Pennsylvania primarily gave rise to plaintiffs' causes

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of action. Thus, the court correctly determined this matter is not a "localized

controversy" and "New Jersey citizens have no particular interest in adjudicating

whether or not the Pennsylvania court system was appropriately used."

Finally, we do not read our case law, as plaintiffs suggest, to require

defendants establish difficulty in obtaining discovery in New Jersey as a

prerequisite to seeking relief based on forum non conveniens, or that it was

inappropriate to dismiss the complaint before discovery could be completed.

With that said, we agree with plaintiffs there appears to be no unreasonable

difficulty in obtaining discovery, particularly where the two jurisdictions at

issue are close geographically. However, this factor simply does not outweigh

the fact, as the court found, that the essential legal and factual nexus of this

matter is Pennsylvania-based.

In Kurzke, our Supreme Court "address[ed] the timing" of a motion to

dismiss based on forum non conveniens and concluded a motion to dismiss on

those grounds "should not be heard unless the movant has made a good faith

effort to obtain discovery and can provide the court with a record verifying that

discovery is unreasonably inadequate for litigating in the forum chosen by the

plaintiff." 164 N.J. at 168. "Mere speculation about potential inadequacies

ordinarily is not a sufficient basis to deny the plaintiff the choice of forum."

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Ibid. In that case, the Court determined "the lack of discovery ma[de] any

balancing inconclusive and premature." Id. at 169.

Similarly, in D'Agostino II, the Court explained "a trial court's disposition

of a forum non conveniens motion would be enhanced in such cases if decision

were reserved until discovery has proceeded sufficiently to enable the court to

make a better-informed assessment of the private- and public-interest factors."

115 N.J. at 494 n.1. In that matter, "the record before the trial court was 'sparse'"

because there had been no discovery. Ibid. And, in Rippon, we observed "that

permitting the parties to engage in a period of discovery prior to considering

their motions would have assisted the trial court in reviewing defendants'

assertion that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed on grounds of forum non

conveniens." 449 N.J. Super. at 364.

The record does not support the conclusion defendants' motion to dismiss

based on forum non conveniens was premature or that the parties would h ave

benefitted from a greater opportunity to engage in discovery. Plaintiffs have not

explained how additional discovery is necessary to supplement the discovery

obtained in the previous actions, which related to the same events at issue in this

litigation. As noted, the parties have been engaged in litigation in various

forums since 2013. The record before us is far from sparse and the court's

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decision was not based on "[m]ere speculation about potential inadequacies."

Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 168. Rather, the record before the motion court was clearly

sufficient to enable it to make a well-informed "assessment of the private- and

public-interest factors," D'Agostino II, 115 N.J. at 494 n.1.

IV.

Next, plaintiffs assert the court erred in finding nine of their claims were

barred by the statute of limitations. They argue the court "misapplied the

government interest standard when it determined that Pennsylvania's, and not

New Jersey's, statute of limitations applied," specifically contending the court

failed to assess "the policies underlying each state's laws and the statute of

limitations and the government interest served in their application." On this

point, plaintiffs again note New Jersey maintained an interest "where one New

Jersey resident . . . forg[ed] documentation in an attempt to unlawfully steal the

property owned by another New Jersey resident."

They similarly maintain "New Jersey has a strong interest in affording its

citizens the ability to recover or secure the property." Further, according to

plaintiffs, the parties were New Jersey residents during the events underlying

the Delaware County action and "the counts to which the statute of limitations

were applied by the trial court did not involve the administration of the

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underlying Delaware County Action in Pennsylvania; rather, they were derived

from conduct substantially related to New Jersey." We conclude the court's

governmental interest analysis used to apply Pennsylvania's statute of

limitations was erroneous and the correct analysis is set forth in section 142 of

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, as directed by McCarrell v.

Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 227 N.J. 569, 574 (2017).

"When a civil action is brought in New Jersey, our courts apply New

Jersey's choice-of-law rules in deciding whether this State's or another state's

statute of limitations governs the matter." Id. at 583. "The analytical framework

for deciding how to resolve a choice-of-law issue is a matter of law." Id. at 584.

"The first inquiry in any choice-of-law analysis is whether the laws of the states

with interests in the litigation are in conflict." Ibid. "[W]hen a complaint is

timely filed within one state's statute of limitations but is filed outside another

state's, then a true conflict is present." Ibid.

The analysis our courts use to resolve choice-of-law issues has changed

over time. In P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 139 (2008), the

Court noted it had "embrac[ed] the modern governmental interest analysis" in

1967. However, in Camp Jaycee, the Court "formally adopted the Second

Restatement's most-significant-relationship test . . . for deciding the choice of

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substantive law in tort cases involving more than one state." McCarrell, 277

N.J. at 589 (emphasis in original). Camp Jaycee did not specifically adopt the

Second Restatement to resolve choice-of-law conflicts regarding statutes of

limitations. Id. at 591.

In McCarrell, the Court held "section 142 of the Second Restatement is

now the operative choice-of-law rule for resolving statute-of-limitations

conflicts because it will channel judicial discretion and lead to more predictable

and uniform results that are consistent with the just expectations of the parties."

Id. at 574. Section 142 provides:

Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense
of the statute of limitations is determined under the
principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the
exceptional circumstances of the case make such a
result unreasonable:

(1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations
barring the claim.

(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations
permitting the claim unless:

(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial
interest of the forum; and

(b) the claim would be barred under the statute of
limitations of a state having a more significant
relationship to the parties and the occurrence.

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 [Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 142
(1988).]

The Supreme Court explained "[u]nder section 142(2)(a), the statute of

limitations of the forum state generally applies whenever that state has a

substantial interest in the maintenance of the claim." McCarrell, 227 N.J. at

593. Accordingly, "[i]n that circumstance, the inquiry ends for statute -of-

limitations purposes, unless exceptional circumstances would render that result

unreasonable" and "[o]nly when the forum state has 'no substantial interest' in

the maintenance of the claim does a court consider section 142(2)(b)." Ibid.

The parties do not dispute that a conflict exists between New Jersey's and

Pennsylvania's statutes of limitations. Pennsylvania's limitations period with

respect to all but one of plaintiffs' claims 6 is two years while New Jersey's is six.

See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Here, the court erred in

applying the governmental interest analysis to resolve the conflict instead of the

Second Restatement test.

6
Plaintiffs allege claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud/fraudulent
misrepresentation, conversion, replevin/declaratory judgment, civil conspiracy,
corporate waste, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with contract, abuse of
process, and a violation of the Dragonetti act. Although not raised by either
party below or before us, it appears Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for
unjust enrichment actions is four years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525(a)(4).
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 While our review of application of a statute of limitations period to bar a

cause of action is de novo, see Save Camden Pub. Schs. v. Camden City Bd. of

Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018), in light of our decision to

affirm the court's forum non conveniens dismissal in conjunction with plaintiffs'

subsequent filing in Pennsylvania, we believe the proper course is for a

Pennsylvania court, applying its own choice-of-law rules, to resolve the issue.

Indeed, "[a] forum non conveniens dismissal . . . is a determination that the

merits should be adjudicated elsewhere." Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l

Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007). Accordingly, we vacate the portion

of the court's order dismissing claims one through eight and ten with prejudice

based on the statute of limitations. The parties, of course, can renew their

applications in the Pennsylvania courts, as appropriate.

To the extent we have not addressed any arguments raised by either party,

after considering these arguments against the record and applicable law, we

conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

In sum, we affirm the portion of the court's April 12, 2022 order

dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice based on forum non

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conveniens. We vacate the portion of that order dismissing counts one through

eight and ten with prejudice based on the statute of limitations.

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