UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5806
HENRY H. DINGER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield.
David A. Faber, District Judge.
(CR-92-8)
Submitted: June 20, 1996
Decided: July 16, 1996
Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Hunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, C. Cooper Fulton, Assis-
tant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appel-
lant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Miller A. Bushong III,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Henry H. Dinger, Jr., appeals the 24-month sentence imposed upon
revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the district
court did not consider the Revocation Table contained in the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Chapter 7 policy statements, United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (Nov. 1994), as
required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West Supp. 1996). We affirm.
Dinger began serving a three-year term of supervised release in
April 1995. In June 1995, after a hearing requested by the probation
officer, the district court found that Dinger had violated a condition
of his supervised release by drinking to excess on several occasions.
The court modified Dinger's supervised release conditions by impos-
ing a curfew. In July 1995, after Dinger twice failed to comply with
the curfew, the district court again modified his supervised release
conditions to include, among other things, electronic monitoring of
his curfew, weekly meetings with a probation officer, a daily breatha-
lyzer test, and intensive outpatient counseling for his alcohol problem.
In August 1995, Dinger was ten minutes late getting home on one
occasion, tested positive for alcohol use on two occasions, and was
arrested on state charges of public intoxication, disorderly conduct,
obstructing an officer, and destruction of property.* At a hearing in
October 1995, Dinger offered explanations for each of his violations.
Through counsel he requested a sentence within the revocation range,
but he also stated that he needed inpatient treatment for his alcohol
problem. The government asked for a two-year sentence for the safety
of the community because of Dinger's failure to control his drinking
and history of alcohol-related violence. The district court revoked
Dinger's supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months.
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*Dinger pled guilty to destruction of property, resisting arrest, and
obstructing an officer. The other charges were dismissed.
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Before revoking a term of supervised release, the district court
should consider certain factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West
1985 & Supp. 1996), one of which is the applicable Chapter 7 policy
statements governing the revocation of supervised release terms. See
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a)(4)(B), 3583(e). However, the Chapter 7 pol-
icy statements are not binding. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638,
642 (4th Cir. 1995). Having considered the relevant factors and the
applicable policy statements, the court has the discretion to impose a
sentence outside the ranges set out in the Revocation Table. Id.
Here, the district court expressly considered the four-to-ten month
sentencing range set out in the relevant Chapter 7 policy statement,
as well as the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553, and decided that
the statutory maximum sentence of two years would be of most bene-
fit to the public and to Dinger. The court stated that, because no fur-
ther term of supervised release could be imposed once Dinger
finished serving the revocation sentence, a two-year sentence pro-
vided the best opportunity for him to receive intensive alcohol treat-
ment.
Dinger contends that the district court's reasons for imposing the
maximum term were legally flawed and therefore the court cannot be
said to have considered the Chapter 7 policy statements. Dinger
points out that rehabilitation or the provision of medical care is not
an appropriate reason for imposing a particular sentence under the
guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)
(1988). However, both protection of the public and the provision of
needed medical care to the defendant are factors which the court is
directed to consider under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C) before
requiring a defendant to serve all or part of his term of supervised
release in prison. In sum, we find that the district court properly exer-
cised its discretion in this case.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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