IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TERENCE R. JOHNSON, No. 84246-3-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, a UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Washington State Agency,
Respondent.
SMITH, C.J. — Under Washington law, when the Department of Licensing
receives notice from a court that an individual has failed to pay court-ordered
fines resulting from a drunk driving offense, it must suspend that person’s
license. After Terence Johnson repeatedly failed to pay his fines, the Kirkland
Municipal Court provided such notice, and Johnson’s license was suspended.
Johnson contends the Department violated due process by not holding its own
hearing to determine his ability to pay the fines. Our Supreme Court concluded
that the statutory scheme governing license suspensions satisfies due process in
City of Bellevue v. Lee, 166 Wn.2d 581, 210 P.3d 1011 (2009). Lee controls
here; therefore, we conclude due process was satisfied and affirm.
FACTS
In May 2014, Johnson was charged with and pleaded guilty to driving
under the influence in the Kirkland Municipal Court.1 At sentencing, the
municipal court imposed jail time and ordered Johnson to pay a series of
1 Johnson was pro se during arraignment.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
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mandatory and discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). These LFOs
totaled $4,068.91 and were payable to the municipal court clerk’s office. The
judgment and sentence contained a notice that “[f]ailure to pay [the fines] in full
or have a payment plan set up with Signal Management by the due date . . . may
result in additional late penalties and the matter will be referred to a collection
agency.” The notice informed Johnson that failure to pay “may also result in a
bench warrant and/or the suspension of [his] driving privileges as directed by the
Department of Licensing.” Johnson did not challenge the imposition of the LFOs
at sentencing and he did not appeal the judgment and sentence.
Between May 2014 and May 2019, Johnson appeared at several review
hearings before the municipal court to evaluate his compliance with the
requirements of his DUI conviction.
2015 Suspension
In 2015, the municipal court notified the Department that Johnson had
failed to make required LFO payments. As mandated by statute, the Department
sent Johnson a notice informing him of his pending license suspension and how
to resolve the payment issue or seek administrative review of the Department’s
proposed action. See RCW 46.20.245(2) (setting out notice requirements in
license suspension process). Johnson requested an administrative review of the
proposed suspension. The Department completed its review and informed
Johnson it was upholding the suspension.
Johnson then both appealed the Department’s decision in King County
Superior Court and filed a civil complaint against the Department in federal court,
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alleging the Department unlawfully suspended his license. The federal court
dismissed Johnson’s case for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies.
Johnson v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. C15-0446MJP (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2015).
Following this, and while his appeal was pending in superior court, Johnson filed
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Filing for bankruptcy automatically stayed all
collection actions against Johnson, which in turn stayed the Department’s
suspension of his license. Because of the stay, the Department reissued
Johnson’s license and the superior court dismissed his appeal as moot.
Two years later, in July 2017, the bankruptcy court dismissed Johnson’s
petition and Johnson was again required to pay his LFOs.
2018 Suspension
Soon after his bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the municipal court
issued another notice to the Department about Johnson’s nonpayment of the
LFOs. In December 2017, the Department sent Johnson a new notice informing
him that his license would be suspended if he did not either resolve the payment
issue with the court or seek administrative review with the Department. Johnson
did neither. Instead, in January 2018, Johnson filed a second civil complaint
against the Department in federal court. Johnson v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. C18-
0147JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2018). The federal court again dismissed
Johnson’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Johnson, No.
C18-0147JLR at *1. As a result of his inaction, Johnson’s license was
suspended for the second time in early February 2018.
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While Johnson’s license was suspended, he continued to drive and was
subsequently charged in March 2019 for driving with a license suspended
(DWLS) in Mercer Island District Court. The DWLS charge violated the terms of
Johnson’s 2015 DUI conviction and, as a result, the municipal court imposed 30
additional days of electronic home monitoring.
2019 Lawsuit
In May 2019, Johnson moved the municipal court to reduce or waive his
remaining LFOs. The court removed his LFOs from collections, waived all
accrued interest, cut Johnson’s principal balance in half, and required him to
make monthly payments of fifty dollars. The court also told Johnson that if he
made payments for six months, he could move the court to strike the remaining
balance. The court then sent the Department a notice indicating that Johnson
was eligible for license reinstatement.
In September 2019, Johnson filed a third civil complaint against the
Department, his first in King County Superior Court, alleging the Department
unlawfully suspended his license without offering him a payment plan for his
court fines. The Department moved for summary judgment. Johnson requested
a continuance to obtain municipal court records, which the court denied. The
court granted the Department’s summary judgment motion and Johnson
appealed to this court. We concluded that the superior court abused its
discretion in denying Johnson’s continuance motion and remanded for further
proceedings. Johnson v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. 81646-2-I, slip op. (Wash. Ct.
App. June 28, 2021) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov /opinions/pdf/
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816462.pdf.2
On remand, Johnson amended his complaint, maintaining his earlier
arguments but seeking an additional declaration that the statutory scheme for
license suspensions is unconstitutional. The parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The court granted the Department’s motion and denied Johnson’s
motion for reconsideration.
Johnson appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Johnson contends (1) that the Department’s suspension of his
license violated his due process rights under article 1, section 3 of the
Washington Constitution, (2) that the Department’s suspension of his license
violated his statutory rights under RCW 10.01.160, (3) he is entitled to a “decree”
that his claims are justiciable, (4) he is entitled to another “decree” ordering the
Department to reinstate his license and ordering the Mercer Island District court
to dismiss his pending DWLS citation, and (5) that the court erred in denying his
motion for reconsideration. Because we conclude Johnson’s due process and
statutory rights were not violated, we also conclude the court did not err in
granting the Department’s motion for summary judgment and we affirm.
Standard of Review
“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence
and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
2 GR 14.1(c) (“Washington appellate courts should not, unless necessary
for a reasoned decision, cite or discuss unpublished opinions in their opinions.”).
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nonmoving party.” Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015).
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
CR 56(c).
Due Process
Johnson asserts that the statutory scheme for suspending driver’s
licenses—which requires the Department to automatically suspend a license if it
receives notice from a court under RCW 46.64.025—violates the due process
clause of article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution because it does not
require the Department to certify that the court conducted an ability-to-pay
hearing. He urges us to declare the automatic suspension requirement in RCW
46.20.289 unconstitutional. The Department contends that the constitutionality of
the statutory scheme issue has already been addressed by our state Supreme
Court in Lee, 166 Wn.2d at 589. We agree with the Department.
We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. OneAmerica Votes v.
State, 23 Wn.2d 951, 963, 518 P.3d 230 (2022). Statutes are presumed to be
constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must
prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Assoc. Gen.
Contractors of Wash. v. State, 200 Wn.2d 396, 403, 518 P.3d 639 (2022).
Under RCW 46.64.025, whenever a person fails to comply with the terms
of a criminal complaint or criminal citation for a moving violation, the court “shall
promptly give notice of such fact to the department of licensing.” (Emphasis
added.) When the Department receives such notice from the court,
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RCW 46.20.289 provides that “the department shall suspend all driving
privileges.” (Emphasis added.) Before suspension, the Department must give
the driver 45 days written notice. RCW 46.20.245(1). The driver may then
request an administrative review within 15 days of receiving the notice.
RCW 46.20.245(3). The only issues to be addressed in the administrative review
are: “(i) Whether the records relied on by the department identify the correct
person; and (ii) Whether the information transmitted from the court or other
reporting agency or entity regarding the person accurately describes the action
taken by the court or other reporting agency or entity.” RCW 46.20.245(b).
Our state Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Department’s suspension procedures as outlined in RCW 46.20.245 and
RCW 46.20.289 and concluded they meet due process requirements.3 Lee, 166
Wn.2d at 583. In Lee, motorists whose driver’s licenses were suspended for
nonpayment of traffic citations brought an action against the city, challenging the
Department’s suspension procedures. 166 Wn.2d at 583. Applying the
3 In Lee, the Court considered whether the statutory scheme violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See 166 Wn.2d at 583-86 (citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151
Wn.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004), in which the Court invalidated a prior set of
suspension procedures for violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause).
The Court has also held that article I, section 3 of the Washington
Constitution is virtually identical to its federal analogue and provides “ ‘no further
elaboration’ ” of rights. In re Pers. Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298, 310,
12 P.3d 585 (2000) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 295, 302, 831 P.2d 1060
(1992).
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Mathews4 balancing test, the Court concluded that the Department’s procedures
met due process requirements because they provide both notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Lee, 166 Wn.2d at 589.
Lee is controlling in the present case. Johnson advances a similar
argument as the drivers in Lee—he asserts that the license suspension
procedures outlined in RCW 46.20.245 and 46.20.289 violate due process
because he was not provided an in-person hearing. 166 Wn.2d at 583-85. But
Johnson offers no compelling argument as to how Lee is distinguishable from the
present case; and the cases he cites in an attempt to distinguish Lee are
unconvincing. Both predate Lee and concern different statutory schemes for
license suspension. See Flory v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 84 Wn.2d 568, 527
P.2d 1318 (1974) (concluding due process requires Department to provide driver
with full evidentiary hearing before suspending licenses under RCW 46.29.070);
State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) (holding Department
violated due process by sending notice of suspension to driver’s last known
address, rather than driver’s address of record as required by statute); cf. Lee,
166 Wn.2d at 583 (“We invalidated a prior set of procedures because drivers
were not given any sort of hearing prior to the suspension of licenses [in 2004],
4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18
(1976). In cases involving the potential deprivation of a private interest by the
government, we apply the Mathews balancing test to ensure that due process
requirements are met. Gourley v. Gourley, 158 Wn.2d 460, 467-68, 145 P.3d
1185 (2006). The three Mathews factors are: (1) the private interest affected;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the challenged
procedures and probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest, including the potential burden of additional procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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. . . but we hold that the new procedures . . . meet due process requirements.”)
(citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004)). Though
Johnson urges this court to conduct a Mathews balancing test to determine
whether his due process rights were infringed, doing so would be duplicative; the
Lee court analyzed this same statutory scheme using the Mathews balancing test
and concluded there was no due process violation. 166 Wn.2d at 585-89.
Though Lee concerned civil moving violations, not criminal moving
violations, the same substantial private interest—use of a driver’s license—is
present here. 166 Wn.2d at 586. Moreover, “there is minimal risk that a criminal
defendant will be erroneously deprived of their driver’s license,” “since a criminal
proceeding which results in a conviction provides sufficient due process.” City of
Redmond v. Bagby, 155 Wn.2d 59, 63-64, 117 P.3d 1126 (2005). And the
governmental interest is significantly higher in cases involving criminal cases,
since those suspended drivers are “ ‘more likely to be involved in causing traffic
accidents, including fatal accidents, than properly licensed drivers, and pose a
serious threat to the lives and property of Washington residents.’ ” Bagby, 155
Wn.2d at 65 (quoting LAWS OF 1998, ch. 203, § 1). Thus, the Mathews analysis
in Lee is still applicable here.
Johnson also asserts that Johnson v. City of Seattle involved “identical
circumstances” and should control. 184 Wn. App. 8, 21-22, 335 P.3d 1027
(2014). In Johnson, Johnson was cited by Seattle for parking too many vehicles
on his single-family lot, in violation of Seattle Municipal Code 23.44.016, even
though he subsequently established a vested right to a legal nonconforming use
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to park the additional cars on his lot. 184 Wn. App. at 11. This court determined
the ordinance violated due process because it prevented Johnson from
presenting evidence of his nonconforming use during the fact-finding hearing with
the Department of Planning and Development. Johnson, 184 Wn. App. at 20-22.
But unlike the fact-finding hearing in Johnson, here the Department’s review of
mandatory suspensions is administrative and “involves processing paperwork,
not fact-finding.” Lee, 166 Wn.2d at 588. And Johnson’s argument that
RCW 46.20.245 impermissibly deprives him of “his right to interpose a legal
defense” in violation of due process is unpersuasive. Johnson does not specify
what “legal defense[s]” he was deprived of making.
Still, Johnson contends that Lee does not control and urges us to consider
a recent Thurston County Superior Court decision—Pierce v. Department of
Licensing—as persuasive authority.5 But we are not bound by a superior court’s
conclusions of law and decline to consider Pierce.6
Lee concerned the same statutory scheme and dictates the outcome of
this case. We conclude that Johnson’s due process rights were not violated.
5 Pierce v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. 20-2-02149-34 (Thurston County Super.
Ct., Wash. April 30, 2021). Johnson acknowledges that Pierce is not legal
authority and has no precedential value to this court.
6 We note, however, that the court’s ruling in Pierce has since been
superseded by statute. See ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5226, 67th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2021) (amending RCW 46.20.289 to remove Department’s
authority to suspend licenses for non-payment of non-criminal moving violations).
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RCW 10.01.160
In his briefing, Johnson asserts that the Department should have
conducted its own ability-to-pay hearing and, in the alternative, that the
Department’s suspension of his license was based on an invalid judgment
because the municipal court failed to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing as
required by RCW 10.01.160(3). But at oral argument, Johnson took a different
stance, contending that the Department must affirmatively state—via a
checkbox—that it confirmed the court conducted an adequate ability-to-pay
hearing before suspending a license. The Department contends that it performs
a purely administrative function and is not authorized to evaluate the sufficiency
of the process afforded in a judicial proceeding. We agree with the Department
that it is not the appropriate entity from which Johnson can pursue the relief he
seeks.
In an administrative review, RCW 46.20.245(b) authorizes the
Department to address only the following: “(i) Whether the records relied on by
the department identify the correct person; and (ii) Whether the information
transmitted from the court or other reporting agency or entity regarding the
person accurately describes the action taken by the court or other reporting
agency or entity.” Former RCW 10.01.160(3) (2015)7 provides that “[t]he court
shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to
pay them.” “To determine the amount and method for paying the costs, ‘the court
7 Johnson contends that the Department violated his statutory rights when
it suspended his license in February 2018. Accordingly, the version of
RCW 10.01.160 in effect at that time applies.
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shall take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of
the burden that payment of costs will impose.’ ” State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827,
838, 344 P.3d 680 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting RCW 10.01.160(3)).
Here, the Department’s function and review is purely administrative. See
RCW 46.20.245(b). Neither RCW 46.20.245 nor RCW 10.01.160 permit the
Department to intervene in court proceedings as Johnson envisions. Therefore,
we do not reach, because the Department cannot reach, whether the court
properly inquired into Johnson’s ability to pay as required by Blazina. Though
the record does not reveal whether or not the municipal court conducted an
individualized inquiry, this is not the issue before us, and would be properly
raised only on direct appeal of the municipal court action. Johnson cannot hold
the Department accountable for his failure to object to the court’s imposition of
LFOs.
The plain language of RCW 10.01.160(3) makes clear that the court, not
the Department, is tasked with conducting an ability-to-pay inquiry.
RCW 10.01.160(3) (“The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs. . . . In
determining the amount and method of payment of costs . . . , the court shall take
account of the financial resources of the defendant.”) (emphases added).
Contrary to Johnson’s assertion, the Department has not been granted the
authority to ensure whether litigants receive an ability-to-pay hearing before their
license is suspended. The Department is not required to provide Johnson
another opportunity to assert an inability to pay during an administrative review.
Moreover, when Johnson asked the proper entity—the court—to reduce his fees,
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it did so immediately. Any delay in receiving relief was solely due to Johnson’s
own inaction. We conclude that the Department did not violate Johnson’s
statutory rights under RCW 10.01.160.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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