UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5884
CHARLES ANTHONY COTTON, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Jackson L. Kiser, Chief District Judge.
(CR-95-30-R)
Submitted: June 11, 1996
Decided: July 26, 1996
Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Malcolm McL. Doubles, Salem, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P.
Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Joseph W. H. Mott, Assistant
United States Attorney, Brendan Chao, Third Year Law Intern, Roa-
noke, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Charles Anthony Cotton, Jr., appeals his conviction
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 1996) for using or carrying
a firearm during the commission of a drug crime, and under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846 and 841(a)(1) (1988) for conspiracy to distribute and posses-
sion with the intent to distribute cocaine base. Finding no error, we
affirm.
First, Cotton claims the district court abused its discretion by refus-
ing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea for the§ 924(c) convic-
tion under Bailey v. United States, #6D6D 6D# U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 4039
(U.S. Dec. 6, 1995) (No. 94-7448). Cotton correctly claims he did not
"use" a firearm under the Bailey standard. However, the district court
did not abuse its discretion because Cotton's conviction is valid under
the "carry" prong of § 924(c). Cotton's indictment specifically stated
that he "did knowingly use or carry a firearm" in violation of § 924(c)
(emphasis added). Cotton left the gun in his car while collecting on
a drug debt; its proximity made it available during the transaction.
Thus, Cotton's conviction is valid for "carrying" a firearm. See United
States v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Barber, 594 F.2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835
(1979).
Second, Cotton claims the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. However, an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim is not reviewable on direct appeal unless it "conclusively
appears" from the record that defense counsel's representation was
not effective. United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir.
1994). The record does not conclusively demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel. Thus, we do not address the issue, which may
properly be asserted in a motion under 28 U.S.C.§ 2255 (1988).
Accordingly, we affirm Cotton's conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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