Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 20, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D23-1776
Lower Tribunal No. 23-20926
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City of Miami, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Miguel Angel Gabela, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Pedro P.
Echarte, Jr., Judge.
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney and Kerri L. McNulty, Litigation &
Appeals Division Chief, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant City Attorney, for
appellants.
Law Firm of Juan-Carlos Planas, P.A., and Juan-Carlos Planas; David
J. Winker, P.A. and David J. Winker, for appellee Miguel Angel Gabela.
Before LINDSEY, HENDON and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.
The City of Miami appeals a declaratory final judgment interpreting its
charter’s residency qualification for city commission candidates. Specifically,
the City appeals the trial court’s interpretation of the residency requirement.
In interpreting the city charter, the trial court found city commission district
one candidate Miguel Gabela qualified as a candidate for the city
commission election on November 21, 2023. The City contends that the trial
court erred in interpreting the charter and finding Gabela qualified. The City
argues that the plain language of the charter and related city code provisions
require a year of continuous residency within a district immediately prior to
qualifying, which Gabela fails to meet. We agree with the City that the plain
language of the relevant charter provision controls. However, in reviewing
the plain language, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and the resulting
determination finding Gabela qualified to seek office as city commissioner
for district one.
BACKGROUND
Gabela, for the second consecutive election, seeks office as a
commissioner for district one in the City of Miami. Gabela resided at 1701
NW South River Drive—located near the edge of district one—since 2000. 1
1
Miami is governed by a five-member city commission and a mayor. The
commission consists of five members elected from districts within the City,
numbered one through five. See § 4(b), City of Miami Charter. The
2
Gabela resided at the same address during his unsuccessful candidacy for
the district one city commissioner seat in 2019, and it was his residence
when he sought the district one seat again this year. Under the former district
maps, adopted March 24, 2022, Gabela’s residence remained within district
one. On June 29, 2023—less than five months before the city commission
election, and in response to a federal lawsuit alleging that the districts had
been unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered—the current commissioners
adopted a resolution approving a new electoral map which moved the district
one boundary to place Gabela’s property out of that district and into district
three. 2
commission itself is responsible for judging the elections and qualifications
of its own members, including apportioning the boundaries of the five
electoral districts. Id. (d). City commissioner elections are held on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday of November in odd-numbered years, with
runoffs occurring two weeks later. § 7, City of Miami Charter.
2
The district court subsequently struck both the original March 2022 maps
and the June 2023 remedial maps as unconstitutionally racially
gerrymandered and adopted its own interim map, though the United States
Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit has since administratively stayed
that judgment pending appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied a motion
to vacate the stay. See GRACE, Inc. v. City of Miami, No. 1:22-cv-24066-
KMM, 2023 WL 4853635 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 30, 2023), stay granted No. 23-
12472, 2023 WL 5286232 (11th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023), stay upheld No. 23A116,
2023 WL 5284458 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2023). Gabela alternatively argues that
because of the administrative stay, he has in effect continuously resided in
district one even after the adoption of the June 2023 map. However, as we
conclude that the city charter contains no continuous residence requirement,
we decline to address this issue further.
3
Gabela promptly moved for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the new district map and determine his eligibility to run
in district one. Shortly thereafter, he also moved to a new residence within
the new boundaries of district one. The City counterclaimed for declaratory
and injunctive relief, and after a hearing, the trial court declared that the city
charter’s residency requirement mandated that a candidate “shall have
resided” within the district for one year at any time prior to qualification, with
no requirement of continuous residency up to the date of qualification.
Because Gabela resided within the district for well over a year prior to
qualifying for the election, he met the qualification requirements and
remained eligible for election as district one commissioner. This appeal
followed. 3
ANALYSIS
The relevant provision of the City of Miami Charter, section 4(c),
provides that “candidates for the city commission shall have resided within
the district at least one (1) year before qualifying and be electors in that
district, and shall maintain residence in that district for the duration of their
3
Our review is de novo. “An order in a declaratory judgment action is
generally accorded a presumption of correctness on appellate review.
However, to the extent that the decision rests on a question of law, the order
is subject to full, or de novo, review on appeal.” Reform Party of Fla. v. Black,
885 So. 2d 303, 310 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted).
4
term of office.” Likewise, section 16-6(b)(3) of the City of Miami Code
requires that “[a] candidate for the office of commissioner shall . . . [h]ave
resided within the district they wish to represent for at least one year prior to
qualifying.” The City contends that we must read into these provisions a
requirement of continuous residence for the year immediately preceding
qualification. Under that reading, the City argues, Gabela fails to satisfy the
residency requirement because he hasn’t continuously resided in district one
for the past year. The City’s reading fails to comport with the plain language
of the ordinance.
“Municipal ordinances are subject to the same rules of construction as
are state statutes.” Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of N. Miami, 286 So. 2d
552, 553 (Fla. 1973). Accordingly, we “must give to a statute (or ordinance)
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words employed by the legislative
body,” and “courts generally may not insert words or phrases in municipal
ordinances in order to express intentions which do not appear, unless it is
clear that the omission was inadvertent.” Id. at 553–54. If the plain language
of the ordinance is unambiguous, we are required to apply its plain meaning
and are without power to construe it in a way which would modify, limit, or
5
extend those express terms. See, e.g., Hill v. Davis, 70 So. 3d 572, 575–76
(Fla. 2011); Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005). 4
In Leon v. Carollo, 246 So. 3d 490, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), this court
evaluated the same residency requirement of section 4(c), City of Miami
Charter, and concluded that the residency requirement “unambiguous[ly]”
functioned as a qualification requirement to run for office as opposed to an
eligibility requirement to hold office. While that’s not the issue we examine
here, we echo the admonition in Leon that:
4
“Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the
statute's plain language for legislative intent.” Archstone Palmetto Park, LLC
v. Kennedy, 132 So. 3d 347, 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The City claims that the trial court’s interpretation
would lead to an absurd result, based on its subjective reading of the intent
of the drafters of the residency requirement. We see no such problem.
There’s nothing patently absurd about a charter provision that requires
residency within the district without making it a continuous residency
requirement. And even if the City doesn’t like the result, “[c]ourts should not
resort to the absurdity doctrine merely because of disagreements with the
result of legislation.” Raik v. Dep’t of Legal Affs., Bureau of Victim Comp.,
344 So. 3d 540, 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). As an aside, it appears the more
absurd result would be the City’s preferred outcome—adding terms and
conditions, not present in the text of the charter’s residency requirement, to
prevent a multiyear district resident from contesting an election where, as
here, the boundaries were moved a few houses over mere months before
the election. In any event, where the language of a charter provision or
ordinance is “clear and unambiguous,” we don’t look beyond the plain
language or employ canons of construction (including the absurdity doctrine)
to determine legislative intent. Gaulden v. State, 195 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla.
2016) (citing Borden v. E.-Eur. Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)).
We apply the law as written.
6
[T]he voters of Miami, through their democratically-approved
charter, have agreed on the structure of their government, and
the rules by which they want their leaders to be elected and
serve. Our role is to apply this law as it is written, and not to
write-in requirements that are not there or to fix holes that are.
Doing so subverts our role in the separation of powers, and the
will of the people of Miami in consenting to be governed by its
founding document. Surely the people of Miami didn't mean to
leave out the eligibility requirements in the city charter, Leon
says. Surely they did, as evidenced by the text they voted on
and approved, we say.
Id. at 496 (citations omitted); see also Spence-Jones v. Dunn, 118 So. 3d
261 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (finding the entirety of section 4 of the Miami Charter
to be unambiguous). As explained in Leon, we won’t—and can’t—fix holes
or write in requirements that aren’t contained in the plain language. Surely
the people of Miami didn’t mean to leave out a continuous district residency
requirement in the city charter, the City says. “Surely they did, as evidenced
by the text they voted on and approved, we say.” Leon, 246 So. 3d at 496.
The City’s expression of what it thinks the residency provision should mean
conflicts with the plain language and meaning of the words as written.
The charter requires that a city commission candidate “shall have
resided within the district at least one (1) year before qualifying” for the
election. If a municipality intended to require such residency be for at least
one continuous year, or for the year immediately preceding qualification, it
could easily do so. Indeed, two opinions of this court cited by both parties’
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reference two differently-worded municipal charter residency requirements.
One contains the word “continuous” (North Miami), and one doesn’t (Miami).
Compare Leon, 246 So. 3d at 495 (determining that the City of Miami code
requirement that “[a] candidate for the office of commissioner shall . . . [h]ave
resided within the district they wish to represent for at least one year prior to
qualifying” constituted a qualification requirement), with Burns v. Tondreau,
139 So. 3d 481, 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (determining that the City of North
Miami charter requirement that the mayor “be a continuous resident of the
City for one year prior to the time of qualification and thereafter” constituted
an eligibility requirement (emphasis added)).
We’re just determining what the words mean here. The proper
interpretation of such words either permit Gabela to run (his position) or
deem him not qualified to run (the City’s position). “The preeminent cannon
of statutory interpretation requires us to presume that [the] legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” BedRoc
Ltd., LLC v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (quotation omitted). The City’s
argument would require us both to read words into the City’s residency
requirement that aren’t there, and by implication to render the use of the word
“continuous” in North Miami’s requirement mere surplusage. See Hechtman
v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003) (“It is an
8
elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect
must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if
possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere
surplusage.”); see also Fla. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 47 So. 921, 923 (Fla. 1908)
(“It is our duty to declare the law as it is written. We cannot undertake by a
construction of the statute to add to it or to subtract from it. Its language is
plain and unambiguous.”). We decline the City’s invitation to add by judicial
fiat what the plain language of its charter provision doesn’t require.
Further, the City’s argument would ignore the meaning of the future
perfect tense “shall have resided.” The future perfect tense of a verb
expresses an action that will be completed at any time before a certain fixed
future point in time. For example, a requirement that a student shall have
resided on campus for a year before graduation contains no requirement that
the student reside on campus as a senior right before graduation. Similarly,
the requirement that a candidate to be qualified shall have resided within a
district for a year is a discrete act, that Gabela’s over 20-year residency in
district one satisfies.
The plain language of the City’s district residency requirement doesn’t
require continuous residency, or residency immediately preceding
qualification. On the record before us, and the trial court, there’s no dispute
9
that Gabela lived within district one for more than one year prior to qualifying.
The trial court correctly read the residency requirement of the city charter
and the companion requirement of the city code, and properly found Gabela
qualified as a candidate for the city commission district one election.5
Affirmed.
5
We take no position on the validity of the redistricting itself, which is the
subject of the separate federal action. See GRACE, 2023 WL 4853635, at
*1.
10