In re M.M.

2023 UT App 95

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF M.M.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

A.M.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20220624-CA
Filed August 24, 2023

Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Jeffrey J. Noland
No. 1140984

Emily Adams, Sara Pfrommer, and Hannah K.
Leavitt-Howell, Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Following a multi-day bench trial, the juvenile court
entered an order terminating A.M.’s (Mother) parental rights to
her child, M.M. (Child). Mother contends the court erred in
denying her reunification services and in concluding termination
of her parental rights was strictly necessary. Because Mother has
not persuaded us that the court committed reversible error, we
affirm its order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
 In re M.M.

BACKGROUND 1

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of three children: Child,
born in 2015; A.M. (Sister), born in 2018; and B.B. (Brother),
born in 2019. All three children have different biological
fathers. This appeal concerns only Child. Nevertheless, a
complete understanding of the events giving rise to this case
necessitates a recounting of the background as it relates to all
three children.

¶3 In December 2016, prior to the birth of Sister and Brother,
Child’s maternal grandmother (Grandmother) and maternal step-
grandfather (Grandfather) noticed “large bruises on [Child’s] hips
and thighs when they put him into the bath.” The following day,
a caseworker from the Division of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) met with Grandmother and Grandfather and examined
Child. The caseworker observed the same bruising on Child that
had been seen the day before, as well as a “small bruise in
[Child’s] hairline above his forehead.” Child was transported to
the hospital where a doctor observed the bruising and opined that
“the bruising is concerning for abuse because of its location, linear
component, the large size, and the lack of history explaining
them.”

¶4 A few months later, in February 2017, Child was brought
to the hospital for a breathing treatment for his asthma. While
at the hospital, a doctor again observed “linear bruising on
[Child’s] buttocks,” which she described as a “classic bruise
found with spanking or inflicted trauma.” She explained the
bruising was consistent with “excessive,” “repeated high-force
spanking.”

1. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court findings.” In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, n.2, 521 P.3d 887
(quotation simplified).

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¶5 During the time of these injuries, Child had been residing
with Mother, Mother’s husband (Stepfather), 2 Grandmother, and
Grandfather, and he had also attended daycare. Ultimately, no
one was able to provide an explanation for the bruising. As a
result, the juvenile court concluded that Child “has been abused
by an unknown perpetrator” and adjudicated him dependent as
to Mother. The court allowed Child to remain with Mother,
contingent on her compliance with a safety plan and completion
of court-ordered services. In December 2017, after Mother had
received a year of services, the court terminated its jurisdiction
and returned permanent custody and guardianship of Child to
Mother.

¶6 The following month, Sister was born. Brother was born a
year and a half later.

¶7 In August 2019, Brother suffered a series of abusive
episodes. First, Mother said she “fell going down some stairs”
while holding Brother. Thereafter, Brother’s father picked Brother
up from a babysitter and became concerned that Brother was
vomiting and appeared dehydrated. Brother was taken to the
doctor for examination but was sent home with his father because
the cause of the vomiting was “undetermined.” A few weeks later,
Brother’s father again observed that Brother had been vomiting
and appeared dehydrated. Brother was taken to the hospital for
examination.

¶8 Upon examination, Brother’s head appeared “swollen.” A
subsequent CT scan revealed a “large” brain bleed and a skeletal
survey revealed “multiple healing rib fractures.” A doctor
evaluated Brother the following day and expressed that Brother’s

2. Stepfather and Mother married one day after DCFS made the
initial home visit to observe Child. Prior to the marriage,
Stepfather spent “multiple nights in a row” in the home with
Mother and Child.

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initial vomiting was “consistent with the brain injury” and a
“sign” that the brain injury had occurred. She noted that
although Brother’s head circumference had not been measured
during his initial visit to the doctor, by the time of his second
visit—which occurred approximately two weeks later—Brother
“had a massive head.” She also opined that Brother’s injuries were
caused by one of his caregivers and were “consistent with
inflicted trauma and child abuse.” When questioned, both parents
denied any involvement or knowledge of injuries to Brother.
However, based on her conversation with both parents, the doctor
had “much more concern” that Mother had caused Brother’s
injuries.

¶9 Based on Brother’s injuries, the State filed a verified
petition for custody and guardianship on behalf of all three
children in August 2019. In the petition, the State asked the
juvenile court to find that “[Brother] is severely abused by
[Mother]” and that Child and Sister were “siblings at risk” and
“neglected” as to Mother.

¶10 Over the next several months, the juvenile court
transferred temporary custody of Sister and Brother to their
respective fathers. Although the State requested that Child be
removed from Mother’s custody, the court allowed Child to
remain home with Mother on the condition that she comply with
a safety plan. The safety plan required “line of sight supervision”
by Grandmother and Grandfather for “any contact” between
Mother and Child. But Mother did not abide by the safety plan,
and in January 2020, after a DCFS caseworker observed a series of
three events of non-compliance, the court transferred Child to
DCFS’s custody, finding that Mother had “substantially
endangered” Child’s welfare. Child was then placed in a foster
care home.

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¶11 In July 2020, Mother appeared before the juvenile court for
adjudication of the State’s verified petition for custody. 3 After
negotiations with Mother, the State agreed to amend the petition
by removing the allegation that Mother had severely abused
Brother, replacing it with an allegation that Brother suffered
“severe physical abuse while in the care of [Mother].” Following
this amendment, Mother proceeded with adjudication and
entered a plea pursuant to rule 34(e) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile
Procedure by which she neither admitted nor denied the
allegations but they were deemed admitted as a matter of law.

¶12 At the close of the hearing, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Brother had suffered “severe physical
abuse while in the care of [Mother].” Accordingly, the court found
that “[Sister] and [Child] are siblings at risk” and were
“neglected” as to Mother. In addition to adjudicating the
children’s statuses, the court also substantiated the DCFS
supported finding of severe physical abuse of Brother while in
Mother’s care. The court ordered that Brother and Sister continue
in the temporary custody of their respective fathers and that Child
continue in the custody of DCFS.

¶13 Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court held a disposition
hearing during which it resolved the custody petition as to
Brother and Sister by granting custody and guardianship to their
respective fathers and terminating jurisdiction. The court
requested briefing on the issue of whether Mother should be
provided reunification services for Child. Citing the allegations
that Mother physically abused her children, even after receiving

3. Although the juvenile court adjudicated Child’s status as to
Mother in July 2020, the written order was not entered until
August 2021—approximately one year after the adjudication
hearing. Mother appealed the written adjudication order, arguing
that she was deprived of due process by the court’s delay in
entering the order, but this court affirmed.

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court-ordered services, as well as Child’s success in his current
foster placement, the State and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
argued that reunification services were not in Child’s best interest
and accordingly requested that services not be provided. In
September 2020, the court entered an order denying reunification
services to Mother.4 In April 2021, the court set Child’s primary
permanency goal as adoption with his current foster parents.

¶14 The next month, the State filed a petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights to Child. The matter proceeded to an
eight-day bench trial that took place in March and April 2022.

¶15 At trial, several therapists who had provided mental health
services to Mother testified. All agreed that Mother suffered from
trauma and that treatment was needed to address it. These
therapists further testified that while Mother had attended some
therapy sessions, Mother had either canceled, rescheduled, or
failed to attend many of the sessions, and that although Mother
had made some progress in therapy, she still had a long way to go
to process her trauma.

¶16 Child’s therapist and foster parents testified regarding
Child’s communications with them, as well as Child’s

4. At the time reunification services for Mother were denied, an
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) request
form had been sent to Child’s biological father (Father), who
resides in South Carolina. Following denial of services for Mother,
the juvenile court changed Child’s primary permanency goal
from reunification with Mother to reunification with Father with
a concurrent goal of adoption. During a subsequent permanency
hearing, the court terminated reunification services to Father due
to his failure to comply with any of the three ICPC requests
initiated by DCFS and changed Child’s primary permanency goal
to adoption with his current foster parents. Father’s parental
rights to Child were then terminated in June 2022.

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improvements since his removal from Mother’s custody. Child’s
therapist explained that Child suffered from “separation anxiety
disorder and unspecified trauma and stressor-related disorder”
but that these conditions had greatly improved while Child was
living with his foster parents. Likewise, Child’s foster mother
testified that Child had grown emotionally while in her care. She
detailed Child’s emotional bonds with the members of his foster
family and recounted how it was “an easy decision” to pursue
adopting Child. Moreover, Child’s therapist and foster mother
both testified that Child had reported witnessing Mother “hit his
sibling on the head” and that Child had also reported that Mother
had hit him.

¶17 Following trial, the juvenile court issued an order
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. The court found the
testimony and evidence presented to be true, and therefore
concluded that the State had proved by clear and convincing
evidence three statutory grounds for termination. The court also
found that it was in Child’s best interest and strictly necessary to
terminate Mother’s parental rights. In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted it had “considered the specific circumstances” of
the case, including Child’s “wishes to remain in his current foster
home” and the feasibility of an alternative to termination, such as
a permanent guardianship.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶18 Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights to Child, raising two issues for our review.
First, Mother argues the court erred when it refused to order
reunification services to her. We review the juvenile court’s
interpretation of the law for correctness; however, “[t]he ultimate
decision whether to provide or deny reunification services is a
determination that we review for abuse of discretion.” In re Z.G.,
2016 UT App 98, ¶ 4, 376 P.3d 1077.

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¶19 Second, Mother argues the juvenile court erred when it
concluded that termination of her parental rights was strictly
necessary. “We review deferentially a lower court’s best-interest
determination and will overturn it only if it either failed to
consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its
decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the
evidence.” In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 18, 520 P.3d 38
(quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Reunification Services

¶20 Mother first argues the juvenile court erred when it denied
reunification services to her. Specifically, she contends the court
misinterpreted the law and abused its discretion when it (1) failed
to provide the “necessary findings for the presumption against
reunification services to apply” and (2) improperly weighed the
statutory factors a court must use when determining whether to
order reunification services.

¶21 After a juvenile court adjudicates a child as abused,
neglected, or dependent, the court must conduct a dispositional
hearing. See Utah Code § 78A-6-311(1) (2020). At that hearing, if
the court orders that the child continue in the custody of DCFS,
the court shall (1) “establish a primary permanency plan” and
(2) “determine whether, in view of the primary permanency plan,
reunification services are appropriate.” Id. § 78A-6-312(2).

¶22 The decision to order reunification services is therefore
discretionary with the juvenile court, and “parents have no
constitutional right to receive these services.” In re A.K., 2015 UT
App 39, ¶ 15, 344 P.3d 1153 (quotation simplified); see also In re
N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955–56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Utah Code § 78A-
6-312(20)(a) (2020). Accordingly, we will overturn the court’s

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decision only if it “either failed to consider all of the facts or
considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against
the clear weight of the evidence.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 31, 496
P.3d 58 (quotation simplified).

¶23 In determining whether to order reunification services, the
child’s “health, safety, and welfare shall be the court’s paramount
concern.” Utah Code § 78A-6-312(5) (2020). And in making this
determination, the juvenile court must consider a non-exclusive
list of statutory factors, including the following:

• “failure of the parent to respond to previous
services or comply with a previous child and
family plan;”

• “the fact that the minor was abused while the
parent was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol;”

• “any history of violent behavior directed at
the child or an immediate family member;”

• “whether a parent continues to live with an
individual who abused the minor;”

• “any patterns of the parent’s behavior that
have exposed the minor to repeated abuse;”

• “testimony by a competent professional that
the parent’s behavior is unlikely to be
successful; and”

• “whether the parent has expressed an
interest in reunification with the minor.”

Id. § 78A-6-312(23). However, in cases involving “obvious sexual
abuse, sexual exploitation, abandonment, severe abuse, or severe

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neglect,” the court has no duty to provide services. Id. § 78A-6-
312(4). And several circumstances—if found by clear and
convincing evidence—create “a presumption that reunification
services should not be provided to a parent.” Id. § 78A-6-312(21).

¶24 Before the juvenile court, the State and the GAL
argued that reunification services should not be offered to
Mother. While only the State argued that the presumption against
providing services should apply, both parties argued that the
statutory factors weighed in favor of denying reunification
services. Ultimately, the court denied services, finding they were
not “appropriate” “given the fact that [Mother] had services
before.”

¶25 Mother takes issue with the juvenile court’s determination
on two grounds. As an initial matter, she asserts the court made
“no findings in its reunification order, much less findings by clear
and convincing evidence,” that would allow the court to apply the
presumption against providing reunification services. But even if
Mother’s assertion is correct and a presumption against
reunification services does not apply in this case, Mother ignores
that the court may still properly deny services regardless of
whether a presumption exists. 5 And on the facts of this case, the
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that denying
reunification services to Mother was appropriate.

5. Moreover, Mother’s position on this point seems to ignore the
juvenile court’s own explanation of its reasoning to deny
reunification services. At the disposition hearing, the court
explicitly agreed with Mother’s counsel that Child did not qualify
as a “severely abused child,” which would create a presumption
against providing services. As a result, the court stated, “I don’t
really attach the presumption that [Mother] should not receive
reunification services. I’m kind of looking towards the
presumption that she should . . . .”

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¶26 Next, Mother asserts the juvenile court improperly
weighed the statutory factors a court must consider when
determining whether to provide reunification services. According
to Mother, “four[ 6] of the seven factors weigh in favor of granting
Mother reunification services” and “the remaining three factors
do not tip the balance towards not offering reunification services.”
We disagree.

¶27 First, Mother contends the juvenile court improperly
determined she had failed to respond to reunification services in
the past. See Utah Code § 78A-6-312(23)(a) (2020) (requiring courts
to consider the “failure of the parent to respond to previous
services or comply with a previous child and family plan” when
determining whether to order reunification services). She claims
that the dismissal of the first protective services case in December
2017 and the full restoration of custody of Child shows she
responded to services and complied with her previous family
plan. But in concluding that this factor weighed against Mother,
the court considered Mother’s compliance in the first protective
services case as well as her actions after that case was closed. The
court explained,

I see that you’ve had services before on [Child]. We
had a [protective supervision services] case. . . . You
engage in services. We think things are good. We
close the case.

6. These factors are (1) “the fact that the minor was abused while
the parent was under the influence of drugs or alcohol,”
(2) “whether a parent continues to live with an individual who
abused the minor,” (3) “testimony by a competent professional
that the parent’s behavior is unlikely to be successful,” and
(4) “whether the parent has expressed an interest in reunification
with the minor.” See Utah Code § 78A-6-312(23)(b), (d), (f), (g)
(2020).

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Then not much longer . . . we have a severe
abuse to [Child]’s younger sibling . . . . We’ve
already done reunification services or services by
DCFS for you on [Child] and here we are again with
a severely abused child.

¶28 This explanation is sufficient to show that the court
adequately considered whether Mother had failed to respond to
previous reunification services. The court weighed Mother’s prior
compliance against her actions following the completion of the
original services. Because the court’s decision is not “against the
clear weight of the evidence,” a “measure of deference is owing”
to the court’s decision. In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 32 (quotation
simplified). Accordingly, we will not perform an “independent
‘reweighing’ of the evidence” but will instead “respect[]” the
court’s decision. Id.

¶29 Second, Mother contends the juvenile court improperly
weighed against her the factors concerning “any history of violent
behavior directed at the child or an immediate family member”
and “any patterns of the parent’s behavior that have exposed the
minor to repeated abuse.” See Utah Code § 78A-6-312(23)(c), (e)
(2020). Specifically, Mother asserts these factors do not weigh
against her because she “was not adjudicated as abusing [Child]
in 2017,” there are “no other allegations” that Child or Sister have
been otherwise injured, and it has “never been established that
Mother harmed [Brother].”

¶30 But Mother’s arguments on this point ignore substantial
record evidence indicating that Mother did have a history of
violent behavior directed at Child or Child’s immediate family
members and that Mother’s behavior exposed Child to repeated
abuse. While Mother is correct that she was not adjudicated as
abusing Child in 2017, Child’s statements to his foster mother and
therapist provide substantial evidence of Mother’s history of
violent behavior toward Child and other immediate family

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members. Notably, the juvenile court found that during a therapy
session, Child credibly reported to his therapist that he had
witnessed Mother “hit his sibling on the head.” And at trial,
Child’s foster mother testified that on multiple occasions, Child
told her that Mother had hit him. Further, as the juvenile court
found, Child, Brother, and Sister were all exposed to repeated
abuse while in Mother’s care. Indeed, Child and Sister were found
to be “siblings at risk” and “neglected” based on Mother’s rule
34(e) plea to the allegation that Brother suffered “severe physical
abuse while in the care of [Mother].” This exposure occurred
subsequent to the court’s 2017 determination that Child had been
“abused by an unknown perpetrator” during a time when Mother
“was the primary caregiver.”

¶31 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
not to order reunification services for Mother. In reaching this
decision, the court evaluated the evidence before it, and Mother
has not demonstrated that the court’s decision was against the
clear weight of the evidence. 7

7. Mother challenges the adequacy of the juvenile court’s findings
in support of its decision not to order reunification services by
asserting that “the juvenile court made no findings in its
reunification order.” But Mother’s assertion is overbroad; the
juvenile court did make explicit factual findings regarding a
number of the facts we have noted as supportive of its
determination not to order services. And, while we acknowledge
that the court did not explicitly disclose all the analytic steps it
took in deciding not to provide services, this is a case where the
court’s “unstated findings can be implied” because “it is
reasonable to assume that the [juvenile] court actually considered
the controverted evidence and necessarily made . . . finding[s] to
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual
determination[s] made.” Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379
(continued…)

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II. Strictly Necessary

¶32 Next, Mother argues the juvenile court erred in
determining it was strictly necessary to terminate her parental
rights to Child. In particular, Mother contends the court’s strictly
necessary analysis was “improperly brief and conclusory.”

¶33 “Because the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected, a court may only terminate
parental rights upon a finding that termination is strictly
necessary to the best interest[] of the child.” 8 In re S.T., 2022 UT

P.3d 882 (quotation simplified). It is not a case “where there is a
matrix of possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the
[juvenile] court’s actual findings.” Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,
1025–26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified). The evidence
and arguments presented below, coupled with the juvenile
court’s decision not to order services, necessarily imply that the
juvenile court found the factors in Utah Code subsections 78A-6-
312(23)(c) and (e) weigh against the provision of services based on
the findings and evidence we have outlined above. Although on
this record the unstated steps of the juvenile court’s analysis can
be implied, we caution courts to ensure that the analytic steps
taken in support of such fact-sensitive decisions are fully
articulated in an oral or written ruling, order, or judgment.
Detailed findings aid appellate review and reduce the likelihood
of reversal.

8. “To terminate a parent’s rights, Utah law requires that both
elements of a two-part test are satisfied. First, the court must find
that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination are
present. Second, the court must find that termination of the
parent’s rights is in the best interest[] of the child.” In re S.T., 2022
UT App 130, ¶ 25 n.5, 521 P.3d 887 (quotation simplified). Here,
Mother acknowledges the juvenile court properly found at least
(continued…)

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App 130, ¶ 25, 521 P.3d 887 (quotation simplified). “This analysis
should be undertaken from the child’s point of view, not the
parent’s.” In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 63, 472 P.3d 827 (quotation
simplified).

¶34 When evaluating whether termination is strictly necessary,
the juvenile court must address whether “the child can be equally
protected and benefited by an option other than termination.” Id.
¶ 66. This inquiry cannot be satisfied merely by relying on the
“categorical concern” that adoption offers the highest degree of
permanency. In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, ¶ 25, 506 P.3d 606. Instead,
the court must analyze the “particularized circumstances of the
case” and “explore whether other feasible options exist that could
address the specific problems or issues facing the family, short of
imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights.”
In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). If another
option exists where “the child can be equally protected and
benefited,” then “termination is not strictly necessary” and “the
court cannot order the parent’s rights terminated.” In re B.T.B.,
2020 UT 60, ¶ 66.

¶35 In determining that it was strictly necessary to terminate
Mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court explicitly stated that it
“considered whether a placement with Permanent Guardianship
would equally protect and benefit [Child].” Ultimately, the court
decided against such an arrangement, finding it was not in Child’s
best interest “as it does not provide the permanency that he seeks
and wishes for.” Citing In re J.A.L., 2022 UT 12, 506 P.3d 606,
Mother contends this conclusion was error because it is based on
the categorical concern that a permanent guardianship is not as

one ground to terminate her parental rights. Accordingly, our
focus is limited to only the court’s best interest determination.

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permanent as an adoption. 9 Mother’s argument is unavailing,
however, because it selectively focuses on the court’s conclusion
without considering it in the fuller context.

¶36 Here, the juvenile court was not presented with any
feasible alternative option for a permanent guardianship
placement, nor has Mother proposed one on appeal. At the time
of trial, the only individuals that had previously been involved in
the case were not feasible placement options. Indeed, Grandfather
had failed to comply with the safety plan by allowing Mother to
interact with Child outside his “line of sight,” which ultimately
led to Child’s removal; Grandmother and Mother were estranged;
and the State had initiated termination proceedings for Father. 10
Consequently, there was “no other option, short of termination

9. In a related vein, Mother also asserts the juvenile court’s
decision was conclusory because the court focused only on
negative testimony and overlooked the positive testimony of
several of Mother’s therapists. But this position ignores that “[i]t
is the role of the juvenile court, not this court, to assess the weight
and credibility of expert witnesses and to choose among their
testimonies.” In re G.V., 916 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (per
curiam). As such, we decline to reweigh the evidence.

10. The lack of alternative options was reiterated through the trial
testimony of Child’s great-uncle (Uncle). Uncle testified that
Mother and Grandfather were estranged, largely due to
Grandfather’s role in having Child removed from Mother’s
custody, and that Mother and Grandmother were estranged
because Grandmother is “a very toxic individual” and “abusive
toward” Mother. Uncle also explained that although he wanted to
be “involved” with Child, he was not in a position for Child to be
placed with him. Lastly, Uncle noted that his brother had applied
for Child to be placed with him, but his application was not
approved.

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and adoption, that would have otherwise been apparent to the
juvenile court.” See In re D.G., 2022 UT App 128, ¶ 8 n.2, 522 P.3d
39, cert. denied, 527 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2023). And “where only one
feasible custody option exists, the categorical concern that
adoption is more stable than a permanent guardianship is not
implicated.” In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 32 n.6 (quotation
simplified).

¶37 In sum, given Child’s “strong emotional ties with [his]
foster parents,” see id., and the lack of “any remotely feasible
alternatives to termination and adoption,” see In re D.G., 2022 UT
App 128, ¶ 8 n.2, it was entirely proper for the juvenile court to
find that it was strictly necessary to terminate Mother’s parental
rights. 11

11. We again caution juvenile courts to “adequately disclose[]”—
either in an oral or written ruling—all the “analytic steps” they
take when they conduct a best interest analysis. Keiter v. Keiter,
2010 UT App 169, ¶ 21, 235 P.3d 782 (describing a challenge to the
adequacy of findings as raising the issue of whether “the findings
as a whole adequately disclosed the analytic steps taken by the
trial court”). Here, however, even assuming that the court’s
articulation of its strictly necessary analysis could have or even
should have been more robust, without any feasible alternatives
to termination and adoption, Mother cannot show that the court’s
finding on this point was against the clear weight of the evidence.
See generally In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 19, 520 P.3d 38 (“[I]n
some instances (e.g., where the existence of a particular option
would not be readily apparent to the court), a parent may need to
expressly ask a [juvenile] court to consider a specific non-
termination option in order to properly preserve the right to
argue, on appeal, that the court did not adequately consider that
option.”). But in cases where a feasible alternative placement
option does exist, a court assessing strict necessity must explain,
(continued…)

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CONCLUSION

¶38 The juvenile court did not err in terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Child. The court’s decision to deny Mother
reunification services was not an abuse of discretion because the
court’s decision is well supported by evidence in the record. And
the court did not err when it found that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was strictly necessary because there were no
feasible alternative placement options other than termination and
adoption. Affirmed.

“on the record,” why adoption and termination of the parent’s
rights would better further the child’s best interest than the
alternative option. See In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 74, 472 P.3d 827.

20220624-CA 18 2023 UT App 95