In Re: R.C.A., Appeal of: R.C.A.

J-A17035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: R.C.A., JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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:
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:
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APPEAL OF: R.C.A., JR. : No. 1850 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 0452-2021-O

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

Appellant, R.C.A., Jr., appeals from the decree entered in the Delaware

County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court, which granted the petition for

payment of counsel fees filed by Appellee, J. Michael Considine, Jr. We affirm.

The Orphans’ Court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this appeal as follows:

On September 15, 2021, Douglas Oakford, Executor of the
Estate of [M.A.] (“Decedent”), filed a petition to adjudicate
[Appellant] incapacitated and to appoint a plenary
guardian.[1] [Appellant] is the son of Decedent. Decedent
passed away on September 9, 2020. At the time of
Decedent’s death, she owned a residence located at 1608
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “The court, upon petition and hearing and upon the presentation of clear and

convincing evidence, may find a person domiciled in the Commonwealth to be
incapacitated and appoint a guardian or guardians of his person or estate.”
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(a).
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Winton Avenue in Havertown, PA 19038 (“the Property”).
According to Decedent’s will, her home was to be sold six
months after her death and the proceeds were to go into a
trust for Appellant’s benefit. Mr. Oakford was also the
trustee of the testamentary trust created for the benefit of
Appellant.

During his entire life and after Decedent’s death, Appellant
resided in the Property. According to the guardianship
petition, Appellant was refusing to leave the Property,
refusing to grant access to anyone, including professional
social workers, and refusing to cooperate in the process of
selling the home and relocating. Appellant was also in a
living situation that appeared to involve extreme hoarding
over decades. [Appellee] was initially retained on April 13,
2021 by Appellant to represent him in the matter involving
his mother’s estate. The guardianship petition stated that
[Appellee] was retained to establish a logical distribution of
the inheritance and to relocate Appellant into a new
financially sound home using the inheritance funds.
[Appellee] attempted to work with Appellant, despite his
refusal to cooperate, and in doing so, [Appellee] became
concerned for his welfare and that he would be susceptible
to financial exploitation. During his representation of
Appellant, [Appellee] suggested that Appellant be examined
by an expert to see if a guardian of his person and/or estate
would be necessary. The guardianship petition was then
filed by the executor of the estate on September 15, 2021,
and a hearing on the petition was scheduled for October 25,
2021. In addition, a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Ms.
Jacquelyn Goffney, was appointed on behalf of Appellant on
October 19, 2021. GAL Goffney and the executor’s attorney
have acknowledged that there was a need for Appellant to
vacate the Property.

Attorney James Cunilio entered his appearance on October
20, 2021 for representation of Appellant in the guardianship
matter and filed an answer to the guardianship petition on
October 22, 2021. A continuance request of the October
25th court date was granted for the parties to have additional
time in working out the matter and due to an alleged dispute
over whether [Appellee] was in fact discharged from further
representation of Appellant. Appellant signed a letter dated
November 18, 2021 to be sent to [Appellee] to discharge

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him from his duties, as Appellant’s attorney. [Appellee]
denied that he received said letter.2 [Appellee] filed an
answer to the guardianship petition on November 22, 2021,
on the same date as the second hearing, and agreed to do
no further work. At the hearing held on November 22, 2021,
GAL Goffney confirmed that Appellant has selected who he
wants to be his attorney and has released other counsel.

On April 26, 2022, [Appellee] filed a petition for counsel fees
in the guardianship matter. Monthly invoices were included
as exhibits to his petition for counsel fees in which he
calculated his attorney’s fees and costs to total $6,384.99.[3]
A hearing was held on June 20, 2022 to address the petition
for counsel fees. Upon review, the Orphans’ Court properly
concluded that the fees and costs incurred up until
[Appellee] learned that he was discharged as Appellant’s
attorney were reasonable and the award of $6,202.03 was
equitable.[4]

When [Appellee] was asked by the court why he believes he
should be paid for legal fees pursuant to the retainer
agreement, he stated the following:

I tried to represent this client’s best interest. We did
many things at his house to try to get him to
cooperate with the will. He wouldn’t do it. We
brought in a social worker. There is over $200,000
[in an] account that he had a right to. He wanted me
to do bills. He wanted me to do a lot of things. I did
____________________________________________

2 The record on appeal includes a copy of the letter, as well as an affidavit of

service from Attorney Cunilio’s legal assistant. In the affidavit, the legal
assistant stated that she sent the letter to Appellee via first class mail and
email. Nevertheless, we observe that Appellee’s physical and email addresses
set forth in the affidavit and letter do not match the addresses for Appellee on
this Court’s docket.

3 On May 23, 2022, the executor of Decedent’s estate withdrew the petition

to adjudicate Appellant incapacitated and appoint a plenary guardian.

4 As discussed infra, the court reduced the total amount of counsel fees to
ensure that Appellee was compensated only for work done prior to his
discharge.

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all that.

The work that [Appellee] completed for Appellant is reported
in his multiple invoices attached to the petition for counsel
fees. At the June 20th hearing, [Appellee] testified that after
the filing of the guardianship petition, [Appellee] wanted to
have Appellant evaluated by an expert. Before this could be
done, [Appellee] was discharged from representing
Appellant, and he “did not do anything more in the case
because [he] didn’t want to run up the hours unnecessarily.”

At the hearing, [Attorney] Cunilio alleged that most of the
charges from [Appellee] were for the guardianship matter.
While [Appellee] argued that the estate matter and the
guardianship matter are one matter, [Attorney] Cunilio
argued that they are two separate matters. [Appellee]
offered the retainer agreement signed by Appellant on April
13, 2021 into evidence during the hearing held on June 20,
2022.[5] [Attorney] Cunilio claimed that Appellant only hired
[Appellee] in the estate matter and not in the guardianship
matter.

Appellant testified at the hearing held on June 20, 2022.
Appellant moved out of the Winton Avenue Property and
moved into his own apartment on or about May 13, 2022.
Appellant testified that he originally retained [Appellee] to
represent him regarding his mother’s estate matter.
Appellant wanted assistance in determining what the trust
was and how much was supposed to go into it, as well as
what his legal rights were. There were several insurance
annuities that were going to be deposited into the trust, and
Appellant sought out [Appellee] to retrieve copies of said
annuities. Appellant testified that [Appellee] did not
complete what he believed he had asked [Appellee] to
complete. Appellant testified that he had this belief because
[Appellee] was providing him with inaccurate amounts of
money to be distributed to him and his siblings. Appellant
testified that he had never authorized [Appellee] to
represent him in the guardianship matter.
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5 The agreement specified that Appellant permitted “the trustee of
[Decedent’s] estate to pay the law firm out [of Appellant’s] portion of the
proceeds of the estate.” (Exhibit P-1, submitted 6/20/22).

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* * *

On June 20, 2022, the court determined that [Appellee] is
to be awarded for all of his work done in representing
Appellant up until he learned that Appellant was discharging
him as his attorney at the November 22, 2021 hearing.
[Appellee] confirmed that $6,202.[03] was the total amount
due up until November 22, 2021 when he filed his answer
and agreed to do no more work for Appellant.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 2/28/23, at 1-6) (internal record citations and

some capitalization omitted).

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 14, 2022. On July 26,

2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule

1925(b) statement on August 2, 2022.6

Appellant now raises six issues for this Court’s review:

Did Appellant … waive the 13 issues set forth in his concise
statement of matters complain[ed] of on appeal when the
trial court addressed each of these issues separately and
noted that the other 32 paragraphs of the statement are
mere statements which require no response?

Notwithstanding the holding in Hempstead v. Meadville
Theological School, [286 Pa. 493, 134 A. 103 (1926),] can
an Orphans’ Court award counsel fees when the attorney’s
services did not protect a common fund for distribution or
administration of the court?

Did the trial court have authority to award counsel fees
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Orphans’ Court Rule 14.4
and Delaware County Orphans’ Court Rule 14.2 when an
____________________________________________

6 On August 4, 2023, Appellee filed an application for leave to submit cases

partially cited at oral argument. We now grant Appellee’s application.

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incapacitated person’s estate was never created?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that
[Appellee’s] fees were reasonable?

Did the retainer agreement signed by [Appellant] for
[Appellee’s] services in [Decedent’s] estate [case], five
months before the guardianship petition was filed, satisfy
the requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Orphans’ Court
Rule 14.4?

Were the fees awarded to [Appellee] proper when
[Appellee] never claimed he was retained by [Appellant] to
represent him in the guardianship matter?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6) (issues reordered for ease of disposition; some

capitalization and quotation marks omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant complains about the court’s conclusion that

Appellant’s prolix Rule 1925(b) statement did not preserve any issues for

appellate review. Appellant insists that the “court was able to address the

thirteen issues it recognized,” and Appellant subsequently “narrowed the

appeal issues from the thirteen identified in his Rule 1925(b) statement to six

issues in his … brief.” (Id. at 34). We agree with Appellant, as our review of

the record does not reveal a basis to support waiver. See Eiser v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 595 Pa. 366, 383, 938 A.2d 417, 427-28 (2007)

(encouraging lower courts to recognize that on rare occasions party may, in

good faith, believe that large number of issues are worthy of pursuing on

appeal; explaining that number of issues raised in Rule 1925 (b) statement

does not, without more, provide basis upon which to deny appellate review

where appeal otherwise complies with mandates of appellate practice).

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Accordingly, we proceed to address Appellant’s remaining claims.

In his remaining issues, Appellant advances multiple theories regarding

why the court should not have granted Appellee’s petition for counsel fees.

Citing Hempstead, supra, Appellant maintains that an Orphans’ Court can

award counsel fees “where the fees protect a common fund for the

administration or distribution under the direction of the court.” (Appellant’s

Brief at 17). Appellant insists that Appellee did not provide services related

to the creation or protection of a fund for the “incapacitated person’s estate,”

because the court did not deem Appellant incapacitated. (Id. at 18).

Likewise, Appellant maintains that Appellee did nothing to create or protect

Decedent’s estate where Appellee merely helped Appellant to move out of

Decedent’s residence.7 To the extent that Appellee’s petition for counsel fees

cited state and local rules governing Orphans’ Court proceedings, Appellant

reiterates that such rules apply only in circumstances where an incapacitated

person’s estate is created.

Appellant acknowledges the Orphans’ Court’s finding that Decedent’s

estate and Appellant’s guardianship matter were effectively intertwined.

Appellant asserts, however, that the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code

does not allow “counsel fees in a decedent’s estate matter to be considered

____________________________________________

7 Thus, Appellant continues to advance the argument he raised in the Orphans’

Court, which is that the guardianship and estate matters must be evaluated
separately.

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and awarded by the Orphans’ Court in a guardianship proceeding.” (Id. at

22). Moreover, Appellant contends that the court erred in finding that

Appellee’s fees were reasonable where the court “failed to identify anything

[Appellee] did in the guardianship matter and instead focused only on what

[Appellee] did in regard to the decedent’s estate[.]” (Id. at 23).

Finally, Appellant attacks Appellee’s retainer agreement, which the

parties executed in April 2021. Appellant complains that the agreement did

not conform to the state Orphans’ Court rule governing representation in

guardianship proceedings. Appellant argues that the agreement related to

Appellee’s representation in the estate case, and the parties executed the

agreement before the executor filed the guardianship petition. Appellant

further argues that he did not authorize Appellee to represent him in the

guardianship matter, and Appellee’s petition for counsel fees admitted this

fact by implication. For these reasons, Appellant concludes that this Court

must vacate the decree granting Appellee’s petition for counsel fees. We

disagree.

The following standard governs our review of an Orphans’ Court decree:

The findings of a judge of the Orphans’ Court Division,
sitting without a jury, must be accorded the same
weight and effect as the verdict of a jury, and will not
be reversed by an appellate court in the absence of an
abuse of discretion or a lack of evidentiary support.
This rule is particularly applicable to findings of fact
[that] are predicated upon the credibility of the
witnesses, whom the judge has had the opportunity
to hear and observe, and upon the weight given to
their testimony. In reviewing the Orphans’ Court’s

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findings, our task is to ensure that the record is free
from legal error and to determine if the Orphans’
Court’s findings are supported by competent and
adequate evidence and are not predicated upon
capricious disbelief of competent and credible
evidence.

In re Estate of Cassidy, 296 A.3d 1219, 1223 (Pa.Super.
Jun. 9, 2023) (citation omitted). “However, we are not
constrained to give the same deference to any resulting
legal conclusions. … This Court’s standard of review of
questions of law is de novo, and the scope of review is
plenary, as we may review the entire record in making our
determination.” In re Estate of Tscherneff, 203 A.3d
1020, 1024 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

In re Estate of Schaefer, 300 A.3d 1013, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2023). “When

an appellant challenges a decree entered by the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt, our

standard of review requires that we be deferential to the findings of the

[O]rphans’ [C]ourt.” In re Staico, 143 A.3d 983, 987 (Pa.Super. 2016),

appeal denied, 641 Pa. 190, 166 A.3d 1221 (2017) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

“An incompetent is liable for necessaries furnished to him prior to the

adjudication of incompetency.” In re Feely’s Estate, 98 A.2d 738, 741-42

(Pa.Super. 1953). “At common law the incompetent’s estate was liable for

necessaries supplied, on the ground, as was said, that the law implied an

obligation on the part of such person to pay for necessaries out of his

property.” In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343, 350, 192 A. 397, 400 (1937). “It is,

of course, essential to show that the legal services rendered were reasonably

necessary for the welfare of the incompetent, before a recovery therefor on

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the theory that they are necessaries will be allowed.” Feely’s Estate, supra

at 742 (quoting 28 Am.Jur. § 64 at 700). See also In re Weightman’s

Estate, 190 A. 552 (Pa.Super. 1937) (explaining that services provided to

incompetent by attorneys and medical experts, in good faith, in course of

habeas corpus proceedings instituted to secure release of incompetent from

state hospital may, in exercise of sound discretion by auditing judge, be

considered necessaries properly chargeable in reasonable amount to

incompetent’s estate, regardless of whether incompetent is released from

state hospital).

Likewise, the award of counsel fees in an action involving the

administration of an estate is within the sound discretion of the Orphans’

Court. See In re Estate of Geniviva, 675 A.2d 306, 313 (Pa.Super. 1996),

appeal denied, 546 Pa. 666, 685 A.2d 545 (1996) (citing In re Estate of

Albright, 545 A.2d 896 (Pa.Super. 1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 571, 559

A.2d 33 (1989)).

What is a fair and reasonable fee is sometimes a delicate,
and at times a difficult question. The facts and factors to be
taken into consideration in determining the fee or
compensation payable to an attorney include: the amount
of work performed; the character of the services rendered;
the difficulty of the problems involved; the importance of
the litigation; the amount of money or value of the property
in question; the degree of responsibility incurred; whether
the fund involved was ‘created’ by the attorney; the
professional skill and standing of the attorney in his
profession; the results he was able to obtain; the ability of
the client to pay a reasonable fee for the services rendered;
and, very importantly, the amount of money or the value of
the property in question.

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In re LaRocca’s Trust Estate, 431 Pa. 542, 546, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (1968)

(internal footnote omitted).

In Hempstead, supra, which Appellant cited in his brief, our Supreme

Court discussed counsel fees in the context of legal services that protect a

“common fund” for administration or distribution:

As a general rule, in Pennsylvania each party to adversary
litigation is required to pay his own counsel fees. As stated
by Gibson, J., in Alexander v. Herr, 11 Pa. 537, ‘If clients
could pay attorney’s fees out of the pockets of their
opponents, they would pay most liberally.’ Nor is there any
law in Pennsylvania which will warrant the payment of such
fees or expenses incident to the preparation for trial, as
costs of the case. In the absence of express statutory
authority, counsel fees cannot be allowed from the adverse
party.

* * *

There are well-recognized exceptions to this rule. Where
the services protect a common fund for
administration or distribution under the direction of
the court, or where such fund has been raised for like
purpose, it is liable for costs and expenses, including
counsel fees incurred. This is the case, even though the
protection given or the raising of a fund results from what
may be properly termed adversary litigation. All of our
cases bearing on the question, the facts concerned, the
administration of estates, insolvent estates, a common fund
in existence or to be raised in which the parties interested
were directly or indirectly benefited as creditors or as
trustees of the fund which ultimately reached designated
parties, are illustrated by the following cases….

Hempstead, supra at 495-96, 134 A. at 103 (most internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

As Appellant notes, our Supreme Court subsequently elaborated on the

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Hempstead holding as follows:

The Pennsylvania cases allowing awards of attorneys fees
and relied upon by the Court in Hempstead in arriving at
its formulation of the rule involved litigation which protected
an estate or fund from fraud or illegal claims. [Hempstead,
supra] at 496, 134 A. at 103, Citing Weed’s Estate, 163
Pa. 595, 30 A. 272 (1894) (certain unsecured creditors of
insolvent estate brought suit to set aside conveyance and
judgments confessed by trustee in fraud of creditors);
Manderson’s Appeal, 113 Pa. 631, 6 A. 893 (1886)
(attorney employed on behalf of trustee defended trust
estate from certain illegal claims). This element of
protection of the fund or estate from fraud was also present
in the United States Supreme Court case of Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881), which
was cited by the Court in Hempstead and relied upon by
appellant in the instant appeal.

Estate of Tose, 482 Pa. 212, 221, 393 A.2d 629, 633 (1978).

Instantly, the Orphans’ Court thoroughly evaluated Appellant’s claims

and determined that Appellee’s work on the guardianship matter was in

furtherance of the administration of Decedent’s estate:

[The Superior] Court has previously held that the Orphans’
Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees
to [an] estate’s counsel for his representation of the estate
during a matter involving former counsel’s mishandling of
the estate. [See Estate of Albright, supra]. In
[Albright], [the a]ppellants argued that fees were
improperly awarded because most of the fees were awarded
due to the mishandling of the administration of the estate,
which is separate from the matter in which attorney’s fees
were awarded, which was for the petition for accounting.
Id. In finding that there was substantial and competent
evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees, [the
Superior] Court reasoned that “[t]he estate[, as a ‘matter,’]
was still pending, and the hearings on the petition[, which
involved accounting for assets of the estate,] were in
furtherance of [its] settlement.” Id. at 905.

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In the instant case, Decedent’s estate matter, in which
[Appellee] was originally retained to represent Appellant,
does intertwine with the subsequent guardianship matter.
The guardianship petition was filed in furtherance of the
pending estate matter. If there was no estate, there would
be no guardianship matter. According to Decedent’s will,
her home was to be sold six months after her death and the
proceeds were to go into a trust for Appellant’s benefit. In
the guardianship petition filed by Mr. Oakford (“Petitioner”)
as executor of the estate, Petitioner averred that Appellant
continued to reside in the home of Decedent, “refus[ed] to
leave, refus[ed] to grant access to anyone including
professional social workers, and refus[ed] to cooperate to
relocate or prepare the house for sale.” In the guardianship
petition, Petitioner argued that a plenary guardian was
necessary for Appellant in order to provide for the proper
relocation and sound viable financial setting of Appellant to
receive his inheritance. Petitioner further stated that
[Appellee] has attempted unsuccessfully to arrange for less
restrictive measures but has failed to do so.

When the guardianship proceedings were underway and a
hearing was held on April 25, 2022, GAL Goffney asserted
that due to a finding of capacity for Appellant, “[We] now
[have a] need [for Appellant] to pack up his belongings and
move into his apartment.” N.T. 4/25/22 at 4. This implies
that there was a clear connection between the estate matter
and the guardianship matter in which the guardianship
matter allowed the estate matter to move forward. There
has been substantial evidence provided to the court to
support the award of attorney’s fees to [Appellee].

(Orphans’ Court Opinion at 13-14) (some capitalization omitted).

As for Appellant’s additional arguments, the court found that Appellee

submitted credible evidence to establish his actions on Appellant’s behalf:

[Appellee] attached his monthly invoices to his petition for
counsel fees, which detailed the legal services rendered and
the time required to complete said services. [Appellee]
further explained his duties and activities as Appellant’s
attorney to support the invoices. As [Appellee] was hired to
represent Appellant in reference to Decedent’s estate, he

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was tasked with the duty of assisting Appellant to move out
of the Property to comply with Decedent’s wishes under her
will so that Appellant could receive the proceeds of the sale
of the Property in a trust for his benefit. One of the very
first statements [Appellee] made at the hearing held on
June 20, 2022, was that he “made every effort to try to get
[Appellant] to cooperate with what the will required.” N.T.
6/20/22 at 3. Not only did [Appellee] aver that he
attempted to make this as inexpensive as possible, but he
also continued to represent to the court that, during his
representation of Appellant, he was concerned for the
welfare of his client and feared someone would take
advantage of him. Id. at 3, 11. [Appellee] stated that
Appellant would not cooperate. Id. at 10. [Appellee’s]
averments that Appellant would not cooperate [are]
corroborated by both the executor’s attorney as well as the
guardian ad litem’s pleadings and arguments presented to
this court. N.T. 4/25/22.

Appellant alleged that the Orphans’ Court erred in
disregarding [Appellee’s] admission that he filed an answer
after the date of Appellant’s letter discharging [Appellee]
because “[he] wasn’t sure” if he was discharged by
Appellant. [N.T. 6/20/22 at 33.] [Appellee] argued that
there was an issue as to whether he was discharged because
he never received the discharge letter dated November 18,
2021. N.T. 6/20/22 at 32-34. [Attorney] Cunilio
maintained that his firm sent the letter via email address
and first-class mail. Id. at 34-35. Further, [Attorney]
Cunilio stated that he would provide to the court
confirmation that the email was sent to [Appellee]. Id. at
35.

The Orphans’ Court never received correspondence or
confirmation that the discharge letter was in fact sent to
[Appellee]. The Orphans’ Court found [Appellee] to be
credible. In doing so, the Orphans’ Court properly
considered and awarded [Appellee] for the services
rendered up until [Appellee] was aware of his discharge as
Appellant’s attorney on November 22, 2021.

(Id. at 18-19) (some capitalization omitted).

The court also concluded that the fees at issue were reasonable:

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The Orphans’ Court took into consideration the complexity
of the matter at issue. The court factored in the specific
required services and the troubles involved in attempting to
represent Appellant as an heir in his mother’s estate. The
importance of [Appellee’s] work was significant in that his
efforts were to ensure Appellant had a place to live as his
mother had wished. After a careful analysis of the hours
claimed by [Appellee] in his petition, the hours of service
rendered were reasonable and justified. The court took the
time to ensure [Appellee] was only awarded with reasonable
fees for services rendered up until the time that he learned
that he was being discharged as Appellant’s attorney. N.T.
6/20/22 at 30-32. Upon careful consideration of
[Appellee’s] petition for counsel fees, the court actually
reduced the total amount sought in said petition to make
certain that [Appellee] was only compensated for the work
done prior to his discharge as Appellant’s attorney. Id. at
32.

(Id. at 23-24) (some capitalization omitted). Regarding the propriety of

Appellee’s retainer agreement, the court emphasized that Appellee “was

retained to represent Appellant in connection with a complicated estate matter

on April 13, 2021, which later developed into a guardianship matter.” (Id. at

15). Because the parties executed the retainer agreement before the filing of

the guardianship petition, the court concluded that the retainer agreement did

not need to comply with the state Orphans’ Court rule governing

representation in guardianship proceedings.

In reviewing the Orphans’ Court’s decision, we conclude that the record

is free from legal error, and the court’s findings are supported by competent

evidence. See Estate of Schaefer, supra. Contrary to Appellant’s

assertions, the record demonstrates that Appellee worked on Appellant’s

behalf to protect Appellant’s share of Decedent’s estate. The invoices attached

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to the petition for counsel fees highlight specific actions on the part of

Appellee, such as “extensive office conference with client on will, assets in

estate, possible theft of assets, [and] need to get house ready for sale[.]”

(Invoice, dated 5/1/21, at 1). Appellee’s actions, in some part, served to

protect the “common fund” of Decedent’s estate from fraud or illegal claims.

See Estate of Tose, supra; Hempstead, supra. While later invoices

evidenced the shift in Appellee’s focus toward litigating the guardianship

petition, we agree with the Orphans’ Court’s characterization of these matters

as being “intertwined,” such that the court possessed the authority to award

fees for Appellee’s work on both matters from the common fund of the estate.

See Estate of Geniviva, supra; Estate of Albright, supra; Feely’s Estate,

supra. Absent more, we decline Appellant’s invitation to second guess the

Orphans’ Court’s credibility determinations and reweigh the evidence. See

Estate of Schaefer, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the decree granting

Appellee’s petition for payment of counsel fees.

Decree affirmed.

Date: 11/28/2023

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