Filed 11/29/23 Marriage of Hiramanek CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Santa Clara)
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In re the Marriage of KAMAL and ADIL C086075/C087408/C088446
HIRAMANEK.
KAMAL HIRAMANEK, (Super. Ct. No. 2009-1-FL-
149682)
Respondent,
v.
ADIL HIRAMANEK,
Appellant.
This case and others involving Adil Hiramanek and his family members were
originally filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Following initial proceedings
in the Sixth Appellate District, various appeals, including these three, were transferred
to this district. These appeals arise from motions, requests, and an application filed
by Adil in a dissolution action between Kamal Hiramanek (now Kapadia) and Adil.
We will refer to Hiramanek family members by their first names for clarity. Kamal did
not file a respondent’s brief.
1
In 2010, the superior court declared Adil a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling
order under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7. That order was affirmed by the Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District in 2012. (In re Marriage of Hiramanek (Aug. 23,
2012, H035887) [nonpub. opn.].)
In appeal No. C086075, Adil challenges the family court’s denial of his motion to
modify child custody and remove one of the children as a protected person under a
restraining order issued against Adil. He also seeks to appeal from several orders of the
superior court denying his requests to file new litigation. In appeal No. C087408, Adil
challenges a family court order characterizing assets in the children’s accounts. And in
appeal No. C088446, Adil challenges the family court’s order denying his application to
vacate the prefiling order and remove him from the vexatious litigants list.
Adil contends the court erred by (1) improperly characterizing funds in the
children’s accounts and not ordering discovery concerning the meaning of a relevant
provision in an agreement between Adil and Kamal; (2) denying Adil’s motion to remove
one of the children as a protected person under a restraining order; (3) denying his
requests to file new litigation; and (4) denying his application to vacate the prefiling order
and remove him from the vexatious litigants list.
Regarding the third contention, to the extent Adil seeks in case No. C086075 to
appeal from orders denying his requests to file new litigation, that portion of the appeal
must be dismissed because an order denying a request to file new litigation by a
vexatious litigant is not appealable. In all other respects we will affirm the challenged
orders.
BACKGROUND
Adil and Kamal married in 1998. Kamal filed a petition for dissolution in 2007,
but they reconciled in 2008. As part of the reconciliation and dismissal of the dissolution
action, Adil and Kamal entered into an agreement that was adopted as an order of the
family court after a hearing in July 2008. (In re Marriage of Hiramanek (Apr. 17, 2019,
2
C082930) [nonpub. opn.].)1 Adil’s mother Roda was a party to the agreement (and a
party to the dissolution action following her complaint in intervention) because some
property held in her name was at issue in the dissolution action. Roda relinquished her
interest in the family residence, and Kamal relinquished any claim to Roda’s assets in
specified accounts. Additionally, the parties agreed that accounts in their minor
children’s names would be held only for the benefit of the children, with Kamal as
custodian of the accounts.
In March 2009, eight months after the family court’s adoption of the agreement as
an order of the court, Kamal again filed a petition for dissolution. Adil attempted to have
the agreement set aside, but the family court denied his motion. Roda also sought to have
the agreement set aside with respect to her relinquishment of her interest in the family
residence, but the family court denied her request and this court affirmed the denial.
(In re Marriage of Hiramanek, supra, C082930.)
We provide additional background in the discussion as relevant to the specific
contentions on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Adil contends the family court erred by improperly characterizing funds in the
children’s accounts and not ordering discovery concerning the meaning of the children’s
funds provision in the agreement. The contention pertains to appeal No. C087408.
In the July 2008 agreement, the parties stipulated, among other things, that any
funds in accounts in the names of their children would be “used only for the benefit of the
children in the discretion of the current custodian.” The agreement further provided that
1 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of this opinion resulting from an
appeal that originated from the same superior court action as this appeal. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)
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Kamal would act as custodian of the children’s accounts. Kamal was to pay to Adil
about $120,000 from the children’s accounts for expenses Adil had already paid for the
children.
Kamal filed a new dissolution action in 2009, and in August 2017, Adil filed a
request to enforce the agreement and adjudicate reserved issues. He requested, among
other things, an order recharacterizing the children’s assets as community property to be
divided in the dissolution action. Although the petition for marriage dissolution had been
granted in 2011, the family court had reserved jurisdiction over the characterization of the
assets in the children’s accounts. The family court denied Adil’s requested
recharacterization, finding that Adil and Kamal had stipulated in the agreement that the
funds in the children’s accounts were solely for the children and not for Adil and Kamal.
According to the family court, nothing in the agreement indicated the stipulated
characterization would end upon dissolution of the marriage.
Adil now argues (A) the agreement is void, (B) the family court erred in
interpreting the agreement, and (C) the family court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence
and denying discovery about extrinsic evidence.
A
Adil argues the agreement is void because Roda, who signed the agreement and
relinquished any claim to the family residence, did not understand the proceedings when
the family court accepted the agreement as an order of the court in July 2008. Adil
provides no authority, and we know of none, establishing that he can assert Roda’s
alleged misunderstanding of the agreement to void the agreement as to himself. (Sviridov
v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514, 521 (Sviridov) [failure to provide
authority forfeits argument].) In any event, Roda’s prior challenge to the validity of the
agreement was unsuccessful. (In re Marriage of Hiramanek, supra, C082930.)
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B
Adil makes several arguments contesting the family court’s interpretation of the
agreement.
He argues there was a prior determination that the agreement was limited to the
duration of the marriage: specifically, a 2013 family court ruling establishing that tax
provisions of the agreement applied only to the years when Adil and Kamal were
married. Although the tax status of the parties and the use of funds for the children are
arguably distinct issues, Adil provides no citation to the record on appeal to help us
resolve the question, and hence the argument is forfeited. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 (City of Lincoln) [arguments not supported by
adequate citations to the record need not be considered on appeal].)
Adil also argues that a provision in the agreement requiring the parties to maintain
complete financial transparency with each other “during their marriage” limits the
duration of the entire agreement. Adil provides no authority for this proposition, and its
merit is not self-evident. (Sviridov, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 521 [failure to provide
authority forfeits argument].) The quoted provision does not expressly limit the duration
of the entire agreement.
Adil further argues any ambiguity in the agreement must be construed against
Kamal because she and her attorney drafted it. (See Civ. Code, § 1654.) Adil does not
establish ambiguity in the agreement with respect to the children’s accounts, however,
and because he provides no citation to the record to establish that Kamal and her attorney
drafted the agreement, the argument is forfeited. (City of Lincoln, supra, 102
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1239.)
Next, Adil argues the relevant provision of the agreement pertains to usage of the
funds, not ownership. He claims the custodian of a fund is not an owner. The arguments
do not undermine the challenged family court ruling.
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In addition, Adil suggests the family court applied a double standard, proving that
the courts are biased against his side of the family. Adil has not shown that the
challenged ruling was unfair or biased.
Moreover, Adil asserts that a paragraph in the agreement providing for
equalization of community assets is dispositive regarding characterization of the
children’s accounts. The cited paragraph provides in pertinent part: “Should [Kamal]
ever file a divorce or any marital action, anywhere in the world, any payment made by
[Adil], pursuant to this paragraph and paragraph 1 [concerning Adil’s payment of some
of Kamal’s legal fees], will be offset from any future financial award of division of
financial property, excluding any real property, child support, spousal support, legal fees,
and personal property.” The paragraph does not refer to the children’s accounts and has
no obvious bearing on their characterization.
C
Adil contends the family court erred by failing to consider extrinsic evidence in
interpreting the provision pertaining to the children’s accounts and by denying further
discovery on the issue.
The meaning of a contract depends on the expressed intent of the parties, viewed
objectively. If a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to
determine the parties’ intent. (Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 11, 21.)
We agree with the family court that the provision pertaining to the children’s
accounts is not ambiguous. The provision does not limit itself to the duration of the
marriage, and nothing in the rest of the agreement imposes such a limitation on that
provision. The only limitation is that any remaining funds are to be disbursed to the
children when they reach a suitable age and maturity. Contrary to Adil’s argument, the
paragraph requiring the parties to maintain financial transparency during the marriage has
no apparent effect on the duration of the provision pertaining to the children’s accounts.
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Because there is no ambiguity in the agreement with respect to the children’s accounts,
the family court properly refused to consider extrinsic evidence.
We review the denial of a motion to compel discovery for abuse of discretion.
(Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) Adil does not
establish that the family court abused its discretion in denying his attempt to obtain
further discovery.
II
Adil next contends the family court erred in denying Adil’s motion to remove one
of the children as a protected person under a restraining order. The contention relates to
appeal No. C086075.
Adil filed a motion to terminate a child custody order with respect to Karl, who
was turning 18, and to remove him as a protected person on the restraining order. The
family court ruled that the custody order as to Karl was terminated by operation of law
when Karl turned 18. However, it denied Adil’s motion to remove Karl as a protected
person under the restraining order because the restraining order applied on its face until
Karl turned 21 and Adil did not show a change in circumstances justifying the removal.
The relevant restraining order was filed on August 27, 2012. It listed Karl’s age as
12 in 2012.
The restraining order is moot as to Karl. (See Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of
Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574 [issue moot when no effectual relief
can be granted].) We can grant no effectual relief because the order expired by its own
terms as to Karl when he turned 21 years old. While an expired restraining order may not
be moot if it could have collateral legal consequences, there is no such showing here.
(San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 564.)
Nevertheless, one matter raised in Adil’s motion is not moot, as far as we can tell.
Adil asked the family court to order Kamal to provide full contact details so that Adil
could contact Karl. The family court denied the request, citing In re Marriage of Jensen
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(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 594, which held that a family court lacks jurisdiction to
facilitate visitation or contact after a child reaches the age of majority. On appeal, Adil
disagrees that Marriage of Jensen supported the family court’s refusal to order Kamal to
give Adil contact information. However, the matter of contact between Adil and Karl is
between the two of them now that Karl is an adult. How to facilitate that contact is
beyond the jurisdiction of the family court. Adil offers no authority, and we know of
none, requiring a family court to order a party to a marriage dissolution action to divulge
the contact information of an adult child.
III
In addition, Adil contends the superior court erred in denying his requests to file
new litigation. The contention pertains to appeal No. C086075.
A vexatious litigant such as Adil must obtain permission from the presiding judge
before filing any new litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.7.) Adil’s notice of appeal in
case No. C086075 listed several orders of the superior court denying his requests to file
new litigation by a vexatious litigant. He contends it was error to deny those requests.
To the extent Adil seeks in case No. C086075 to appeal from orders denying his requests
to file new litigation, that portion of the appeal must be dismissed because an order
denying a request to file new litigation by a vexatious litigant is not appealable. (In re
Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 78-79.)
IV
Adil further contends the superior court erred by denying his application to vacate
the prefiling order and remove him from the vexatious litigants list. The contention
relates to appeal No. C088446.
As noted, Adil was designated a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order
under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7 on June 2, 2010. The designation and order
were affirmed in In re Marriage of Hiramanek, supra, H035887. This application was
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his fourth attempt to vacate the prefiling order and remove his name from the vexatious
litigants list.
A vexatious litigant, such as Adil, may apply to vacate the prefiling order and have
his name removed from the vexatious litigants list. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.8, subd. (a).)
“A court may vacate a prefiling order and order removal of a vexatious litigant’s name
from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious litigants subject to prefiling orders upon a
showing of a material change in the facts upon which the order was granted and that the
ends of justice would be served by vacating the order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.8,
subd. (c).) Because the statute provides that a superior court “may” vacate a prefiling
order on application, we review the denial of the application for abuse of discretion.
(Ibid.; see Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 636 [applying abuse of
discretion review to vexatious litigant determination].)
Adil applied to vacate the prefiling order on August 17, 2018. He claimed there
had been a material change in the facts upon which the prefiling order was granted.
Concerning the material change in facts, Adil declared that no new state court case had
been commenced and that no further findings had been made concerning frivolous filings
since his previous application to vacate the prefiling order.
The superior court considered Adil’s application and issued a detailed order
denying it on September 7, 2018. In the order, the superior court chronicled Adil’s
filings and concluded that the review “reveals he has continued to engage in the type of
conduct that led to the entry of a prefiling order in the first instance.” Adil filed at least
75 requests to file new litigation since he was declared a vexatious litigant. He also filed
motions and litigation in his mother’s name. Five months before the superior court order
denying Adil’s current application to vacate the prefiling order, a federal district court
issued an order precluding Adil from making any filing without the court’s permission.
The superior court concluded: “The numerous denied requests by [Adil] to file
new litigation and his additional litigation activities as described herein necessarily show
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a lack of material change in the facts upon which the prefiling order was granted. The
substantial number of failed attempts to initiate new litigation exemplify that [Adil’s]
abusive and harassing litigation conduct was not abated and the prefiling order is, to a
large extent, serving the purpose for which it was issued. The ends of justice would not
be served by vacating the order.”
Adil now argues the original prefiling order is void, the facts have materially
changed, and the ends of justice would be served by vacating the order.
Adil did not include in his application to vacate the prefiling order any argument
that the prefiling order is void. Therefore, he may not do so here. (Kaufman & Broad
Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226.)
Furthermore, Adil’s arguments attacking the validity of the original prefiling order were
rejected long ago. (In re Marriage of Hiramanek, supra, H035887.) The validity of the
prefiling order is no longer at issue.
Within Adil’s argument that the prefiling order is void, he asserts that prefiling
orders do not apply to pending litigation and to litigants other than plaintiffs (he being the
respondent in the dissolution action) and thus does not apply to him. These arguments
have been rejected in precedent Adil does not distinguish. (In re Marriage of Deal
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 620-621.)
Adil argues there has been a material change in the facts and that vacating the
prefiling order would serve the ends of justice, but he does not provide sufficient citations
to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1247 [appellant forfeited challenges on appeal by failing to cite to the record].)
Adil refers to a finding that he “regularly attempts to argue off-topic issues” in his
filings, but the quoted language does not appear in the 2018 order subject to this appeal.
Adil further asserts “there have been no hearings held in 2020, and barely any during the
remaining of the review period.” Adil provides no citation to the record for his assertion,
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and in any event, because the challenged order was issued in 2018, proceedings in 2020
are not relevant.
Adil has not established error.
DISPOSITION
As to case No. C086075, the portion of the appeal challenging orders denying
permission to file new litigation is dismissed. The order denying Adil’s motion to
remove Karl as a protected person on the restraining order is affirmed.
As to case No. C087408, the orders denying Adil’s motion concerning the
children’s accounts and denying further discovery on the matter are affirmed.
As to case No. C088446, the order denying Adil’s application to vacate the
prefiling order and remove him from the vexatious litigants list is affirmed.
The parties will bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a).)
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
DUARTE, J.
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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