United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 21, 2023
No. 22-40518 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Olivia Sligh,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Conroe, Texas; Tyson Sutton; Alexis Alias
Montes; Montgomery County, Texas,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CV-1417
______________________________
Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Olivia Sligh appeals the dismissal of (1) an excessive force claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a § 1983 failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim;
(3) a § 1983 municipal liability claim; and (4) various failure-to-accommodate
claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We
AFFIRM.
No. 22-40518
I.
This case involves a plaintiff who was bitten and injured by a police
dog. The below facts are mainly taken from the operative complaint. At 1:39
a.m. on July 5, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant Olivia Sligh’s partner called 911 to
report that Sligh was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot.
Sligh’s partner requested an ambulance, and he indicated that Sligh was
unarmed and not a violent person. The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office
notified the City of Conroe of the emergency medical call and requested a
canine officer if available. Tyson Sutton, a police officer employed by the City
of Conroe, and Alexis Alias Montes, a deputy employed by the Montgomery
County Sheriff’s Office, responded to the call. Sutton brought along Thor, a
trained K9 police dog. These two officers, the City of Conroe, and
Montgomery County are the Defendants-Appellees in this action.
The complaint alleges that when the officers located Sligh, Sutton
shined a flashlight in Sligh’s face as Thor barked and lunged at her. Montes
grabbed Sligh, who pulled away. Sutton then sicced Thor on Sligh, and Thor
initially bit Sligh in the upper thigh. Sligh sat down, and Sutton continued to
direct Thor to bite Sligh on the rear of her upper leg and her ankle. Sligh
alleges that “Sutton used the dog to purposively attack and bite” her; that
“Montes did not intervene in the multiple dog bites by words or actions even
though the attack lasted one minute and some seconds”; and that she never
resisted seizure, tried to escape, or assaulted Montes.
Sligh’s complaint is not the only account of what happened that night.
Sligh’s complaint also repeatedly references Sutton’s bodycam footage (the
“Video”), which was attached to Montgomery County and Montes’s motion
to dismiss. In the Video, Sutton encounters Sligh and shines a flashlight at
her. Sligh begins to approach Sutton, who loudly says: “Wait, wait, wait,
don’t! Do not walk towards me! Do not walk towards me! The dog will bite
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No. 22-40518
you!” Sligh acknowledges Sutton before shouting a profanity at the officers.
Montes commands Sligh to place her hands behind her back. Sligh responds
with more profanities and, contrary to the complaint’s assertions that she
never resisted, slaps at Montes’s arms while attempting to pull away. Sligh
and Montes physically struggle for about 11 seconds, at which point Sligh
breaks free from Montes’s grip. Sutton then releases Thor with a bite
command, and Thor bites Sligh as Sutton commands her to get on the
ground. Sligh falls to a seated position on the ground and cries out in pain.
Beginning eight seconds after the bite command, Sutton repeatedly
commands Thor to release Sligh, but Thor does not immediately comply.
Sligh begins lying on her side. 36 seconds after giving the first bite command,
Sutton grabs and pulls Thor’s collar. Thor releases Sligh around 64 seconds
following the first bite command. 1 While Thor was biting Sligh, Montes
reaches to control Sligh’s hands and commands her to put her hands behind
her back. Montes handcuffs Sligh after Thor’s release.
On April 21, 2020, Sligh filed a complaint against the City of Conroe
and John Doe Conroe Police Officers alleging various constitutional,
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Rehabilitation Act claims.
Sligh subsequently amended her complaint three times and added the present
Defendants-Appellees. In the operative third amended complaint filed on
June 23, 2021, Sligh asserted various claims against Sutton and Montes in
their individual capacities as well as claims against the City of Conroe and
Montgomery County. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, she asserted
(1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim against Sutton; (2) a § 1983
failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim against Montes; (3) a § 1983
_____________________
1
The time of the release is unclear from the footage. But given that Thor began and
continued barking from this point, we can infer that the attack lasted 64 seconds at most
from first bite to release.
3
No. 22-40518
municipal/Monell liability claim against the City of Conroe; and (4) various
failure-to-accommodate claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act against both the City of Conroe and Montgomery County.
Montgomery County and Montes jointly moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim, raising, inter alia, a qualified immunity
defense as to Montes. The City of Conroe and Sutton also moved to dismiss,
with Sutton raising a qualified immunity defense. The district court granted
all three motions. It held that (1) Sutton was entitled to qualified immunity
on Sligh’s excessive force claim; (2) Montes was entitled to qualified
immunity on Sligh’s failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim; (3) Sligh
had failed to state a § 1983 municipal liability claim against the City of
Conroe; and that (4) Sligh’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the
City of Conroe and Montgomery County failed because they fell into the
exigent circumstances exception to the ADA. Sligh timely appealed.
II.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss. Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 2016). In
considering a motion to dismiss, we may “also consider ‘[d]ocuments that a
defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss . . . if they are referred to in the
plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.’” Villarreal v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
If an allegation is qualified by the contents of an exhibit attached to the
pleadings, but the exhibit instead contradicts the allegation, “the exhibit and
not the allegation controls.” United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, the Video was attached to
Montgomery County and Montes’s joint motion to dismiss and referenced
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No. 22-40518
by Sligh in her operative complaint. Accordingly, to the extent that the Video
contradicts Sligh’s allegations, the Video controls.
III.
A. Excessive Force Claim
We begin with Sligh’s excessive force claim against Officer Sutton. To
overcome Sutton’s qualified immunity defense, Sligh must show (1) that
Sutton violated a constitutional right; and (2) that the right at issue was
“clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). We can address these inquiries in any
order. See id. at 236.
To succeed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, Sligh must
demonstrate an “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use
of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was
clearly unreasonable.” See Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009)). “In
excessive-force claims, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct depends
on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case . . . .’” Cooper v.
Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Such a determination is based on “the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
The Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor outlined three factors that inform
the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force: “(1) the severity of the crime
at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of
officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” See Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v.
Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
5
No. 22-40518
The first Graham factor, the severity of the crime, weighs in Sligh’s
favor. The officers were called based on concerns about Sligh’s mental
health, not a crime she was suspected of committing.
The second Graham factor, whether the suspect posed an immediate
threat to the safety of officers or others, also weighs in Sligh’s favor. Sligh
may have posed a safety threat to herself, as she had cut herself and was
potentially suicidal, but the officers received no indication that Sligh was
violent, armed, or otherwise posed a threat to others. Defendants-Appellees’
contention that the employment of a dog bite was justified due to Sligh’s
immediate safety threat to herself is unpersuasive in this case. Sligh did not
appear to be engaging in self-harm during her interactions with the officers,
which undermines Defendants-Appellees’ argument that Sligh posed an
“immediate” safety threat to herself that warranted such a dangerous use of
force. It is also difficult to see how Sligh’s self-harm justifies the employment
of a dog bite, which will inevitably lead to more punctures or lacerations.
Defendants-Appellees contend that Sutton could not determine
whether Sligh had a weapon in her clothing, which weighs in favor of
employing the dog bite. But it is difficult to imagine that Sutton would have
believed that Sligh, who was wearing a tank top and women’s athletic shorts,
was armed when no weapon was produced during the physical struggle
between Sligh and Montes. Furthermore, because the officers did not suspect
that Sligh was violent or had committed a crime, the fact that she was
unsearched is not enough to permit a reasonable officer to assume that she
posed an immediate threat. See Cooper, 844 F.3d at 523 n.2.
The third Graham factor, whether the suspect was actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, appears to weigh against Sligh.
The Video shows that Sligh actively resisted seizure, did not follow verbal
commands, and engaged in a physical struggle with Montes. Once Sligh
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No. 22-40518
broke free from Montes’s efforts to physically apprehend her, a reasonable
officer could conclude that a heightened use of force would be necessary to
detain her for her own safety. However, even where force is authorized,
officers must employ an appropriate degree of force to stay within
constitutional bounds. An officer must use force “with measured and
ascending actions that correspond[] to [a suspect’s] escalating verbal and
physical resistance.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332–33 (alterations in original)
(quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2012)).
We find that under these circumstances, the decision to sic Thor on
Sligh constituted an excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. When Sligh slipped free from Montes’s attempt to seize her,
there was a break in the action. At that point, the officers could have
attempted to escalate their use of physical force in a more measured manner,
or they could have provided a clear warning that they would employ a dog
bite if Sligh did not comply. Instead, Sutton sicced Thor on Sligh without
warning.
Without any further attempts to subdue Sligh without the use of a dog
bite, and without providing Sligh any warning that she may be subjected to a
dog bite if she did not comply, Sutton sicced a dog on a woman who (1) was
not suspected of any crime; (2) did not pose an immediate safety threat to
officers or others; and (3) was in need of emergency medical intervention due
to self-harm. Furthermore, Sligh—surrounded by a fence and thick foliage—
was not attempting to flee the officers. Employing a dog bite under these
circumstances arguably constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of
Sligh’s Fourth Amendment rights. 2
_____________________
2
We need not and do not address the issue of whether the prolonged duration of
Thor’s bite also constituted excessive force. Because Thor disobeyed Sutton’s commands
to release Sligh, the extension of the application of force in this case was arguably
7
No. 22-40518
Because we find that Sligh has alleged a violation of a constitutional
right, we turn to the question of whether that right was clearly established at
the time of the violation. “To answer that question in the affirmative, we
must be able to point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of
persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in question with
a high degree of particularity.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371–72 (5th
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although this does not mean that “a case directly on point” is required,
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
“‘[I]n an obvious case,’ the Graham excessive-force factors
themselves ‘can clearly establish’” the law without a body of relevant
precedent. Cooper, 844 F.3d at 524 (quoting Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757,
764 (5th Cir. 2012)). We find that the facts here do not present such an
“obvious case.” Because Sligh actively resisted seizure, the third Graham
factor weighs against her and justified a use of heightened force. While the
method of heightened force employed may have been unconstitutionally
excessive, the Graham analysis in this case is not so obvious as to clearly
establish the law without a body of relevant authority. Sligh therefore bears
the burden of identifying precedent that clearly establishes her constitutional
right.
_____________________
unintentional. Sligh has offered no evidence that Thor, nor police dogs more generally,
frequently ignore such commands to release. Neither has she offered any clearly established
law indicating that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he or she loses control
of a canine engaged in a dog bite. We therefore find that the unintended use of canine force
that occurred after Sutton ordered Thor to release did not violate Sligh’s clearly established
right. Because we find that there was not a clearly established violation of a constitutional
right, we need not address “whether in fact there is such a right.” See Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236–37.
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No. 22-40518
In arguing that Officer Sutton violated her clearly established right,
Sligh relies primarily on the case Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517 (5th Cir.
2016). In Cooper, the namesake plaintiff fled on foot after being pulled over
on suspicion of driving under the influence (“DUI”). Id. at 521. An officer
radioed for backup and explained that Cooper was a DUI suspect. Id.
Defendant Officer Brown answered the call with his police dog, Sunny, who
discovered Cooper in a small wood-fenced “cubbyhole.” Id. The parties
disputed whether Sunny initiated the attack or if Brown ordered it, but they
agreed on the following sequence of events following the initial bite:
Sunny continued biting Cooper for one to two minutes. During
that time, Cooper did not attempt to flee or to strike Sunny.
Brown instructed Cooper to show his hands and to submit to
him. At the time of that order, Cooper’s hands were on
Sunny’s head. Brown testified that he could see Cooper’s
hands and could appreciate that he had no weapon. Brown then
ordered Cooper to roll onto his stomach. He complied, and
Brown handcuffed him. But he did not order Sunny to release
the bite until after he had finished handcuffing Cooper.
Id. This court affirmed the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. at 524–26. On the
question of whether there was a constitutional violation, we held that all the
Graham factors except for the severity of the crime “push[ed] heavily for
Cooper.” Id. at 522. Cooper did not pose an immediate threat because he was
not suspected of committing a violent offense, Brown had not been warned
that Cooper may be violent, and Brown could see that Cooper was unarmed.
Id. at 522–23. Furthermore, Cooper was “not actively resisting arrest or
attempting to flee or to strike Sunny.” Id. at 523. The only act of resistance
Brown identified was Cooper’s understandable failure to raise his hands
while being bit by Sunny. Id. And, in any case, Cooper complied with
Brown’s order to roll onto his stomach. Id. Also relevant to our analysis was
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No. 22-40518
Brown’s failure to immediately command Sunny to release the bite; instead,
he waited until after Cooper had been handcuffed. Id. at 521, 523. In sum,
while explicitly noting that we were not creating a per se rule on
reasonableness, we concluded that “[u]nder the facts in this record,
permitting a dog to continue biting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee
is objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 524.
The present case is distinguishable from Cooper in at least two material
aspects. First, Sligh actively resisted seizure. See id. (“Our caselaw makes
certain that once an arrestee stops resisting, the degree of force an officer can
employ is reduced.” (emphasis added)). Second, Cooper involved a dog bite
that was intentionally prolonged. Sunny bit Cooper for one to two minutes
before the officer finally ordered Sunny to release. Id. at 521. Here, Sutton
repeatedly ordered Thor to release Sligh beginning about eight seconds after
the initial bite command. And when Thor failed to obey his repeated
commands, Sutton made affirmative efforts to release Thor by pulling his
collar about 36 seconds following the first release command. Such conduct
on Sutton’s part suggests that the amount of force intentionally used here
differs from Cooper, where the dog bit the plaintiff for one to two minutes and
the officer did not order the dog to release the plaintiff until after the suspect
was handcuffed. See id. at 524 (noting that “permitting a dog to continue
biting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee is objectively unreasonable”
(emphasis added)).
We find that Cooper’s precedent does not sufficiently “place[] the . . .
constitutional question beyond debate.” See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Cooper
involved a nonresisting plaintiff and an intentionally prolonged application of
force. Because the present case involves an application of unintentionally
prolonged force against an actively resisting plaintiff, we do not find that
Sutton’s violation of Sligh’s constitutional right was clearly established.
Sutton is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
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No. 22-40518
B. Bystander Liability Claim
We next consider Sligh’s failure-to-intervene/bystander liability
claim against Montes. To overcome Montes’s qualified immunity defense,
Sligh must identify law clearly establishing that Montes’s actions violated her
constitutional rights, i.e., she must show that “any reasonable officer would
have known that the Constitution required them to intervene.” Joseph, 981
F.3d at 345. She has not done so. We accordingly need not and do not reach
the question of whether Montes violated Sligh’s constitutional rights. See
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37.
Sligh relies entirely on Cooper as clearly establishing the law relating
to Montes’s actions. But this reliance on Cooper is misplaced because Cooper
is wholly inapplicable to a bystander liability theory. The facts and analysis in
Cooper concerned only the conduct of the specific officer who controlled the
dog. There was consequently no discussion in Cooper of whether another
officer on site would be required to intervene as a bystander. Thus, Cooper
cannot clearly establish that Montes—a bystander—violated Sligh’s
constitutional rights by failing to intervene. Sligh points to no other case
clearly establishing the law on this issue. Accordingly, Montes is entitled to
qualified immunity on Sligh’s bystander liability claim.
C. Municipal Liability Claim
We next consider Sligh’s municipal liability claim against the City of
Conroe. For such a claim, Sligh must identify “(1) an official policy (or
custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving
force’ is that policy or custom.” See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,
541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328
(5th Cir. 2002)).
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No. 22-40518
Sligh asserts three separate theories of municipal liability. First, Sligh
argues that the City of Conroe had inadequate written policies concerning
police dogs. Second, Sligh contends that the City of Conroe failed to
adequately train Officer Sutton on the use of his police dog. Third, Sligh
asserts that the City of Conroe ratified Sutton’s actions by failing to punish
him or change their policies. We address each theory of municipal liability in
turn.
1. Inadequate Policies Claim
For an inadequate policies claim, “[a] plaintiff must show that (1) an
official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the
moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peña v. City of
Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hicks-Fields v.
Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff must also show
that the policy was implemented with “deliberate indifference” to the
“known or obvious consequences” that constitutional violations would
result. Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407
(1997)). Usually, a plaintiff must show “a pattern of similar violations” to
establish deliberate indifference. Valle, 613 F.3d at 547. “To show deliberate
indifference based on a single incident, there must be evidence that shows
that it should have been apparent or obvious to the policymaker that a
constitutional violation was the ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the
particular policy.” Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 391 (quoting Burge v. St. Tammany
Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Sligh’s policy-based claim fails because she has not adequately alleged
that an official policy was a moving force behind Officer Sutton’s violation of
her constitutional right. Sligh alleges that “the only policy that the City has
on the use of attack dogs is that they may be used on anyone: evading arrest;
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No. 22-40518
known to be armed; that has demonstrated violence; that has the potential
for violence; or has committed a felony.” Sligh mischaracterizes the policy
in question. Her quotations are misrepresentations of the relevant policy
language, which states that police dogs can be “released off leash to
apprehend any suspect evading arrest that is known to be armed, has
demonstrated violence, or the potential for violence, or has committed a
felony offense.”
Sligh cannot establish a “moving force” causal relationship between
this policy and Officer Sutton’s constitutional violation. The policy limits the
offensive employment of canines to a subset of suspects evading arrest, which
does not apply to Sligh. Because Sutton was not following this policy when
he sicced Thor on Sligh, we find that the policy cited by Sligh was not a
moving force behind Sutton’s constitutional violation.
Sligh also fails to adequately allege that the City’s canine policies were
deficient. She relies on Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994), an
out-of-circuit authority, to support her proposition that a failure to adopt a
departmental policy governing the use of police dogs constitutes deliberate
indifference. But in Chew, the court held that municipal liability could be
found “[w]here the city equips its police officers with potentially dangerous
animals, and evidence is adduced that those animals inflict injury in a
significant percentage of the cases in which they are used,” provided that the
city “fail[s] to engage in any oversight whatsoever of an important
departmental practice involving the use of force.” Id.
Sligh’s reference to the City’s policy, which limits the offensive use
of canines to apprehending a subset of suspects evading arrest, undermines
her assertion that the City’s canine policies were deficient. Additionally,
unlike the plaintiff in Chew, Sligh fails to allege a widespread pattern of
canine-related injury that would provide the City with “[a]ctual or
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No. 22-40518
constructive knowledge” that its canine policies were constitutionally
inadequate. See Burge, 336 F.3d at 370 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett
v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984)). She does not convincingly
argue why she need not show a pattern of violations here, arguing only that
this court should “infer” that such problems were “reoccurring.” Sligh’s
speculation is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference as necessary for
an inadequate policies claim.
Because the City’s actual canine policy was not a “moving force”
behind Officer Sutton’s constitutional violation, and because Sligh has not
alleged facts indicating that the City was deliberately indifferent to a known
or obvious risk that its canine policies would result in constitutional
violations, we find that the district court did not err in holding that Sligh
failed to adequately allege an inadequate policies claim against the City of
Conroe.
2. Failure-to-Train Claim
A failure-to-train theory of municipal liability requires Sligh to show
that “1) the [city] failed to train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is
a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the
alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure to train or
supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.” See Peña, 879 F.3d at 623 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson
v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Sligh’s failure-to-train claim fails because, as described above, she
cannot show deliberate indifference on the City of Conroe’s part. Sligh
argues that the need for more or different training here is so obvious that the
policymakers can reasonably be said to be deliberately indifferent. But she
rests the entirety of her conclusory argument on the single present incident
and pleads no pattern of prior incidents sufficient to place the City of Conroe
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No. 22-40518
on “actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training
program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); cf. id. at 62 (“A pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” (quoting
Brown, 520 U.S. at 409)). Because Sligh has failed to allege specific and non-
conclusory facts that would show that the City was deliberately indifferent in
adopting its training policy, we find that the district court did not err in
dismissing Sligh’s failure-to-train claim against the City of Conroe.
3. Ratification Claim
Concerning ratification, if “authorized policymakers approve a
subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification [is] chargeable to
the municipality because their decision is final.” World Wide Street Preachers
Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). “The theory of
ratification, however, has been limited to ‘extreme factual situations.’” Id.
(quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009)).
“Therefore, unless the subordinate’s actions are sufficiently extreme—for
instance, an obvious violation of clearly established law—a policymaker’s
ratification or defense of his subordinate’s actions is insufficient to establish
an official policy or custom.” Id.
Sligh’s ratification theory fares no better than her other theories of
municipal liability. Ratification is a limited theory of liability, and, for the
reasons stated above, the present circumstances are neither an obvious
violation of clearly established law nor an extreme factual circumstance
sufficient to support a municipal liability claim. Thus, Sligh’s ratification
theory fails.
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No. 22-40518
D. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Finally, we consider Sligh’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
against the municipalities. 3 “Title II of the ADA provides that ‘no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.’” Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12132). Although her briefing is not particularly clear, Sligh appears
to be pursuing a failure-to-accommodate claim. 4
“To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and
its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the
entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d
584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015). “Plaintiffs ordinarily satisfy the knowledge
element by showing that they identified their disabilities as well as the
resulting limitations to a public entity or its employees and requested an
accommodation in direct and specific terms.” Smith v. Harris County, 956
F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020). “When a plaintiff fails to request an
_____________________
3
We adjudicate and refer to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims collectively as
the “ADA claims” below. See D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d
450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because this court has equated liability standards under § 504
[of the Rehabilitation Act] and the ADA, we evaluate [Plaintiff’s] claims under the statutes
together.”).
4
Specifically, Sligh argues that the municipal Defendants-Appellees failed to
accommodate her mental disabilities by (1) using a police attack dog; (2) not educating and
training officers in caring for mentally disabled persons; (3) not using verbal de-escalation
techniques; (4) not protecting Sligh from further harm; (5) not allowing Sligh an
opportunity to account for her being surrounded; (6) not adopting a policy to protect the
mentally disabled; (7) not conducting self-evaluation plans under the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act; and (8) not modifying their programs and services to accommodate the
mentally disabled.
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No. 22-40518
accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing that ‘the
disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’
were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” Id. at
317–18 (quoting Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir.
2017)).
Sligh does not meet this standard. Assuming arguendo that she is a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, Sligh pleads no facts
showing that she requested an accommodation or that her disability and
limitations were known by the covered entity. At this stage, we must take as
true her allegations that “Officer Sutton and Deputy Montes learned that
Olivia had cut herself, was suicidal, [and] that she was a mental health
patient.” But Sligh does not allege that she identified her disabilities or
resulting limitations; nor does she allege that she requested any of her
accommodations “in direct and specific terms” to the officers. See id. at 317.
The Video further corroborates that she did not request the accommodations
that she now alleges were denied.
Having failed to make such requests, Sligh can “prevail only by
showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable
accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant
agents.” See id. at 317–18 (quoting Windham, 875 F.3d at 237). But she does
not attempt to make this showing. Nor could she. Neither her limitations nor
her highly specific desired accommodations were open, obvious, and
apparent under the given facts, where a police dog was used to track a missing
person who then immediately began physically struggling with one of the
officers. Because Sligh has not shown that her disability and limitations were
known by the municipalities, her failure-to-accommodate claims under the
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No. 22-40518
ADA and Rehabilitation Act are inadequate and were appropriately
dismissed. 5
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
_____________________
5
Because we can “affirm on any ground supported by the record, including one
not reached by the district court,” we do not and need not consider the district court’s
invocation of the exigency exception to the ADA. See Ballew v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 668
F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012).
18