Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1385 v. Greater Dayton Regional Transit Auth.

[Cite as Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1385 v. Greater Dayton Regional Transit Auth., 2023-Ohio-4331.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, :
LOCAL 1385 :
: C.A. No. 29801
Appellant :
: Trial Court Case No. 2019 CV 4256
v. :
: (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
GREATER DAYTON REGIONAL : Court)
TRANSIT AUTHORITY :
:
Appellee

...........

OPINION

Rendered on December 1, 2023

...........

JOSEPH S. PASS, Attorney for Appellant

MATTHEW L. ROBERTS & LAUREN M. LARRICK, Attorneys for Appellee

.............

LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1385 (“the Union”) appeals

from an order of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas overruling the Union’s

motion to enforce the court’s December 5, 2019 judgment, which had confirmed an

arbitration award. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the trial court’s order and
 -2-

remand the cause for an evidentiary hearing on the Union’s motion to enforce the trial

court’s December 5, 2019 judgment.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} This appeal involves Michael Humerick, a union member who was terminated

from employment by RTA on October 11, 2017. The Union filed a grievance against

RTA pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and RTA.

{¶ 3} On September 24, 2018, the Union won its arbitration relating to Humerick.

The arbitrator concluded that “[Humerick] will be reinstated with full back pay, benefits,

and seniority.” The arbitrator did not determine what was the proper amount of full back

pay and benefits.

{¶ 4} On September 18, 2019, the Union filed an application in the Montgomery

County Common Pleas Court to confirm the arbitration award. As part of that application,

the Union pointed out that RTA had reinstated Humerick but had failed to pay him full

back pay and benefits, as required by the arbitration award. On December 5, 2019, the

trial court entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.

{¶ 5} On March 23, 2022, the Union filed a motion to enforce the trial court’s

December 5, 2019 judgment. As part of that motion, the Union requested that the trial

court order RTA to pay Humerick an additional $23,008.95 plus statutory interest for back

pay and benefits that had been calculated incorrectly by RTA. On April 20, 2022, RTA

filed a motion to dismiss the Union’s motion.

{¶ 6} On May 8, 2023, the trial court granted RTA’s motion to dismiss and
 -3-

overruled the Union’s motion to enforce the December 5, 2019 judgment. The trial court

incorporated by reference its June 21, 2021 ruling in Montgomery C.P. Case No. 2018-

CV-1904, in which it had found that Humerick’s acceptance of RTA’s check constituted a

ratification of the arbitrator’s award and ended the justiciable controversy regarding his

grievance. The Union filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. The Trial Court Erred in Overruling the Union’s Motion to Enforce the Trial

Court’s Judgment Based on The Doctrine of Ratification

{¶ 7} The Union’s sole assignment of error states:

The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas committed

reversible error by granting Greater Dayton Regional Transit Authority’s

motion to dismiss the Amalgamated Transit Union 1385’s motion to enforce

the December 5, 2019 order and judgment entry confirming the labor

arbitration award issued pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining

agreement.

{¶ 8} In its May 8, 2023 decision overruling the Union’s motion to enforce the trial

court’s December 5, 2019 judgment, the trial court referenced and relied on the reasoning

expressed in its June 21, 2021 ruling in Montgomery C.P. Case No. 2018-CV-1904.

There, the trial court stated, in relevant part:

RTA asserts that it has made Sandra Thompson, Keith Ashburn,

Michelle Blair, and Michael Humerick whole and Local 1385 is asking this

Court to award additional damages. * * * Local 1385 does not dispute that
 -4-

RTA made these payments and they were accepted by the grieving parties.

RTA argues that Local 1385 is asking this Court to expand the judgment

and award new damages. * * * The Court agrees that the acceptance of

RTA checks by these four employees constitutes a ratification of the

arbitrator’s awards and ends the justiciable controversy regarding those

grievances. * * * Not only are these arbitration awards not part of this

Court’s judgment that the Court of Appeals affirmed, there is no longer a

justiciable dispute with respect to those grievances. Thus, the Court

DENIES Local 1385’s motion to enforce those judgments.

June 21, 2021 Decision, p. 4 (Case No. 2018-CV-1904), citing Geiger v. Morgan Stanley

DW, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-608, 2010-Ohio-2850, ¶ 15-16.

{¶ 9} The Union contends that “[t]he trial court committed reversible error by

holding that an individual employee was the party and therefore when the individual

employee accepted some payment from RTA (regardless of amount), the arbitration

award was ratified by [the Union], thereby rendering the Union’s claims non-justiciable.”

Appellant’s Brief, p. 6. The Union argues that the trial court’s erroneous ruling creates a

host of unintended consequences that must be avoided. Id. at 17-19.

{¶ 10} RTA responds that the trial court’s “decision is consistent with well-settled

case law in Ohio holding that a plaintiff has no right to modify an arbitration award or seek

additional damages under R.C. 2711.09 if the plaintiff already ratified the award by

accepting payment or otherwise reaping the benefit of the award.” Appellee’s Brief, p.

5. RTA also contends that “[i]f this Court were to determine that the trial court has
 -5-

jurisdiction over the Union’s claims, it would have to hold a hearing and allow the RTA,

the Union, and Humerick to present testimony and evidence so this Court could determine

whether Humerick is entitled to additional damages, and if so, the amount of such

additional damages. The court would therefore have to perform the same functions the

parties specifically and contractually designated to arbitrators.” Id. at 14.

{¶ 11} “Ratification has been defined as the approval by act, word, or conduct of

that which was improperly done.” (Citation omitted.) AFCO Credit Corp. v. Brandywine

Ski Ctr., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 217, 221, 610 N.E.2d 1032 (9th Dist.1992). ”The intention

to ratify is an essential element, and is at the foundation of the doctrine of ratification.”

Id., citing Jeffords v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 19 Ohio Law Abs. 701, 702 (2d

Dist.1935). We agree with the Union that Humerick’s acceptance of RTA’s payment, by

itself, did not constitute ratification on the part of the Union that RTA’s payment constituted

full back pay and benefits, as required by the arbitration award.

{¶ 12} The record is unclear whether RTA’s payment to Humerick was made by

direct deposit or check. Moreover, it is unclear from the record whether RTA’s payment

was made directly to Humerick or sent to the Union, which then forwarded the payment

to Humerick. What is clear, however, is that the Union, not Humerick, was the party

opposing RTA at the arbitration and the only party that could “ratify” RTA’s payment.

{¶ 13} In Leon v. Boardman Twp., 100 Ohio St.3d 335, 2003-Ohio-6466, 800

N.E.2d 12, ¶ 18, a union filed a grievance on behalf of an employee. The grievance was

submitted to an arbitrator, who reduced the employee’s discharge to a suspension and

reinstated him to his position as a police officer but declined to award any back pay. The
 -6-

employee, on his own behalf, filed a motion in the common pleas court to vacate the

award when his union declined the employee’s request for further representation

regarding the issue of back pay. The trial court dismissed the employee’s application on

the basis that he was not a party to the arbitration regarding his discharge and, therefore,

lacked “standing to bring a motion to vacate the arbitration decision.” Id. at ¶ 2. The

Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that an

employee has no standing to challenge the arbitration award and is not a party to the

arbitration proceedings as contemplated by R.C. 2711.10 absent language in the

collective bargaining agreement allowing the employee to have control over the arbitration

proceedings. Id. at ¶ 3. The employee appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

{¶ 14} The Ohio Supreme Court focused on the well-established principle that “an

aggrieved worker whose employment is governed by a collective bargaining agreement

that provides for binding arbitration will generally be deemed to have relinquished his or

her right to act independently of the union in all matters related to or arising from the

contract, except to the limited extent that the agreement explicitly provides to the

contrary.” Id. at ¶ 17. Based on this principle, the Court held that ”when an employee's

discharge or grievance is arbitrated between an employer and a union under the terms of

a collective bargaining agreement, the aggrieved employee does not have standing to

petition a court to vacate the award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10, unless the collective

bargaining agreement expressly gives the employee an independent right to submit

disputes to arbitration.” Id. at ¶ 18.

{¶ 15} RTA does not contest the fact that it and the Union were the two parties to
 -7-

the arbitration proceeding at issue in this appeal. RTA contends, however, that

Humerick retained the power to accept payment from RTA and bind the Union as a result

thereof through the doctrine of ratification. But Leon makes it clear that, absent a

provision in the collective bargaining agreement giving the employee this independent

power, RTA must deal directly with the Union, not the employee. As the Union accurately

points out, allowing an employee to essentially settle or ratify his or her claim for less than

what an arbitrator awarded by simply accepting a payment from an employer would lead

to several practical difficulties. Just as an employee does not have standing to challenge

an arbitration award unless the collective bargaining agreement provides otherwise, an

employer cannot escape the effect of an arbitration award by sending a partial payment

to an employee in the hopes he or she will accept it and somehow bind the Union.

{¶ 16} There is no evidence in the record that the Union played any role in

calculating the amount that RTA paid Humerick. Moreover, there is no evidence in the

record that the Union took any actions or made any statements that could reasonably be

construed as an intent on the part of the Union to ratify the payment made by RTA as the

correct amount of full back pay and benefits. Rather, the Union’s actions in moving to

confirm the arbitration award and then moving to enforce the judgment made it clear that

the Union did not agree with the position that RTA’s payment had fully satisfied the

arbitrator’s award. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of

ratification precluded it from considering the merits of the Union’s motion to enforce the

December 5, 2019 judgment.

{¶ 17} The cases cited by RTA in favor of the trial court’s ratification finding are
 -8-

inapposite and unpersuasive. In Luby v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

52874, 1987 WL 19250 (Oct. 29, 1987), the appellant was injured through the negligence

of an uninsured motorist. The appellant demanded arbitration and was awarded

$19,000, which was duly paid and accepted by the appellant. The appellant then moved

to confirm the award in the common pleas court to pursue prejudgment interest. The

trial court granted summary judgment against the appellant on its confirmation

application. The Eighth District affirmed, concluding that “[h]aving received and

accepted payment in satisfaction of the award, appellant ratified the arbitration award,

and in applying for confirmation, presented no case or controversy to the court below.”

Id. at *2. The facts in Luby involved a situation where the arbitrator awarded a specific

amount, and that entire amount was paid. That is not the case here. Further, the Luby

case involved a payment to the actual party to the arbitration, which did not occur here.

{¶ 18} In Geiger v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-608,

2010-Ohio-2850, the appellant worked for Morgan Stanley as a commissioned financial

investment advisor. He resigned under duress and filed an arbitration statement of claim

against his former employer alleging wrongful termination, coercion, and unfair

competition. Ultimately, the arbitration panel rendered a determination nominally in favor

of Geiger, awarding him $3,000 plus interest. Morgan Stanley tendered a check for the

award amount including interest, and Geiger accepted and cashed the check. Geiger

then filed a motion in the court of common pleas to modify the arbitration award. The

trial court denied Geiger’s motion to modify.

{¶ 19} On appeal, the Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s judgment based on
 -9-

the principle that there is no right to obtain modification or confirmation of an arbitration

award “when the party so moving has ratified the award by accepting payment or

otherwise reaping the full benefit of the award.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Luby. Consequently,

the Geiger court concluded that “Geiger has fully accepted the benefits of the arbitration

order and, having thus ratified it, does not have standing to pursue modification of that

order in the court of common pleas.” Id. at ¶ 17. The facts in Geiger involved a situation

in which the arbitrator awarded a specific amount, and that entire amount was paid. That

was not the case here. Further, the Geiger case involved a payment to the actual party

to the arbitration, which did not occur here.

{¶ 20} In Weaver Workshop and Support Assn., OEA-NEA v. Summit Cty. Bd. of

Mental Retardation and Dev. Disabilities, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19780, 2000 WL 799097

(June 21, 2000), a union filed a grievance on behalf of an employee who had received a

two-day suspension from work. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the

grievance was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator sustained the grievance and

stated that the employer had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

employees’ disciplinary suspension of two days was for just cause. The union and the

employee filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award. While the motion was pending,

the employer added two days of pay to the employee’s regular paycheck, which the

employee cashed. The employer filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted

based on the Luby decision.

{¶ 21} On appeal, the Ninth District concluded that once the employee “accepted

the payment for the two-days of missed work, she ratified the arbitration award, thereby,
 -10-

leaving no case or controversy for the trial court to decide.” Id. at *2. Further, the Ninth

District noted that the motion to confirm was instead a motion to modify, because the

union and the employee “were, in effect, attempting to modify or correct the arbitrator’s

award to include reimbursement for time and a-half and prejudgment interest.” Id.

Since the union and the employee failed to bring their motion within three months of the

arbitrator’s award, the court could not modify the arbitration award. Id., citing R.C.

2711.13. Unlike the facts in Weaver, Humerick was not a party to the arbitration or the

common pleas court case. Also, the arbitrator’s award in the record before us, unlike in

Weaver, did not award a sum certain but instead ordered RTA to pay Humerick full back

pay and benefits. Finally, Weaver was decided before the Ohio Supreme Court’s Leon

decision.

{¶ 22} RTA also contends that the Union should have filed a grievance over the

failure to pay the full amount of Humerick’s benefits and back pay rather than filing a

motion to enforce the trial court’s judgment. But that would not make sense. The Union

had already submitted a grievance to binding arbitration over Humerick’s discharge from

employment. RTA, after losing the arbitration, unilaterally determined how much it

believed constituted full back pay and benefits. The Union (and Humerick) disagreed

with RTA’s calculation and believed that RTA had underpaid Humerick and therefore had

not complied with the arbitration award, which had been confirmed as part of the trial

court’s December 5, 2019 judgment. To make the Union start the whole process over

by having to file a separate grievance over the correct amount of backpay and benefits -

when any alleged error in the calculation was made solely by RTA - would result in a
 -11-

piecemeal arbitration approach that inevitably would frustrate the purpose of submitting

matters to binding arbitration in the first place. We believe the better approach is the one

taken by the Eighth District in City of Cleveland v. Laborers Internatl. Union Local 1099,

2018-Ohio-161, 104 N.E.3d 890 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 23} In City of Cleveland, the union filed a grievance against the City of

Cleveland, alleging that the city had violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement

by having private contractors perform work traditionally performed by the union. The

arbitrator determined the city had violated its collective bargaining agreement and ordered

the city to pay “reasonable and demonstrable lost back pay” to the bargaining unit

members. Id. at ¶ 2. The arbitrator retained jurisdiction for 60 days to resolve any

issues arising from implementation of the award.

{¶ 24} Ultimately, the city appealed the arbitrator’s decision by filing with the

common pleas court a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The union then filed an

application to confirm the arbitrator’s award. The trial court denied the city’s motion to

vacate the arbitration award and granted the union’s motion to confirm the award. The

Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at ¶ 3-4.

{¶ 25} Following the Eighth District’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, the

union returned to the arbitrator with a request for a hearing on the back pay award. The

arbitrator found that he lacked jurisdiction to issue an additional award. Id. at ¶ 5-6. The

union then filed with the common pleas court a motion to show cause or alternative post-

judgment motion to determine reasonable and demonstrable lost back pay. Id. at ¶ 7.

The city denied it was violating the arbitrator’s decision and moved to dismiss the union’s
 -12-

complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court awarded reasonable and demonstrable

lost back pay in the amount of $307,797.86. The city again appealed to the Eighth

District.

{¶ 26} The court began by explaining that “[a]rbitration procedures are governed

by R.C. Chapter 2711. And R.C. 2711.09 through 2711.14 provide the only procedures

for challenges to, or arguments in support of, an arbitrator's decision.” City of Cleveland,

2018-Ohio-161, 104 N.E.3d 890, at ¶ 12. According to the Eighth District, “[o]nce an

arbitration is completed, the jurisdiction of the trial court is limited to confirmation,

vacation, modification, or enforcement of the award, and only on the terms provided by

the statute.” Id., citing Lockhart v. Am. Res. Ins. Co., 2 Ohio App.3d 99, 101, 440 N.E.2d

1210 (8th Dist.1981), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 27} Based on the limited options available to the trial court, the Eighth District

concluded:

Here, we have an arbitrator's award that has been confirmed, and

pursuant to R.C. 2711.12, it has the effect of a judgment and can be

enforced by the trial court. In considering Local 1099's motion to show

cause or alternative post-judgment motion to determine “reasonable and

demonstrable lost back pay,” reviewing the parties' briefs and responses,

examining the evidence, and awarding the union $309,797.86, the trial court

did not improperly modify the arbitrator's award of “reasonable and

demonstrable lost back pay.” Rather, the court exercised its authority to

issue orders pursuant to the rules of civil procedure and its inherent power
 -13-

to interpret and enforce a judgment of the court. Such action was

necessary to provide meaning and effect to the judgment and ensure that

litigation progresses toward final resolution. Without the court's order, the

arbitration award of “reasonable and demonstrable lost back pay” was

meaningless and unenforceable.

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 28} Like the facts in City of Cleveland, if the trial court does not determine the

amount that RTA should have paid Humerick, there will be no meaning and effect to the

trial court’s December 5, 2019 judgment or the arbitration award. Rather, RTA would be

able to make its own determination of what constituted full back pay and benefits and

unilaterally impose that amount on the Union and Humerick, while the Union would have

no meaningful opportunity to dispute whether RTA’s payment satisfied the arbitration

award and the December 5, 2019 judgment.

{¶ 29} Ideally, both parties would have submitted to the arbitrators their respective

arguments regarding how much money RTA was required to pay Humerick in the event

the arbitrator ruled in favor of the Union. If the parties had done that, then the arbitrator

could have decided the proper amount of back wages and benefits and included that as

part of the arbitration award. Then, if either party disagreed with the amount in the

arbitrator’s award, that party could have filed a motion to modify the award in the common

pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2711.11. But that did not happen here. While the way this

case proceeded was less than ideal, we do not see anything in the record or the law that

precludes the trial court from holding an evidentiary hearing and determining the proper
 -14-

amount of money that should have been paid by RTA to comply with the arbitrator’s

award, which the trial court had confirmed in its December 5, 2019 judgment. As the

Eighth District pointed out, if the trial court does not do so, the arbitrator’s award

essentially would be rendered meaningless and unenforceable. City of Cleveland at

¶ 26.

{¶ 30} The sole assignment of error is sustained.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 31} Having sustained the sole assignment of error, we will reverse the judgment

of the trial court and remand the cause to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing

on the Union’s motion to enforce the trial court’s December 5, 2019 judgment.

.............

HUFFMAN, J., concurs.

TUCKER, J., concurs:

{¶ 32} Though I concur in the well-reasoned majority opinion, I write separately to

state that the evidence at the required evidentiary hearing could establish that the Union,

by act, word, or conduct, did ratify the payment made to Humerick. And, if the evidence

were to support this conclusion, Humerick would not be entitled to further damages.