[Cite as State v. Davis, 2023-Ohio-4351.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BROWN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2023-03-006
: OPINION
- vs - 12/4/2023
:
RONALD T. DAVIS, :
Appellant. :
APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
Case No. CRB 2200709 and CRB 2200759
Zachary A. Corbin, Brown County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary McMullen, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Joshua R. Crousey, for appellant.
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Ronald T. Davis, timely appeals his domestic violence conviction,
a first-degree misdemeanor, after a bench trial. The victim was his live-in girlfriend at the
time, Cheryl Neville. The parties agree on the general sequence of events. Their
disagreements as to the evidence and relevant discrepancies in their accounts will be
discussed accordingly.
Brown CA2023-03-006
{¶ 2} Davis and Neville dated on and off for about four and a half years. Near the
end of July 2022, Neville moved into Davis' home. Approximately two weeks later on August
7, 2022, Davis and Neville were in Davis' truck driving to his home when they got into an
argument. Davis testified Neville was argumentative, laughing at him, and otherwise
attempting to incite him. At one point during the argument, Davis stated that he should drive
his truck off the road and kill them both.
{¶ 3} Eventually, Davis stopped the truck on the side of the road and told Neville to
get out. Neville testified that after Davis stopped the truck, he came around, opened the
passenger door, grabbed her by her arms and legs, and told her to get out of the vehicle.
At trial, Davis testified he only stopped the car on the side of the road and told Nevile to get
out. However, on police body camera footage introduced at trial, Davis stated he "pull[ed]
over, open[ed] the door, unleash[ed] [Neville's] belt, and [tried] to push [her] out of the car"
because Neville started the fight. At one point during the argument, Neville called her
brother, Daniel Owens, to have Owens come pick her up if Davis left her on the road. The
call, however, quickly ended. Neville testified that Davis took the phone from her and ended
the call.
{¶ 4} Despite this series of events, Davis and Neville together arrived back at Davis'
home with the understanding that Neville would begin gathering her things and move out.
Davis left the house and spent the night in his garage. Neville remained in the house.
{¶ 5} At approximately 3:00 a.m. the next morning, Davis entered the house to get
ready for work. Neville proceeded to ask Davis when a good time would be for her to have
someone help remove her belongings from the home. Neville testified that at that point,
Davis became enraged, put his hands around her neck, and pushed her into the bedroom
so hard she went into the bedroom closet. This, according to her, caused her to fall to the
floor in pain.
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{¶ 6} According to Davis, however, Neville was "standing in [his] way from the
bathroom * * * [He] pushed her into the bedroom * * * [He] turned [her] around, grabbed by
her – the back of her arms * * * [and] pushed her into the bedroom * * *." Davis testified to
being upset because despite the fact they had dated on and off for four and a half years,
their relationship was quickly spiraling, and Neville desired to move out only two weeks after
moving in.
{¶ 7} During this dispute, Neville called 9-1-1. She told the operator that Davis was
being abusive and had grabbed her arms. She also claimed Davis was bruising her. Neville
recounted the events of the last day and repeatedly mentioned she wanted to move her
belongings out of Davis' home. Neville told the 9-1-1 operator that during their altercation
on the side of the road, Davis pulled her hair and tried to choke her.
{¶ 8} Deputies Michael Stephens and Gregory Williams responded to Davis' home
after the 9-1-1 call was placed. Deputy Stephens primarily spoke with Davis, and their
conversation was recorded on Stephens' body camera. Deputy Williams primarily spoke
with Neville, but he had no body camera. Davis and Neville proceeded to tell the deputies
much of what has already been outlined above. Deputy Williams recalled Neville told him
that Davis had grabbed her by the arms and pushed her into the bedroom. There was no
mention of Davis' hands around Neville's neck. However, Deputy Williams also recalled
that Neville indicated that her neck was injured or sore. Neville had no physical injuries that
Deputy Williams could observe. Before leaving, the deputies worked with Davis and Neville
to come to an agreement on how Neville would get her belongings out of the house.
{¶ 9} On August 11, 2022, Neville received medical attention and was treated with
an epidural in her neck to alleviate pain. At trial, Davis testified that he knew Neville had a
history of neck issues. In fact, Davis drove Neville to her neck surgery appointment the
prior year. Davis also stated he bought Neville "Tiger Balm" that she used every day to help
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alleviate her neck pain. Neville, however, testified the balm was not for her.
{¶ 10} No charges were initially filed against Davis. However, after Deputy Williams'
supervisor reviewed the incident and believed charges were reasonable, Davis was
charged on August 17, 2022 with misdemeanor domestic violence in the fourth degree in
violation of R.C. 2919.25(C). On August 30, 2022, Davis was also charged with
misdemeanor domestic violence in the first degree in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The
complaint alleged that on "August 8, 2022 * * * Davis grabbed his live in [sic] girlfriend by
the arms and forcibly turned her around and pushed her into the bedroom of the residence.
In doing so * * * Davis posed the threat of physical violence occurring by his action."
{¶ 11} A bench trial was held on January 30, 2023. The court heard testimony from
Neville, Deputy Stephens, Daniel Owens, Deputy Williams, and Davis. In its February 2,
2023 decision, the trial court found Davis guilty of domestic violence in the first degree. The
court's sentence for Davis included 180 days in jail (with 178 days suspended and two days
credit), one year of probation, and restitution in the amount of $574.34. Davis' fourth-degree
misdemeanor charge was merged into the first-degree misdemeanor conviction, and he
received no sentence for it. This appeal followed.
{¶ 12} Davis raises two assignments of error on appeal:
I. THE COURT ERRED BY FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY WHEN THE
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION
II. THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Although consideration of the weight of the evidence effectively subsumes consideration of
the sufficiency of the same evidence, we will briefly examine both standards of review.
{¶ 13} The Ohio Supreme Court held long ago that when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at trial that "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
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found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Essentially, "the test for
sufficiency focuses on whether the state met its burden of production at trial * * *." State v.
Paul, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-10-026, 2012-Ohio-3205, ¶ 10.
{¶ 14} However, a manifest weight of the evidence determination must examine "the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side
of the issue rather than the other." State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, (1997),
quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990). The Thompkins court further observed,
"When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and
disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony." Id., citing Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2218 (1982); See also State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio
St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25. Stated differently, during this examination, appellate
courts "review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice" that a new
trial must be ordered. State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168.
{¶ 15} As a result, as stated above, "[a] determination that a conviction is supported
by the manifest weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency."
State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-02-009, 2022-Ohio-1984, ¶ 58, citing State
v. Reeder, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2020-09-012 and CA2020-09-013, 2021-Ohio-2988,
¶ 31.
{¶ 16} At the onset, we note that because the fourth-degree misdemeanor charge
was merged for sentencing, there is no final and appealable order as to that charge. Thus,
any purported issues surrounding that charge are not ripe for review, and we lack jurisdiction
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to consider them. State v. Cottrell, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2022-11-014, 2023-Ohio-3932,
¶ 22. As to Davis' first-degree misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence, he argued
that the state failed to prove that he intended to cause Neville harm or caused Neville harm.
{¶ 17} R.C. 2919.25(A) states, "No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to a family or household member." Under R.C. 2901.22(B), "[a] person acts
knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will
probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has
knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably
exist." Physical harm, in turn, "means any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment,
regardless of its gravity or duration." R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).
{¶ 18} There are undoubtedly inconsistencies between Neville's testimony at trial,
statements given during the 9-1-1 call, and her conversation with Deputy Williams. For
example, Neville testified that Davis grabbed her neck on August 8, 2022, but she told the
9-1-1 operator that Davis attempted to choke her on August 7. Neville's trial testimony was
also inconsistent with her telling the 9-1-1 operator and Deputy Williams that it was her arms
that Davis grabbed on August 8.
{¶ 19} While there are inconsistencies in Neville's accounts as to what extent and
exactly where Davis laid his hands on Neville, there is ultimately no dispute that on the
morning of August 8, 2022, Davis, at the very least, grabbed Neville in the hallway, forcibly
turned her around, and shoved her into the bedroom. Davis himself testified as such. In
addition, Neville's conversation with the 9-1-1 operator as well as Neville and Deputy
Williams' trial testimony demonstrate that Neville's neck and associated neck pain were
consistently brought up during the incident. At the time of the incident, Davis knew about
Neville's neck issues, had driven her to surgery for her neck, and, at least according to him,
had bought Neville products to help alleviate her neck pain.
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{¶ 20} Given this baseline of facts that are undisputed or otherwise consistent, the
evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that Davis was aware when he forcibly
shoved Neville that his conduct would probably cause her pain, particularly in her neck.
This awareness goes to the element of "knowingly." The probability of causing harm
remained true regardless of Davis' intent or purpose. Further, it is clear that Neville reported
neck pain which caused her to later have an epidural in her neck to relieve that pain. It is
undisputable physical harm occurred.
{¶ 21} The weight of the credible evidence presented at trial thus supports the
conclusion that Davis was aware his conduct had a reasonable probability of causing
Neville, his live-in girlfriend and household member, physical harm and that his conduct
indeed caused Neville physical harm. We find the trial court did not lose its way in resolving
conflicts presented by the differing accounts presented at trial, and there is no manifest
miscarriage of justice in the trial court's judgment. Both assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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