USCA11 Case: 22-14070 Document: 24-1 Date Filed: 12/07/2023 Page: 1 of 14
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14070
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ERIC WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OFFICER DAVID SESSION,
402,
WILLIAM VOGT,
Officer, Lauderhill Police Department,
DAVLIN SESSION,
Officer, Lauderhill Police Department,
CHIEF OF POLICE, LAUDERHILL POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY OF LAUDERHILL,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14070
Defendants-Appellees,
LAUDERHILL POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-60810-RKA
____________________
Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Watkins appeals the district court’s order dismissing
with prejudice his third amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
against his arresting officers William Vogt and Davlin Session,
Chief of Police Constance Stanley, and the City of Lauderhill, Flor-
ida, alleging that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated when he was arrested for exposure of his sexual or-
gans without probable cause. On appeal, Watkins argues that: (1)
the district court erred in dismissing his claims against his arresting
officers and the chief of police in their individual capacities because
they did not have arguable probable cause to arrest him and were
not entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) the court abused its
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22-14070 Opinion of the Court 3
discretion by dismissing his final-policymaker claim against the city
and chief of police in her official capacity because he complied with
its prior order instructing him not to file any new claims in his third
amended complaint. After thorough review, we affirm.
I.
We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant qual-
ified immunity on a motion to dismiss, accepting the factual allega-
tions in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284
(11th Cir. 2019). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff
pleaded sufficient factual content to allow a court to reasonably in-
fer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
“[A]n amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and be-
comes the operative pleading in the case.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co.,
483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007).
We review a district court’s order dismissing an action for
failure to comply with the rules of the court for abuse of discretion.
Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). “Discretion
means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision
will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
influenced by any mistake of law.” Id. (quotations omitted). Even
so, a dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with court rules
is an extreme remedy that is only proper when the district court
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finds “a clear record of delay or willful conduct and that lesser sanc-
tions are inadequate to correct such conduct.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
II.
First, we are unpersuaded by Watkins’s claim that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing Counts One through Five, the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims against his arresting officers
and the chief of police in their individual capacities. To state a
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant de-
prived him of a right secured under the U.S. Constitution or federal
law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Rich-
ardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). Qualified im-
munity protects public officials from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability where they
are not “on notice their conduct is unlawful.” See Garcia v. Casey,
75 F.4th 1176, 1185, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted).
To establish qualified immunity, a defendant must first show
that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the misconduct was alleged to have occurred. Id. at 1185.
Once the defendant has established that he was acting within his
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. An arresting officer
is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows that
(1) he violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of his conduct was clearly established at that time. Id.
A plaintiff can demonstrate that a right is clearly established in one
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of three ways, namely by pointing to (1) “case law with indistin-
guishable facts,” (2) “a broad statement of principle within the
Constitution, statute, or case law,” or (3) “conduct so egregious
that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total ab-
sence of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288,
1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009).
A defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly estab-
lished right “unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite
that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have un-
derstood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
778–79 (2014). Put differently, existing precedent must have placed
“beyond debate” whether the officer violated that clearly estab-
lished right. Id. at 779 (quotations omitted). Thus, the Supreme
Court has “stressed the need to identify a case where an officer act-
ing under similar circumstances was held to have violated” the
Constitution. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018)
(quotations and ellipsis omitted). Courts should not “define clearly
established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at
779 (quotations and citation omitted).
An arrest not supported by probable cause violates the
Fourth Amendment. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186. Further, “the
Constitution prohibits a police officer from knowingly making
false statements in an arrest affidavit about the probable cause for
an arrest in order to detain a citizen . . . if such false statements
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were necessary to the probable cause.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d
1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999). However, “the existence of probable
cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent con-
stitutional challenge to the arrest.” Gates v. Khokar, 884 F.3d 1290,
1297 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted); see Black v. Wigington,
811 F.3d 1259, 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2016) (determining that proba-
ble cause defeated a malicious prosecution claim and holding that
the plaintiff’s claim failed because the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity).
Probable cause exists “where facts, derived from reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of reason-
able caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed.” Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (quotations omitted). In de-
termining whether an officer had probable cause to seize a suspect,
a court must “ask whether a reasonable officer could conclude that
there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.” Id. (quotations
and ellipses omitted). The validity of an arrest is not dependent on
the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest, and
“[p]robable cause . . . may be found if there is probable cause to
believe any crime was committed, whether or not there is probable
cause for the crime the arresting officer actually believed had been
committed.” Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2018).
Further, a warrantless custodial arrest can be supported by proba-
ble cause even if the offense is minor or seemingly insignificant. Id.
But even without probable cause, an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity from a false arrest claim if the officer had
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arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Garcia, 75 F.4th at
1186. Arguable probable cause exists where “a reasonable officer,
looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could
have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.” Id. (quotations
omitted). Arguable probable cause is only lacking “if the state of
the law on the date of the alleged misconduct makes it obvious that
the officer’s acts violated the plaintiff’s rights in the specific set of
circumstances at issue.” Id. (quotations and brackets omitted). So,
the question becomes whether the plaintiff has satisfied his burden
of showing that, as a clearly established matter of law, an objective
officer could not have reasonably concluded there was probable
cause to arrest under the particular circumstances. Id.
In pertinent part, a person who commits acts that “are of a
nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public
decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness
them” is guilty of the Florida misdemeanor offense of breach of
the peace or disorderly conduct. Fla. Stat. § 877.03. Further, a per-
son commits the Florida misdemeanor offense of nuisance if his
behavior “tend[s] to annoy the community, injure the health of the
citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals.” Id. § 823.01.
The standard by which a supervisor may be held responsible
for the actions of a subordinate under § 1983 is extremely rigor-
ous. Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir.
2019). Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the un-
constitutional acts of their subordinates based on respondeat supe-
rior. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). Rather,
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supervisors can only be held personally liable when they (1) partic-
ipate in the alleged constitutional violation, or (2) “there is a causal
connection between actions of the supervising official and the al-
leged constitutional deprivation.” Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 820 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). A
plaintiff can establish the necessary causal connection “when a his-
tory of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice
of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [she] fails to do
so.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Counts One
through Five against Officer Vogt, Officer Session and Chief Stan-
ley in their individual capacity based on qualified immunity, since
the allegations in the third amended complaint established that
they had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Watkins for
some crime. As for his claims against the Officers, it has been and
remains undisputed that they were acting within their discretion-
ary authority at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.
Thus, Watkins bore the burden of establishing that (1) the Officers
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures un-
supported by probable cause, and (2) their actions were clearly un-
lawful at the time of the incident. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1185.
The Officers’ arrest of Watkins was lawful if they had at
least arguable probable cause to believe that he had committed or
was committing some crime, and, notably, it does not have to be
based on the offense announced at arrest. See id. at 1186; Cannella,
891 F.3d at 969. So the question is whether the Officers had
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arguable probable cause to arrest Watkins for either breaching the
peace or creating a public nuisance. See Manners, 891 F.3d at 969.
Each Florida statute has a broad reach in the conduct it covers -- an
individual violates either statute merely if his actions “are of a na-
ture to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public
decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness”
or if his behavior “tend[s] to annoy the community, injure the
health of the citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals.” Fla.
Stat. §§ 823.01, 877.03.
Accepting all the facts alleged in the third amended com-
plaint as true, the Officers had arguable probable cause to believe
Watkins was breaking the law or had broken the law under either
statute. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186. Watkins alleged that the
Lauderhill Police Department had received several anonymous re-
ports of someone urinating and defecating in the area Watkins was
found. Watkins added that he admitted at the time of his arrest to
dumping his urine in the public park. It was not unreasonable for
officers to believe the act of dumping urine in a public park would
affect the peace and enjoyment of others trying to enjoy the area,
especially considering the many recent complaints the police de-
partment had received. It was also reasonably conceivable for the
Officers to believe that dumping bodily fluids in a public area could
put the health of citizens at risk.
As for Watkins’s claim that the Officers failed to provide any
cases finding that public urination or public dumping of urine vio-
lates Florida law, Watkins himself bears the burden of showing that
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a clearly established constitutional right was violated by the offic-
ers. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1185–87. But he provides no caselaw sup-
porting his claim that public urination or public disposal of urine
does not violate Florida’s nuisance or breach of peace statutes and
that officers making an arrest under similar circumstances violated
a suspect’s constitutional rights. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. And
we’ve found nothing from the Florida Supreme Court, this Court,
or the Supreme Court where an officer has been found to have vi-
olated an arrestee’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights by
placing them under arrest for the public disposal of urine.
Moreover, because the Officers had arguable probable cause
to arrest Watkins, the district court also did not err in dismissing
Count Five against Chief Stanley in her individual capacity, since
that supervisory liability claim was predicated on Counts One
through Four. As the record reflects, Watkins did not claim that
Chief Stanley personally participated in his challenged arrest. This
means that in order to support a supervisory liability claim against
Chief Stanley, Watkins was required to allege sufficient facts to
plausibly indicate a causal relationship between Stanley’s actions
and his arrest by the Officers. Knight through Kerr, 856 F.3d at 820.
However, Watkins alleged only that Chief Stanley was the final-
policymaker and effectively ratified the arrest made by the Officers.
Because the Officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Wat-
kins, he cannot demonstrate that Chief Stanley was on notice of
consistent constitutional deprivations by her officers and that she
failed to act. Id.
II.
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We also find no merit in Watkins’s argument that the district
court abused its discretion by dismissing his final-policymaker
claim in Count Five, against the City of Lauderhill and Chief Stan-
ley in her official capacity. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), if a
plaintiff fails to prosecute his case or comply with a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action. The court also has the
inherent ability to dismiss a claim in light of “its authority to en-
force its orders and provide for the efficient disposition of litiga-
tion.” Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483. Generally, where the litigant has
been forewarned, dismissal for failure to obey a court order does
not amount to abuse of discretion. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,
837 (11th Cir. 1989). In addition, the district court’s consideration
of alternative, lesser sanctions need not be explicit, if the record
supports the conclusion that the court implicitly found that those
sanctions would not better serve the interests of justice. Zocaras,
465 F.3d at 484.
Although both failure-to-train and final-policymaker claims
attack the execution of a government policy or custom as defined
under Monell, they require proof of different actions. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)
(the execution of a government’s policy or custom must inflict the
claimed injury for the local government to be held responsible un-
der § 1983). To establish a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a city was deliberately indifferent to citizens’
rights by knowing of constitutional violation or a high likelihood
thereof and making “a deliberate choice not to take action” in its
training programs. See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293. Alternatively, the
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final-policymaker theory requires a showing that “the deci-
sionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy
with respect to the action ordered” 1 and that the decisionmaker
made “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action” considering
various alternatives with respect to the subject matter in question.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than for-
mal pleadings drafted by lawyers and will be liberally construed.
Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Nev-
ertheless, pro se litigants are required to comply with applicable pro-
cedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Further, the leniency afforded pro se litigants with liberal construc-
tion “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a
party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sus-
tain an action.” Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168–69 (quotations omitted).
A district court need not allow amendment in the event of undue
delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue preju-
dice to the opposing party, or futility of the amendment. Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Here, we begin by noting that the district court properly dis-
missed Watkins’s claim in his third amended complaint against
Chief Stanley in her official capacity. As the record makes clear, the
district court had already dismissed any claims against Chief Stanley
1 This Court has previously recognized that, under Florida law, police chiefs
have final policymaking authority in their respective municipalities for law en-
forcement matters. See Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005).
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in her official capacity with prejudice in its order dismissing in part
Watkins’s second amended complaint. At the end of that order,
the district court specified that Watkins could file a third amended
complaint “alleging the counts he has already advanced against the
Defendants who now remain” and “will not be permitted to add
new counts or defendants.” This instruction was sufficient to con-
vey to Watkins that he could only replead the counts against the
same defendants that the court had dismissed without prejudice.
Moreover, when the district court later considered the De-
fendants’ motion to dismiss Watkins’s third amended complaint, it
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Count Five against the
City of Lauderhill and Chief Stanley in her official capacity for fail-
ure to follow the court’s order. Indeed, the court’s earlier order
expressly cautioned Watkins that he would “not be permitted to
add new counts or defendants” and was only allowed to “take his
best crack” at reasserting the claims he had already alleged. Never-
theless, while Watkins had asserted a failure-to-train claim in his
second amended complaint, he asserted a final-policymaker claim
in his third amended complaint. The court correctly determined
that those were two unique claims because they required proof of
different elements. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483; Lewis, 561 F.3d at
1293. Thus, by asserting the final-policymaker claim in his third
amended complaint, Watkins directly violated the court’s order.
Although dismissal with prejudice is an extreme measure,
the district court was simply enforcing its previous instruction for
Watkins not to add any new claims in his third amended complaint.
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It reasoned that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction to rem-
edy Watkins’s repeated disregard of the court’s instructions, and it
was not required to explicitly consider lesser alternative sanctions.
See Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483–84. Although pro se pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, the dis-
trict court had given Watkins multiple opportunities to amend his
complaint to state a plausible cause of action. See Campbell, 760
F.3d at 1168. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
dismissal was appropriate because Watkins’s final-policymaker
claim would likely require additional discovery, which would ex-
pend additional time and resources even though the discovery pe-
riod had closed two years prior to this new claim being raised.
The court also was within its discretion to prohibit further
amendment of the complaint because it found it would have been
futile at such a late stage of the case and would result in undue
prejudice to the Defendants. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Moreover,
Watkins was forewarned, after receiving three opportunities to
amend his complaint, that the next dismissal would be with preju-
dice, and Watkins still failed to heed the court’s unambiguous in-
struction. See Moon, 863 F.2d at 837.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Wat-
kins’s third amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.