Ex parte Demetrius Issac Carey PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Demetrius Issac Carey v. State of Alabama) ( Mobile Circuit Court: CC-18-6270 Criminal Appeals: CR-2022-0718).
Rel: December 8, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
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Ex parte Demetrius Issac Carey
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Demetrius Issac Carey
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-18-6270;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-2022-0718)
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Demetrius Issac Carey was convicted of possessing a firearm in
violation of § 13A-11-72(a), Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced as a
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habitual offender to 50 years in a state penitentiary. The Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unpublished
memorandum, Carey v. State (No. CR-2022-0718, Dec. 9, 2022), ____ So.
3d ____ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) (table). Carey sought certiorari review,
which this Court granted. We affirm the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
Facts
In 2017, Officer Mark McCormick of the Mobile Police Department
responded to a report of a domestic-violence incident involving a firearm
at a single-story apartment complex. Officer McCormick called out for
anyone in the apartment to come out. A woman named Lakeisha Sims
immediately came out with her hands in the air, followed a few minutes
later by Carey, who was naked. Carey asked Officer McCormick to
retrieve a pair of jeans, which he specifically identified as "brown on the
front." Officer McCormick found the jeans where Carey had directed him,
and he searched them for weapons before returning them to Carey. In the
left hip pocket of the jeans, Officer McCormick found a single blue pill
and a magazine for a Springfield Armory XD 9mm handgun, containing
13 rounds of ammunition. Officer McCormick found a Springfield Armory
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XD 9mm handgun under a few items of clothing in a basket containing
dirty laundry. The handgun was the model for which the magazine
located in Carey's jeans pocket was designed, and it contained a similar
magazine.
Detective Jeremy Burch of the Mobile Police Department
interviewed Carey later at police headquarters. Carey admitted to
ownership of the jeans and the blue pill found in the pocket, but he denied
ownership or knowledge of the magazine found in the same pocket or of
the handgun found in the laundry basket.
A grand jury indicted Carey for unlawful possession of a firearm in
violation of §13A-11-72(a), which provides, in relevant part:
"No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere
of committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence,
misdemeanor offense of domestic violence, violent offense as
listed in Section 12-25-32(15), [Ala. Code 1975,] anyone who
is subject to a valid protection order for domestic abuse, or
anyone of unsound mind shall own a firearm or have one in
his or her possession or under his or her control."
Testimony at trial showed that the registered occupant of the apartment
was not Carey, but Darinicia Sims. The evidence also showed that the
apartment was not Carey's residence; that there was no indication of how
long he had been there that day; and that the handgun was not found on
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his person. Carey moved for a judgment of acquittal on the basis that
insufficient evidence had been presented to establish that he owned,
controlled, or had knowledge about the handgun found in the laundry
basket. The circuit court denied the motion and submitted the case to the
jury, which returned a guilty verdict on the same day as the trial. The
circuit court sentenced Carey as a habitual offender to 50 years’
imprisonment.
Carey appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. That court, in an
unpublished memorandum, held that "there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Carey
constructively possessed the firearm found in the laundry basket," and it
affirmed Carey's conviction and sentence. Carey timely filed an
application for rehearing, which the Court of Criminal Appeals
overruled. Carey petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing
that the precedents addressing constructive possession are conflicting.
We granted the petition and issued the writ.
Standard of Review
Carey filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that the
evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction, which the circuit
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court denied. In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support
a conviction,
" '[T]his court must view that evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. The [inquiry] is whether the jury
might reasonably find that the evidence excluded every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt; not whether such
evidence actually excludes every reasonable hypothesis but
guilt, but whether a jury might reasonably so conclude.' "
Dolvin v. State, 391 So. 2d 133, 137 (Ala. 1980) (quoting Cumbo v. State,
368 So. 2d 871, 874 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)).
Analysis
Carey argues that the prosecution presented no evidence at trial to
show that he "owned or controlled" the dwelling where the handgun was
found. He relies on Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 1144, 1145 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1976), Crane v. State, 401 So. 2d 148, 149 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981),
and their progeny. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not address this
issue in its unpublished memorandum. The State counters that the
magazine in Carey's jeans pocket clearly linked him with the handgun
and that "jurors need not leave their common sense at the door" when
making findings of this sort.
Because Carey had not been in actual control of the handgun, the
State had to prove that he had constructively possessed it by showing the
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following: (1) actual or potential physical control; (2) intention to exercise
dominion; (3) external manifestations of intent and control (Radke v.
State, 52 Ala. App. 397, 398, 293 So. 2d 312, 313 (Crim. 1973), aff’d, 292
Ala. 290, 293 So. 2d 314 (1974)); and (4) knowledge of the presence of the
prohibited item (Ex parte Tiller, 796 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 2001)). 1 These
requirements have long been treated as the "elements" of constructive
possession. See, e.g., Ex parte Fitkin, 781 So. 2d 182, 183 (Ala. 2000);
Bright v. State, 673 So. 2d 851, 852 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Radke, 52
Ala. App. at 398, 293 So. 2d at 313. Carey essentially asks this Court to
adopt a fifth element of constructive possession -- ownership or control of
the premises where the prohibited item was located. We decline to do so.
Carey relies upon a rule adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals
and this Court in certain cases in which there was no direct evidentiary
link between the prohibited item and the person charged with
constructive possession. In Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 1144, 1145 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1976), "the State had only shown that the [defendant] was
1Although the first three of these elements have sometimes been
referred to as "attributes," see, e.g., Radke, 52 Ala. App. at 398, 293 So.
2d at 313, we clarify here that these are, in fact, the elements of
constructive possession in Alabama law.
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present in the apartment of some other person, dressed in rumpled
clothing, sans shoes and jacket," and "[w]hether [the defendant] knew
that prohibited drugs were in the apartment … [was] left to mere
conjecture and speculation." The Williams court held that because the
defendant did not own or control the apartment, the State had failed to
prove constructive possession. Id.
In Crane v. State, 401 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981), the Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction of a defendant who had been
standing in the downstairs foyer of an apartment when police arrived. He
was charged with constructive possession of marijuana discovered by
police in an upstairs bedroom of the apartment. "No evidence whatsoever
was presented to the jury which would indicate that the [defendant] had
any knowledge of or connection with the marijuana found by the police."
Id. at 149. The Court in Crane held that, because the defendant did not
own or control the apartment, and because there was no evidence
connecting him with the marijuana, the State had failed to prove
constructive possession. Id. at 150-51.
In Ex parte J.C., 882 So. 2d 274 (Ala. 2003), this Court reversed the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the conviction of a
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juvenile defendant for trafficking in marijuana found in his father's
bedroom. The juvenile was not even in the house when the search began.
At trial, the State presented no evidence indicating that the juvenile had
ever entered his father's bedroom or that he had any intent to exercise
dominion over the marijuana found therein. Some drug paraphernalia
was found in the juvenile's bedroom. However, this Court held that that
evidence, by itself, did not show that the juvenile had possessed the
particular marijuana found in the father's bedroom, especially when
considering that no drugs had been found in the juvenile's bedroom. The
Court in J.C. held that, in the absence of a direct evidentiary link between
the juvenile and the marijuana, the State had failed to prove constructive
possession. Id. at 278. 2
A review of those cases reveals that the courts likely employed this
requirement for one purpose: to keep third parties from being charged
2Carey does not rely directly on this part of J.C. in his petition or
his brief, but the J.C. Court's adoption of the rule from Williams and
Crane regarding ownership or control of the premises means that this
Court must treat this rule as binding precedent. J.C. is also useful as a
contrast to the instant case, because it helps illustrate the difference
between the presence and absence of a direct evidentiary link between
the prohibited item and a defendant charged with constructive
possession.
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with constructive possession of items located in someone else's dwelling
in the absence of any evidentiary connection between the third parties
and the items. In each of these cases, the defendant was charged with
constructive possession of narcotics located inside a dwelling the
defendant did not own. See, e.g., Williams, 340 So. 2d at 1145; Crane, 401
So. 2d at 150. Tellingly, in none of those cases was any evidence
presented at trial linking the defendant directly with the narcotics. And
even in J.C., in which it was shown that the juvenile defendant did live
in his father's house, the State introduced no evidence at trial to connect
the juvenile directly with the narcotics found in the house. J.C., 882 So.
2d at 278. Viewed in this light, the rule on which Carey relies was likely
adopted to prevent criminal liability based on constructive possession
from attaching to any third party unlucky enough to be in a dwelling
where a prohibited item or contraband has been found. However, under
that reasoning, criminal liability based on constructive possession could
attach to the owner of the dwelling.
Carey is correct that those cases indicate that, in certain
circumstances when no other evidence of constructive possession is
present, "[w]here contraband is seized inside a residence, 'constructive
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possession can only arise "where the prohibited material is found on the
premises owned or controlled by the [defendant]." ' " J.C., 882 So. 2d at
277 (quoting Crane, 401 So. 2d at 149, quoting in turn Williams, 340 So.
2d at 1145). However, this Court would be construing the reasoning and
holdings in those cases too broadly by making the ownership or control of
the dwelling where a prohibited item or contraband is found a categorical
element of constructive possession. When contraband is seized inside a
dwelling and there is no direct evidentiary link between the contraband
and a defendant, then the rule of J.C., Crane, and Williams holds. When
there is such a link, however, as there is in this case, whether the
defendant had the ownership or control of the dwelling is not a
requirement for finding constructive possession. Under those
circumstances, ownership or control of the dwelling is a sufficient, but
not necessary, basis for finding constructive possession. Temple v. State,
366 So. 2d 740, 743 (Ala. Crim. App 1978) ("While nonexclusive
possession may raise the suspicion that all occupants had knowledge of
the contraband found, a mere suspicion is not enough. ... What is required
is some evidence that connects the defendant with the contraband that is
found." (emphasis added)); Radke, 52 Ala. App. at 398, 293 So. 2d at 313
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(" 'Constructive possession may arise where [contraband] is found on
premises owned or controlled by the accused, provided the State further
shows facts enabling a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused knew of the presence of the [contraband].' " (quoting Davis v.
State, 40 Ala. App. 609, 611, 119 So. 2d 236, 238 (Crim. 1960).
Holding that only the owner or controller of the dwelling can ever
be held criminally liable based on constructive possession of a prohibited
item in his dwelling takes the analysis too far. By such logic, no one can
ever constructively possess any item, no matter how direct the
evidentiary connection between the person and the item, in any dwelling
that is not his own. This strict application can only lead to absurd
results.3
Indeed, this Court has hinted at an alternate test for cases in which
3If Carey's argument is correct, then a drug dealer could not be
convicted of possessing drugs located inside another person's dwelling, so
long as the drugs were not on his person at the time the drugs were found
by law enforcement and his actual possession of the drugs could not
otherwise be established. Even if a large sum of cash was found in the
drug dealer's pocket, the trial court would be prohibited from
determining that the jury could reasonably infer that the money was the
price of the drugs and that, therefore the drug dealer had constructively
possessed the drugs. It would be absurd to interpret the rule of J.C.,
Crane, and Williams as Carey suggests so as to prevent a finding of
constructive possession under these circumstances.
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the defendant does not exclusively own or control the dwelling where a
prohibited item or contraband is found. This Court has held that " '[w]hile
non-exclusive possession may raise a suspicion that all the occupants had
knowledge of the contraband found, a mere suspicion is not enough. Some
evidence that connects a defendant with the contraband is required.' "
J.C., 882 So. 2d at 277-78 (quoting Grubbs v. State, 462 So. 2d 995, 997
(Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (emphasis added)). This Court has also stated that
" 'evidence that debris of the contraband was found on defendant's person
or with his personal effects' " is sufficient to prove the defendant's
constructive possession of the contraband, even when the defendant was
merely an occupant of the dwelling. Id. at 278 (quoting Grubbs, 462 So.
2d at 997-98). This precedent would seem to dictate that, when
circumstantial evidence establishes a direct inferential link between the
defendant and the item he is charged with constructively possessing,
whether the defendant owns or controls the dwelling is less material. See
also 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and Firearms § 10 (2013) ("Constructive
possession of a weapon can be inferred from incriminating statements or
circumstances linking the defendant to the weapon."); Emile F. Short,
Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in Premises of which
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Defendant Was in Nonexclusive Possession, 56 A.L.R. 3d 948 § 4
("[W]here the defendant is in nonexclusive possession of premises on
which illicit drugs are found, it cannot be inferred that he knew of the
presence of such drugs and had control of them, unless there are other
incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such an
inference.").
In this case, a magazine designed for a particular handgun and
containing ammunition for that handgun was found in a pocket of a pair
of jeans Carey admittedly owned. The same pocket also contained a blue
pill he identified as his own. A handgun of the exact make and model for
which the magazine was designed was found nearby in a laundry basket,
with a matching magazine. When viewed in favor of the prosecution, this
evidence tends to connect Carey directly to the handgun found in the
apartment. The question before this Court " 'is not whether [the] evidence
excludes every reasonable hypothesis but guilt, but whether a jury might
reasonably so conclude.' " Dolvin, 391 So. 2d at 137 (quoting Cumbo, 368
So. 2d at 874). The evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient
to warrant submitting the case to the jury, and the circuit court
reasonably concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support direct
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inferences by the jury that Carey (1) had potential physical control of the
handgun, (2) had the intent to exercise dominion over the handgun, (3)
exhibited external manifestations of intent and control over the handgun,
and (4) had knowledge of the presence of the handgun.4
IV. Conclusion
The rule of Williams, Crane, and their progeny remains good law.
This decision does not overturn those precedents. It merely recognizes
that they are subject to a simple, commonsense limitation, and are not to
be too strictly applied when the evidence establishes a direct inference
connecting the defendant with the prohibited item he is charged with
4Williams and Crane apply to "contraband." Because guns are not
prohibited items per se, the only way the handgun at issue in this case
could be "contraband" is if Carey possessed it even though he is a person
legally prohibited from possessing guns. But if the handgun belonged to
Carey, a strict application of Williams and Crane would dictate that the
jury could not find that Carey possessed the handgun because the
handgun was not inside Carey's own residence. If the handgun was not
Carey's, the handgun was not "contraband," and Williams and Crane do
not apply. In that case, the jury could find that Carey constructively
possessed the handgun -- at which point the handgun becomes
"contraband" again. This kind of circular reasoning is a problem for the
strict application of Williams and Crane outside of the context of
possession of controlled substances. Neither party has asked this Court
to overturn Williams, Crane, or J.C., but this Court may need to clarify
them in an appropriate case.
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constructively possessing.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion, which Sellers, J.,
joins.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree that the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment upholding
Demetrius Issac Carey's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
The State presented substantial evidence connecting Carey to the
firearm hidden in the apartment; thus, the jury could have therefore
reasonably concluded that Carey was in constructive possession of the
firearm and in violation of § 13A-11-72(a), Ala. Code 1975. 5
As the majority opinion explains, a defendant can be found to be in
constructive possession of contraband only when there is substantial
evidence connecting him to the contraband. See, e.g., Temple v. State,
366 So. 2d 740, 743 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (emphasizing that "[w]hat is
required is some evidence that connects the defendant with the
contraband that is found"). There is no requirement that the contraband
be found on premises that the defendant owns or controls,
notwithstanding some imprecise language that can be found in previous
5Section 13A-11-72(a) provides that "[n]o person who has been
convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or attempting to
commit a crime of violence … shall own a firearm or have one in his or
her possession or under his or her control." Carey has previous
convictions for robbery and assault.
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caselaw. See, e.g., Crane v. State, 401 So.2d 148, 149 (Ala. Crim. App.
1981); Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 1144, 1145 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976).
But just as a finding that a defendant owns or controls premises is
not required to make a finding of constructive possession, neither is a
finding of ownership or control over the premises on which contraband is
found sufficient by itself to support a finding of constructive possession.
See Radke v. State, 52 Ala. App. 397, 398, 293 So. 2d 312, 313 (Crim.
1973), aff'd, 292 Ala. 290, 293 So. 2d 314 (1974) (" 'Constructive
possession may arise where [contraband] is found on premises owned or
controlled by the accused, provided the State further shows facts
enabling a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
knew of the presence of the [contraband].' " (emphasis added; citation
omitted)). In other words, there must still be substantial evidence
connecting the defendant to the found contraband even when there is
evidence showing the defendant's ownership or control over the premises
on which the contraband is found. I'm concerned that the majority
opinion's statement that "ownership or control of the dwelling is a
sufficient, but not necessary, basis for finding constructive possession,"
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___ So. 3d at ___, could be misunderstood as suggesting otherwise. I
therefore concur in the result. 6
Sellers, J., concurs.
6Additionally, I express no opinion as to footnotes 3 and 4, which I
do not believe are essential to the opinion's holding.
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