Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Perry Jack Probus, Jr.

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1376-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 15-CR-00098

PERRY JACK PROBUS, JR. APPELLEE

OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals an order vacating

Perry Jack Probus, Jr.’s 45-year imprisonment sentence after the Circuit Court

concluded that Probus’s trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective. Though Probus

raised multiple allegations in his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)

11.42 motion, the Trial Court reserved ruling on most of Probus’s post-conviction
claims after finding ineffective assistance on one claim. Following our de novo

review of the legal conclusions, we respectfully disagree that ineffective assistance

of counsel occurred on that single claim, and, thus, we reverse and remand for

further proceedings on the outstanding claims.

BACKGROUND

Probus was an accomplice to a home invasion and robbery. He was

ultimately convicted of complicity to commit first-degree robbery, complicity to

commit first-degree burglary, two counts of complicity to commit first-degree

wanton endangerment, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree.

Probus’s prior convictions include being a convicted felon in possession of a

firearm, burglary in the third degree, theft by unlawful taking under $500,

possession of burglary tools, receiving stolen property under $500, facilitation to

manufacturing methamphetamine with a firearm, receiving stolen property over

$500, and illegal possession of a controlled substance. The facts underlying

Probus’s conviction were thoroughly detailed by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s

published opinion on direct appeal affirming his 45-year sentence:

Tammy Robinson was working as a nanny when at
mid-morning she answered a knock at the door. There
stood a man later identified as Solomon Slinker. He was
dressed as a deliveryman and claimed he had a package
for the homeowner, “Billy.” Slinker asked Robinson for
a signature, so Robinson went to find a pen.

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 As Robinson returned to the door, she found
Slinker inside the house pointing a gun at her. After a
brief struggle, Slinker subdued Robinson. Robinson told
Slinker to take whatever he wanted but not to harm
Billy’s two children, who were also in the house at the
time. Slinker tied Robinson’s hands together with zip-
ties, but she broke free when one of the children ran to
her. Slinker then pushed Robinson and the child into the
bathroom and followed them inside the bathroom. While
inside the bathroom, Robinson heard drilling and banging
coming from inside the house, prompting her to conclude
that another person had entered the house and was
making those noises.

Eventually, Slinker left the bathroom, and
Robinson retrieved her cell phone and called for help.
Robinson did not encounter any other intruder after
Slinker left the bathroom. Sergeant Ray Whitehill
arrived, and his investigation revealed, among other
things of interest, a blue U-Haul blanket covering a safe
in the garage. Sergeant Whitehill later found out that the
safe had been moved to the garage from the master
bedroom. Sergeant Whitehill then spoke with Robinson,
Billy, and some neighbors. Of note, one of the neighbors
recalled seeing a white Ford F-150 in Billy’s driveway.
After speaking with these individuals, Sergeant Whitehill
received a call from Kathy Hatcher.

Hatcher asked if there had been a home invasion
“the other night” in the neighborhood. Hatcher stated
that her son, Slinker, may have been involved. Hatcher
told Sergeant Whitehill that her husband overheard
Slinker’s phone conversation in which Slinker stated that
he and “P.J.” had “made the news” but were unable to get
the safe. Hatcher’s husband identified “P.J.” as the
defendant in this case, Perry Jack Probus.

Sergeant Whitehill arrested Slinker on an
outstanding warrant for an unrelated crime. Sergeant
Whitehill took that opportunity to interview Slinker about

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the home invasion, and Slinker admitted to the crime and
implicated Probus. Slinker gave an account of the events
surrounding the home invasion.

Slinker and Probus had become housemates earlier
in the month. Slinker learned of a failed invasion of
Billy’s home that Probus and an individual named Steven
Vaughan had attempted. Slinker offered to help Probus
make another attempt at the home invasion.

Probus showed Slinker Robinson’s Facebook
picture and told Slinker that Robinson would be the one
answering the front door of Billy’s residence. Probus
apparently told Slinker that Billy would pay them $3500
to take a safe from the house or $1000 to retrieve
paperwork out of the safe if they could not take the safe.

The evening before the home invasion, Probus sent
Slinker a text telling him to be ready the following
morning. Later, on the morning of the invasion, Probus
texted Slinker, telling him to get ready. Slinker dressed
as a UPS deliveryman. Probus brought the white F-150
truck to be used in the home invasion, while Slinker
brought zip-ties, a cellphone jammer, walkie-talkies, a
clipboard, and a box. At the suggestion of Probus,
Slinker also brought a BB gun with the orange tip
removed.

Probus and Slinker arrived at Billy’s residence and
the events with Robinson transpired as described above.
As Slinker guarded Robinson and the child inside the
bathroom, Probus signaled for Slinker to exit the house
and return to the truck. Slinker saw that Probus had not
retrieved the safe and asked Probus about it. Probus
responded that the safe was too heavy but both would
still be paid.

Upon arriving at Probus’s house, Probus told
Slinker to leave and lay low for a while. When Slinker
asked Probus about the money, Probus told Slinker that

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 he had retrieved some laptops and purses that they could
sell and split the proceeds.

Because of Slinker’s confession, Sergeant
Whitehill obtained a search warrant for Probus’s
residence where he collected several Coach purses,
(identified as belonging to Billy’s girlfriend who resided
at Billy’s home), walkie-talkies, a cell phone jammer,
two U-Haul blankets, and other various items of interest.

Probus was indicted. After two mistrials, at
Probus’s third trial, the jury convicted Probus of
complicity to first-degree robbery, complicity to first-
degree burglary, two counts of complicity to first-degree
wanton endangerment, and of being a persistent felony
offender, recommending a total sentence of 45 years’
imprisonment, which the trial court imposed.

Probus v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.3d 339, 342-44 (Ky. 2019) (footnote omitted).

The first mistrial occurred because the Commonwealth made an

erroneous statement during opening statements. The second mistrial was due to a

witness for the Commonwealth stating that Probus was on parole, and thus

indicating that Probus was a convicted felon. Neither of these errors occurred

during the third trial, which resulted in the convictions listed above.

Following his direct appeal, Probus filed an RCr 11.42 motion raising

numerous post-conviction claims. One of those claims involved whether Probus’s

trial counsel1 was ineffective in her investigation and presentation of evidence

regarding the weapon used during the robbery and burglary. Notably, the weapon

1
Hereinafter referred to as “Defense counsel.”

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used was never recovered, and testimony at trial identified the weapon variously as

a BB gun, a fake gun, a toy gun, and an Airsoft gun. Specifically, Probus alleged

in his post-conviction motion that Defense counsel should have conducted a more

thorough investigation into evidence that Airsoft guns do not meet the statutory

definition of dangerous instrument or deadly weapon, and that she should have

presented that additional evidence at trial. The Trial Court held an evidentiary

hearing on the post-conviction motion. Defense counsel testified regarding her

investigation and trial strategy.

Defense counsel is an experienced criminal defense attorney who has

worked for both the Louisville Metro Public Defender’s Office and the Department

of Public Advocacy. During her career, Defense counsel participated in

approximately 20 trials. Utilizing her experience, Defense counsel conducted

extensive investigation and spent lengthy amounts of time preparing for Probus’s

three trials. Defense counsel formulated and employed three methods of defense

for Probus, ultimately seeking an acquittal on all charges.

First, Defense counsel attempted to get the Trial Court to conform the

charges against Probus to charges that conformed to Slinker’s plea-bargain

charges. Regarding the principal perpetrator, Defense counsel was aware that

Slinker had pled guilty to second-degree robbery and other lesser charges in

exchange for a reduced sentence. Prior to trial, Defense counsel attempted to get

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Probus’s charges amended to conform with Slinker’s plea, arguing the

amendments were due to the weapon not being a dangerous instrument or a deadly

weapon. The Trial Court rejected that argument, finding the nature of the weapon

was a factual issue for the jury. The Kentucky Supreme Court on direct appeal

likewise rejected that this claim violated Probus’s rights to due process when the

Commonwealth chose to prosecute Slinker on a different theory than Probus.

Probus, 578 S.W.3d at 345-46.

Second, Defense counsel then attempted to undercut the reliability of

the Commonwealth’s evidence by showing the jury that the Commonwealth’s view

of the type of weapon used was inconsistent and changing:

So basically, what it was, was, we wanted the jury to see
that when it inured to his benefit, it was this kind of
weapon, and when it was against Mr. Probus, it was now,
all of a sudden, a bb gun, capable of firing metal pellets.
And he (Slinker) indicated, in his testimony, that they
fired metal pellets.

Video Record (“VR”) 2/25/22, 9:47:26. On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme

Court rejected Probus’s argument that “the Commonwealth offered insufficient

evidence that the gun with which Slinker threatened Robinson constituted a

‘deadly weapon’ or ‘dangerous instrument[.]’” Probus, 578 S.W.3d at 344-45.

Third, Defense counsel employed an alibi defense. Defense counsel

proffered evidence to the jury that Probus was at his own home during the crime.

Defense counsel presented the testimony of another person who lived at Probus’s

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residence to testify that he had video cameras around the compound and daily

would review the cameras to see if anything had occurred. The witness testified

that he had reviewed the security cameras for the morning and afternoon of the

commission of the crime and had not seen Probus leave.

Concerning her investigation, Defense counsel testified that her work

product was extensive, producing some 20 banker’s boxes of files. Defense

counsel’s investigation included listening to Slinker’s plea colloquy and having

others listen to it. No one could determine whether Slinker said what type of

projectiles were fired or could be fired from the weapon he used to commit the

crime. Defense counsel also utilized an intern to research Airsoft guns,

discovering that there are some Airsoft guns that fire metal pellets that can meet

the statutory definition of dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. Defense

counsel reviewed the law and believed that whether the weapon was capable of

being a deadly weapon would ultimately be a fact question for the jury.

Furthermore, Defense counsel strategically exploited a patent error in

the indictment without bringing it to the Commonwealth’s attention until later in

the trial. The Commonwealth had not indicted on all sustainable theories of the

burglary and robbery crimes, including a theory that the victim suffered physical

injury. For example, the robbery statute allows for a conviction under multiple

theories, including if physical force is used that causes physical injury to a non-

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participant in the crime.2 Defense counsel noted, “As you are perfectly well aware,

there was a huge fight between the victim and Mr. Slinker, for purposes of a

robbery conviction.” VR 2/25/22, 9:49:30. Indeed, the photographs introduced

showed extensive bruising to one of the victims. Defense counsel’s strategy was to

utilize her above theories to cast doubt that the weapon was not a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument, all the while preparing a legal defense against the possible

attempt by the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to include the physical

injury theory.

Defense counsel’s strategy on the amendment was successful. The

Commonwealth was not permitted to amend the indictment after the presentation

of evidence, and Defense counsel pigeonholed the Commonwealth to proving that

a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument was used.

2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 515.020, as it read when the underlying actions occurred,
provided that a person commits robbery in the first degree:

. . . when, in the course of committing theft, he uses or threatens
the immediate use of physical force upon another person with
intent to accomplish the theft and when he: (a) Causes physical
injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (b) Is
armed with a deadly weapon; or (c) Uses or threatens the
immediate use of a dangerous instrument upon any person who is
not a participant in the crime.

KRS 515.020(1)(a)-(c). In contrast, a person commits second-degree robbery when the
perpetrator of the theft uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force with the intent to
accomplish the theft. KRS 515.030.

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 “The case law wasn’t on my side. I have to be honest with you, I was

surprised when the judge did not allow the amendment prior to the submission to

the jury, um, because the notice requirement was, it was all over the discovery –

the physical force and the fight and the allegations – and, you know, we did what

we could, which was focus on one area where we believed that we had the wiggle

room to make the argument and say, judge, this is, this is not, and we were

fortunate, and [the judge] agreed.” VR 2/25/22, 9:50:36. “It (the physical force

theory) was not in the indictment. They literally, you know, usually in an

indictment they do both theories, but in this specific indictment they specifically

left out that portion of the statute.” VR 2/25/22, 9:51:38.

In addition to keeping the indictment narrow, Defense counsel’s

strategy was to attack Slinker’s testimony regarding the weapon used. To combat

the statutory definition of dangerous instrument, Defense counsel’s research

showed that the main difference between an injurious Airsoft gun and a non-

injurious Airsoft gun was on the type of pellet used, “and that’s why we focused on

that.” VR 2/25/22, 9:53:02. Defense counsel summarized her strategy in the

following exchange:

Def. Counsel: At that point in time, I’ll be honest with
you, I just didn’t know, and our position was there’s no
proof that there were metal pellets. You know, that it
was not in Solomon’s plea colloquy. They didn’t ask
about it. Um, and we knew from the research that there
were Airsoft pellet guns that fired metal pellets, including

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 the one that he had, but we didn’t know that there were
metal pellets.

P.C.[3] Counsel: There was never an Airsoft gun
recovered, was there?

Def. Counsel: No.

P.C. Counsel: And so . . .

Def. Counsel: It was based upon what Mr. Slinker said.

P.C. Counsel: Ok, and what Mr. Slinker did, was,
consistent with his statement that he broke the orange
tip?

Def. Counsel: Yes.

P.C. Counsel: Off of it?

Def. Counsel: Yes.

P.C. Counsel: To make it look more like a gun, or a real
gun?

Def. Counsel: Yes.

VR 2/25/22, 10:34:23.

Defense counsel admitted she was not a firearms “person” and did not

think of hiring an expert. She was aware that there is a distinction between an

“actual” firearm and an Airsoft gun, though.

3
In video recordings of the proceedings below, we refer to Probus’s post-conviction counsel as
“P.C. Counsel” and his Defense counsel as “Def. Counsel.”

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 Charles Stephenson, a ballistics trial consultant, also testified at the

evidentiary hearing. Stephenson is a military veteran with extensive experience in

firearms. Stephenson received and tested an Airsoft pistol from Probus’s post-

conviction counsel. Stephenson explained that Airsoft weapons shoot projectiles

through one of two means: some are mechanically powered, using levers and

springs; and some use compressed air supplied by carbon-dioxide-cartridges. The

one he tested was a mechanically-powered weapon, with a stated terminal velocity

of 100-110 feet per second.

Stephenson was asked to make an overall evaluation about the effects

of this particular Airsoft weapon that post-conviction counsel provided. He

determined it was a “toy replica” gun with a mechanical mechanism, safe enough

to conduct testing in his office. He set up ballistics gelatin and test fired plastic

Airsoft projectiles at the gelatin at various distances from point-blank to three feet.

None of the plastic projectiles penetrated the ballistics gel.

Stephenson concluded that the weapon provided him by post-

conviction counsel was a toy, not a firearm, because it used a non-explosive

mechanism for firing the projectile, and the plastic projectile was not designed to

penetrate skin.

Stephenson stated that because a metal BB is a smaller diameter than

the Airsoft chamber, the Airsoft gun should not be able to shoot the metal BB.

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When asked if some Airsoft weapons do shoot metal projectiles, Stephenson

responded that he had researched and found that Airsoft competitions are highly

regulated and do not permit the use of metal projectiles. He also noted that

comparatively a metallic BB gun would have a higher risk of injury than an Airsoft

gun.

Stephenson created a report detailing the results of his experiments.

The report was admitted, with the Trial Court noting that the gun tested was not the

weapon actually used in the commission of the crimes.

On cross-examination, the Commonwealth questioned whether

Stephenson was aware that some Airsoft weapons have terminal velocities of 750

feet per second, and Stephenson admitted that some Airsoft weapons can have

terminal velocities that are higher than the weapon he tested, noting that the

velocities can be “considerable.” Those with higher velocities would shoot

projectiles with more force. He did not believe a plastic Airsoft projectile would

hurt more at a higher velocity, though, because it was designed to break apart upon

impact.

When asked about whether an Airsoft gun could cause serious eye

injuries, Stephenson responded that he was not an ophthalmologist, and that his

preliminary research was “inconclusive.” Stephenson did have his shatter-proof

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glasses on while conducting his experiments, and he ultimately admitted that an

Airsoft gun could cause an eye injury.

Probus also testified at the hearing. His testimony was limited to

establishing that he had two or three Airsoft guns in his garage when Slinker

purportedly went to the garage to retrieve a weapon to use in the crime. Probus

said that one of his guns in the garage was “similar” to the Airsoft weapon tested

by Stephenson.

TRIAL COURT’S RULING

The Trial Court entered an order granting the RCr 11.42 motion in

part, vacating the judgment, and remanding for a new trial, finding in relevant part:

The key issue centers around [Defense] counsel’s alleged
failure to reasonably investigate the law as it relates to
the definitions of a “deadly weapon” and “dangerous
instrument,” the failure to investigate the nature of an
airsoft gun that was allegedly used by Slinker in this
case, and the failure to present expert testimony and
evidence related to airsoft guns to the jury. [Defense
counsel] testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did
pursue the issue of the airsoft gun being used in the
offenses for which Probus was indicted. [Defense
counsel] stated that during Slinker’s prosecution, that the
Commonwealth during the colloquy preceding the entry
of Slinker’s plea that the amendment of the Robbery, 1st
degree charge to Robbery, 2nd degree was based in part
on the fact that weapon [sic] used by Slinker in the home
invasion robbery could not be considered a deadly
weapon. [Defense counsel] stated that she was aware of
the Commonwealth’s characterization of the gun in the
Slinker prosecution. The Commonwealth in prosecution
of Probus at trial, tried him on the narrative that the gun

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used by Slinker in the home invasion robbery was a
“deadly weapon” or “dangerous instrument.” [Defense
counsel] made a motion requesting that the trial judge,
the Honorable Judge Karen Conrad, rule that the gun
used by Slinker did not meet the definition of a “deadly
weapon” or “dangerous instrument.” Judge Conrad ruled
that whether the gun could be considered a “deadly
weapon” or “dangerous instrument” was a factual issue
to be determined by the jury. [Defense counsel]
testified at the evidentiary hearing that she had an intern
at DPA, a law student, do research on airsoft guns and
she learned that airsoft guns used metal pellets. [Defense
counsel] testified that she never considered consulting an
expert to educate herself on the nature of the [A]irsoft
gun or considered presenting expert testimony evidence
about the weapon used. [Defense counsel]’s awareness
of the Commonwealth’s shifting stance on the
characterization of the gun coupled with [Defense
counsel’s] own motion about the characterization of the
[A]irsoft gun indicates that she was fully aware during
trial preparation and the trial that the characterization of
the nature of the gun used in the robbery was a key issue.
That [Defense counsel] was aware of the key relevance
of establishing the nature of the gun used by Slinker, it is
not reasonable that she failed at trial to try to establish
what type of gun was used by Slinker in the robbery
during the trial.

The gun used by Slinker was never recovered in this
case, and Slinker provided the only description and
information about the weapon used at the trial of this
matter. Slinker testified that he had broken the orange tip
off a “toy gun” that was used during the home invasion
robbery. Slinker during his testimony at Probus’ trial
referred to the gun used during the robbery as a “toy
gun”, “fake gun”, “BB gun”, “toy BB gun” and
“[A]irsoft gun.” Most often Slinker called the gun at
issue a “BB gun.” [Defense counsel] failed to try to
establish at trial what the defense’s position was as it
pertained to the nature of the gun used. Clearly,

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[Defense counsel] understood that Slinker had allegedly
used an [A]irsoft gun in the robbery as she and her intern
had conducted research on that type of weapon, the
weapon has been characterized as such in Slinker’s plea,
and she sought a ruling from the trial [sic] that the
[A]irsoft gun used did not fall into the definition of a
“deadly weapon” or “dangerous instrument.” Being
cognizant of these issues, [Defense counsel] did not make
reasonable efforts to establish/clarify/emphasize at trial
what type of gun Slinker used in the crime. Also,
[Defense counsel] failed to investigate the nature of
[A]irsoft guns appropriately and present such information
to the jury (potentially via expert testimony) to establish
to the jury that the [A]irsoft gun used by Slinker did not
meet the definition of a “deadly weapon” or “dangerous
weapon”. From [Defense counsel]’s motion to the trial
court and request that an intern perform research on the
issue of [A]irsoft guns, it appears that [Defense counsel]
recognized that Slinker’s use of an [A]irsoft gun in the
offense was relevant, but did not make reasonable efforts
in establishing before the jury: what type of weapon
Slinker used and why the type of weapon used by Slinker
was relevant to the charges in the case.

...

[The Trial Court discussed the relevant legal standards
for when a weapon constitutes a deadly weapon, noting
that the Commonwealth must prove that the weapon is
capable of producing death or serious physical injury to
meet the statutory definition.]

The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 501, 507 (Ky. 2010) has
recognized that a jury can reasonably find that pellet and
BB guns can constitute a [sic] “deadly weapons” or
“dangerous instruments” given the history of serious
physical injuries which have been caused by BB guns.
Herein, the alleged weapon was an [A]irsoft gun, not a
BB gun. Although [Defense counsel] and an intern

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conducted some manner of research about [A]irsoft guns,
they presumably failed to appreciate the distinction of
[A]irsoft guns from BB guns or appreciate how the case
law on the issue of “deadly weapons” and “dangerous
instruments” was relevant to that distinction. Regardless,
[Defense counsel] did not via cross-examination of
Slinker or presentation of expert testimony, make
reasonable efforts to communicate to the jury that
Probus’ argument was that Slinker used an [A]irsoft gun
in the robbery or that an [A]irsoft gun is not a “deadly
weapon,” i.e. “the type of weapon form [sic] which a shot
could cause death or serious physical injury.” Wilburn
[v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321,] 329 [(Ky. 2010)].
(Note: “Dangerous instrument” means any instrument,
including parts of the human body when a serious
physical injury is a direct result of the use of that part of
the human body, article, or substance which, under the
circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used,
or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing
death or serious physical injury. KRS 500.080(3).) That
expert testimony would be needed to establish the nature
of an [A]irsoft gun would be clear, as it is specialized
knowledge, and not information that lay people would
know without [Defense counsel] presenting some
evidence to the jury that an [A]irsoft gun by its nature
does not qualify as a “deadly weapon” or “dangerous
instrument.”

At the evidentiary hearing, Probus presented the
testimony of a firearms and ballistics expert, Charles
Stephenson, who provided testimony about the nature of
an [A]irsoft gun, is [sic] distinguished from a BB gun.
Charles Stephenson performed testing using an [A]irsoft
gun similar to the weapon allegedly used by Slinker in
the home invasion robbery, and illustrated that an
[A]irsoft gun does not eject a pellet with sufficient
velocity to render it capable of breaking or penetrate [sic]
human skin. Stephenson testified that [A]irsoft gun
pellets will disintegrate when it strikes a surface, and that
metal bbs cannot be loaded into an [A]irsoft gun. The

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 implication of this information on the nature of [A]irsoft
guns being that [A]irsoft guns are not readily capable of
causing death or serious physical injury.

As stated previously, [Defense counsel] recognized that
there was an argument to be made that the [A]irsoft gun
used by Slinker could not be considered a “deadly
weapon” or “dangerous weapon [sic],” but did not
actually put forth a reasonable effort at trial to establish
that an [A]irsoft gun was used by Slinker or present any
evidence or information to the jury about the nature of an
[A]irsoft gun. [Defense counsel’s] performance as
counsel was deficient, in that she recognized an issue but
did not at Probus’ trial make reasonable efforts to address
that issue. Probus’ conviction for Complicity to
Robbery, 1st degree, Complicity to Burglary, 1st degree,
and two counts of Complicity to Wanton Endangerment,
1st degree all relied on the jury finding that Slinker used
a “deadly weapon” or “dangerous instrument.” The
Court finds that Probus did suffer prejudice from
[Defense counsel’s] deficient performance, in that there
is a reasonable probability that Probus would have
obtained a different outcome if not for [Defense
counsel’s] errors. There is a reasonable probability that
if not for [Defense counsel’s] errors that Probus would
have been convicted of a lesser offense. A conviction of
a lower offense not only means a lower number of years,
but also a radically different parole eligibility service
percentage. The loss of an additional twenty years of a
person’s life to imprisonment is not a minor matter, and
the loss of a reasonable probability to be convicted of a
lesser offense because of an attorney’s deficient
performance is sufficiently prejudicial to a defendant.

Order at 3-8.

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 STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standard

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984), and as adopted in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ky. 2016). The Strickland

standard requires proof of two prongs to establish ineffective assistance of counsel:

first, counsel’s performance must be deficient; and, second, that deficient

performance must have prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2064.

Deficient performance is established when “counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution].” Id. Our analysis of

counsel’s performance focuses on the reasonableness of trial counsel’s actions.

For example, while counsel must conduct a “complete investigation[,]” our review

of the investigation is not of the investigation itself, but of the reasonableness of

trial counsel’s decisions, to wit: “that counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigation

unnecessary under all the circumstances and applying a heavy measure of

deference to the judgment of counsel.” Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436,

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446 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279

S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009), adopting standard announced in Strickland, supra.

Our review must itself be comparative only to defense counsel who

has reasonable abilities and means and is operating within other reasonable

demands. “A reasonable investigation is not an investigation that the best criminal

defense lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited time and resources,

but also with the benefit of hindsight, would conduct.” Id. (citing Thomas v.

Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 1998)).

During the reasonableness review of counsel’s performance, we must

“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. “We must analyze counsel’s overall performance and the totality of

circumstances therein in order to determine if the challenged conduct can

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 736.

Under the prejudice prong, “A defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance when the ‘errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.’” Commonwealth v. Searight, 423

S.W.3d 226, 230 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). To prove prejudice, there must be a showing of a reasonable probability of

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a different outcome had counsel’s unprofessional errors not occurred. Id. “This

reasonable probability is a probability ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). Both

prongs must be met for relief to be afforded. Id. at 231.

On appeal of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following an

evidentiary hearing, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings and

determinations of witness credibility, reviewing factual findings for substantial

evidence and clear error, while ultimately reviewing de novo the legal conclusion

of whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance pursuant to Strickland. See

McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 736.

ANALYSIS

The Trial Court found both deficient performance and resulting

prejudice on the sole issue of counsel’s investigation and presentation of evidence

regarding Airsoft guns. Though the Trial Court’s order is thorough and thoughtful

on these analyses, we respectfully disagree with both conclusions.

Initially, we begin our analysis of the Trial Court’s factual findings.

Even after applying great deference to the Trial Court’s determination of witness

credibility, we hold that there were two clear errors with the factual findings.

First, the Trial Court found that the weapon used was an Airsoft gun,

not a BB gun. This factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence and is

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clearly erroneous. The actual weapon used was never recovered, and the Kentucky

Supreme Court on direct appeal found the evidence at trial was sufficient for a

reasonable person to find that the weapon was a BB gun.

The evidence at the post-conviction hearing, on the other hand,

focused on a straw weapon – an Airsoft weapon provided to Stephenson by

Probus’s post-conviction counsel. And the Airsoft weapon provided by post-

conviction counsel was determinatively not even the same type of weapon used

during the crime; at best there was a chance that it was “similar” to one of many

Airsoft guns Probus owned when the crime occurred.

Moreover, the evidence at the hearing did not establish that the only

possible weapon used during the commission of the crime was an Airsoft gun.

Probus’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that he had two or three Airsoft

guns in the garage where Slinker had testified at trial he had obtained the weapon

used for the crime. Probus further testified that the weapon tested by Stephenson

was “similar” to one of the Airsoft guns in his garage. This testimony is not

substantial evidence that the Airsoft gun tested was similar to the one used in the

crime. There was admittedly at least one other Airsoft gun in the garage. And,

more importantly, the fact that there were two or three Airsoft guns in the garage

does not in and of itself prove that there were no other weapons in the garage when

Slinker went to the garage to take a weapon.

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 Probus also argues substantial evidence supports the Trial Court’s

factual finding that an Airsoft gun was used because Slinker testified at trial that he

broke the orange tip off the weapon. This testimony, Probus argues, should be

read in light of 15 U.S.C.A.4 § 5001(b)(1) as establishing that the weapon was an

Airsoft gun. That federal statute does require a distinguishing colorant, “blaze

orange,” as an “integral” and “permanent[] affix[ture]” on the tip or barrel of

certain firearms, including Airsoft guns, when they are first sold. It does not

require such orange plugs or tips on firearms or traditional BB or pellet-firing air

guns.

But this statute is not dispositive of the instant factual findings as it

likewise does not prohibit an orange plug or tip from being placed on the barrel of

other weapons. It is possible for a person to make a functioning firearm appear as

a fake weapon. Cf. People v. De Los Santos, No. G037646, 2007 WL 2199995, at

*3 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Cir. Aug. 1, 2007) (“We also conclude there is also sufficient

evidence to support a conclusion the weapon used to kill the victim was real,

whether or not it had an orange tip.”) (unpublished/non-citable in California courts

by operation of Rule 8.1115 of the California Rules of Court); Paredez v. State,

No. 04-03-00764-CR, 2004 WL 1835821, at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 18, 2004) (“This

evidence suggests that the gun was not a toy gun with an orange cap but instead a

4
United States Code Annotated.

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real gun with some orange paint on the end.”). Compare with, New York City,

N.Y., Code § 10-131(j)(1)(ii) (defining a firearm with a substantial portion of the

exterior of the weapon in bright orange as a “deceptively colored firearm” and

making ownership of the same illegal).

Moreover, Probus’s argument from this statute presents a logical

fallacy. As the argument goes, because the law requires that all non-deadly and

non-dangerous firearms have orange tips, therefore all firearms with orange tips

are non-deadly and non-dangerous. But the inverse is not necessarily true. Indeed,

if all judges must wear robes, it is not also true that anyone wearing a robe must be

a judge.

Additionally, all of this newly-introduced evidence at the post-

conviction hearing must be read in light of the evidence adduced at trial. At trial,

the evidence repeatedly demonstrated the weapon was a BB gun. The victim

testified that she felt the cold steel of the weapon during the burglary and robbery.

Slinker more often than not referred to the weapon as a BB gun. And the

Kentucky Supreme Court on direct appeal held the evidence at trial sufficient to

survive a directed verdict motion and permit a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt on the BB gun theory. The evidence at the evidentiary hearing,

on the other hand, was not substantial: the weapon tested was a straw weapon

selected by Probus’s post-conviction counsel; Probus said he had more than one

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Airsoft gun in his garage; and Probus only stated that the weapon was “similar” to

one of the Airsoft guns he owned. Not weighing the veracity of this post-

conviction testimony at all, but believing it all to be true, it still was not substantial

evidence to say conclusively the weapon tested by Stephenson was similar to the

weapon used by Slinker during the commission of the crime. Being unsupported

by substantial evidence, this finding is clearly erroneous that the weapon tested

was similar to the weapon used in the crime.

We also note that in this same vein of testimony, the Trial Court found

the “implication” of the information given by Stephenson was that “[A]irsoft guns

are not readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.” Order at 7.

However, this implication is not supported by substantial evidence. It is based on

Stephenson’s direct examination testimony and his testing of one, defense-

proffered Airsoft weapon. Stephenson testified on cross-examination that there

exist other, more powerful Airsoft weapons that have substantially higher terminal

velocities. Stephenson also testified that he had on protective eyewear during his

tests and admitted it was possible for an Airsoft weapon to damage one’s eyes.

Accordingly, there was not substantial evidence to support a finding that Airsoft

guns are categorically not readily capable of causing death or serious physical

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injury.5 Moreover, such a categorical statement would necessarily be a legal

conclusion that these weapons do not fit within the statutory definitions, a legal

conclusion which we would review de novo.6

Second, the Commonwealth argues that the following statement by

the Trial Court is an erroneous factual finding, “[Defense counsel] did not make

reasonable efforts to establish/clarify/emphasize at trial what type of gun Slinker

used in the crime.” Order at 5. However, whether Defense counsel’s actions are

reasonable is a legal conclusion that we review de novo in the following sections.

A. Strickland Deficient Performance.

First, we analyze whether Defense counsel rendered deficient

performance under Strickland. Though the Trial Court conducted a thorough

analysis and concluded that counsel’s performance fell below the Strickland

5
We further note that while the focus has been on the damage that the projectile could cause, one
could wield a toy gun as a bludgeon in such a way that it could cause death or serious physical
injury. Cf. State v. Hicks, 14 Ohio App. 3d 25, 469 N.E.2d 992 (1984). In Kentucky, a
dangerous instrument is defined as “any instrument . . . under the circumstances in which it is
used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury.” KRS 500.080(3). As the Trial Court correctly determined during
Probus’s trial, because the weapon was visible to the victim, the jury had to determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the weapon was a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument. See Lawless v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 676 (Ky. 2010) (compiling
cases). Here, we do not need to determine whether the weapon could be used as a bludgeon, but
it would be error to conclude categorically that all Airsoft weapons cannot constitute dangerous
instruments when they could be used as bludgeons.
6
See supra Note 4 for our obiter dicta on this issue.

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reasonableness standard, we have reviewed the evidence and, respectfully, have

arrived at a different conclusion.

We reiterate that our review of counsel’s performance must provide

“great deference” to trial counsel and afford a “strong presumption that counsel

acted reasonably and effectively.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 156

(Ky. 2021) (citations omitted). Moreover, a counsel’s investigation need only be

reasonable, “not an investigation that the best criminal defense lawyer in the world,

blessed not only with unlimited time and resources, but also with the benefit of

hindsight, would conduct.” Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 446. Rather, the question is

more appropriately tailored to “whether the known evidence would lead a

reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527,

123 S. Ct. 2527, 2538, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003).

Here, counsel conducted a reasonable investigation and formulated a

reasonable defense. The undisputed evidence showed that Defense counsel

recognized one of the issues in the case – whether the weapon used fell within the

statutory definitions of deadly weapon or dangerous instrument – and investigated

the same and presented multiple defenses. Defense counsel researched the nature

of the potential weapon used, even utilizing an intern to research Airsoft guns.

Defense counsel testified that they had over 20 banker’s boxes of research in the

case. Defense counsel was aware that based on the research she reviewed, some

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Airsoft guns can shoot metallic projectiles, which, given the law in Kentucky,

could make them potentially capable of causing at least a serious, physical injury.

Defense counsel was also aware, based on the law and the investigation, that the

weapon would not be dangerous if it was only shooting non-metallic projectiles.

Thus, she attempted in numerous ways to show that the weapon Slinker used was a

toy Airsoft gun that should result in lesser charges.

To that end, at trial Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined

Slinker about the weapon, utilizing his prior statements and his plea in attempting

to pin him down on the type of weapon he used:

Def. Counsel: I want to talk to you a little bit more about
this gun. Now you indicated to Detective Whitehill that
it was a toy gun, is that correct?

Slinker: Yes, ma’am.

Def. Counsel: A fake gun?

Slinker: A BB gun.

Def. Counsel: Well, you didn’t use BB in the statement,
but was it a plastic BB gun?

Slinker: It was a BB gun.

Def. Counsel: I don’t know what that is?

Slinker: It’s, uh, uh, a BB gun.

Def. Counsel: Ok. There are different types of BB guns,
and so let me move forward from this. You actually
appeared in front of Judge Conrad to enter that plea that

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Mr. Baxter [the Commonwealth’s Attorney] went over
you with?

Slinker: Yes, ma’am.

Def. Counsel: One of the reasons that the
Commonwealth Attorney said at that time that he was
reducing the charges was because of the type of gun that
you had used, do you remember that?

Slinker: Yes, ma’am.

Def. Counsel: And he said that the reason that he was
reducing the charges was because you told him that it
was a fake gun, a toy gun, is that correct?

Slinker: It was a toy BB gun.

Def. Counsel: On the record you actually said to the
Court that it was a, what’s it called? Airsoft gun? Is that
correct?

[Slinker shrugs.]

Def. Counsel: We have a copy of the video tape if you’d
like to watch it.

Slinker: I don’t, I . . .

Def. Counsel: You don’t remember telling the judge that
it was an Airsoft gun?

Slinker: Yes, yes, yes . . .

Def. Counsel: Okay, so you do remember telling the
judge that it was an Airsoft gun, and telling the
prosecutor that it was a toy gun, that it was a fake gun?

Slinker: Yes.

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 Def. Counsel: And you got a reduction in your charges
because, based upon that, is that correct?

Slinker: Yes, ma’am.

VR 11/1/17, 3:02:50.

This cross-examination by Defense counsel effectively showed to the

jury that Slinker previously referred to the gun as a toy, fake, and Airsoft gun.

Moreover, Defense counsel effectively showed the jury that if they were to believe

the gun was a toy gun, a fake gun, or an Airsoft gun, the lesser-included offenses

were the proper charges, as Slinker’s plea could have been based on the weapon

falling into one of these three categories.7 However, as the Kentucky Supreme

Court and the Trial Court both noted, throughout the rest of Slinker’s testimony, he

contradicted this testimony, most often referring to the weapon as a BB gun.

His testimony created a fact issue:

7
As the Kentucky Supreme Court held, this testimony showed the nature of the weapon used
was one of many bases that would support the reduced charges for Slinker:

But the only basis for Probus’s argument that the Commonwealth
reduced Slinker’s charges because the gun at issue was not a
traditional firearm comes from Slinker’s testimony at Probus’s
trial. This testimony alone cannot convincingly support the
assertion that the Commonwealth had no other basis for reducing
Slinker’s charges than this fact alone. In sum, the factual basis for
Probus’s argument is severely lacking, because, even if Slinker is
correct that the Commonwealth reduced his charges based on the
characterization of the gun at issue, the Commonwealth could have
reduced Slinker’s charges for several other reasons.

Probus, 578 S.W.3d at 345.

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 whether the weapon was a deadly weapon was a question
of fact that should be submitted to the jury to decide, a
jury could reasonably determine that a pellet or BB gun
was a deadly weapon (i.e. a type of weapon from which a
shot could cause death or serious physical injury) in light
of history of serious physical injuries caused by BB or
pellet guns.

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 501, 507 (Ky. 2010) (citations and

footnotes omitted).

Defense counsel’s focus on the nature-of-the-weapon defense also

kept the Commonwealth from later amending the indictment to include the

alternative theory for first-degree robbery, namely that the perpetrator caused

physical injury to a non-participant in the crime. KRS 515.020(1)(a). See, e.g.,

Alderson v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.3d 884, 896-97 (Ky. 2023) (“Whether an

amendment of an indictment during a trial to allow for a different method of

committing the same crime is permissible, is a highly fact-specific inquiry

depending on the evidence available to the defendant, the defenses offered and

whether the defendant would be prejudiced . . . .”).

We are reminded that “as a court far removed from the passion and

grit of the courtroom, we must be especially careful not to second-guess or

condemn in hindsight the decision of defense counsel. A defense attorney must

enjoy great discretion in trying a case, especially with regard to trial strategy and

tactics.” Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 317 (Ky. 1998). In the

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instant case, Defense counsel conducted a thorough investigation and employed

defense tactics that allowed the jury to find either that Probus was completely

innocent due to his alibi, or that Probus was guilty of the lesser-included offenses

due to the weapon being a toy, fake, or Airsoft gun. The jury rejected both

defenses, though.

In sum, based on the evidence at trial and that adduced at the

evidentiary hearing, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion the Trial Court

drew that Defense counsel’s investigation was deficient as it related to the type of

weapon used and that her performance was deficient in relation to the same issue.

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengable[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104

S. Ct. 2066. Here, Defense counsel conducted a reasonable and thorough

investigation of the case – including researching the nature of Airsoft guns, the

contents of Slinker’s plea, and the facts of the case – and she presented a three-part

defense that the jury ultimately rejected. Having reasonably conducted an

investigation and reasonably prepared defenses, we find Defense counsel’s

performance did not amount to Strickland deficient performance. Thus, we reverse

the Trial Court on this Strickland prong.

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 B. Strickland Prejudice.

Additionally, we respectfully disagree with the Trial Court that

counsel’s performance resulted in Strickland prejudice. To find prejudice, we

would have to determine that the result of the trial was unreliable. We reiterate

that under the prejudice prong, “A defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance when the ‘errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair

trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.’” Searight, 423 S.W.3d at 230 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). To prove prejudice, there must be

a showing of a reasonable probability of a different outcome had Defense

counsel’s unprofessional errors not occurred. Searight, 423 S.W.3d at 230. “This

reasonable probability is a probability ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).

Here, Defense counsel effectively put before the jury evidence that

Slinker’s plea bargain was contingent on the weapon being a fake, a toy, or an

Airsoft gun. However, arguendo, had Defense counsel’s investigation and

presentation of evidence regarding Airsoft guns constituted Strickland deficient

performance, the additional evidence from the evidentiary hearing is not of such

quality as to undermine confidence in the outcome of this case. The Trial Court’s

analysis on this Strickland prong focused solely on the reduction in time that lesser

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charges would bring. But our analysis must be broader into whether the trial itself

was unreliable and unfair as a result.

To that end, we note that two of the three defenses were not affected

at all by the evidence from the hearing regarding the Airsoft weapon testing.

Probus’s alibi defense was not changed, nor was Probus’s pre-trial challenge based

on Slinker’s plea. The jury still had factual questions to resolve. And the evidence

at trial, as shown by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s detailed recitation of the facts,

was highly inculpatory.

Moreover, had Defense counsel presented expert testimony about the

Airsoft guns, the evidence would have cut both ways as it did at the evidentiary

hearing. The expert testified that some Airsoft guns do not fire at such a velocity,

but he also admitted that there are some Airsoft guns that do fire at much higher

velocities. Moreover, he testified that being shot in the eye could injure the eye.

Any resulting prejudice is further eroded by the fact that it was

Probus’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that established the similarity

between the Airsoft gun tested and the one kept in Probus’s garage. Notably,

Probus did not testify during the guilt phase at his trial.

Accordingly, we cannot say that failure to present this additional

evidence resulted in a trial whose result is unreliable. Thus, we reverse on this

issue and remand for further proceedings on Probus’s remaining claims.

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 C. Procedural Bar.

The Commonwealth also argues that Probus’s underlying claim on

this issue is procedurally barred as having been raised and rejected on direct

appeal. The Commonwealth cites to Prescott v. Commonwealth, 572 S.W.3d 913

(Ky. App. 2019). Having already found there was no ineffective assistance of

counsel on the underlying claim, we need not address this alleged, procedural bar.

We note, however, that a review of the reasonableness of Defense counsel’s

investigation and the reasonableness of Defense counsel’s presentation of the

evidence is collateral to a review of the sufficiency of the evidence and not

“redundant” or “essentially the same components of his original arguments

presented on direct appeal, despite being assigned different labels[,]” as were the

arguments in Prescott. 572 S.W.3d at 923.

CONCLUSION

Following our de novo review of Probus’s ineffective assistance of

Defense counsel claim regarding her investigation and presentation of evidence

about an Airsoft weapon, we conclude that Defense counsel’s performance was not

deficient and did not result in Strickland prejudice. Accordingly, we REVERSE

the Trial Court’s order on this issue and REMAND for additional proceedings on

Probus’s remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron David L. Stewart
Attorney General of Kentucky La Grange, Kentucky

Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky

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