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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12797
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBROY WILLIAMS,
a.k.a. Spy,
a.k.a. Spy Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12797
D.C. Docket No. 8:04-cr-00158-SCB-TBM-1
____________________
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robroy Williams, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
peals the District Court’s denial of his motion for compassionate
release, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(A)(1). Williams argues that the
District Court erred in finding that he was ineligible for compas-
sionate release because he meets the requirements in U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B) (U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n 2021). Williams also argues that the District Court
abused its discretion by relying on his Jamaican citizenship and the
nature of his offense of conviction to determine that he posed a
danger to the community, and by ignoring his dangerousness con-
sidering his advanced age.
I. Background
A federal grand jury indicted Williams, and seven codefend-
ants, with conspiring to distribute cocaine and marijuana with in-
tent to unlawfully import it into the United States, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 960(a)(3), 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 960(b)(1)(G). The
grand jury also indicted Williams, and one codefendant, with con-
spiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of
46 U.S.C. § 1903(j), (g), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). Williams
pled guilty to both counts.
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22-12797 Opinion of the Court 3
The District Court sentenced Williams to 360 months’ im-
prisonment. Williams directly appealed, challenging the enhance-
ments imposed by the court and the reasonableness of his sentence,
but we affirmed Williams’s sentence.
Williams, through his attorney, moved to correct his sen-
tence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. The District Court denied his § 2255 motion.
Williams, proceeding pro se, filed a second motion to correct his
sentence under § 2255, arguing that counsel was ineffective in his
previous § 2255 proceeding. The District Court denied Williams’s
second § 2255 motion because it was untimely and successive.
Williams then moved pro se for home confinement or a re-
duction of his sentence in the form of compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argued that his previous stroke and
his medical conditions of diabetes, high cholesterol, vulnerability
to varicella-zoster virus, high glucose, hypertension, and odnasal
pterygium increased his risk of severe illness or death from
COVID-19. Williams attached supporting documentation to his
motion, including: his initial request for home confinement, the fa-
cility administrator’s denial of his request, an affidavit from his sis-
ter confirming his release plan, an affidavit from a doctor support-
ing any defendant’s attempt to seek release from custody during
the COVID-19 pandemic, a memorandum from the Attorney Gen-
eral instructing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to prioritize home
confinement as an appropriate response to COVID-19, and his
medical records.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12797
The Government opposed Williams’s motion. It argued
that the authority under § 3582 to grant home confinement was
committed solely to the BOP’s discretion. It noted (1) that Wil-
liams’s release plan conflicted with his unresolved detainer with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), (2) that Williams
had more than eighteen months remaining to serve, and (3) that
Williams had not served 50% of his current 360-month sentence.
The Government also explained that Williams’s motion could be
granted only upon a finding of extraordinary and compelling cir-
cumstances, and that his conditions were not specified in the Sen-
tencing Commission’s policy statement as medical conditions that
constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassion-
ate release. It argued that even if Williams could establish an ex-
traordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release, the
§ 3553(a) factors—including the nature of his criminal conduct and
the need to protect the community—weighed strongly against
granting him compassionate release.
The District Court denied Williams’s motion. It concluded
that Williams failed to establish an extraordinary and compelling
reason warranting compassionate release. It also concluded that
the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting Williams’s motion
because he would pose a danger to the community if released. It
noted that Williams “was convicted of a serious drug offense and
[that he] has an unresolved INS detainer with [ICE] because he is a
Jamaican citizen who will be deported after serving his sentence.”
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22-12797 Opinion of the Court 5
After Williams was transferred to a new prison, he filed an-
other motion for compassionate release. He referenced the medi-
cal conditions listed in his previous motion and noted that he also
had a history of heart problems. He emphasized that he was
sixty-five years old, had served over half of his sentence, and was a
nonviolent offender. If granted release, he planned to return to Ja-
maica to become a youth mentor and be with his family. He at-
tached more medical records from his previous prison, the facility’s
denial of his request for compassionate release, and evidence that
he had completed multiple courses relating to self-improvement
while serving his sentence.
The District Court denied Williams’s motion without the
need for the Government’s response. The court noted that Wil-
liams was not terminally ill, and his medical problems were
well-controlled in the BOP and not such that he could not provide
self-care. The District Court also considered the § 3553(a) factors
and concluded that they weighed against granting Williams’s mo-
tion because he posed a danger to the community if released. Wil-
liams appealed. 1
1 After he filed his appeal, Williams filed a motion for reconsideration, in which
he reiterated his arguments from his original motion and emphasized his med-
ical ailments, his good behavior, and his rehabilitative efforts. He also attached
medical records, a news article on COVID-19 at BOP institutions, and certifi-
cates of completion for coursework at the prison. The District Court denied
Williams’s motion for reconsideration. It found that Williams failed to
demonstrate the availability of new evidence, an intervening change in con-
trolling law, or a need to correct a clear error or manifest injustice.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12797
II. Legal Standards
“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v.
Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “After eligibility is es-
tablished, we review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion.” Id. “The abuse of
discretion standard of review ‘is not simply a rubber stamp.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam)). “A court must explain its sentencing decisions ade-
quately enough to allow for meaningful appellate review.” John-
son, 877 F.3d at 997. The abuse of discretion standard “does afford
district courts a ‘range of choice,’ and we ‘cannot reverse just be-
cause we might have come to a different conclusion.’” Giron,
15 F.4th at 1345 (quoting United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 912
(11th Cir. 2021)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies
an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making
its determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.
“We liberally construe pro se filings, including pro se applica-
tions for relief pursuant to § 2255.” Winthrop-Redin v. United States,
767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014). That said, we may not rewrite
filings for pro se litigants. See Benning v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs.,
71 F.4th 1324, 1340 (11th Cir. 2023).
III. Discussion
Williams argues that the District Court erred in failing to lib-
erally construe his arguments that his advanced age was the basis
for his motion for compassionate release. He asserts that because
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22-12797 Opinion of the Court 7
he is sixty-five years old, has served more than ten years, and has
deteriorating health conditions he is eligible for a reduction of his
sentence under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B). The Government
argues that the District Court appropriately considered § 1B1.13
cmt. n.1(B) and that Williams failed to mention the age provision
and failed to argue that he had experienced a serious deterioration
in physical or mental health because of the aging process. We
agree with the Government.
“A district court has no inherent authority to modify a de-
fendant’s sentence and may do so ‘only when authorized by a stat-
ute or rule.’” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345 (quoting United States v.
Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 2015)). “A statutory exception
exists for compassionate release.” Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Under this exception, a district court may grant a pris-
oner’s motion for compassionate release after deter-
mining that (1) “extraordinary and compelling rea-
sons warrant such a reduction,” (2) “such a reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission,” and (3) § 3553(a)
sentencing factors weigh in favor of a reduction. 2
2 Those factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence
imposed; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the
sentence range established; (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispari-
ties among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12797
Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
“The Sentencing Commission has issued a policy statement
concerning this exception: Section 1B1.13.” Id. “The application
notes for Section 1B1.13 identify four general categories of ‘extraor-
dinary and compelling reasons’: medical, age, family, and a
‘catch-all “other reasons” category.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2021)); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
cmt. n.1(A)–(D). Relevant here is the age category. Under that
category, a defendant can establish extraordinary and compelling
circumstances if he or she is (1) “at least 65 years old”; (2) “experi-
encing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because
of the aging process”; and (3) has “served at least 10 years or 75
percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(B). We are bound by the Commission’s
definition of extraordinary and compelling reasons. See Bryant,
996 F.3d at 1251–52.
The District Court did not err in determining that Williams
was ineligible for compassionate release. To begin, the court con-
sidered all the subsections within § 1B1.13, including the section
describing extraordinary and compelling circumstances based on
age. The court explained that Williams “fail[ed] . . . to demonstrate
an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate
release because his circumstances do not fall within U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(D). He is not terminal, his medical prob-
lems are well-controlled in the [BOP], and they are not such that
he cannot provide self-care.”
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Though the District Court appears to have focused its dis-
cussion on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A), that decision was reason-
able. Williams failed to argue that he was eligible under n.1(B).
Instead, he noted that “he is a high-risk inmate, due to his medical
issues, and [he] is 65 years old which is the age hardest to recover
if such coronavirus is contracted.” True, Williams mentions his
age throughout his motion, but nowhere does he argue that he ex-
perienced a “serious deterioration in physical or mental health be-
cause of the aging process.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B)(ii) (empha-
sis added). The District Court therefore reasonably focused on
Williams’s various medical conditions under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
cmt. n.1(A). 3 See Benning, 71 F.4th at 1340 (“Although we review
pro se filings liberally, we cannot ‘rewrite [a] . . . pleading’ to request
a different form of relief.” (alteration and omission in original)
(quoting Campbell v. Air. Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th
Cir. 2014))). And the District Court did not err in finding that Wil-
liams’s medical conditions did not qualify as an extraordinary and
compelling reason for early release. See, e.g., Harris, 989 F.3d at 912
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing compassionate release to an inmate with hypertension, despite
the existence of COVID-19); Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 (holding the
same where the prisoner’s high cholesterol, high blood pressure,
3 Moreover, Williams’s health conditions were noted in a 2009 medical record
when Williams was fifty-two years old. On this record, there is nothing to
suggest that Williams has experienced a serious deterioration in physical or
mental health because of the aging process.
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and coronary artery disease were “manageable in prison, despite
the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic”).
Extraordinary and compelling circumstances did not war-
rant granting Williams’s motion. It is therefore unnecessary to
reach whether the District Court abused its discretion in applying
the § 3553(a) factors. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1350.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s order denying
Williams’s motion for compassionate release.
AFFIRMED.