Cite as 2023 Ark. 189
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-22-696
Opinion Delivered: December 14, 2023
FREDRICK JONES APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 60CR-20-2061]
V.
HONORABLE WENDELL GRIFFEN,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice
The Pulaski County Circuit Court convicted appellant Fredrick Jones of first-degree
murder, first-degree battery, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of
cocaine with the purpose to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, fleeing, and felon in
possession of a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison for first-
degree murder, sixty years in prison for first-degree battery, and an aggregate term of forty
years on the remaining convictions, to be served concurrently. For reversal, Jones argues that
the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss on the charges of first-degree
murder and first-degree battery. We affirm.
I. Facts
Jones waived his right to a jury trial and was tried before the circuit court. At trial,
evidence was presented that on April 25, 2020, Thelton Smith, Sr., was shot while driving
down his street. The following day, his daughter, Montrell Smith, called 911 because she saw
the man whom her father had identified as the person who shot him. She then called 911 a
second time when she saw the man get into his van and drive off, and she followed him until
the police arrived and attempted to pull him over. Smith identified Jones in court as the man
who was the subject of her 911 call.
Retired Officer Rodney Blocker testified that he was a patrol officer on duty with
the Little Rock Police Department on April 26, 2020. He responded to a dispatch call at
approximately 12:04 p.m. that day because Smith reported that she had spotted Jones driving
a green Chrysler Town and Country van. Officer Blocker saw the van at the intersection of
12th Street and South Rodney Parham and attempted to make a felony traffic stop in relation
to the previous day’s shooting. Jones initially stopped at a traffic light, but when Officer
Blocker ordered him to turn off his vehicle, Jones refused and fled in his van southbound on
John Barrow Road. Officer Blocker turned on his siren and began to pursue Jones. Officer
Blocker testified that during the pursuit, he reached a speed of ninety-three miles per hour.
Jones failed to stop at a red light at the intersection of West 36th Street and John Barrow
Road, and his vehicle struck a white Toyota Sienna van occupied by Jose and Virginia
Hernandez. Officer Blocker’s dash camera recorded the pursuit and collision, and that
footage was played at the bench trial.
The Hernandezes’ van caught fire on impact, and the police were able to remove
them from the vehicle before it exploded. They were taken by ambulance to Baptist Hospital,
where Mr. Hernandez died during surgery as a result of internal bleeding. Mrs. Hernandez
suffered three broken ribs and a broken shoulder.
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Jones’s van was disabled as a result of the collision, and he became trapped under the
dashboard and had to be removed by EMTs. Inside Jones’s van, officers discovered a loaded
rifle, a medicine bottle containing a white rock-like substance, and a shaving bag “containing
some drug paraphernalia, what appeared to be rock cocaine, and also a scale.” Police
subsequently obtained a search warrant for Jones’s van and discovered a second firearm inside
it. The white rock-like substances were later determined to be cocaine. Additionally, the
State introduced sentencing orders reflecting Jones’s prior felony convictions.
At the close of the State’s case, Jones moved to dismiss the charges against him. As to
first-degree murder, he argued that the State had failed to prove that Mr. Hernandez’s death
occurred “in furtherance of ” Jones’s fleeing from police. On first-degree battery, Jones argued
that the State had failed to prove that Mrs. Hernandez’s injuries occurred “in the furtherance
of ” his fleeing from police. The circuit court denied Jones’s motions. After informing the
court that the defense did not intend to call any witnesses, Jones renewed his motions, which
the circuit court again denied. It found him guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree battery,
simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of cocaine with the purpose to
deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, fleeing, and felon in possession of a firearm. Jones
was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment for first-degree murder, sixty years’
imprisonment for first-degree battery, and an aggregate term of forty years’ imprisonment
on the remaining convictions, to run concurrently. Jones filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, Jones argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss
the charges of first-degree murder and first-degree battery. A motion to dismiss at a bench
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trial, like a motion for directed verdict at a jury trial, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Gill v. State, 2015 Ark. 421, at 3, 474 S.W.3d 77, 79. The test for determining
sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports
the verdict. Id., 474 S.W.3d at 79. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty
and precision to compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass beyond mere suspicion
or conjecture. Id., 474 S.W.3d at 79. On appeal, this court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered.
Id., 474 S.W.3d at 79.
In the present case, Jones committed first-degree murder if he “commit[ted] or
attempt[ed] to commit a felony; and [i]n the course of and in the furtherance of the felony
. . . [he] cause[d] the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Supp. 2019).
Jones committed first-degree battery if he committed a felony, and, in the course of and in
furtherance of the felony, he caused serious physical injury to any person under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-13-201(a)(4)(A), (B)(1) (Supp. 2019). Here, fleeing was the felony underlying each of
these charges. A person commits felony fleeing when, knowing that his immediate arrest is
being attempted by a duly authorized law-enforcement officer, he flees from the officer by
means of a vehicle and causes serious physical injury to any person as a direct result of fleeing
from the law-enforcement officer. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125(a), (d)(3) (Supp. 2019).
With regard to his motions to dismiss the charges of first-degree murder and first-
degree battery, Jones argues that the State failed to establish that those crimes were
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committed “in furtherance of” the offense of felony fleeing. Citing several out-of-state cases,
Jones asserts that the ordinary and accepted meaning of “in furtherance of” is to “advance”
or “promote.” He concedes that “his conduct in driving a vehicle at a high rate of speed
and driving through a red light was done to advance or promote his flight from a police
officer” but argues that “colliding with the victims’ vehicle and causing their respective
death and serious physical injury did not advance or promote his commission of felony
fleeing.”
We have rejected a similar argument in Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, 516 S.W.3d
727. In that case, Noble was convicted of first-degree felony murder with commission of a
terroristic act as the underlying felony. On appeal, Noble challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his murder conviction, arguing that under the facts there, he did not
shoot and kill the victim “in furtherance of” the commission of the terroristic acts because
the State failed to prove that the murder was committed to facilitate the terroristic acts. Id.
at 3–4, 516 S.W.3d at 730. In Noble, this court distinguished Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421,
731 S.W.2d 756 (1987), in which “[t]he court reversed because the felony-murder statute
could not be read to encompass the facts, which clearly showed that Parker entered the
[victim’s] house, which was the felony, with the sole purpose to commit murder.” Noble,
2017 Ark. 142, at 4, 516 S.W.3d at 730 (citing Parker, 292 Ark. at 425, 731 S.W.2d. at 758).
We stated that “the killings [in Parker] could not be in furtherance of a burglary because the
burglary was only a means of achieving the murders.” Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 731. This
court clarified in Noble that “to be convicted of felony murder, the defendant must have an
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intent or objective to commit the underlying felony as opposed to the primary goal of
murder.” Id., 516 S.W.3d at 731. The court held that
after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude
that there was substantial evidence that Noble “in the course of and in furtherance
of” committing the terroristic acts of shooting at an occupied vehicle with the intent
to cause property damage, caused the death of [the victim]. Thus, unlike Parker . . .,
the death occurred “in the course of and in furtherance of” the felony, as opposed
to the felony occurring “in the course of and in furtherance of” the murder. Noble
had an independent objective to commit terroristic acts, and his intent related to the
acts of terrorism, not to murder. See Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, 177–78, 264 S.W.3d
498, 503 (2007) (“[T]he culpable intent or mens rea relates to the crime of the
underlying felony . . . and not to the murder itself.).
Id. at 5–6, 516 S.W.3d at 731.
Our holding in Noble governs the present case. Here, Jones had the culpable intent,
or mens rea, to commit the crime of felony fleeing, as opposed to the primary goals of murder
and battery. Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 731. The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the State, established that Jones had the intent to flee, and “in
the course of and in furtherance of” that flight, he caused Mr. Hernandez’s death and Mrs.
Hernandez’s serious physical injuries. Thus, because substantial evidence supports Jones’s
convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree battery, we hold that the circuit court
properly denied his motions to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm.
III. Rule 4-3(a)
Because Jones received a life sentence, this court, in compliance with Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), has examined the record for all objections, motions, and
requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Jones. No prejudicial error has
been found.
Affirmed.
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David Sudduth, Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for
appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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