In the Int. of: E.J.A., a Minor

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.J.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: LEGAL COUNSEL FOR :
MINOR CHILD :
:
:
: No. 740 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0009a

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.M.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE :
MINOR CHILD :
:
:
: No. 741 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0010a

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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El.A., born in August 2019, and R.A., born in June 2018, appeal from

the decrees terminating the parental rights of their mother (“Mother”) and

father (“Father”).1 Upon review, we affirm.

The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) first

became involved with the family in 2019 based upon concerns with substance

abuse by Mother and Father. A referral was made to CYF in August 2020

based on an allegation that they were abusing drugs and not properly

disciplining or supervising the four oldest children. Those children were placed

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1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parents’ rights as to three additional

siblings: B.W., born in May 2014; Ed.A., III, born in June 2015; and A.A.,
born in June 2021. We have adjusted the abbreviations used within this
writing to align with those used by this Court in several related cases presently
or recently before this Court. To wit, with respect to termination, Father and
Mother have also appealed, and those appeals are docketed at 683-687 MDA
2022, and 755-759 MDA 2022, respectively. Additionally, Father and Mother
also appealed the goal change from reunification to adoption, docketed at 201-
205 MDA 2022 and 295-299 MDA 2022, respectively. Finally, Father and
Mother appealed from an order finding them both perpetrators of abuse as to
B.W. and El.A. This Court stayed all matters, including the instant termination
appeal, pending resolution of the abuse appeals. Ultimately, we affirmed the
findings of abuse. See Int. of B.W., 2023 WL 5526687 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse as to Father); Int.
of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-
precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse as to Mother). Although
the stay has been lifted in the termination matters, it remains active on the
goal change appeals. Regrettably, the cumulative effect has been the tragic
prolongation of several Children’s Fast Track cases for this family, which are,
by nature, meant to be resolved quickly by this Court for the benefit of the
impacted children.

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into care and adjudicated dependent on September 16, 2020. After A.A. was

born, he was likewise placed into care and adjudicated dependent.2

As a result of the dependency adjudications, Mother and Father were

ordered to, inter alia, cooperate with both announced and unannounced home

visits by CYF; complete a mental health evaluation and follow treatment

recommendations; actively participate in services; obtain employment and

provide proof of income to CYF; maintain safe, clean, and appropriate housing;

submit to random drug testing; and continue their drug and alcohol treatment

and participation in a methadone program. See Family Service Plan, 10/2/20,

at 14, 16-18; see also Family Service Plan, 3/12/21, at 14 (adding, among

other things, that the parents notify CYF of any change in household members

and attend medical appointments for the children, and for Father to adhere to

the conditions of his probation); Family Service Plan, 8/9/21 (same, issued

following A.A.’s birth and adjudication of dependency).

Meanwhile, in the companion dependency matters, allegations of

physical abuse were made against Father and Mother in December 2020 and

January 2021, as to B.W. and El.A. The report included allegations that the

parents slapped the children with an open hand, including when El.A. was less

than one month old, and struck the children with a belt. In his forensic

interview with the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”), B.W. indicated that he

would take the beatings in order to spare his younger siblings from similar
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2 All five children were eventually placed in the same pre-adoptive resource

home, where they remained together at the time of the termination hearing.

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abuse. See Orphans’ Court Opinion (El.A.’s appeal), 6/15/22, at 26 (citing

CAC video).

This Court recounted the testimony offered at the March 10, 2022

finding of abuse hearing as follows:

The CAC forensic interviewer. . . testified: “B.W. disclosed being
beat — his words — that El.A. was slapped with a belt,” Father
beat R.A. and El.A., Mother slapped B.W., and B.W. observed
potential drug use. B.W. further reported El.A. suffered injuries,
including bleeding from the mouth.

CYF Caseworker [Kristen] Marshall, who observed the interview,
testified:

B.W. disclosed that he and his siblings were being
punished with a black belt with little spikes on it. He
reported that it was hurtful. B.W. actually stated it
hurt more than a gun. He stated the spikes were
sharp and caused him to bleed. He stated he would
cry and he was hit over and over. The very red marks
like — were left like it was bleeding, but it wasn’t. And
he stated that both parents would hit him.

CYF additionally entered into evidence the forensic interview
summary and a DVD video of the forensic interview. Ms. Marshall
sought, but did not receive, medical records that might show
physical injury to B.W. She also attempted multiple times to
schedule an interview with Mother and Father, but was
unsuccessful.

With respect to El.A., Ms. Marshall testified that B.W. stated
Mother and Father sometimes slapped El.A., so there was blood
under his tongue, and that El.A. would cry a lot and neighbors
would hear. As stated above, B.W.’s statements led to a referral
as to El.A. An investigation revealed El.A. was taken to the York
Hospital emergency room for bleeding from the mouth in August
2019 when he was less than a month old.

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Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239, at *2-3 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(non-precedential decision) (cleaned up). Following a prolonged

investigation, partially due to the parents’ refusal to submit to police

interviews, the court found both Mother and Father to be perpetrators of abuse

against B.W. and El.A. As noted, this Court affirmed those findings.

On January 19, 2022, CYF filed petitions to terminate the parental rights

of Mother and Father as to all five children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). As to the four oldest children, B.W., Ed.A., R.A.,

and El.A., CYF also sought termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).

The court held hearings on the petitions on April 1 and 18, 2022.3 CYF

presented the testimony of caseworker Kristen Marshall, the family advocate

and family therapist from Pressley Ridge, and Mother’s methadone counselor

at Pyramid Healthcare and recovery specialist at RASE Project, and Father’s

methadone counselor and probation officer. Through their testimony, it was

relayed that the parents had been consistent with their visits with the children

and had made significant progress resolving their substance abuse. However,

as of the first day of the hearing, CYF remained concerned because they had

not alleviated the environmental concerns at the house, made progress in

their mental health treatment, or established financial stability. Additionally,

____________________________________________

3 At the termination hearing, each child had their own attorney representing

their respective legal interests. David Worley, Esquire, collectively
represented the best interests of all five children as their guardian ad litem
(“GAL”).

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visits had not progressed beyond supervised, and both parents recently tested

positive for alcohol, which concerned CYF for multiple reasons.

At the second hearing, over two weeks later, Father and Mother

testified. During the gap between hearings, Mother re-initiated mental health

treatment and Father had an appointment for the following day. Also in the

interim, the family therapist visited the home on a scheduled visit. Mother

attempted to demonstrate that the house had since been made appropriate

for reunification through her own testimony and by recalling the family

therapist. The parents also explained their work histories, the utility payments

at the house, and attendance at medical appointments for the children.

Finally, Father, presented testimony from another CYF caseworker regarding

Ms. Marshall’s alleged bias.

The children’s GAL argued that termination was in the best interests of

each child. Specifically, the GAL was concerned that the physical abuse had

been unaddressed and was wary of the last-minute efforts by the parents to

finally re-initiate mental health treatment and attempt to make the home

environment appropriate. Through legal counsel, two-year-old El.A.

expressed that despite the finding of abuse, he had a strong bond with his

parents and would oppose termination. Likewise, legal counsel for three-year-

old R.A. relayed that she also had a strong bond with her parents and would

oppose termination. Notably, there was no indication by legal counsel or any

other witness that either child had articulated a specific desire to remain with

Mother and Father.

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At the conclusion of the hearing, adopting the GAL’s concerns, the

orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of Mother and father as to all

five children, and issued separate orders changing each child’s permanency

goal to adoption. El.A. and R.A. timely filed notices of appeal and concise

statements pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The orphans’ court complied

with Rule 1925(a).

El.A. presents the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law and/or
abused its discretion in entering its judgment and/or the
[orphans’] court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable?

2. Whether pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(1), insufficient evidence was
presented to show that the parents, by conduct continuing for
a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition, either evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to the child or had refused or failed
to perform parental duties?

3. Whether pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(2), insufficient evidence was
presented to show that the parents exhibited a repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, [neglect] or refusal by either
parent which had caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being and that any such alleged conditions and
causes of incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent?

4. Whether pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(5), insufficient evidence was
presented to show that the conditions for removal continue to
exist and that the parents, either individually or collectively,
cannot or will not remedy those conditions in a reasonable
period of time and that termination serves the needs and
welfare of the child?

5. Whether pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(8), insufficient evidence was
presented to show that the conditions that led to the removal

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continue to exist and that termination best serves the needs
and welfare of the child?

6. Whether pursuant to [§] 2511(b), insufficient evidence was
presented that termination served the developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare of the child?

El.A.’s brief at 4-5 (cleaned up).4

With respect to R.A.’s appeal, this Court is presented with a single

question, namely, whether the orphans’ “court abused its discretion and erred

as a matter of law and/or exercised manifestly unreasonable judgment in

terminating the parental rights of [R.A.’s] mother and father when insufficient

evidence was presented to satisfy [the] burden of proof?” R.A.’s brief at 7. 5

In sum, both children ask this Court to review the orphans’ court’s discretion

in terminating their parents’ parental rights involuntarily.

We begin with the relevant legal principles governing such review:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
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4 El.A. listed and withdrew three additional issues. CYF and the GAL filed a
single, collective brief in support of affirming the orphans’ court’s decrees.

5 The GAL and CYF filed a single, collective brief in support of affirming the

orphans’ court’s decrees.

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upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings,

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed

by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

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parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). T.B.B.,

supra at 395. The children assert that CYF failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the

termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with the orphans’

court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus our analysis

for both children and both parents on § 2511(a)(5) and (b), which provide as

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:

....

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance

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reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.

....

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

First, we address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by

terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father as to El.A. and R.A.

pursuant to § 2511(a)(5). Termination under this subsection requires that

the moving party prove the following elements:

(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal or
placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not
remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within
a reasonable period time; (4) the services reasonably available to
the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to
removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.

In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

El.A. argues that there was insufficient evidence that the conditions

leading to his removal remained at the time of the termination hearing

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because his parents had successfully addressed their substance abuse issues.

See El.A.’s brief at 29-30. He characterizes CYF’s environmental concerns as

“minor” and contends that they had been addressed. Id. at 30. Finally, El.A.

assails the evidence that termination would be in his best interests. Id.

R.A., for her part, also focuses on the parents’ compliance with drug

treatment as demonstrating that the substance abuse issues leading to

placement had been resolved and argues that any concerns about Father’s

anger towards the service providers had been resolved. See R.A.’s brief at

34, 38. Additionally, she posits that the court erred in relying on Father’s

disorderly conduct conviction without knowing the date of the underlying

conduct, and in relying on CYF’s concerns related to environmental issues and

financial documentation. Id. at 38-39. According to R.A., the parents

submitted documentation to their service team and, after noting the

contentious relationship between the parents and Ms. Marshall, R.A. questions

the general stewardship of the case towards reunification under Ms. Marshall.

Id. at 43-46. To that end, she challenges the orphans’ court’s statement

during the hearing discounting statements that Ms. Marshall may have said

out of frustration regarding the underlying matter. Id. at 48. R.A. alleges

that her parents had addressed all concerns and demonstrated their ability to

properly supervise the children. Id. at 46-47. In sum, she avers that the

orphans’ court placed greater weight on negative events occurring more than

a year before the filing of the termination petition and inadequate weight on

the positive and recent progress of parents. Id. at 47.

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While El.A. and R.A. focus on testimony supporting the conclusion that

the environmental concerns had been remedied by the parents and financial

documents provided to the service team, it was wholly within the province of

the orphans’ court to make credibility determinations regarding the testimony

offered and reach the opposite conclusion. As to the court’s decision to credit

Ms. Marshall’s testimony, it noted that “[w]hether she said some untoward

things out of frustration does not necessarily impact credibility.” N.T. Hearing,

4/1/23, at 169. We discern no error in this conclusion. The court was merely

expressing its understanding that these cases were difficult and that those

who work in stressful fields sometimes say things, outside the presence of the

court or the parties involved, that they would not otherwise state. However,

so doing does not necessarily impugn their character or discredit their

testimony. Rather, the court waited until hearing Ms. Marshall’s testimony, in

light of the conflicting testimony from the Pressley Ridge workers, to ascertain

her credibility. Ultimately, the court found Ms. Marshall credible.

In finding Ms. Marshall credible, the court also rejected the argument

that she had stymied progress through her stewardship of the case and lack

of diligence in the abuse investigation. As noted by Ms. Marshall, the visits

were not expanded to partially supervised because of the open abuse

investigation, the condition of the house remained inappropriate, the parents’

difficulties in setting boundaries during visits, and generally insufficient

progress with their parenting goals. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 68-69.

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Her testimony was supported by that of the Pressley Ridge witnesses.

The family advocate, Michele Mahoney, testified that the original concern

necessitating supervised visits was the parenting capacity of Mother and

Father. See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 56. The parents demonstrated an

improved ability to control visits after therapy started in September 2021, and

at the time of the termination hearing, she indicated that she would now be

amenable to partially-supervised visits. Id. at 56.

Likewise, the family therapist, Jessica Myers, testified that a second

supervisor was added to the visits because there were concerns with the

parents whispering to the children, as well as for someone to monitor B.W.’s

mental health during visits. Id. at 77-78. The whisperings and potentially

manipulative conversations were one of the reasons that visits had not

progressed to partially supervised. Id. at 109. Nonetheless, she testified

that, at the time of the termination hearing, she would support partially-

supervised visitation. Id. at 107.

Even if the open investigation had been the only reason preventing visits

progressing to partially supervised, that was not the sole fault of Ms. Marshall.

She explained the procedure regarding open abuse investigations, and that

the police must initially conduct interviews in order to move the investigation

along. Father and Mother refused to participate in those interviews. Once

Ms. Marshall was directed by the court in November 2021 to proceed without

the benefit of those interviews, she completed the abuse investigation by

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January 11, 2022. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 63-64; B.W., supra at *2.

While the delay in the investigation was certainly unwanted, it cannot be

attributed solely to Ms. Marshall, particularly as it was the refusal by the

parents to participate in the initial police interview that stalled the

investigation. Moreover, once Ms. Marshall conducted the investigation, it

appears to have been completed with expediency.

As the court’s credibility determinations are supported by the record,

they should remain undisturbed. See M.G., supra at 73-74; T.B.B., supra

at 394. Accepting these credibility determinations, our review of the certified

record indicates that the court found that CYF had met its burden as to

termination based upon the parents’ failure to demonstrate the ability to

provide safe and stable care for the children. This was evidenced by the

housing concerns, failure to take seriously the mental health treatment, and

lack of evidence of a stable income to support five children.

Ms. Marshall, who had been assigned to the case since October 2020,

testified that Mother’s primary concerns at adjudication were substance

abuse, environmental issues in the home, mental health, and drug testing.

See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 197. With regard to the environmental issues,

as noted hereinabove, the parents’ goals included complying with

unannounced and announced home visits by CYF, maintaining safe

appropriate housing, and performing routine housekeeping.

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During Ms. Marshall’s tenure, she attempted to make eight home visits.

In November 2020, there were lice issues, the heavy smell of animal feces

and urine smell, and problems with the toilet, stairwell railing, and one of the

bedroom floors. At the next two visits, both in December 2020, the toilet and

railing issues had been repaired. In January 2021, she was unable to enter

the house due to COVID-19 concerns and lice. In July 2021, a proxy visited

the house but was not permitted inside. Nonetheless, the proxy noted that it

smelled like garbage outside and the front porch was messy. In August 2021,

Ms. Marshall was denied entry into the house but noted a strong smell of

animal feces when the door was opened. Again, in January 2022, she was not

allowed into the house to conduct a home visit. Her last visit was conducted

on March 24, 2022. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 46-47.

During the last visit, which was unannounced, Mother was away from

the home, but returned when called and was inside for a few minutes before

admitting Ms. Marshall and her supervisor into the home. There was a potent

smell of animal feces and urine, feces in the kitchen trash, a dog peeing

sporadically in the house, space heaters throughout the home, including one

on top of a laundry basket filled with clothes, no sink in the only bathroom,

concerns with water damage in the parents’ bedroom, and animal feces in one

of the children’s rooms. See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 200-203.

Turning to the elements of § 2511(a)(5), neither child contests that they

were removed from their parents’ care for a period exceeding six months.

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Therefore, the first element is satisfied. As to the second, third, and fourth

elements, the initial placement was based upon concerns about the parents’

drug use, inappropriate parenting, unstable employment, unsafe housing, and

the need for mental health treatment. Once there were allegations and

findings of abuse, that naturally became part of the concerns as to their

parenting and ability to provide a safe home environment. While the parents

made great strides with regard to their drug abuse, the orphans’ court

concluded that they could not remedy the remaining conditions leading to

adjudication within a reasonable amount of time. See e.g., Orphans’ Court

Opinion (El.A.’s appeal), 6/15/22, at 29. Specifically, the court held as

follows:

As the record shows, the children were removed from Father and
Mother for more than parents’ drug use or Father’s overdose. CYF
received a referral several days prior to Father’s overdose. CYF
had prior history with the family and feared Mother would revoke
the safety plan implemented for the children’s welfare. From the
outset, the revised safety plan, dated October 2, 2020, provided
objectives that are not beyond the control of the parents related
to cooperating with agency services, gaining employment and
financial stability, providing proof of income, securing appropriate
housing and sleeping quarters for the children, routine
housekeeping, and methadone treatment, etc.

Furthermore, the allegations of physical abuse by B.W. and the
finding of abuse raise safety concerns regarding the children. The
parents’ consistent denials that anything happened regarding the
finding of abuse is concerning. During the period that the children
have been outside of the home, a report to the court for a
permanency review hearing indicated that Father often escalates
to yelling and cursing during team conversations[.] On August 31,
2021, the Catholic Services Intensive Family Services Team closed
out services and recommended anger management because
Father was inappropriate. In September 2021, Mother reported

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that an argument escalated to the point that her mother
threatened to file a protection from abuse order against her.
Father pleaded nolo contendere to disorderly conduct for fighting
for 12 months [of] probation. The court is not aware of the date
of the specific disorderly conduct. However, these other instances
occurred after or while Mother and Father were receiving various
services and raise concerns regarding the safety of the children.

The children . . . have been removed for almost twenty months at
this time. Parents certainly made progress with regard to the
methadone program as required by the family service plan cited.
The parents could not remedy the remaining conditions within a
reasonable time. Given that parents have had some services close
unsuccessfully or declined, it is not likely that available services
will remedy the remaining conditions that led to the removal or
placement of the children within a reasonable period of time. . . .
[T]he court believed termination serves the best interests of the
children who require permanency.

There was testimony that the children enjoy their visits with the
parents and are bonded to them. Despite this, the court believes
termination is in the children’s best interests. The safety and well-
being of the children is of paramount concern to the court. The
children are all together in a safe environment with [the foster
mother], whom they call “mom-mom,” and they are receiving
therapy. The children have exhibited troubling behaviors, which
suggests trauma.

Id. at 27-29 (cleaned up). With respect to the children who are appealing the

termination decrees, R.A. has been sexually acting out. Id. at 29-30.

While we agree that the parents should certainly be commended for

their successful drug treatment and sobriety, the children were not removed

solely on the basis of substance abuse. The parents have failed to make

sufficient progress towards the remaining goals, namely, engaging with

mental health treatment to address, inter alia, the physical abuse; correcting

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the environmental concerns in the home; and demonstrating financial

stability.

[T]he statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held
in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Therefore,

we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding

statutory support for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(5) as to El.A. and

R.A.

Turning to § 2511(b), we again set forth the guiding principles.

[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare above concerns for the parent.

Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs
and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
consider. The court must consider whether the children are in a
pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
always an easy task.

Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105–06 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up).

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This Court has emphasized that “the extent of the bond-effect analysis

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re

Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). In

weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep

the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269

(Pa. 2013). “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

A court cannot “toll the well-being and permanency” of a child indefinitely in

the hope that a parent “will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities

of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc)

(citation omitted).

The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that

termination was in the best interests of El.A. and R.A. with respect to both

parents. Notably, the GAL advocated in favor of termination as being in their

best interests. See Appellees’ brief (El.A.’s appeal) at 27 (arguing that

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of El.A.); Appellees’ brief

(R.A.’s appeal) at 27 (same as to R.A.). The court acknowledged the bond

between the two children and the parents, and that both Mother and Father

have made progress towards some of their goals. However, the court held

that it “cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for

permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the

future.” Orphans’ Court Opinion (El.A.’s appeal), 6/15/22, at 35 (quoting

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R.J.S., supra at 513). Ms. Marshall testified that based upon her

observations of the children in the resource home, El.A. and R.A. have a family

relationship with the foster mother and are safe in the resource home. N.T.

Hearing, 4/1/22, at 217-18.

As El.A. and R.A. are together with their siblings, safe, and bonded with

their foster mother, the court concluded that it was in their best interests to

terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father so that the children could

achieve permanency. Id. at 35-36. As detailed hereinabove, the facts as

found by the orphans’ court are supported by clear and convincing evidence,

and its conclusions are free from legal error. In our review, its conclusions

are not manifestly unreasonable, or the subject of partiality, prejudice, bias,

or ill-will, so as to support a reversal of the decrees terminating involuntarily

the parents’ parental rights as to El.A. and R.A. See C.M., supra at 359. In

light of our deferential standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion, and

affirm the decrees terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father as to

El.A. and R.A.

Decrees affirmed.

P.J.E. Stevens joins this Memorandum.

Judge McCaffery files a Dissenting Statement.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2023

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