NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JODY R.O. CARR, No. 22-36052
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00332-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DAVID C. NYE, Judge; B. LYNN
WINMILL, Judge; JOSH TEWALT,
Director IDOC; MARK KUBINSKI, IDOC
Official; AMANDA GENTRY; RACHAEL
ALTIG; BARNEY; McKEY;
NICODEMUS; CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 12, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Idaho state prisoner Jody R.O. Carr appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Carr’s claims against the district judges
as barred by judicial immunity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,
1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to the determination of whether
an act is judicial in nature and subject to absolute judicial immunity).
The district court properly dismissed Carr’s claims against the prison
officials because Carr failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.
See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se
pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010)
(setting forth the elements of a § 1983 conspiracy claim); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408
F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the elements of a First Amendment
retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
490 (1969) (“[T]he State may impose reasonable restrictions and restraints upon
the acknowledged propensity of prisoners to abuse both the giving and the seeking
of assistance in the preparation of applications for relief . . . .”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
because further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
2 22-36052
review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would
be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 22-36052