D'Angelo, J. v. JP Morgan

J-A17017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JAMES A. D’ANGELO, SR. AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CAROLYN D’ANGELO : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 1928 EDA 2022
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., :
JAMES A. D’ANGELO, JR., :
MORTGAGE FIRST LENDING GROUP, :
CITIZENS SETTLEMENT SERVICES, :
INC., TONYA FRIEND, MICHELLE A. :
SHERIDAN, STEWART TITLE :
INSURANCE COMPANY :

Appeal from the Order Entered June 27, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No(s): 2007-00041

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2023

James A. D’Angelo, Sr., and Carolyn D’Angelo (“the D’Angelos”) appeal

from the orders granting summary judgment to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

(“Chase”) and Stewart Title Guaranty Company (“Stewart Title”).1 After

careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The D’Angelos initiated proceedings against Stewart Title Insurance
Company; however, by stipulation, the parties agreed to substitute Stewart
Title Guaranty Company as the correct party, and the trial court approved that
stipulation on September 9, 2013. See Order, 9/9/13. Nevertheless, the
caption incorrectly indicates Stewart Title Insurance Company rather than
Stewart Title Guaranty Company.
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This case has an extensive procedural history spanning three dockets

over seventeen years and involving and three trial court judges. In a prior

appeal, this Court summarized a significant portion of the relevant factual and

procedural history as follows:

On July 3, 2006, [Chase] filed a mortgage foreclosure action
against [the D’Angelos] at No. 2006-06047 alleging that [they]
had defaulted on a note and mortgage dated August 11, 2005
(“the Note and Mortgage”) in the amount of $1,462,500.00. [The
Note and Mortgage pertained to residential property owned by the
D’Angelos at 102 Pickwick Drive in Doylestown, Pennsylvania
(“the property”). Chase was not a party to the 2005 mortgage
transaction, which involved the refinancing of existing mortgages
on the property by Lancaster Mortgage Bankers, LLC
(“Lancaster”). Lancaster thereafter assigned the Note and
Mortgage to EMC Mortgage Corporation (“EMC Mortgage”). On
September 14, 2006, EMC Mortgage assigned the Note and
Mortgage to Chase, with an effective date of February 16, 2006.
Thereafter, Chase paid approximately $70,600 in outstanding
interest, property taxes, and homeowner’s insurance premiums
on the property, while the D’Angelos made no payments
whatsoever.]

On January 4, 2007, [the D’Angelos] filed a multi-count
complaint against [Chase] and other defendants at No. 2007-
00041[ (“the declaratory judgment action”). The other
defendants named in the declaratory judgment action were: the
D’Angelos’ son, James D’Angelo, Jr. (“James Jr.”); Mortgage First
Lending Group (“Mortgage First”); the president and principle of
Mortgage First, Harry M. Anthony (“Anthony”); Citizens
Settlement Services, Inc. (“Citizens”); an employee and notary
public for Citizens, Tonya Friend (“Friend”); and James Jr.’s
girlfriend, Michelle A. Sheridan (“Sheridan”).] [Chase] filed an
answer to the complaint asserting that the Note and Mortgage
were valid because they were duly notarized, and [asserted a
counterclaim for unjust enrichment, averring] that [the
D’Angelos] would be unjustly enriched if the court granted
declaratory relief, because [the D’Angelos] had two prior
mortgages on the property totaling approximately $1,500,000.00
which they had paid off with the proceeds of the Note. On March
12, 2007, [the D’Angelos] filed an amended complaint at No.

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2007-00041. [In their amended complaint, only Counts I and II
were directed at Chase. At Count I, the D’Angelos sought a
declaratory judgment that the Note and Mortgage were forged and
that Chase had no right to enforce the invalid and unenforceable
Note and Mortgage. At Count II, the D’Angelos sought quiet title
to the property.]

On July 1, 2010, [Chase] filed a motion to consolidate the
actions at Nos. 2006-06047 and 2007-00041. On July 16, 2010,
[Chase] filed a motion for partial summary judgment in [the
declaratory judgment] action at No. 2007-00041.

On December 14, 2010, the trial court granted [Chase’s]
motion to consolidate the two actions. On April 11, 2011, the trial
court granted [Chase’s] motion for partial summary judgment [on
the unjust enrichment counterclaim] and imposed an equitable
lien of $1,339,387.50 against [the D’Angelo’s] interest in the
property, finding that[,] regardless of whether the Note and
Mortgage were forged, [the D’Angelos] received a significant
benefit from the Note and Mortgage by using the Note proceeds
to pay off prior mortgages.

On December 28, 2011, [the D’Angelos] filed a motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint to add EMC Mortgage as
an additional defendant and to add a new claim against [Chase]
and EMC Mortgage under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law [(“UTPCPL”), 73 Pa.C.S.A. § 201-1 et seq.]. The
trial court did not immediately rule on [the D’Angelos’] motion to
amend.

On September 10, 2012, the trial court denied [the
D’Angelos’] emergency motion to stay the sheriff’s sale of the
property. On September 12, 2012, [the D’Angelos] appealed the
order denying their emergency motion to this Court at 2393 EDA
2012[; however, this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory].
On September 14, 2012, the property was sold to [Chase] at
sheriff’s sale. [The D’Angelos] failed to file a petition to set aside
the sheriff’s sale, and the sheriff’s deed was recorded on October
10, 2012. . . ..

[In November 2012, the D’Angelos commenced a separate
action at No. 2012-09563 against Stewart Title by filing a writ of
summons.]

On February 6, 2014, [Chase] filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on Counts I and II of [the D’Angelos’]

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amended complaint in [the declaratory judgment action at] No.
2007-00041. On February 2[8], 2014, the trial court denied [the
D’Angelos’] motion for leave to file a second amended complaint
in [the declaratory judgment action at] No. 2007-00041.

On March 13, 2014, [the D’Angelos] filed a response in
opposition to [Chase’s] motion for partial summary judgment in
No. 2007-00041. On April 30, 2014, [the D’Angelos] filed a
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint on the basis of
a press release by the United States Department of Justice which
stated that [Chase] had agreed to pay a $13 billion settlement for
misleading investors about securities containing toxic mortgages.

On July 3, 2014, after briefing and oral argument, the trial
court granted [Chase’s] motion for summary judgment on Count
II [for quiet title,] but denied summary judgment on Count I [for
declaratory judgment]. On August 8, 2014, [the D’Angelos]
appealed the July 3, 2014 order to this Court at 2313 EDA 2014.
On January 13, 2015, the trial court [entered an order denying
the D’Angelos’] motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.
[I]n March . . . 2015, this Court quashed [the D’Angelos’] appeal
at 2313 EDA 2014.

Thereafter, [i]n July . . . 2015, [Chase] filed a motion to
voluntarily discontinue its mortgage foreclosure action at No.
2006-06047 without prejudice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 229(a). On
August 17, 2015, [the D’Angelos] filed a response opposing
[Chase’s] motion. On December 1, 2015, the trial court entered
[an] order . . . grant[ing Chase’s] motion to voluntarily
discontinue its [mortgage foreclosure] action at No. 2006-06047
and vacated the order consolidating the actions at Nos. 2006-
06047 and 2007-00041.

[The D’Angelos] filed a notice of appeal at No. 2006-
06047—but not at No. 2007-00041—from the December 1, 2015
order. [However, because the December 1, 2015 order was not
appealable, this Court quashed the appeal.]

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D’Angelo v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,161 A.3d 374 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(unpublished memorandum at **1-5) (footnotes and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).2

In 2016, the D’Angelos filed a complaint in the separate action they

commenced against Stewart Title at No. 2012-09563. In that pleading, the

D’Angelos asserted two claims for violations of the UTPCPL, a claim under the

Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act,3 a claim for fraud/fraudulent

concealment, a civil claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (“RICO”) Act,4 and a claim for unjust enrichment. The

D’Angelos averred that Stewart Title had been complicit in, and was vicariously

liable for, the allegedly fraudulent actions of the individuals and entities

participating in the August 2005 mortgage transaction. Specifically, the

D’Angelos averred that Stewart Title, a title insurance company, had an

agency relationship with Absolute Settlement Services (“Absolute”) which

authorized Absolute to issue title insurance policies for Stewart Title up to a

certain amount (i.e., $1,000,000). See Verified Complaint, 10/27/16, at ¶¶ 9,

20. The D’Angelos claimed that Stewart Title permitted Absolute to exceed

____________________________________________

2 For a more detailed history of the procedural background of this appeal, see

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/14, at 1-12.

3 See 73 P.S. § 2270.1 et seq.

4 See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962.

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the limit of its authority, without written permission to do so, when Absolute

issued a title insurance policy on behalf of Stewart Title for the property upon

the acquisition of the Note and Mortgage by Chase. See id. The D’Angelos

further claimed that Stewart Title’s contractual obligation under the title policy

to assume Chase’s defense in the declaratory judgment action, and Stewart

Title’s expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars in paying for Chase’s

counsel fees, constitute evidence of collusion between Chase and Stewart Title

in defrauding the D’Angelos. See id. at 15, 18, 20, 59. The D’Angelos

eventually withdrew the two UTPCPL claims, and the Fair Credit Act claim

asserted against Stewart Title.

In 2017, the D’Angelos filed a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint in the declaratory judgment action. Therein, the D’Angelos sought

to assert fraud claims against Chase and Stewart Title (which was not a party

to the declaratory judgment action), and to add Chase’s attorneys as

defendants. The trial court denied that motion on January 19, 2018.5

In October 2018, Chase and Stewart Title filed renewed motions for

summary judgment. On February 7, 2020, the trial court entered orders

denying the renewed motions for summary judgment filed by Chase and

Stewart Title. However, the trial court later vacated its February 7, 2020

orders. In July 2021, the trial court granted Sheridan’s motion for summary

____________________________________________

5 The docket bears an entry dated January 22, 2018, which indicates that the

order was entered on January 19, 2018.

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judgment and dismissed all claims against her with prejudice. On August 6,

2021, the trial court entered an order granting Chase’s renewed motion for

summary judgment and dismissed all claims against it with prejudice. On

August 13, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting Stewart Title’s

renewed motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against it

with prejudice.

The matter then proceeded against the remaining defendants in the

declaratory judgment action. The case was finally concluded on June 27,

2022, when the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in

favor of the D’Angelos and against James, Jr., Mortgage First, Citizens,

Anthony, and Friend in the amount of $1,862,500.00. The D’Angelos filed a

timely notice of appeal, and both they and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.6

The D’Angelos raise the following issues for our review:

1. Where a motion to amend raises the existence of fraudulent
concealment by the defendants, is it an abuse of discretion and
an error of law to deny the right to amend?

2. Does the coordinate jurisdiction rule prohibit a successor judge
overruling a decision of a predecessor judge in the same case?

3. Do repetitious summary judgment motions already denied a
total of five times by two predecessor judges require the non-
____________________________________________

6 The D’Angelos seventeen-page Rule 1925(b) concise statement is anything

but concise, and purports to raise nine issues and thirteen sub-issues, many
of which are duplicative. See Concise Statement, 8/16/22, at 4-17; see also
Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/22, at 3 (describing the concise statement as
“extensive” and “highly repetitious”).

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movant to provide additional issues of material fact to survive
the same summary judgment?

4. When fraud on the court results in a series of orders based on
the court’s belief in the fraud as truth, are decisions based on
that fraud subject to vacatur?

D’Angelos’ Brief at 17-18 (issues reordered for ease of disposition,

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In their first issue, the D’Angelos contend that the trial court erred or

abused its discretion by denying their repeated motions for leave to file

amended complaints. Our standard of review of a trial court’s order denying

a party leave to amend a pleading is limited to considering whether the trial

court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion. See Schwarzwaelder

v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 621 (Pa. Super. 2006). Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.

1033(a), a party, either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of

court, may at any time change the form of action, add a person as a party,

correct the name of a party, or otherwise amend the pleading. See

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033(a). The right to amend lies within the discretion of the trial

court and should be granted liberally unless there is an error of law or

prejudice to the adverse party. See Hill, 85 A.3d at 557.

However, amendments may not be made if they introduce a new cause

of action after the statute of limitations has run. See John Goffredo & Sons,

Inc. v. S. M. G. Corp., 446 A.2d 255, 256 (Pa. Super. 1982). Further, while

the right to amend should not be withheld when there is some reasonable

possibility that the amendment can be accomplished successfully, “where

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allowance of an amendment would . . . be a futile exercise, the [pleading] may

be properly dismissed without allowance for amendment.” Wiernik v. PHH

U.S. Mortg. Corp., 736 A.2d 616, 624 (Pa. Super. 1999). Finally, to permit

a plaintiff to change its claim at the very end of the case may be unjust. See

West Penn Power Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 348 A.2d 144, 156 (Pa.

Super. 1975) (declining to permit amendment when the moving party would

gain an inequitable advantage).

The D’Angelos assert that they “have a reasonable possibility that

amendment [sic] can be accomplished successfully.” D’Angelos’ Brief at 74.

They claim that they provided the trial court with a fully developed proposed

amended complaint. Id. at 75. According to the D’Angelos, “[Chase’s] best

argument against amendment is the statutes of limitation.” Id. The

D’Angelos assert that the statutes of limitation are unavailable to Chase and

Stewart Title. Id.

Our review discloses that, in the declaratory judgment action, the

D’Angelos filed three separate motions for leave to amend. In those motions,

the D’Angelos sought to add new parties as defendants and assert several new

claims against both new and existing parties. Specifically, in 2011, the

D’Angelos filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and add

an additional defendant. Therein, the D’Angelos sought to add EMC Mortgage

as an additional defendant and to add new claims against Chase and EMC

Mortgage under the UTPCPL. Honorable Jeffrey Finley denied that motion by

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order entered on February 28, 2014. In April 2014, the D’Angelos filed a

motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Therein, the D’Angelos

sought to assert a claim that the loan application submitted to Lancaster was

a deliberate fraud perpetrated by Chase as part of its $13,000,000,000

settlement with the Department of Justice for misleading investors who

bought residential mortgage-backed securities. Judge Finley denied that

motion by order entered on January 14, 2015. In August 2017, the D’Angelos

filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Therein, the D’Angelos

sought to assert fraud claims against Chase and Stewart Title (which was not

a party to the declaratory judgment action), and to add Chase’s attorneys as

defendants. Honorable Alan Rubenstein denied that motion by order entered

on January 19, 2018. Notably, Honorable Jeffrey Trauger did not rule on any

of the D’Angelos’ motions for leave to file an amended complaint.

In presenting their first issue, the D’Angelos fail to identify the specific

claims they sought to add in their various motions or specify the parties

against whom they sought to assert those additional claims. The D’Angelos

also fail to identify what additional parties they sought to add as defendants,

or what claims they sought to assert against those additional parties. Without

the identification of any particular claim or party sought to be added, this

Court is unable to ascertain any purported claim of error as to the three orders

in question. To be sure, without such clarification, this Court is unable to

assess whether any requested amendment would have been a futile exercise,

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whether the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations,

whether tolling principles might apply, or whether the proposed amendments

would be inequitable. See John Goffredo & Sons, Inc., 446 A.2d at 256;

Wiernik, 736 A.2d at 624; West Penn Power Co., 348 A.2d at 156. The

D’Angelos’ vague and unsupported statement that the statutes of limitation

are unavailable to Chase and Stewart Title is simply insufficient to overcome

these deficiencies. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b) (providing that arguments which

are not appropriately developed are waived); see also Coulter v. Ramsden,

94 A.3d 1080, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that mere issue spotting

without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our

appellate review of a matter).

Moreover, the D’Angelos have provided no discussion whatsoever as to

the reasons articulated by Judge Finley and Judge Rubenstein for denying the

D’Angelos’ various motions for leave to amend, nor any explanation as to how

those judges abused their discretion or erred in any manner when denying

leave to amend. Indeed, the only discussion provided by the D’Angelos

regarding any particular judge is their statement that “Judge Trauger

[ignored S-2]; hence his orders wholly disregarding such evidence must be

reversed . . ..” D’Angelos’ Brief at 77. Given that Judge Trauger did not rule

on any of the D’Angelos’ motions for leave to amend, this statement suggests

that the D’Angelos’ claims regarding the orders denying leave to amend

entered by Judge Finley and Judge Rubenstein are abandoned. See In

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Interest of T.Q.B., 286 A.3d 270, 273 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that

issues raised in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement that are not developed in

appellate brief are abandoned). Accordingly, we deem the D’Angelos’ first

issue waived for lack of development and/or abandoned.

In their second issue, the D’Angelos contend that the August 2021

orders granting summary judgment to Chase and Stewart Title violate the

coordinate jurisdiction rule. Under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, judges of

coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each

other’s decisions. See Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 422,

425 (Pa. 1997). The coordinate jurisdiction rule is premised on the sound

jurisprudential policy of fostering finality in pretrial proceedings, thereby

promoting judicial economy and efficiency. Id. This rule applies equally to

civil and criminal cases, and it falls within the law of the case doctrine. Id.

Under the law of the case doctrine,

[a] court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should
not reopen questions decided by another judge of the same court
or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter. Among
the related but distinct rules which make up the law of the case
doctrine are that: . . . upon transfer of a matter between trial
judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may
not alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by
the transferor trial court.

Id. (citation omitted).

In determining whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies, we look

to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the

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case. See Parker v. Freilich, 803 A.2d 738, 745 (Pa. Super. 2002). Our

Supreme Court has explained:

Where the motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections
differ from motions for judgment on the pleadings, which differ
from motions for summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later
motion is not precluded from granting relief although another
judge had denied an earlier motion. However, a later motion
should not be entertained or granted when a motion of the same
kind has previously been denied, unless intervening changes in
the facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at the question.

Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 261 A.3d 506, 510 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Riccio, 705

A.2d at 425).

The D’Angelos argue that the orders entered by Judge Trauger in August

2021 granting summary judgment to Chase and Stewart Title violate the

coordinate jurisdiction rule because they encompass the same issues decided

in orders entered previously by Judge Finley and Judge Rubenstein.

Specifically, the D’Angelos claim that the following orders preclude any further

ruling on their claim against Chase at Count I of the amended complaint filed

in the declaratory judgment action: Judge Finley’s July 7, 2014 order denying

Chase’s motion to dismiss Count I; Judge Rubenstein’s January 19, 2018 order

denying Chase’s motion to dismiss Count I; Judge Rubenstein’s February 14,

2018 order denying Chase’s motion for reconsideration of his January 19,

2018 order denying Chase’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I; and

Judge Trauger’s February 7, 2020 order initially denying Chase’s renewed

motion for summary judgment.

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The D’Angelos claim that the following orders preclude any further ruling

on their claims against Stewart Title: (1) Judge Rubenstein’s January 19, 2018

order denying Stewart Title’s initial motion for summary judgment; (2) Judge

Rubenstein’s February 14, 2018 order denying Stewart Title’s motion for

reconsideration of the January 19, 2018 order; and Judge Trauger’s February

7, 2020 order initially denying Stewart Title’s renewed motion for summary

judgment.

The D’Angelos maintain that “there is not one bit of new information”

and there has been no intervening change in the controlling law nor any

substantial change in the facts or evidence which would permit a departure

from the coordinate jurisdiction rule. D’Angelos’ Brief at 60-61.

The trial court considered the D’Angelos’ second issue and determined

that it lacked merit. Judge Trauger reasoned:

The assertion by [the D’Angelos] that the court violated the
coordinate jurisdiction rule by granting the renewed motion[s] for
summary judgment where previous motions for summary
judgment were denied ignores the important factual
developments which have occurred since the original filing. In
Pennsylvania, a lower court may consider subsequent motions for
summary judgment where a large amount of new information has
been added to the record in the time between the two motions.
In this case, there have been numerous depositions and written
discovery conducted since the original filings which have brought
a large amount of new information into the record. Therefore, the
court did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule by granting
the renewed motion[s] for summary judgment . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/22, at 4 (internal citation, quotation marks, and

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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Based on our review, we discern no violation of the coordinate

jurisdiction rule. Chase’s initial motions for summary judgment as to Count I

were filed in 2014 and 2016, respectively. Stewart Title’s initial motion for

summary judgment was filed in August 2017. Chase and Stewart Title did not

file their renewed motions for summary judgment until October 2018. Judge

Trauger specifically noted that “there have been numerous depositions and

written discovery conducted since the original filings which have brought a

large amount of new information into the record.” Id. The record reflects

that, in 2018, the D’Angelos filed a motion for an extension of time to conduct

additional depositions, which the trial court granted in May 2018. See Order,

5/8/18, at 1. The record also reflects that the D’Angelos were noticing

depositions and propounding discovery requests throughout 2018. See e.g.,

Notice of Deposition of Stewart Title Corporate Representative, 7/24/18;

Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Request for Interrogatory Responses and Document

Production Directed to Chase, 8/1/18.7 Chase and Stewart Title deposed both

James D’Angelo, Sr., and Carolyn D’Angelo on July 27, 2018. See Deposition

of James D’Angelo, Sr., 7/27/18; see also Deposition of Carolyn D’Angelo,

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7 Stewart Title asserts that, after its initial motion for summary judgment was

denied in January 2018, the D’Angelos “served extensive additional discovery
upon [Stewart Title] and [Chase] and conducted numerous additional
depositions, including the depositions of three present or former employees
of [Stewart Title], a representative from [Chase], [Chase’s] counsel, Joseph
Kessler, Esquire, and a former officer of the title agency, Absolute.” Stewart
Title’s Brief at 20, 38-39.

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7/27/18. Moreover, the trial court entered an “Agreed Case Management

Order” in June 2019 which expressly contemplated that expert reports and

supplemental expert reports would be submitted by August 1, 2019, and that

additional dispositive motions would be filed by the parties by August 30,

2019. See Agreed Case Management Order, 6/18/19, at unnumbered 1.

Notably, that order was signed by the D’Angelos’ counsel, thereby indicating

their consent to the order. See id. at unnumbered 3.8

Given that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that there

were intervening changes in the evidence of record since the original motions

for summary judgment were filed by Chase and Stewart Title, we discern no

violation of the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Accordingly, the D’Angelos’

second claim warrants no relief.

In their third issue, the D’Angelos challenge the entry of summary

judgment for Chase and Stewart Title. Our standard of review of the grant of

a motion for summary judgment is well-settled:

We view the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of
review of a trial court’s order granting or denying summary
judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial

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8 The trial court subsequently entered a Date Certain Case Management Order

extending these deadlines. See Date Certain Case Management Order,
8/7/19, at 1.

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court’s order will be reversed only where it is established that the
court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906, 912-13 (citation omitted).

The D’Angelos assert that they raised genuine issues of material fact

which should have defeated summary judgment for Chase and Stewart Title.

Although the D’Angelos’ arguments regarding the entry of summary judgment

for Chase are intermingled with their arguments regarding the entry of

summary judgment for Stewart Title, we will attempt to separate those

arguments to properly address the orders granting summary judgment.

We first address the D’Angelos’ challenge to the entry of summary

judgment for Chase. The D’Angelos point to Chase’s public admission in 2013

that “from 2005-2007 [it] routinely approved hundreds of billions of dollars of

fraudulent mortgages as part of its colossal [residential mortgage backed

securities (“RMBS”) f]raud.” D’Angelos’ Brief at 63. The D’Angelos maintain

that this public admission by Chase raised a genuine issue of material fact.

The D’Angelos assert that, at some point in the litigation, Chase and its

attorneys knew that the mortgage applications were forgeries. The D’Angelos

further claim that Chase and its attorneys knew of exhibit S-2, a document

entitled Corporate Assignment of Mortgage which purports to show that Chase

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acquired the Note and Mortgage on August 11, 2005.9 The D’Angelos argue

that “S-2 is certainly revelation of a deceptive act and defense strategy that

misled the D’Angelos and the court as to [Chase’s] defense.” Id. at 72.10 The

D’Angelos assert that “[t]hrough its agent Lancaster, who [Chase] used as a

troll to find mortgages to fuel its colossal RMBS fraud, [Chase] was certainly

just as involved in underwriting and approving the August 11, 2005

mortgage.” Id. at 68. The D’Angelos contend that their “fraud claim against

[Chase] in Count I of its [declaratory judgment action] should have been

permitted” by denying its repetitive motion for summary judgment.11 The

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9 Stewart Title points out that exhibit S-2 is undated, incomplete, and
unrecorded. See Stewart Title’s Brief at 20 (noting that the document does
not indicate a date when the purported assignment became effective, the
recording information for the mortgage purportedly being assigned is blank,
and the document was never recorded in the Recorder of Deeds); see also
Chase’s Brief at 18 (contending that “[t]here is no testimony or other evidence
that [S-2] was ever delivered to Chase, and the document was never
recorded”).

10 The D’Angelos additionally claim that, at some point, Chase and its counsel

became aware of the affidavit of Sylvia Juarez, which was purportedly
produced in the D’Angelos federal bankruptcy proceedings. However, the
Juarez affidavit was not presented to the lower court and is not part of the
certified record. Therefore, we may not consider it. See Ruspi v. Glatz, 69
A.3d 680, 691 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that this Court may not consider
evidence that is not included in the certified record).

11 The D’Angelos additionally claim that the August 11, 2005 mortgage is void

as a matter of law because it was not recorded until after the ninety-day
deadline required by 21 P.S. § 444. Notably, section 444 applies to deeds,
not mortgages, which are subject to 21 P.S. § 621 (requiring that a mortgage
be recorded within six months). Moreover, the record reflects that the
mortgage in question was recorded within six months.

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D’Angelos conclude by claiming that Judge Trauger “had no grounds to rethink

Judge Finley or Judge Rubenstein’s orders” denying summary judgment to

Chase.” Id. at 72.

Initially, we observe that the D’Angelos limit their argument to the

propriety of Judge Trauger’s August 6, 2021 order granting summary

judgment to Chase on Count I of the amended complaint filed in the

declaratory judgment action. Although the D’Angelos purport to appeal from

the April 11, 2011 order granting partial summary judgment for Chase in the

form of an equitable lien on the property, and the July 7, 2014 order granting

partial summary judgment for Chase on Count II (quiet title) of the amended

complaint, the D’Angelos present no argument regarding these orders. Thus,

any challenge to entry of partial summary judgment for Chase on the claims

for an equitable lien and quiet title is waived. See In Interest of T.Q.B.,

286 at 273 n.5 (holding that issues raised in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement

that are not developed in appellate brief are abandoned).

Turning to the grant of summary judgment for Chase on Count I of the

amended complaint, Judge Trauger explained the basis for his ruling, as

follows:

In this case, [Chase] has obtained ownership by sheriff’s sale of
the property pursuant to the equitable lien previously granted by
[Judge] Finley against the property. As a result, there is no longer
a controversy with respect to the mortgage validity and property
ownership because [Chase] is no longer asserting any claim under
the alleged fraudulent mortgage. Even if [the D’Angelos]
succeeded in proving the fraudulent mortgage, they would not be
entitled to a declaratory judgment against [Chase] because the

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equitable lien entered by [Judge] Finley is separate and distinct
from the alleged fraudulent mortgage. Further, [the D’Angelos]
failed to timely seek to set aside the sheriff’s sale. Therefore, [the
D’Angelos’] only claim against [Chase] for a declaratory judgment
is moot and was properly dismissed by this court.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/22, at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the D’Angelos, as the

nonmoving party, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by Judge Trauger

in granting summary Judgment to Chase on Count I of the amended complaint

based on the mootness doctrine. We have described the mootness doctrine

as follows:

[C]ases presenting mootness problems involve litigants who
clearly had standing to sue at the outset of the litigation. The
problems arise from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten
under way—changes in the facts or in the law—which allegedly
deprive the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome. The
mootness doctrine requires that an actual case or controversy
must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed.

Pub. Def.’s Office of Venango Cnty. v. Venango Cnty. Court of Common

Pleas, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie,

812 A.2d 591, 599-600 (Pa. 2002)). “Where the issues in a case are moot,

any opinion issued would be merely advisory and, therefore, inappropriate.”

Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Newtown Twp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa.

2013). “An issue before a court is moot when a determination is sought on a

matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing

controversy.” Printed Image of York, Inc. v. Mifflin Press, Ltd., 133 A.3d

55, 59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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J-A17017-23

In their amended complaint, the D’Angelos merely sought a judicial

declaration that, because the Note and Mortgage executed on August 11,

2005, had been forged, those documents were invalid, and Chase, as an

assignee of the Note and Mortgage, could not enforce those documents.12 See

Amended Complaint, 3/12/07, at ¶¶ 23-24. That question became entirely

moot when Chase obtained the equitable lien, and thereafter acquired the

property on September 14, 2012, through the sheriff’s sale, which the

D’Angelos did not seek to set aside. Thus, Chase has had no need to enforce

the Note and Mortgage since September 14, 2012. Because a determination

of the validity and enforceability of the Note and Mortgage cannot have any

practical effect on the existing controversy, Count I of the amended complaint

is entirely moot.13 Accordingly, the D’Angelos’ challenge to the August 6, 2021

order granting summary judgment for Chase on Count I of the amended

complaint merits no relief.

The D’Angelos’ next challenge the grant of summary judgment to

Stewart Title based on the statute of limitations. “Statutes of limitations are

rules of law that set time limits for bringing legal claims.” Didomizio v.

____________________________________________

12Contrary to the D’Angelos’ assertion otherwise, Count I of the amended
complaint does not aver that Chase participated in the August 11, 2005
mortgage transaction, either directly or indirectly, or that Chase committed
any fraud of forgery. See Amended Complaint, 3/12/07, at ¶¶ 22-25.

13 Notably, the D’Angelos do not discuss the mootness doctrine or challenge

the sole basis for Judge Trauger’s entry of summary judgment for Chase.

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J-A17017-23

Jefferson Pulmonary Assocs. & Asthma Allergy & Pulmonary Assocs.,

P.C., 280 A.3d 1039, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2022). The general rule is that a cause

of action accrues, and thus the applicable limitations period begins to run,

when an injury is inflicted. See Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 361 (Pa.

2009); see also Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono

Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the statute of

limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit

arises).

Fraud claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7). Claims under RICO are subject to a four-year statute of

limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4). Claims for unjust enrichment are

subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4).

Once a cause of action has accrued and the prescribed statutory period has

run, an injured party is barred from bringing his cause of action. See Fine v.

Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 2005).

In certain cases involving latent injury, and/or instances in which the

causal connection between an injury and another’s conduct is not apparent,

the discovery rule may operate to toll the statute of limitations until the

plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, that he has been injured

and that his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct. See id. at

859. As this Court has explained:

The discovery rule is a judicially created device which tolls
the running of the applicable statute of limitations until that point

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J-A17017-23

when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know: (1) that he
has been injured, and (2) that his injury has been caused by
another party’s conduct. The limitations period begins to run
when the injured party possesses sufficient critical facts to put him
on notice that a wrong has been committed and that he need
investigate to determine whether he is entitled to redress.

Melley v. Pioneer Bank, N.A., 834 A.2d 1191, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is an exception to the

requirement that a complaining party must file suit within the statutory period.

This Court has explained:

Where, through fraud or concealment, the defendant causes
the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of
inquiry, the defendant is estopped from invoking the bar of the
statute of limitations. Moreover, defendant’s conduct need not
rise to fraud or concealment in the strictest sense, that is, with an
intent to deceive; unintentional fraud or concealment is sufficient.
Mere mistake, misunderstanding or lack of knowledge is
insufficient however, and the burden of proving such fraud or
concealment, by evidence which is clear, precise and convincing,
is upon the asserting party.

Molineux v. Reed, 532 A.2d 792, 794 (Pa. 1987) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Importantly, in order for fraudulent concealment

to toll the statute of limitations, the defendant must have committed some

affirmative independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiff justifiably

relied.” Id. Additionally, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove active

concealment by clear and convincing evidence. See Montanya v.

McGonegal, 757 A.2d 947, 951 (Pa. Super. 2000).

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The D’Angelos assert that, at some point in the litigation, Stewart Title and its

attorneys knew that the title insurance applications were forgeries. The

D’Angelos contend that, almost five months after the August 2005 transaction

had closed, Stewart Title created a fraudulent title insurance policy to protect

itself after it discovered that its agents, Anthony and Friend, had issued a

policy in collusion with James Jr.14 The D’Angelos argue that the discovery

rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment should apply to toll the statute

of limitations on its claims against Stewart Title. The D’Angelos further argue

that Stewart Title has no statute of limitations defense because it is vicariously

liable for the fraudulent actions of its agents, Anthony and Friend, and it

cannot escape such liability by claiming that Anthony and Friend are merely

“limited agents.” D’Angelos’ Brief at 71. The D’Angelos point to a letter sent

by counsel for Absolute to counsel for Stewart Title regarding Anthony and

Friend, and assert that this letter presented a genuine issue of material fact

which precluded the entry of summary judgment.

____________________________________________

14 Stewart Title explains that “Absolute was a policy-issuing limited agent for

Stewart Title which handled all aspects of the August 11, 2005 mortgage,
including conducting the title search, handling the title work, issuing the
commitment, conducting the settlement, disbursing the funds, recording the
mortgage on December 29, 2005, and thereafter issuing a title insurance
policy on behalf of Stewart Title (with an effective date of the mortgage
recording, December 29, 2005), and then recording the title policy. See
Stewart Title’s Brief at 14-17. Absolute was not involved in the lower court
proceedings and, from the record before us, it is unclear what relationship, if
any, Absolute had with Anthony and Friend.

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The trial court considered the D’Angelos’ challenge to the order granting

summary judgment for Stewart Title and determined that it lacked merit. The

court reasoned:

It is undisputed that all claims arise out of the August 11,
2005 refinance transaction. . . ..

. . . The refinance transaction took place in 2005 and [the
declaratory judgment] action was initiated in 2007 against all
other defendants. The November 2, 2012 writ of summons filed
by [the D’Angelos] against . . . Stewart Title followed
approximately seven years after the transaction and more than
six years after the date upon which [the D’Angelos] clearly had
knowledge by their own admission of the alleged forgery by their
son. Clearly, this would be outside the longest statute of
limitations period applicable to the pending claims by [the
D’Angelos] versus [Stewart Title].

Even if the statute of limitations clock were to begin only
upon [the D’Angelos’] express acknowledgement of the alleged
forgery, it was confirmed by James D’Angelo, Sr. that [the
D’Angelos] had actual knowledge of the alleged forgery on
July 12, 2006. D’Angelo, Sr. Deposition, 03/28/17, [at] 70. The
filing of the subsequent writ of summons against . . . Stewart Title
on November 2, 2012[,] is more than six years past the expressly
acknowledged date [the D’Angelos] had actual notice and
knowledge of the alleged forgery. Therefore, even if the statute
of limitations clock begins on the date [the D’Angelos]
acknowledge they were aware of [the] alleged forgery, [their]
complaint against Stewart Title is barred by the applicable statute
of limitations and [Stewart Title] was entitled to summary
judgment.

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J-A17017-23

Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/22, at 5-6 (footnote and unnecessary capitalization

omitted, emphasis in original).15

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the D’Angelos, as the

nonmoving party, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by Judge Trauger

in granting summary Judgment to Stewart Title based on the statute of

limitations. It is undisputed that the D’Angelos discovered that they had been

injured and that their injury was caused by another party’s conduct in July

2006. James D’Angelo, Sr. testified that he discovered the alleged forgery on

July 12, 2006, when he was served with Chase’s complaint in the mortgage

foreclosure action and he confronted his son, James, Jr., who admitted that

he forged the D’Angelos’ signatures. See Deposition of James D’Angelo, Sr.,

7/27/18, at 99; see also Deposition of James D’Angelo, Sr., 3/28/17, at 57-

58, 70. Carolyn D’Angelo became aware of the forgeries a few weeks after

James, Sr. was served with Chase’s complaint in the mortgage foreclosure

action. See Deposition of Carolyn D’Angelo, 7/27/18, at 34; see also

Deposition of James D’Angelo, Sr., 7/27/18, at 99-100. Accordingly, any

application of the discovery rule would apply, if at all, to the period between

the purported date of injury, August 11, 2005, and the date the D’Angelos

____________________________________________

15 The trial court further determined that summary judgment on the RICO
claim was appropriate because the D’Angelos presented no evidence
whatsoever to support their RICO claim against Stewart Title. See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/26/22, at 6.

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J-A17017-23

discovered their injury in July 2006. Thus, even under the discovery rule, the

statute of limitations on all of the D’Angelos’ claims began to run in July 2006.

With respect to the D’Angelos’ attempt to invoke the doctrine of

fraudulent concealment, in order for the doctrine to toll the statute of

limitations, the defendant must have committed some affirmative

independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied.

Baselice, 879 A.2d at 278. Here, the D’Angelos have not identified any

independent act of concealment by Stewart Title on which they claim to have

justifiably relied. Even crediting the D’Angelos’ unsupported claim that

Stewart Title created a fraudulent title insurance policy in December 2005, the

D’Angelos have not asserted that they justifiably relied on that policy or that

the issuance of that policy somehow concealed the identity or involvement of

Stewart Title or its agents. Regardless, by the time the D’Angelos filed the

declaratory judgment action in January 2007, they knew that other parties

and entities had assisted their son in executing the forged mortgage refinance

documents, including Anthony and Friend. Thus, even if the D’Angelos had

properly invoked the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the statute of

limitations would have been tolled no later than January 2007. Accordingly,

given our determination that the statute of limitations on all of the D’Angelos’

claims began to run in July 2006, their claims for fraud/fraudulent

concealment, RICO violations, and unjust enrichment were barred by the

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J-A17017-23

applicable two and four-year statutes of limitation. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5524(7); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(4).

As we discern no error or abuse of discretion by Judge Trauger in

granting summary judgment in favor of Chase and Stewart Title, the

D’Angelos’ third issue merits no relief.

In their final issue, the D’Angelos assert that Chase and Stewart Title

committed fraud on the court and that every order issued in this case that

was procured by such fraud on the court must be vacated. While Pennsylvania

courts will not countenance fraud, see Sallada v. Mock, 121 A. 54, 55 (Pa.

1923) (holding that that “where a judgment has been obligated by fraud, no

court will permit its records and processes to be the instruments of infamy”);

see also Commonwealth v. Harper, 890 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Super.

2006) (holding that “courts simply will not countenance fraud, and when a

decision is obtained through its use, the court retains the inherent power to

rescind that decision”), our courts have not created a legal definition for fraud

upon the court. However, the Third Circuit has passed upon the topic, noting

that “[t]he concept of fraud upon the court challenges the very principle upon

which our judicial system is based: the finality of a judgment.” Herring v.

United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005).

In Herring, the Third Circuit articulated a stringent test to determine

whether fraud had been committed upon the court:

In order to meet the necessarily demanding standard for
proof of fraud upon the court[,]we conclude that there must be:

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(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which
is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.
We further conclude that a determination of fraud on the court
may be justified only by the most egregious misconduct directed
to the court itself, and that it must be supported by clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence.

Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.

2009) (defining an officer of the court as “[a] person who is charged with

upholding the law and administering the judicial system,” specifically judges,

clerks, sheriff deputies, and attorneys).16

The Herring Court explained that “the fraud on the court must

constitute “egregious misconduct . . . such as bribery of a judge or jury or

fabrication of evidence by counsel.” Herring, 424 F.3d at 390 (citing In re

Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538

F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir. 1976)). Mere perjury by a witness is not enough to

constitute fraud upon the court. See id.

____________________________________________

16 Other United States Courts of Appeals expressly require that fraud upon the

court must involve an officer of the court. See Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley
Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1993) (defining fraud upon the court
as consisting of conduct by an officer of the court); Pumphrey v. Thompson
Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that “one species of
fraud upon the court occurs when an ‘officer of the court’ perpetrates fraud
affecting the ability of the court or jury to impartially judge a case”); Weese
v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that “fraud on the
court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to,
subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of
the court”) (citation omitted); Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H.
Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 1980) (same).

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J-A17017-23

The D’Angelos contend that “the fraud on the court is [Chase’s] seminal

lie that ‘[Chase] did not participate in underwriting or approval of the

Mortgage and loan documents having acquired the August 11,

Mortgage by assignment [on September 14, 2006].’” D’Angelos’ Brief

at 43 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, emphasis in original). The

D’Angelos argue that exhibit S-2, which is a purported Corporate Assignment

of Mortgage dated and notarized on August 11, 2005, proves that Chase

acquired the mortgage and note on August 11, 2005. The D’Angelos maintain

that, “[b]ecause the actual assignment date is also the actual transaction date,

the logical inference is that [Chase] was certainly involved in underwriting and

approving the blatantly fraudulent and utterly forged August 11, 2005

mortgage application along with its agent Lancaster.” Id. at 44. According

to the D’Angelos, “the . . . August 11, 2005 mortgage paid off an April 2005

$1,500,000 mortgage which was also blatantly fraudulent and utterly forged.”

Id.

The trial court initially considered aspects of the D’Angelos fraud on the

court claim in 2014, when it stated:

[The D’Angelos] make the bald and very serious allegation
that “lawyers representing Stewart Title and [Chase] concealed
that information from this court to defraud this court and [the
D’Angelos] and to profit from the fraud by taking [their] home.”
While this court takes judicial notice that banks are typically in the
business of lending money through the provision of notes and
mortgages and earn profits by charging interest on those
mortgages, the record is devoid of any factual support for the
allegations concerning “concealment” and “fraud” perpetrated
upon this court or the D’Angelos.

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Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/14, at 17, 21 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

The court went on to describe the D’Angelos’ claim that “[Chase] and Stewart

Title, their lawyers, and witnesses, made false statements and concealed . . .

material facts using nothing but their immense financial and legal power

spending over $500,000 to persecute the D’Angelos in this court in order to

profit from fraud” as “wholly unsupported, wildly speculative, very serious,

and in part completely irrelevant . . ..” Id. (unnecessary capitalization

omitted).

While the trial court did not specifically mention the D’Angelos’ fraud on

the court claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, it nevertheless stated: “no

reasonable finder of fact could conclude [the D’Angelos’] repeated baseless

and factually unsubstantiated allegations of a ‘seminal lie’ would leave any

genuine issue of material fact for a factfinder required to overcome summary

judgment.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/22, at 7 (unnecessary capitalization

omitted); see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/18/21, at 7 (same).

Based on our review, we conclude that the D’Angelos have failed to meet

their demanding burden of proving fraud upon the court. Under Herring, the

D’Angelos were required to establish by clear, unequivocal, and convincing

evidence that there has been: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the

court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the

court. Herring, 424 F.3d at 386-387. In their brief, the D’Angelos have

asserted only that Chase and Stewart Title, which are not officers of the court,

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committed a fraud upon the court. The D’Angelos have not identified any

wrongdoing, let alone intentional fraud, committed by any individual officer of

the court to the trial court in these proceedings. As such, the D’Angelos have

failed to present clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that an officer of

the court directed an intentional fraud at the trial court and, in fact, deceived

the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Date: 12/19/2023

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