UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7057
STEVEN WHISENANT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
DAVID K. SMITH; EDWARD MURRAY; LARRY W. HUFF-
MAN; HENRY PONTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Chief District
Judge. (CA-93-802-R)
Submitted: December 19, 1996 Decided: January 6, 1997
Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven Whisenant, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Campbell Alexander,
Assistant Attorney General, Jill Theresa Bowers, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Appellant appeals from the district court's orders entering
judgment on the jury verdict in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) action
and denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law. The record
does not contain a transcript of the jury trial. Appellant has the
burden of including in the record on appeal a transcript of all
parts of the proceedings material to the issues raised on appeal.
Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); 4th Cir. Local R. 10(c). Appellants proceed-
ing on appeal in forma pauperis are entitled to transcripts at gov-
ernment expense only in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)
(1994). By failing to produce a transcript or to qualify for the
production of a transcript at government expense, Appellant has
waived review of the issues on appeal which depend upon the tran-
script to show error. Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 26 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1025 (1992); Keller v. Prince
George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 954 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987). We have
reviewed the record before the court and the district court's
opinions and find no reversible error. We therefore affirm the
district court's order entering judgment on the verdict. We also
affirm the district court's order denying Appellant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law because the denial of summary judgment
does not necessitate a finding of a constitutional violation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the mate-
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rials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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