139 Nev., Advance Opinion 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE No. 84655
GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON
AND ESTATE OF KATHLEEN JUNE
JONES, PROTECTED PERSON.
KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, FL
Appellant,
vs.
ROBYN FRIEDMAN; DONNA
SIMMONS; AND ELIZABETH
BRICKFIELD, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
FOR KATHLEEN JUNE JONES,
Respondents.
Appeal from district court order granting guardian ad litem
fees. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark CountY, Linda
Marquis, Judge.
Affirmed.
Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Scott Cardenas and
Elizabeth Mikesell, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Dawson & Lordahl, PLLC, and- Elizabeth Brickfield, Las Vegas,
for Respondent Elizabeth Brickfield.
Michaelson Law and John P. Michaelson, Ammon E. Francom, and Peter R.
Pratt, Henderson,
for Respondents Robyn Friedman and Donna Simmons.
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Julia S. Gold, Chairperson, Dara J. Goldsmith, Amicus Curiae Chairperson,
Michael W. Keane, and Amanda Netuschil, Reno,
for Amicus Curiae State Bar of Nevada, Probate and Trust Law Section.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, LEE, and
PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, HERNDON, J.:
Roughly 18 months after respondents petitioned for
guardianship over their mother, triggering the contentious litigation that
followed,1 the district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to aid it in
determining the protected person's best interests. The GAL, an attorney,
soon thereafter filed a notice of intent to seek the fees and costs to be
incurred at her standard hourly rate. After submitting a report, the GAL
sought fees at her stated rate. The court awarded her those fees over the
protected person's objection. At issue in this appeal are three arguments
against the fee award: (1) the GAL has no right to fees when the district
court order appointing her did not specify the rate, as required by the
Nevada Statewide Rules for Guardianship (NSRG); (2) the court improperly
appointed an attorney as the GAL under NRS 159.0455 and NSRG Rule 8;
and (3) the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that
of a fiduciary, not an attorney.
'See Matter of Guardianship of Jones, 138 Nev. 51, 507 P.3d 598 (Ct.
App. 2022), for background information on the guardianship proceedings.
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We conclude that the protected person waived any argument
pertaining to the form of the district court's order by failing to raise the
issue below. Even so, we note that, within days of the GAL's appointment,
the protected person was notified that the GAL would seek fees at her
requested rate of compensation, and the district court's failure to specify the
rate in the order thus did not prejudice the protected person. We further
conclude that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as
requiring the court to •appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved
volunteer program. However, this error was harmless because the district
court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the
complexity of this matter. Lastly, we conclude that the record contains
substantial evidence supporting the GAL's fee request. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her
requested fees.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Upon petition, re8pondents Robyn Friedman and Donna
Simmons became temporary guardians over their Mother, appellant
Kathleen June Jones (June); their temporary guardianship was followed by
their sister Kimberly's appointment as guardian. During Kimberly's term
as guardian, there were over 400 documents filed in the Case; .25 hearings
held, and at least 3 investigations conducted into the. circumstances
Underlying the guardianship proceedings. -
A major issue between the parties concerned Robyn's and
Donna's ability to obtain communication, visits, and vacation time with.
june. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue. and
aPpointed respondent Elizabeth BriCkfield, an attorney, as GAL for June.
In particular, the court directed Brickfield to address the issue in the
following manner:
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Schedule[ ] opportunities for Protected Person to
elect to speak with and/or visit in person with her,
adult daughters and [address] whether • the
Guardian has an obligation to facilitate, prompt,
encourage, plan, schedule, and/or create an
environment that prornotes an• opportunity for
continued communication between Protected •
Person and her adult daughters based upon the
current level of care and needs of the Protected
Person.
The court later asked Brickfield to assist with another issue—that of
relocating June to California. • It.noted that each of the issues for which it
sought the GAL's help were interrelated and complex. As to COmpensation,
the order stated, "Nile guardian ad litem may request fees from the
guardianship estate or a third party" and any request must comply with
NRS 159.344.
Five days after the order was filed, Brickfield filed a notice Of
appearance and a notice of intent to•seek attorney fees and costs•froin the
guardianship estate pursuant to NRS 159.344(3). BriCkfield's nOtic,.e
indicated that her hourly rate was •$400 and listed various support staff
billing at rates ranging from $75 to $350 per hour. In response, June filed,
a notice of objection, arguing that the GAL was not entitled to her Attorney
rate of $400 per hour because the issues did not require legal, services or
legal expertise. June prOposed that the GAL should charge within the
national average range, which June represented •to be $22 to $45 per hour.
Kimberly joined June's opposition. Brickfield filed a declaration in resPonse
to the notice of objection, describing her extensive experience and•
qualifications and asserting that the rate was comparable to that charged
by other attorneys with similar qualifications in Clark•County for seryice8
as counsel and as a GAL.
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About 6 weeks later, Brickfield filed her report to the court. The
report outlined Brickfield's work on the case:
(i) reviewed the pleadings relevant to the issues of
visitation and Communication and the Physician's
Certificate and accompanying report; (ii) met with
Ms. Jones by telephone on 2/24/21 and in person on
3/25/21; Ms. Jones was accompanied by LACSN
counsel; (iii) met individually with Ms. Jones' five
children by separate telephone or Zoom
conferences; the children who are represented by
counsel were accompanied by counsel. Each
meeting with a child lasted approximately one
hour; the two meetings with Ms. Jones totaled one
hour; and (iv) separate telephone conversations
with the respective children's counsel.
Brickfield also provided her conclusions and made recommendations in
June's best interests.
Brickfield thereafter filed a petition seeking approval of her
GAL fees and costs, requesting a total of $5713.50. Brickfield requested
$5400 in fees for herself for 13.5 hours of work, $310 in fees for 2 hours of
work by a paralegal, and $3.50 in costs for filing fees. June objected,
agreeing that Brickfield was entitled to compensation but arguing that a
GAL should be paid at a lower GAL rate rather than an attorney rate. She
added that Brickfield misrepresented how she benefited her and that, in
fact, she gained no benefit from Brickfield's appointment. She added that
she should not have to pay for a GAL to whom she objected. The district
court entered a written order awarding Brickfield her• requested $5713.50
in fees and costs. June appealed,2 and the Probate and Trust Section of the
Nevada State Bar was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief.
2 Respondents assert that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because
the order awarding guardian ad litem fees and costs was entered amidst
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DISCUSSION
Any error in the district court's order appointing the GAL is waived
June argues the district court lacked authority to award the
GAL fees because it did not specify the GAL's rate in its appointment order.
NSRG 8(1) requires the district court to "state the hourly rate to be charged
by the guardian ad litem" in the appointment order. June contends that
Brickfield cannot receive payment because her rate was not specified in the
appointment order. She adds that the district court also did not •amend its
appointment order to comply with NSRG 8(I) after receiving Brickfield's
notice of intent to seek fees. • Resp-ondents assert that June waived her
argument that the order appointing the GAL•does not conform with NSRG
8(I) because June failed to raise it below.3 Respondents also argue that any
error in failing to state the GAL's exact rate was not prejudicial.
Generally, "[a] point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes
to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not
ongoing guardianship proceedings and thus does not constitute a special
order after final judgment appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) •and because it
is not appealable under any other provision of that rule. We conclude that
the order is independently appealable under NRS 159.375(5) (allowing
appeals from orders in guardianship proceedings "authorizing the payment
of a debt, claim, devise, guardian's fees or attorney's fees"). Moreover,
despite respondents' request, we decline to issue sanctions for June's
counsel filing this appeal, as this appeal ostensibly was filed to protect her
interests and presents previously unanswered questions of law pertaining
to attorney GALs. NSRG 9.
3Respondents further suggest that the issue was waived when JUne
failed to appeal from the order appointing the GAL. However, that order
was not appealable. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343,
345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) ("[W]e may only consider appeals authorized
by statute or court rule."); NRAP 3A(b) (providing appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments and other specified orders).
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be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52,
623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). This general rule applies even to issues that are
subject to review de novo. Schuck v. Signature Flight Support of Nev., Inc.,
126 Nev. 434, 436, 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010).
The record below supports that June waived any argument that
the district court order did not satisfy the formalities under NSRG 8(I).
June did not raise any such issues with the district court's order in her
objection to Brickfield's notice for feeS, nor did she raise •any suCh issues in
her opposition to Brickfield's petition .for fees. Finally, June did not raise
any issues with the GAL's appointment order at the hearing on the motion
for fees. Thus, June waived any arguments to the form of the appointment
order.
• Even if the issue had been prOperly raised, Jurie fails to
demonstrate any prejudice warranting reversal. See NRCP 61. (providing
that reversal is not warranted where the error• is harmless). The order
specifically required the GAL to comply with NRS 159.844, indicating tó the
parties the GAL was•allowed to seek fees, arid further expressly permitted
the GAL to "request fees froth the guardianship. estate or a third party."
Shortly after the order was entered and on the same day she filed her notice
of appearance, Brickfield filed her notice of intent to seek fees. See NSI1G
8(I). June noticed her objection, but the court did not 'alter the noticed
compensation rate. Thus, while June correctly notes that the district court
should have stated the GAL's permissible hourly rate in its order of
appointment, the error was harmless in this instance and did: not diVest the
court of authority to later award fees.
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The district court erred in concluding that it must appoint an cOtorney •to
serve as a GAL, but the error was harinless
In addressing June's objections to Brickfield's motion for fees,
the district court concluded that it could appoint a nonattorney as GAL only
if a court-approved volunteer advocate program was established under NRS
159.0455. June argues that the court erred in so concluding. Respondents
argue that, even if the court could have appointed a nonattorney outside of
a volunteer advocate program, no other person who had the appropriate
training and experience to serve as the GAL was suggested to the court,
noting that Brickfield was uniquely qualified to address the išsues present
in such a complex case.
The district court's interpretation and construction of a statute
presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Zohar v, Zbiegien, 130
Nev. 733, 737, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). Likewise, the district Court's legal
conclusions regarding court rules are reviewed de novo. Casey u.. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 128 Nev. 713, 715, 290 P.3d 265, 267 (2012). When
interpreting a statute that is clear on its face, the language of a statute
should be given its plain meaning. Zohar, 130 Nev. at 737, 334 P.3d at 405.
A GAL may be appointed by the court to represent a protected
person if the court determines that the protected person will benefit from
the appointment and the GAL's services will be beneficial in determining
the protected person's best interests. •NRS 159.0455(1). Under NRS
159.0455(3), "[i]f a court-approved • volunteer advoCate •program fcir
guardians ad litem has been established in a judicial district, a court may
appoint a person who is not an attorney to represent a protected person or
proposed protected person as a guardian ad litem." On•the other hand,
NSRG 8, which governs GALs appointed pursuant to NRS 159:0455,
specifies in subsection H that "[a] guardian ad litein may be a trained
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volunteer from a court-approved advocate program; an attorney, or any
other person that the court finds has appropriate training and experience."
June argues that NRS 159.0455 and NSRG 8(H) contradict each
other on the topic of who a court may appoint as GAL. But there is no
conflict: NSRG 8(H) creates a complete list of people who could be eligible
to serve as a GAL ("a trained volunteer from a court-approved advocate
program, an attorney, or any other person that the court finds has
appropriate training and experience"). Meanwhile, the statute clarifies that
the court may appoint a nonattorney a court-approved volunteer
advocate program for guardians ad litern has been established in a judicial
district." NRS 159.0455(3). But the statute does not create a necessary
condition for the appointment of a nonattorney. So the district court erred
in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the appointment of an
attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program.
A third option under NSRG 8(H) exists and does not conflict
with NRS 159.0455(3). NSRG 8(H) provides three types of•individuals that
the district court can appoi.nt as a GAL: an attorney, a volunteer from a
volunteer advocate program, and "any other person that the court finds has
appropriate training and experience." While the district court analyzed the
first two options, it did not address the third option, which included any
person trained and experienced as a GAL. Thus, it erred to the extent it
concluded that it had to appoint an attorney because no trained volunteer
was available.
This error, however, was • harmless, as the district court
alternatively stated that an attorney GAL was specifically appointed due-to
the complex nature of the case, the visitation issues' impact on June, and
the parties' continuing inability to communicate effectively. See NRCP 61;
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Cook v. Sunrise Hosri. & Med. Ctr., LLC, 1.24 Nev. 907, 1007, 194 P.3d 1214,
1220 (2008) (explainiAg that to be reei-Sible error, the moving party must
demonstrate that a substantial right was prejudiced and "that, but for the
error, a different result might have been reached"). There is no evidence in
the record that the district court was aware of any nonattorney with the
appropriate training and experience to be Considered for the appointment.
Nor does the record reflect that any such persons were proposed to the
district court for consideration. So, while NSRG 8(H) providês• three
options, the facts of the instant case indicate that the third option was not
available to the district court. The district court revieWed. Brickfield's
extensive qualifications, including her experience, legal .abilities, and
knowledge in the guardianship field. Because June cannot •demonstrate
that the district court could have appointed a nonattorney to deal with the
complex legal issues relating to June's guardianship and relocation, we
conclude that the district court's error could not-have affected the outcome
of the GAL proceedings. Its error was thus harmless. •
The district court did not abuse its di.scretion in awarding the GAL's fees
June contends that the district court should not have awarded
Brickfield fees at her attorney rate because a GAL performs fiduciary
services, as opposed to legal services.4 June argues that NRS 159.0455 and
NSRG 8 make clear that a GAL, as "an officer of the court," is a fiduciary
and is restricted from "offer[ing] legal advice to the protected person." NRS
159.0455; NSRG 8(C) (noting that "[a] guardian ad litem is an officer of the
court"); •NSRG 8(N) (distinguishing the role of an attorney from the role of
4June clòes not provide any arguments specific to the $3.50 in costs or
the paralegal's $310 in fees. Thus, June appears to only .dispute the $5400
in fees awarded to Brickfield.
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the GAL); see also NRS 159.344 (concerning the payment of attorney fees
and costs in a guardiariShiP). June alleke§ that the district court's finding
that the customary fiduciary rate for a G.AL in Clark County is $400 per
hour or more has no evidentiary basis and that, based on the market rate,
a reasonable fee ranges between $22 to $48 per hour.
Respondents argue that the district court's fee order is
supported by substantial evidence and that Brickfield's fees as a GAL were
appropriately paid at an amount commensurate with her attorney rate.
Respondents contend that there is no market rate requirement and that the
dikrict court satisfied the requirements codified in NRS 159.344.
But the statute requires a court to determine the nature of the
services performed in awarding compensation: it distinguishes between
if services that require an attorney[,] which may be compensated at an
attorney rate, and "fiduciary services," which may be compensated at a
fiduciary rate. NRS 159.34.4(5)(g). We now determine that, while GALs in
Nevada act in the same manner as a fiduciary and do not provide "attoi'ney"
work, the record nonetheless contains substantial evidence supporting the
district court's award of Brickfield's requested fees.
GALs are fiduciaries
A fiduciary relationship is one "between two persons When one
of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of a.nother
upon matters within the scope of the relation[ship]." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 874 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2008); see also Matter of Frei Irrevocable
Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 Nev. 50, 58, 390 P:3d 646, 653 (2017) (sine)..
As noted, the district court may appoint a GAL to benefit the
protected person and assist in determining the protected person's bek
interests. NRS 159.0455(1)(a). A GAL "is an officer of the court and is not ;
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Rptr. 2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a GAL is a party's
representative whose pi.166se is to prótect, the person, creating a role that
is "more than an attorney's but less than a party's"); Shainwald v.
Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (collecting cases and
explaining that "[a] guardian ad litem is a representative of the court"). The
GAL's duties are limited to those set forth in the district court's order. NRS
159.0455(2). GALs are also prohibited from offering legal advice to the
protected person. NRS 159.0455(4).
We conclude that the relationship between GALs and protected
persons is fiduciary in nature. The scope of duties GALs are ordered to
perform is directed by the court for the benefit of the protected person.
NSRG 8. While amicus contends that GALs are only "officers of the court"
pursuant to NRS 159.0455(4), nothing prevents an officer of the court from
also being a fiduciary. GALs are required to "zealously advocate for the best
interest of the protected person . . . in a manner that will enable the court
to determine the action that will be the least restrictive and in the best
interest of the protected person or proposed protected person." NSRG 8(B).
This duty fits squarely with the definition of a fiduciary. Likewise, GALs
are to "advocate for the best interest of the protected person . . . based on
admissible evidence available" and "conduct independent in-vestigation and
assessment of the facts to carry out the directives of the appointing order
and may submit recommendations to the court that are based on admissible
evidence." NSRG 8(G).
Here, every aspect of the GAL's relationship with June is to. act
for her benefit and with her best interests in mind under the direction of
the district court. Other states have recognized the same where the GAL is
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court-appointed and acting a5 a btanch of the judiciary.5 This, however,
does not mean that the 'AL catidot "pei..form services that revire an
attorney. For exainple, advocacy befizire a court is the quintessential task 6f
an attorney and a purpose of the GAL. See NRS 159.0455(4)(a) & (b)
(requiring a GAL to advocate for the protected person's best interests in a
manner that enables the court to act in those interests). We now take thiS
opportunity to clarify how the GAL's actions in a guardianship proceeding
bear on the type of fees they may seek. •
• In Hull v. United States, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
compensation for a GAL was taxable as costs or as attorney fees. 971 F.2d
1499 (loth Cir. 1992). That coUrt held that the GAL's Tole determines
whether its expenses are taxed as costs or attorney fees. Id. at 1510. It
then remanded the case to district court to determine what portions of the
guardian ad litem's work should be taxed as costs and what portiöns should
be paid as attorney fees based on the nature of the GAL's work; specifically,
5 See, e.g., Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cit. 1989)
(concluding that the GAL is a type of fiduciary); Golin v. Allenby, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 762, 787 (Ct. App. 2010) (obServing that a GAL's powers are
"subject to both the fiduciary duties owed to the incompetent person
and . . . the requirement that court approval be obtained for certain acts");
People ex rel. MM., 726 P.2d 1108, 1119-20 (Colo. 1986) (noting the
propriety of appointing a GAL as a fiduciary representative for the
protected person); Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M.
1991) (recognizing that GALs "occuP[y] a position of the highest trust
suggest[ing] that he or she is a fiduciary''); Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d
689, 706 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that "a guardian ad litem's cõurt-
appointed role to act as the representative of a minor's interest is sufficient
to establish a fiduciary relationship"); see also 1 •Pa. 'Cons. Stat. § 1-991
(2008) (defining GAL as a fiduciary); cf. Fleming v. Asbill, 483.S.E.2d 751,
75a-54 (S.C. 1997) (holding that the relationship between a GAL and the
court is not an employer-employee relationship, creating no agency
relationship between the court and the GAL).
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based on Whether the GAL performed tasks "as an officer of the cotirt," or
whether they perforined 1el services aS an attorney." Id. On appeal after
remand, the court upheld the award of guardian ad litem fees as cošts,
findin.g undisputed evidence that the GAL rendered services solely as an
officer of the court while a separately retained attorney rendered attorney
serviCes. Hull ex rel. Hull v. United States, 53 F.3d 11.25, 1128-29 (10th Cir.
1995). We now adopt this distinguishing factor because it clarifies that the
type of work PerfOrmed by the GAL dictates the propriety of the GAL's feeS.
GALs are ha presumptively entitled to "attorney fees" because they do Isla
act as attorneys on behalf of the protected person: However, if they perform
the type of services also performed by .attorneys and have commensurate
experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate
for their work. This conclusion accords with NSRG 8(J);. which requites
courts to analyze the work completed by the GAL and their particWar
expertise and experience. We hold that courts, When determining feeS,for a
GAL, should evaluate (1) the experience and qualifications of the GAL,
(2) the nature and complexity of the 7vork asked Of the GAL, (3) the work
actually performed, (4) the result of the GAL's work, and (5) any other
factors the court finds to be relevant in a particular case.° .We adopt theSe
factors, which are similar to the factors guiding inquiries into attorney feeš'
in guardianship proceedings, because they bear on the propriety .of
°We also clarify that while a GAL seeking compensatibri must meet
the requirernents pf NRS 159.44, as per NSRG 8(J); the factors listed •in
NRS 159.344(5) apply only to attorney fees, not GAL fees. That is, GALs
must meet the written notice and petition requirements laid • out in the
statute, but courts evaluating their compensation should• consider the
factors enumerated above, not the •factors enumerated in NRS 159.344(5).
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GAL's rate, the success (or lack thereof) of the GAL, and the nature of the
GAL's work.
The award of Brookfield's fees at a •rate of $400 per hour is reasonable
When a fee award depends on the interpretation of a statute or
court rule, the district court's decision is reviewed de novo. Logan v. Abe,
131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015). An award of costs is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 267, 350 P.3d at 1.144.
This court has not determined the standard of review. for an
award of fees to a GAL as a fiduciary. We now determine that the
appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Robbins v. Ginese,
638 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by awarding the GAL its attorney rate). An
abuse of discretion "occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or
capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or• reason." Jackson v. State,
117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
The parties agree that the district court discussed each
enumerated factor in NRS 159.344(5) when evaluating Brickfield's fee
request. While we now clarify that NRS 159.344(5) is not appropriately
applied to GAL fees but rather only to attorney fees, June's only argument
is that the fiduciary rate is not equivalent to the attorney rate. However,
based on the factors enumerated above, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Brickfield $400 per hour, as the
court noted the importance of the GAL's report and its determination
regarding the visitation petition. See Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank,
85 Nev. 345, 350, 455 P.2d 31, 33-34 (1969) (stating that the trier of fact
understands the value of the services the best). June's analysis fails to
consider that Brickfield's experience as an attorney was important to this
case, though she was acting as a fiduciary. The distrid court was not
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required to rely on June's suggested $22 to $48 per hour range, as she
merely surveyed three N'rebSites without any indication as to delineating
factors like each GAL's experience, qualifications, or work performed. June
also ignores the difficulty of the visitation petition and the legal knowledge
required to serve her best interests. Meanwhile, the district court reviewed
Brickfield's experience, her qualifications, the services she provided for
June, the invoices submitted, and the benefits June received. The district
court also repeatedly noted the complexity of the visitation petition and the
need for someone with extensive guardianship experience. As it noted,
Brickfield operated in the sensitive area of determining how June's family
members could communicate with or visit her, a deterrnination that
required legal experience and skill. Brickfield also aided in the• court's
determination to remove Kimberly as Jun&s guardian and its appointment
of June's next guardian.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding
that Brickfield's requested fees were appropriate compensation for her work
as a fiduciary in this case. While Brickfield's fees are more appropriately
termed as a fiduciary fee rather than an attorney fee, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding the full amount requested.
CONCLUSION
Although the district court erred by failing to include
Brookfield's rate in the order Of appointment, June waived this argument
by failing to raise it below. Likewise, the district court'S error in concluding
an attorney must be appointed where a volunteer is not available froin a
GAL program, without acknowledging the third option under NSRG 8(H),
was harmless. Finally, while Brookfield is a fiduciary entitled to fiduciary
fees, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding her fees in
an amount commensurate with her attorney rate because the award was
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supported by the GAL's experience, specialized knowledge, and ability to
understand the intricacies of this particular case's complex 'legal issues.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding the GAL fees.
J.
Herndon
We concur:
Lee
Parraguirre
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
17
(0) 194M 41430>