Com. v. Crawley, J.

J-S33028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JESSIE J. CRAWLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 1340 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 12, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0012842-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: December 22, 2023

Jessie J. Crawley (Appellant) appeals from the order entered in the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas denying his second petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Appellant seeks relief from

the judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of 235 to 470 months’

imprisonment imposed following his jury conviction of corrupt organizations2

and related charges resulting from his participation in a state-wide

organization that fabricated prescriptions to obtain and resell Oxycodone. On

appeal, Appellant contends the PCRA court erred in denying his claim that the

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.§ 911(b)(3)-(4).
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Commonwealth3 committed a Brady4 violation by falsely informing the jury

that a material witness agreed to a 10-to-20-year sentence in exchange for

his cooperation, when no agreement had been reached and the sentence the

witness received was significantly less. Because we conclude no Brady

violation occurred, we affirm.

The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions were summarized by a prior

panel of this Court as follows:

Kevin Andrews led a state-wide organization that fabricated
prescriptions to obtain Oxycodone, and employed people — often
women who were addicted to Oxycodone or heroin — to fill the
prescriptions at pharmacies. Thereafter, Andrews illegally sold
the Oxycodone pills.2 Following an investigation, the Pennsylvania
Attorney General’s Office (AG Office) determined that at least 500
fraudulent prescriptions were filled.
__________
2In January of 2015, 24 people associated with the
organization were arrested, and Andrews was arrested in April of
2015 and charged in Blair County. His paramour at that time,
Kristen Berry, testified at trial in this case that Andrews was
sentenced to 33 to 66 years’ imprisonment.
__________

The Commonwealth alleged that Appellant, who was
Andrews’ cousin, was a local leader in the organization, and that
he prepared fraudulent Oxycodone prescriptions, instructed
individuals on how to fill them at pharmacies, transported
individuals to the pharmacies, paid them with cash and Oxycodone
pills, and subsequently ingested some of the pills himself or sold
the pills. The Commonwealth averred that Appellant was
responsible for obtaining more than 15,000 pills over the course
____________________________________________

3 At all relevant times in this case, the Commonwealth’s interests were
represented by the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General.

4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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of a year. An investigative grand jury recommended that charges
be filed against Appellant, as well as his associates Tracy Markin,
Erica Leggett, and Marsha Johnston. Appellant was thus charged
with three counts of acquisition of a controlled substance through
fraud, two counts of corrupt organizations, and one count each of
conspiracy, forgery, identity theft, dealing in proceeds of unlawful
activities, criminal use of a communication facility, and possession
with intent to deliver a controlled substance.[5]

The case proceeded to a jury trial on February 17, 2017.
The Commonwealth presented ten witnesses: Berry (Andrews’
former paramour); Markin and Leggett; AG Office Narcotics Agent
Courtney Van Orden, who investigated this case; Kayla Lantzy,
another paramour of Appellant, who also participated in the
enterprise; Lantzy’s aunt, who was a nurse and procured, at
Appellant’s request, two doctors’ “DEA numbers” that were
subsequently used for fraudulent prescriptions; three women who
filled fraudulent prescriptions at Appellant’s instruction and were
subsequently paid by him; and [Raheem Hall,] a “driver” who
worked for Andrews and observed Appellant create the
prescriptions.4
__________
4 All of these witnesses ─ except the AG’s narcotics agent ─ were

also charged for their roles in the organization.

Commonwealth v. Crawley, 350 WDA 2018 (unpub. memo. at 1-3) (Pa.

Super. Sep. 6, 2018) (record citations & some footnotes omitted), appeal

denied, 372 WAL 2018 (Pa. Feb. 26, 2019).

Relevant to the issue before us, Commonwealth witness Hall testified

that although he was charged in Blair County for his participation in the

fraudulent prescription scheme, no promises had been made to him in

____________________________________________

5 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(12); 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(a)(1), 4101(a)(3),
4120(a), 5111(a)(1), 7512(a); and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.

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exchange for his cooperation.6 See N.T., 2/17/17, at 55. He acknowledged,

however, that his attorney advised him he would be sentenced to “under 10

years.” Id. Upon cross-examination, Appellant’s counsel confronted Hall with

a letter indicating the Commonwealth “recommended 10 to 20 years” for the

Blair County charges in exchange for his “continued cooperation[.]” Id. at 61.

Hall responded, “I never seen that or heard that until right now.” Id. He

insisted that his attorney never told him about that recommendation. Id. at

62. However, Hall conceded that, based upon the sentencing guidelines, his

attorney told him he would face a sentence of 40 to 80 years’ imprisonment

if he was convicted of the charges in the prescription fraud scheme. See id.

at 64-65.

During its closing, the Commonwealth argued to the jury:

Mr. Hall is going to get 10 to 20 years for his case. If you
think that’s a great benefit, here is the thing I don’t understand.
That 10 to 20 years, he didn’t really do anything. He said he only
saw [Appellant] twice. Never spoke to him. . . .

N.T., 2/21/17, at 185. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury that the

Commonwealth and Appellant stipulated to the following: “[T]he

Commonwealth has recommended a sentence of 10 to 20 years in Blair County

for the first witness in this case[, Hall, for his] continued cooperation into the

____________________________________________

6 Hall also admitted that, at the time of the crimes, he was on parole for a

prior conviction of third-degree murder, so that he was also facing time for his
parole violation. See N.T., 2/17/17, at 55-56, 58-59.

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fraudulent prescription practices which he took part in.” N.T., 2/22/17, at 17.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges. See id. at 60-62.

Appellant was originally sentenced on July 6, 2017, to an aggregate

term of 240 to 480 months’ imprisonment. However, after obtaining new

counsel, and requesting post-sentence relief, the trial court agreed that it had

imposed an illegal sentence on one count, and resentenced Appellant on

February 13, 2018, to an aggregate term of 235 to 470 months’ imprisonment.

See Crawley, 350 WDA 2018 (unpub. memo. at 6).

Appellant’s judgment of sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allocatur review On

February 26, 2019. See Crawley, 350 WDA 2018, appeal denied, 372 WAL

2018. Appellant filed a timely, first PCRA petition, pro se, on March 11, 2019.

Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on January 16, 2020,

raising two allegations concerning the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

See Appellant’s Amended Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition, 1/16/20, at 8-

15. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition without conducting a

hearing on March 13, 2020. A panel of this Court affirmed the denial of relief

on February 9, 2021, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s

request for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Crawley, 471 WDA

2020 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Feb. 9, 2021), appeal denied, 57 WAL 2021

(Pa. Dec. 7, 2021).

On January 4, 2022, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition, pro se.

He raised one claim, arguing that the Commonwealth committed a Brady

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violation when it withheld evidence that its witness ─ Hall ─ “received a much

more lenient sentence tha[n] the one portrayed to [Appellant’s] jury.” See

Appellant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545,

1/4/22 (Pro Se Petition), at 10. In fact, in April of 2017, Hall entered a plea

agreement in the fraudulent prescription scheme, and was sentenced to an

aggregate term of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment. See id. at 6; Exhibit G, Hall’s

4/20/17, sentencing order. Later, after receiving PCRA relief, Hall’s minimum

sentence was reduced to a term of four years, eight months, and 26 days to

14 years’ imprisonment. See id. at 6-7; Exhibit H, Hall’s 10/22/18,

sentencing order. Appellant also pled facts to support the governmental

interference and newly discovered facts exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness

requirements. See id. at 5-8, 13; see also 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9545(b)(i)-(ii).

The PCRA court appointed Justin Romano, Esquire, to represent

Appellant, and Attorney Romano promptly filed a motion requesting a PCRA

hearing. See Appellant’s Motion for PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Date, 3/7/22,

at 2 (unpaginated). In its response, the Commonwealth agreed that a “short

evidentiary hearing” was necessary to resolve Appellant’s claim. See

Commonwealth’s Answer to Rule to Show Cause, 5/27/22, at 5.

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The PCRA court conducted a hearing on August 10, 2023. Thereafter,

on October 12, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition. This timely appeal follows.7

Appellant presents three issues for review:

A. Whether the PCRA court erred when it determined that the
Commonwealth, which specifically referenced during its closing
argument that Raheem Hall, a material witness, had agreed to
a 10 to 20 year sentence in exchange for his cooperation
against [Appellant], despite such an agreement never being
reached, and the ultimate agreement including a significantly
lower sentence, violated [Appellant’s] constitutional right to
due process?

B. Whether the PCRA court erred when it determined that the
Commonwealth had no duty to correct the false presentation
to the jury of the fact that Raheem Hall, a material witness,
had agreed to a 10 to 20 year sentence in exchange for his
cooperation against [Appellant], despite the fact that it knew
or should have known that this agreement had not in fact been
reached?

C. Whether the PCRA court erred when it determined that the
Commonwealth’s specific reference during its closing argument
to Raheem Hall, a material witness, having agreed to a 10 to
20 year sentence in exchange for his cooperation against
[Appellant], despite such an agreement never being reached,
and the ultimate agreement including a significantly lower
sentence, created substantial prejudice to [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

Our review of an order denying PCRA relief is well-established:

[We are] limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s findings
of fact are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions
of law are free from legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility
____________________________________________

7 Appellant complied with the PCRA court’s directive to file a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this
Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the
PCRA court’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 971 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).

Although not addressed by the PCRA court or the parties, the timeliness

of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite that we must consider in the

first instance. See Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 204 A.3d 448, 450 (Pa.

Super. 2019). Neither the PCRA court, nor this Court, may “address the merits

of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.” Id.

Every PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be

filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence is final. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence was final on

May 28, 2019, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied

allowance of appeal, and Appellant did not file a petition for certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court.8 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct.

R. 13. Thus, the present petition, filed on January 4, 2022, is facially untimely.

Nevertheless, we may consider an untimely petition if a petitioner pleads

and proves the applicability of one of the three timeliness exceptions set forth

in Section 9545(b) of the Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Moreover,

a petition invoking one of the timeliness exceptions must “be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(2).
____________________________________________

8 The 90th day fell on Monday, May 27, 2019, a federal holiday. See 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1908.

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In his pro se petition, Appellant pled both the governmental interference

and newly discovered facts timeliness exceptions. See Pro Se Petition at 13.

[T]he “governmental interference” exception — set forth in
Section 9545(b)(1)(i) of the PCRA — requires a petitioner to
establish that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of
this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States,” and the “newly discovered facts” exception — set forth in
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA — requires a petitioner to show
that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence.” . . .

Commonwealth v. Towles, 300 A.3d 400, 415 (Pa. 2023), citing 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9541(b)(1)(i)-(ii). Both of these exceptions have been employed by

petitioners to overcome the untimely presentation of a Brady claim. See

Towles, 300 A.3d at 415.

Upon our review, we conclude Appellant established the newly

discovered facts timeliness exception. In his pro se petition, Appellant

detailed when he first learned of the sentence Hall received and the action he

took thereafter to confirm that information.9 See Pro Se Petition at 5-7. He

stated that his girlfriend informed him of Hall’s favorable plea deal in July or

____________________________________________

9 We agree the fact Hall was sentenced to a term of imprisonment more
favorable than the 10-to-20-year term discussed during Appellant’s trial
constituted a newly discovered fact. Hall was sentenced after Appellant’s
trial, and there was no reason for Appellant to inquire as to Hall’s sentence
until his girlfriend learned that Hall received a more favorable plea agreement
than Appellant expected. See Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267,
1286 (Pa. 2020) (disavowing the public records presumption with regard to
claims of newly discovered evidence).

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August of 2020, an assertion she verified in an attached affidavit. See id. at

5 & Exhibit B, Affidavit of Stephanie Lallement, 9/25/21. At that time,

Appellant’s appeal from the order denying his first PCRA petition was pending

before this Court. Nevertheless, Appellant took several steps to substantiate

the information, including submitting a “Right-to-Know Request” in attempt

to get copies of Hall’s sentencing transcripts, and, when that proved futile,

hiring a private investigator. See Pro Se Petition at 5-7; Exhibit D, Right to

Know Request, 1/28/21; Exhibit F, Private Investigator Invoice, 9/3/21. He

further averred that he obtained Hall’s sentencing orders in July of 2021, and

Hall’s PCRA hearing transcripts ─ which explained the further reduction in his

sentence ─ in September of 2021. See Pro Se Petition at 6-7. As noted

above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of

appeal from his first PCRA petition on December 7, 2021, and he filed the

present petition less than one month later, on January 4, 2022. See

Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019) (PCRA

court “has no jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an

appeal from the denial of the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition in the same case

is still pending on appeal”). Thus, because we conclude Appellant has

sufficiently demonstrated the applicability of the newly discovered facts

exception to the PCRA’s timing requirements, we need not consider the

governmental interference exception, and we proceed to examine his

substantive claims on appeal.

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Although Appellant purports to raise three separate issues, they all focus

on his claim that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation. Thus, we

address them together.

Appellant insists the Commonwealth withheld evidence of Hall’s

favorable plea agreement which would have had “a direct bearing on . . . Hall’s

credibility as a Commonwealth witness.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Moreover,

he argues that the Commonwealth compounded the error by making a “false

representation to the jury that [Hall] would receive a 10 to 20 year sentence

in exchange for his cooperation[ when] no such agreement was ever reached.”

Id. Appellant also emphasizes that the Commonwealth referred to the alleged

10-to-20-year sentence in an effort to bolster’s Hall’s credibility. Id. at 14-

15, citing N.T., 2/21/17, at 185 (arguing the 10-to-20-year sentence was not

a “great benefit” because Hall “didn’t really do anything”). He asserts:

Had the true nature of the agreement between the
Commonwealth and . . . Hall been known by the defense, it would
have been used to impeach [Hall] as he was facing a much more
severe sentence absent cooperation. . . .

Appellant’s Brief at 16.

Appellant further argues the Commonwealth had a “continuing duty to

correct [its own] false testimony” even if the “definitive agreement” was not

reached until after Appellant’s trial. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Lastly, Appellant

maintains that Hall was a material witness ─ a fact which the Commonwealth

conceded ─ because his testimony was “essential to the Commonwealth’s

theory of [Appellant’s] role in the criminal enterprise.” Id. at 18, 20.

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Brady and its progeny require the Commonwealth to “disclose all

favorable evidence that is material to the guilt or punishment of an accused,

even in the absence of a specific request by the accused.” Commonwealth

v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1085 (Pa. 2020).

To demonstrate a Brady violation, Appellant must show that: (1)
the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) which was either
exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence favorable to him;
and (3) he was prejudiced by the concealment. To show
prejudice, he must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” A reasonable probability
for these purposes is one which “undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.”

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 264 (Pa. 2013) (citations

omitted). Moreover, in order to obtain relief based upon undisclosed

impeachment evidence, Appellant “must demonstrate that the reliability of the

witness may well be determinative of his guilt or innocence.” Id. at 266

(citations & quotation marks omitted).

Here, the PCRA court concluded Appellant “failed to establish a Brady

claim.” See PCRA Ct. Op., 2/10/23, at 4. First, the court found that because

no plea agreement with Hall had been finalized at the time of Appellant’s trial,

“the Commonwealth cannot be faulted for failing to provide it.” Id. Second,

the PCRA court determined Appellant could not demonstrate prejudice. Id.

The court opined:

Multiple witnesses testified at Appellant’s three-day trial regarding
several instances of Appellant engaging in fraudulent transactions
regarding prescription drugs. Hall’s testimony corroborates and
duplicates testimony from other witnesses whose testimony

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Appellant does not challenge. In short, Hall’s testimony is but a
drop in the sea of evidence which led to Appellant’s conviction.
...

Id. at 4-5. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant

case law, we agree.

First, Appellant failed to establish that the Commonwealth withheld

evidence of an agreement it had with Hall in exchange for his cooperation. As

noted above, when Appellant’s attorney confronted Hall with a letter stating,

“the Commonwealth has recommended 10 to 20 years” as a reduced

sentence based upon his continued cooperation, Hall stated he had “never

seen that or heard that” and that his attorney “never told [him] that.” N.T.,

2/17/17, at 61-62 (emphasis added). The letter Appellant’s counsel received

from the Commonwealth is attached to Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition as

Exhibit A and utilizes the same language, indicating the Commonwealth

merely “recommended 10-20 years” for Hall’s charges in this scheme. See

Pro Se Petition, Exhibit A, Letter from Office of Attorney General, 12/22/16

(emphasis added).

Moreover, Hall’s testimony at the PCRA hearing confirms the PCRA

court’s finding that no definitive agreement had been reached prior to

Appellant’s trial. In fact, at that time, Hall understood the Commonwealth

was offering a plea deal of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment, although he and

his attorney hoped it would be reduced after his testimony. During his

testimony at the PCRA hearing, Hall acknowledged that the deal “started [at]

10 to 20” but was later reduced to “the 7 to 14.” N.T. PCRA H’rg, 8/10/22, at

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14. When asked “[w]hat changed between [Appellant’s] trial and [his] guilty

plea hearing[,]” Hall responded that he did not know, but “guess[ed his]

lawyer talked” to the Commonwealth. Id. Upon questioning by the

Commonwealth, Hall confirmed that at the time of Appellant’s trial, it was his

“legitimate understanding that 10 to 20 was the offer on the table” and there

was no other “secret understanding or unspoken agreement with the

Commonwealth” that he would receive a reduced sentence. See id. at 17.

Thus, the record supports the PCRA court’s finding that there was no specific

plea agreement in place between Hall and the Commonwealth when Hall

testified at Appellant’s trial. See Small, 189 A.3d at 971 (when supported by

the record, PCRA court’s credibility determinations “are binding on this

Court”). Accordingly, Appellant failed to demonstrate the Commonwealth

withheld any impeachment evidence. See Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264.

We also disagree with Appellant’s assertion that the Commonwealth’s

closing argument consisted of “false testimony” that it had a duty to correct.

See Appellant’s Brief at 17. As noted supra, the Commonwealth stated

during its closing argument to the jury that “Hall is going to get 10 to 20 years

for his case.” See N.T., 2/21/17, at 185. While we acknowledge that no

definitive plea agreement was in place at that time, the Commonwealth’s

statement accurately reflected the offer on the table. Hall confirmed that, at

the time of his testimony, he had not pled guilty to the charges he was facing

in Blair County, no promises had been made to him, and that his attorney had

not informed him of the 10-to-20-year recommendation prior to trial. See

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N.T., 2/17/17, at 55, 61-62. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that

“the Commonwealth has recommended a sentence of 10 to 20 years” in

Hall’s prescription case. See N.T., 2/22/17, at 17 (emphasis added). The

Commonwealth’s failure during its closing argument to reiterate that the 10-

to-20-year term was a recommended sentence, and did not reflect a final

agreement, does not constitute a Brady violation. Instead, we characterize

the Commonwealth’s argument as oratorical flair. Furthermore, the trial court

instructed the jury that it “may be guided by the lawyers’ arguments to the

extent . . . they are supported by the evidence[, but it was] not required to

accept the arguments of either lawyer.” See id. at 11. Thus, this claim

warrants no relief.

Lastly, we agree with the PCRA court’s determination that Appellant

failed to establish prejudice. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 4-5. Hall testified that he

began working as Andrews’ driver in October 2013, and continued until his

arrest in January of 2015. See N.T., 2/17/17, at 44. However, during that

time, he only came in contact with Appellant twice ─ once in August of 2014,

and again in December of 2014. See id. at 66-67. Moreover, he testified he

never saw Appellant “pass a script” or in possession of any pills. Id. at 67.

Although Appellant argues Hall “provided crucial testimony connecting

[Appellant] to . . . Andrews[,]” several other witnesses provided the same

connection. See Appellant’s Brief at 18; see also N.T., 2/21/17, at 46-47,

50-51 (Kristin Berry testified she began “passing fraudulent prescriptions” for

Andrews in the fall of 2014 and would travel with him to Pittsburgh where

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Andrews met with Appellant to “bring him pills or pick up prescriptions or give

him prescriptions”); 82 (Kayla Lantzy, who has a child with Appellant, testified

Appellant told her he “bought” his share of the fraudulent prescription

business from his cousin, Andrews); 155-56 (Tracy Markin, who has a child

with Appellant, testified she was present when Andrews explained to Appellant

how to pass fraudulent prescriptions). Therefore, we agree with the ruling of

the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to establish the requisite prejudice to

support his Brady claim. See Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264, 266.

Because we conclude the PCRA court’s factual findings are supported by

the record and its conclusion of law are free of error, we affirm the order

denying relief. See Small, 189 A.3d at 971.

Order affirmed.

12/22/2023

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