RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3636-21
JOHN DOE 1,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARCHDIOCESE OF
PHILADELPHIA,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued November 13, 2023 – Decided December 27, 2023
Before Judges Gilson, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop-
Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-0108-20.
Ruxandra Maniu Laidacker argued the cause for
appellant (Kline & Specter, PC, attorneys; Charles L.
Becker, David Kehm Inscho, Ruxandra Maniu
Laidacker, and Phillip Michael Pasquarello, on the
briefs).
Nicholas M. Centrella argued the cause for respondent
(Clark Hill PLC, attorneys; Nicholas M. Centrella, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually abused in the late 1970s and early
1980s by Father John Mulholland, a Catholic priest. 1 At the time of the alleged
abuse, Mulholland was serving as a priest in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia
(the Archdiocese). Plaintiff appeals from an order granting the Archdiocese's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm because
jurisdictional discovery established that the Archdiocese did not purpos efully
avail itself of any benefits in New Jersey related to Mulholland's alleged abuse
of plaintiff. Therefore, New Jersey does not have personal jurisdiction over the
Archdiocese related to this lawsuit.
I.
We discern the facts from the record developed during jurisdictional
discovery. The Archdiocese is an unincorporated, religious, non-profit
association that operates in Pennsylvania. Its principal place of administration
is in Philadelphia, and it oversees Catholic parishes in five Pennsylvania
counties. The Archdiocese does not oversee or operate any churches, parishe s,
1
Plaintiff identifies himself as "John Doe 1" in his complaint. We refer to him
as plaintiff to protect privacy interests concerning allegations of child sexual
abuse. See R. 1:38-3(c)(9); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f).
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2
or religious facilities in New Jersey. It also does not assign priests to any
parishes in New Jersey.
The Archdiocese does not currently own any real property in New Jersey.
In the past, the Archdiocese did own several properties in New Jersey that w ere
given to it, but those properties were sold before 2013. The Archdiocese also
owned and operated two properties in Ventnor, New Jersey, which it used as
vacation homes for priests. The Ventnor properties were acquired in 1963 and
sold in 2012 and 2013.
Mulholland was ordained as a Catholic priest in the Archdiocese in 1965.
Thereafter, he served as a priest in the Archdiocese at various parishes and
facilities, all located in Pennsylvania. In 2008, the Pope "laicized" Mulholland,
which meant that he was dismissed from the clerical state. See Glossary of
Terms, The Diocese of Springfield, Mass.,
https://diospringfield.org/osevaglossaryofterms/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2023)
(defining "laicization").
Plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania. During his childhood, he attended
and served as an altar boy at Blessed Virgin Mary Church (Blessed Mary) in
Darby, Pennsylvania. While attending Blessed Mary, plaintiff met Mulholland,
who served as a priest at Blessed Mary from 1973 to 1977. Plaintiff asserts that
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3
Mulholland used his position as a priest to groom plaintiff and develop a
relationship of trust with plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff further asserts that
Mulholland then used that position of trust to gain permission from plaintiff's
parents to take plaintiff on trips, including overnight trips to a home Mulholland
owned in Mystic Island, New Jersey.
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 1976, Mulholland engaged in various
"games" and behaviors with plaintiff that involved bondage and activities that
sexually aroused Mulholland. From approximately 1977 to 1980, when plaintiff
was a teenager, Mulholland brought plaintiff to his home in Mystic Island about
ten to twelve times. He alleges that each time, Mulholland had plaintiff engage
in "master-servant" "games" involving sexual torture.
In January 2020, plaintiff sued the Archdiocese in New Jersey. Plaintiff
contends that the Archdiocese is responsible for Mulholland's sexual abuse of
him, and he asserted causes of actions for vicarious liability, negligence,
negligent supervision, and negligent hiring and retention. Plaintiff also contends
that the Archdiocese had known of Mulholland's "proclivities" since 1968 but
did not restrict his activities with children. Instead, according to plaintiff, the
Archdiocese had moved Mulholland to other parishes in Pennsylvania, including
Blessed Mary.
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The Archdiocese moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The trial court initially denied that motion and directed
the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Following the completion of
that discovery, the Archdiocese again moved to dismiss the complaint.
On June 28, 2022, after hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court
issued an order granting the motion and dismissing plaintiff's claims against the
Archdiocese for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff now appeals.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff makes two arguments. He contends that the
Archdiocese is subject to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey because
Mulholland was an agent of the Archdiocese. He also argues that the trial court
erred by focusing narrowly on Mulholland's abusive actions in New Jersey,
rather than considering all of Mulholland's actions and how the Archdiocese
facilitated those actions.
Personal jurisdiction is a "'mixed question of law and fact' that must be
resolved at the outset, 'before the matter may proceed.'" Rippon v. Smigel, 449
N.J. Super. 344, 359 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Est. of
Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996)). We review a trial court's
findings of fact with respect to jurisdiction "to determine if those findings are
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supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record," but conclusions of
law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 358. "A trial court's interpretation of the law
and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to
any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
Having considered plaintiff's arguments in light of the record and
governing law, we reject them. The facts disclosed during jurisdictional
discovery established that the Archdiocese is not subject to jurisdiction in New
Jersey because it did not purposefully avail itself of activities in New Jersey
sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" required for personal jurisdiction.
See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
We have recently published two opinions that set forth the law on when a
non-resident diocese is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey for the
alleged past sexual abuse of a minor by a priest. See D.T. v. Archdiocese of
Phila., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023); JA/GG Doe 70 v. Diocese of
Metuchen, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2023). Like the plaintiffs in those
cases, plaintiff here concedes that he must show specific personal jurisdiction
over the Archdiocese.
A-3636-21
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To determine whether a non-resident defendant may be subject to specific
personal jurisdiction, courts examine the "relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323
(1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). "In order for a
state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over a non[-]resident defendant, the
lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the
forum.'" Jardim v. Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 2019) (third
and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 127 (2014)); accord Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106,
119 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021).
"The 'minimum contacts' requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts
resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities
of the plaintiff." Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see also Waste Mgmt., 138 N.J. at
126 (explaining that "the existence of minimum contacts turns on the presence
or absence of intentional acts of the defendant to avail itself of some benefit of
a forum state"). The contacts "must be the defendant's own choice and not
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'random, isolated, or fortuitous.'" Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
Moreover, courts determine, based on the defendant's "'conduct and
connection' with the forum state . . . whether the defendant should 'reasonably
anticipate being haled into court [in the forum state].'" Bayway Refin. Co. v.
State Utils., Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 429 (App. Div. 2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). In making that
determination, a court "must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests
of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief." Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). So, a court weighs "the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies." Ibid. (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
Neither the Archdiocese's former ownership of properties in New Jersey
nor its supervision over Mulholland as one of its priests establishes specific
jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New Jersey related to Mulholland's alleged
sexual abuse of plaintiff in New Jersey. There is no evidence that the
Archdiocese's former ownership of real properties in New Jersey had any
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relation to plaintiff's allegations of abuse by Mulholland. Plaintiff testified that
he was abused by Mulholland in the late 1970s and early 1980s at a private home
Mulholland owned in Mystic Island, New Jersey. The Archdiocese's former
ownership of other properties in New Jersey was not related to Mulholland's use
of the home in Mystic Island. Specific jurisdiction requires "a connection
between the forum and the specific claims at issue." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017).
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese knew of, approved,
or sanctioned Mulholland taking plaintiff to a private home in Mystic Island.
Accordingly, there is no evidence demonstrating that the Archdiocese
purposefully availed itself of any benefit or activity in New Jersey in connection
with plaintiff's allegations of abuse by Mulholland.
For the reasons we detailed in D.T., we reject plaintiff's argument that
Mulholland was acting as an agent of the Archdiocese when Mulholland
sexually abused plaintiff. ___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 14-19). In short,
there is no evidence that Mulholland was acting within the scope of his
responsibilities as a priest when he sexually assaulted plaintiff. See Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 265; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204; Lebel, 115 N.J. at
323.
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We also reject plaintiff's argument that the Archdiocese's failure to restrict
Mulholland's activities confers personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in
New Jersey. For purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, which in this
matter was raised on a motion to dismiss, we accept plaintiff's allegation that
the Archdiocese knew of Mulholland's deviant sexual behaviors with children
beginning in 1968. We also accept plaintiff's contention that the Archdiocese
transferred Mulholland to other parishes in the Archdiocese to avoid a public
scandal. While that conduct, if proven, would be inappropriate and highly
irresponsible, it does not establish specific personal jurisdiction over the
Archdiocese in New Jersey. All the alleged conduct regarding transferring
Mulholland from one parish to another took place in Pennsylvania. Therefore,
that conduct does not constitute intentional acts of the Archdiocese to avail itself
of some benefit in or from New Jersey. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025; Waste
Mgmt., 138 N.J. at 126.
Finally, we also reject plaintiff's argument that because the Archdiocese
knew that many of its priests were sexually abusing children, the Archdiocese's
failure to restrict Mulholland's activities conferred personal jurisdiction in New
Jersey. All the priests in the Archdiocese served in Pennsylvania, and the
Archdiocese oversaw the activities of those priests in Pennsylvania from its
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administrative headquarters in Philadelphia. While it was foreseeable that
priests would travel outside of Pennsylvania, there is no evidence that
Mulholland took plaintiff to New Jersey on trips sanctioned or sponsored by the
Archdiocese. More importantly, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese had
intentionally availed itself of any benefit in or from New Jersey in connection
with Mulholland taking plaintiff to his private home in New Jersey. In short,
even if plaintiff proved all his allegations against the Archdiocese, those proofs
would not establish personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New Jersey in
connection with plaintiff's lawsuit.
Affirmed.
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