UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DANNY JOE HIRSHFIELD, I, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-3583 (UNA)
)
U.S. ATTORNEYS OFFICE FOR THE )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) and his pro se complaint. The IFP application is GRANTED and, for the reasons stated
below, the complaint DISMISSED.
Plaintiff alleges that he “was personally attacked on the Washington Metro Area Transit
Authority System . . . by an assassin killer with dual style wielded knives military style,” Compl.
at 1, yet the United States Attorney’s Office and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
“failed to ensure [his] safety as a DC Resident,” id. Rather, defendants “let the assailent [sic]
free,” thereby putting plaintiff’s “life at/in jeopardy.” Id. He demands unspecified monetary
compensation.
Though citing 19 U.S.C. § 1592 and 51 U.S.C. § 20137, plaintiff apparently alleges
negligence on defendants’ part. A negligence claim against the federal government or federal
government agency ordinarily would proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, which waives the United States’ sovereign immunity “under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” Hornbeck Offshore
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Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1)). Any such FTCA claim fails, however, because plaintiff does not meet the threshold
requirement that a “claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal
agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified
or registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, and
absent any showing by plaintiff that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over this matter. See Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 F. App’x 445, 445-46
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of unexhausted FTCA
claim “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
113 (1993).
Insofar as plaintiff faults the United States Attorney’s Office for “let[ting] the assailant
free,” Compl. at 1, plaintiff has no recourse in federal district court. The decision to prosecute a
criminal case is left to the discretion of the Executive Branch of government. See Shoshone–
Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Cox v.
Sec’y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). Nor is there a viable legal
claim against the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for failing to adjudicate a matter that
the United States Attorney’s Office had not brought before it.
An Order is issued separately.
DATE: December 28, 2023 /s/
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
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