City of Houston v. Marvis Huff

Opinion issued December 28, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00496-CV
———————————
CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant
V.
MARVIS HUFF, Appellee

On Appeal from the 151st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-02799

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this personal injury suit, appellant, the City of Houston, appeals the trial

court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds and in favor

of appellee Marvis Huff on his negligence claim. In its sole issue, the City contends

that Huff failed to demonstrate a fact issue regarding the City’s notice of his claim,
as required to find a waiver of governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims

Act.

We affirm.

Background

On May 18, 2021, Huff was traveling northbound on 6400 Main Street in

Houston, Texas. Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Officers D. Miller and M.

Flores were traveling southbound on 6400 Main Street when Miller, who was

driving an HPD patrol vehicle, made an improper left turn “through a green light,

from the straight traffic only lane” and struck Huff’s vehicle, which was traveling

straight through the intersection. Huff was found “l[]ying on the street” by Houston

Fire Department (“HFD”) Firefighters/Paramedics, and he complained of “cervical

neck pain, lower back pain, and a headache” during HFD’s initial assessment at the

accident scene. Huff “didn[’]t walk on scene” and was “collared and backboarded”

by HFD and transported to Memorial Hermann Hospital in the Medical Center.

HPD Officer J. Rangel arrived at the scene of the collision and investigated

the accident. In the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report, Rangel concluded that

Officer Miller turned improperly from the wrong lane and identified Miller’s

2
improper turn as the sole contributing factor to the accident. Rangel noted in the

crash report the severity of Huff’s injuries as “C,” meaning “possible injury.”1

On January 14, 2022, Huff sued the City, asserting negligence and negligence

per se claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”).2 The City answered and

specially excepted to Huff’s petition, asserting a general denial and affirmative

defenses, including governmental immunity. The City asserted, among other things,

that Huff failed to provide timely written notice of his claim as required by Texas

Local Government Code Section 51.077 and Article IX, Section 11, of the City’s

Charter.3

The City later moved for summary judgment as to Huff’s negligence claims

on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that Huff did not provide the required notice

within 90 days of the vehicle collision, as required by the City’s charter. The City

also argued that it did not have actual notice of Huff’s claims because the crash report

was not sufficient to provide notice. Finally, the City argued that Huff’s negligence

per se claim fell outside the TTCA’s limited waiver of immunity. In support of its

1
See TEX. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TEX. PEACE OFFICER’S CRASH REPORT CODE SHEET
(2018), https://ftp.txdot.gov/pub/txdot-info/trf/crash_notifications/2018/code-
sheet.pdf.
2
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101, et seq.
3
Huff amended his petition on February 4, 2022. The first amended petition is
substantially identical to the original petition, except for a change in the name of the
service agent for the City.
3
motion, the City attached a copy of the City’s charter, Huff’s responses to the City’s

first set of discovery requests, and an October 13, 2021 letter from Huff to the City

providing written notice of the accident and his injuries.

Huff responded to the City’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that

because the City had actual notice of his personal injuries, he was not required to

provide formal notice within 90 days of the collision. As supporting evidence, Huff

attached the crash report and his medical records from Memorial Hermann, which

included a report prepared by the HFD paramedics who treated Huff at the scene of

the accident and transported him to Memorial Hermann. Huff also stated he did not

wish to maintain his negligence per se claim and conceded that summary judgment

on that claim would be appropriate.

The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment and, as

conceded by Huff, dismissed his negligence per se claim with prejudice. This

interlocutory appeal followed.4

Discussion

In its sole issue on appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred in

denying its motion for summary judgment because Huff failed to provide the City

with formal notice of his personal injury claim within 90 days of his injuries, as

4
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §51.014(a)(8); Town of Shady Shores v.
Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. 2019).
4
required by the City’s charter. It further argues that Huff failed to demonstrate a fact

issue concerning the City’s actual notice of Huff’s claims, as required to sustain the

waiver of governmental immunity under the TTCA.

Huff responds that the evidence introduced in response to the City’s motion,

including the crash report and medical records, created a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the City had actual notice of his injuries and, thus, the trial court

properly denied summary judgment.

A. Standard of Review

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case. City

of Hous. v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013). To establish subject matter

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s

jurisdiction to hear the claim. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 550. Whether a court has

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A lack of subject matter jurisdiction

may be raised in a motion for summary judgment. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,

34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion

for summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656,

661 (Tex. 2005). Under the traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has

the burden to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt.

5
Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). To determine whether there are disputed

issues of material fact, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and

indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at

548–49.

B. Applicable Law

Generally, governmental entities, such as the City, are immune from suits

seeking to impose tort liability on them. See City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543

S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. 2018). That immunity deprives trial courts of subject matter

jurisdiction over such suits, absent a waiver of their immunity. Id. The TTCA

contains such a waiver if notice, as prescribed by statute, is given. Id.

Under the TTCA, a governmental unit must be given notice of a claim against

it “not later than six months after the day that the incident giving rise to the claim

occurred.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a). This formal notice of claim

must describe “(1) the damage or injury claimed; (2) the time and place of the

incident; and (3) the incident.” Id. Claimants must also comply with any time

requirements for notice that a city has adopted by charter or ordinance. See id. §

[non-breaking space] 101.101(b). Here, the City’s charter requires that written

notice of a claim be provided to the City within 90 days after the injuries or damages

were sustained. See HOUS., TEX., CHARTER, art. IX, § 11.

6
 Formal notice of a claim under subsections (a) or (b), however, is not required

“if the governmental unit has actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant

has received some injury, or that the claimant’s property has been damaged.” TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.

1995). For a governmental unit to have actual notice, it must have knowledge of

(1) a death, injury, or property damage; (2) the governmental unit’s alleged fault

producing or contributing to it; and (3) the identity of the parties involved. See

Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341 (“Cathey elements”); see also Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at

776 (stating that, to have actual notice, governmental unit must have same

knowledge it is entitled to receive in formal notice of claim).

One of these forms of notice—formal or actual—is required as a jurisdictional

prerequisite to suit. Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 77 (Tex. 2019). The

purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure the prompt reporting of claims to

enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against

unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial. Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341.

Failure to comply with the notice provision requires dismissal. See Tenorio, 543

S.W.3d at 775–76.

Knowledge that a death, injury, or property damage has occurred, standing

alone, is not sufficient to put a governmental unit on actual notice for TTCA

purposes. Id. at 776. Actual notice requires that the governmental unit not only have

7
knowledge of some injury but requires it have subjective knowledge of information

sufficient to identify the loss ultimately alleged. Jones v. Bd. of Trs. of Galveston

Wharves, 605 S.W.3d 641, 643 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.)

(citing Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 71). “The standard is necessarily subjective,

because lack of formal notice is excused only by actual, not constructive, notice.”

Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 65. Actual notice may be imputed to a governmental unit

when its fault is obvious, or an agent charged with a duty to investigate and report

to the unit receives notice of the three Cathey elements. Angleton Danbury Hosp.

Dist. v. Chavana, 120 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no

pet.).

Thus, an incident that triggers an investigation and accident report will impute

such notice where there is evidence to connect the accident to an action or omission

by the governmental unit such that it should have known of its potential culpability.

See id. The agent charged with a duty to investigate need not be a member of the

agency which is at fault. See Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 77. If a governmental unit

investigates an accident, whether the information acquired imparted actual notice

depends on the particular facts. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at 776.

8
C. Analysis

In its sole issue, the City contends that Huff’s formal notice of his claim to the

City was untimely and that there is no evidence that the City had actual notice of his

claim.

1. Formal Notice

The accident in this case occurred on May 18, 2021. Thus, under the TTCA

and the City’s charter, Huff was required to give the City formal notice of his claim

within 90 days after the date he sustained injuries, or by August 16, 2021. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(b); HOUS., TEX., CHARTER, art. IX, § 11.

The City’s summary judgment evidence included Huff’s October 13, 2021

notice letter providing the City written notice of the collision and Huff’s claims,

which is dated almost 60 days after the deadline for notice had passed. Huff does

not dispute that he failed to provide timely formal notice of his claim to the City.

However, as the City concedes, formal notice is not required where there is evidence

that the City had actual notice of an injury. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 101.101(c). We therefore turn to the question of whether there is any evidence

that the City had actual notice of Huff’s personal injury claim under section

101.101(c).

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 2. Actual Notice

The City argues that it lacked subjective knowledge of Huff’s injuries and its

alleged fault in the accident that produced or contributed to Huff’s injuries. The City

argues that knowledge that an injury or property damage has occurred, standing

alone, is not sufficient to constitute actual knowledge for purposes of the TTCA.

The City contends that Huff’s reliance on the crash report, which stated only that

Huff had “possible injuries” and was transported by HFD to Memorial Hermann

Hospital, is insufficient to confer actual notice on the City.

We disagree. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in favor of Huff as

the nonmovant, we conclude that the evidence created a fact issue as to the City’s

actual notice of Huff’s personal injury claims.

In response to the City’s motion for summary judgment, Huff attached the

crash report prepared by Officer Rangel. Under “Investigator’s Narrative Opinion

of What Happened,” the crash report states that Unit 1 (Officer Miller’s vehicle) was

traveling southbound on 6400 Main Street in Lane #2 of four lanes, which was

designated as a straight-only lane. Unit 2 (Huff’s vehicle) was traveling northbound

on 6400 Main Street in Lane #3 of four lanes, which was also designated as a

straight-only lane. The crash report further states that Unit 1 “turned improperly-

wrong lane . . . from Lane #2 through a green lights, from the straight traffic only

lane with lights and sirens. Unit #1 did not turn from Lane #1 which had a red light.”

10
The crash report states that Unit 2 was traveling straight through the intersection and

“Unit #1 . . . struck . . . Unit #2.”

The crash report included the diagram below, depicting the crash:

In the section entitled “Contributing Factors (Investigator’s Opinion),” the

crash report states:

According to the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report Code Sheet, a code 65 means

“Turned Improperly – Wrong Lane.” Thus, according to the crash report, the sole

contributing factor for the accident was Officer Miller’s improper turn from the

wrong lane.

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 The crash report also notes the severity of Huff’s injuries as “C,” meaning

“possible injury,” and that Huff was transported to Memorial Hermann by HFD. 5

In addition to the crash report, Huff attached a report prepared by the HFD

firefighters/paramedics that treated him at the scene and transported him to the

hospital.6 In that report, the officers described Huff’s complaint as “neck/back pain”

and stated that his primary symptom was “pain, back.” The narrative section of the

report stated:

A007 AOSTF 35YO BLK M LAYING ON THE STREET, C
COLLARED AND BACKBOARDED BY E033. PT WAS
INVOLVED IN MODERATE MVA, HIS CAR WAS STRUCK BY
HPD VEHICLE RESPONDING TO EMERGENCY IN MED
CENTER, JUST TWO BLOCKS FROM MEMORIAL HERMANN
MTC. A007 ASSUMED PT CARE UPON ARRIVAL. PT WAS
AXO4 GCS 15 AND DIDNT WALK ON SCENE. PT DENIED LOC
BUT STATED CERVICAL NECK PAIN, LOWER BACK PAIN,
AND A HEADACHE UPON INITIAL ASSESSMENT. PT HAD NO
OBVIOUS WOUNDS, NO DCAP-BTLS NOTED. PT WAS
LOADED UP AND TRANSPORTED TO MEMORIAL HERMANN
MTC WHERE CARE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ER STAFF
UPON TRIAGE.
For the reasons below, we conclude the above evidence is sufficient to create

a fact issue as to whether the City had both subjective knowledge of Huff’s injuries

and of its alleged fault in contributing to that injury.

5
See TEX. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TEX. PEACE OFFICER’S CRASH REPORT CODE SHEET
(2018).
6
The City does not argue on appeal that this HFD report cannot impute notice to the
City, or that the firefighters/paramedics are not proper agents of the City, or that this
evidence was improper summary judgment evidence.
12
 a. Knowledge of Injury

As to subjective knowledge of Huff’s injuries, the City argues that the notation

of “possible injury” in the crash report and the statement that Huff was transported

to the hospital is insufficient to confer actual notice on the City. We disagree.

First, the City fails to cite any authority supporting the proposition that a

peace officer’s notation of possible personal injury is insufficient to confer

subjective awareness of the injuries that Huff ultimately alleges in this lawsuit. Nor

are we aware of any. In fact, this court, and others, has acknowledged that there is

no requirement that a claimant describe in full medical detail the nature and extent

of his injury in order to satisfy the notice requirements under Section 101.101. See

Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex. v. Garza, No. 01-18-00408-CV, 2019 WL

1523186, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).7

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals rejected this precise argument in a recent

case, Sharyland ISD v. Alvarez, No. 13-22-00165-CV, 2023 WL 2807215 (Tex.

7
See also Ortiz-Guevara v. City of Hous., No. 14-13-00384-CV, 2014 WL 1618371,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating
“[w]e do not interpret the notice provision as requiring a claimant to describe in full
medical detail the nature and extent of his injury” and holding that claimant’s
statements of neck and back pain to accident investigator were sufficient to satisfy
actual notice requirements); City of Wichita Falls v. Jenkins, 307 S.W.3d 854, 860
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied) (rejecting city’s argument that detailed
description of nature and extent of plaintiffs’ injuries was required and concluding
that such is “not the purpose of the notice requirement; all that is required is enough
information for the City to investigate for the purpose of guarding against
unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial”).
13
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). There, the

plaintiffs were injured in a traffic accident with a Sharyland school bus, and

Sharyland ISD argued that the crash report did not provide actual notice of the claim

because it reported only a “possible” injury to the plaintiff, who refused treatment at

the scene. Id. at *1–3. The Sharyland court disagreed and explained:

A contemporaneous statement of a Sharyland employee on the bus
described [the bus driver] driving into the oncoming traffic lane, forcing
another vehicle to veer against the guard rail and “scrape against the
entirety of the length of the railing, narrowly avoiding contact with the
bus.” Further, a Sharyland dispatcher learned that [the bus driver] had
engaged in a possible “hit and run.” The crash report corroborates the
witness accounts, and contrary to Sharyland’s assertion, includes notice
as to injuries and property damage. Officer Resendez concluded that
[the bus driver’s] failure to give half the roadway was a factor causing
the accident. He identified a possible injury to [one of the plaintiffs]
and noted damage to the vehicle’s right side. He also identified the
[plaintiffs] as the occupants of the vehicle.

Thus, it is undisputed that Sharyland had notice, within six months of
the accident, of: (1) personal injury and property damage; (2) its
employee’s alleged fault producing or contributing to the injury and
property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved.

Id. at *3. The court also rejected Sharyland ISD’s “conclusory statement that a peace

officer’s notation of a possible personal injury is insufficient for purposes of actual

notice of injury under the TTCA,” explaining that a governmental entity need not be

absolutely certain as to the nature and extent of a claimed injury to have actual notice

under the TTCA. Id. at *3 n.5 (citing City of San Antonio v. Cervantes, 521 S.W.3d

14
390, 396 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.); City of Wichita Falls v. Jenkins,

307 S.W.3d 854, 860–61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied)).

Furthermore, here, the cases the City cites are readily distinguishable. For

instance, the City cites to a recent decision from this Court, Jones v. Board of

Trustees of Galveston, which involved personal injury claims related to a slip-and-

fall incident at the Port of Galveston’s cruise ship terminal. 605 S.W.3d at 642. The

plaintiff argued that the Port had actual notice of her alleged injuries based on a

report prepared by one of the Port’s officers that documented that her “knee and foot

appeared red after the fall.” Id. at 643. The incident report that the plaintiff relied

on in Jones, however, also documented that the victim did not report any injuries,

that she had already left the terminal by the time the investigator arrived, and that

she had told the investigator that she was “not injured and did not need EMS.” Id.

Based on that record, this Court in Jones held that “the officer’s investigation

did not provide the Port with actual notice of [the plaintiff’s] claim as a matter of

law.” Id. at 644. Rather, noting that the plaintiff had disavowed any injury, we

concluded that “[t]he investigation showed no more than that [the plaintiff] fell, got

back to her feet and departed, disavowed any injury, and declined medical

assistance. That [is] not enough to give the Port actual notice of an injury.” Id.

Similarly, in City of San Antonio v. Cervantes, an on-duty police officer

driving a City of San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) vehicle failed to yield

15
the right of way and collided with a vehicle driven by Cervantes, an on-duty deputy

with the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office. 521 S.W.3d at 392. Cervantes sued the City

for the personal injuries allegedly caused by the police officer’s negligence. Id. The

trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, and, on appeal, the City argued

that it was not given notice that Cervantes was injured. Id. at 395. The City’s

evidence in support of its plea included the Texas Police Officer’s Crash Report, the

SAPD Vehicle Accident Report and Loss Notice, and excerpts from the depositions

of Cervantes and his supervisor. Id.

Both reports in Cervantes stated that there was damage to the Bexar County

vehicle, but that there were no injuries. Id. Cervantes’s supervisor testified that he

spoke to Cervantes not long after the accident and that Cervantes told him that he

was not injured. Id. Finally, Cervantes denied stating that he was not injured, but

stated that he told an SAPD supervisor and his own supervisor that he was “shaken

up” or “kind of numb,” but thought he was “all right” and “okay.” Id. at 396. The

court of appeals held that these words did not constitute “any notice that he ha[d]

received some injury.” Id. “Being ‘shaken up’ or ‘numb’ is a natural consequence

of being in a vehicular accident and communicating that fact does not, alone, give

notice that the person has been injured.” Id.8

8
The City also cites City of San Antonio v. Rocha, No. 04-18-00367-CV, 2018 WL
6517169, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.), in
16
 Here, contrary to Jones and Cervantes, there is no evidence in the summary

judgment record that Huff disclaimed any injury or refused treatment. To the

contrary, the crash report in this case noted possible injuries to Huff and that he was

transported to Memorial Hermann Hospital.9 The HFD narrative also describes

Huff’s condition at the scene, including that he was lying in the street, was

“backboarded,” did not walk on-scene, and complained of neck and back pain. Huff

support. That case is likewise distinguishable, as the investigating officer’s accident
report contained a notation that “[t]here were no injuries in this crash.” Id.
9
This Court’s opinion in City of Houston v. Musyimi, No. 01-21-00670-CV, 2022
WL 2919724, at *5 (Tex. App. July 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.), is also
distinguishable. In Musyimi, this Court held that the City did not have actual notice
of the plaintiff’s personal injury claim because it did not have subjective awareness
of his personal injuries. We noted that “a governmental unit’s awareness of an
accident, without more, is not sufficient to show that it had subjective knowledge of
any personal injuries sustained in the accident.” Id. Nor was the fact that the City
conducted an investigation enough to show that the City had the requisite subjective
knowledge to establish actual notice—particularly because the City’s investigation
did not reveal Musyimi’s personal injuries. Id. The crash report in Musyimi
“affirmatively showed that the City’s investigation of the accident found that
Musyimi had not sustained any personal injury in the accident.” Id. We explained:

The notation “N” was entered in the box designated for the
investigating officers to report the severity of Musyimi’s injuries, if
any. The code sheet for the crash report defined an entry of “N” to
mean “Not Injured,” thus indicating that the officers were neither
informed nor otherwise aware that Musyimi had sustained any
personal injury as a result of the accident. The report similarly
reflected that Officer Cerda and his passenger were uninjured. It also
indicated that Musyimi had driven his car from the scene.

Id. Contrary to the report in Musyimi, the crash report here noted that Huff sustained
“possible” injuries and that he was transported to the hospital. Huff also reported
back and neck pain to HFD on-scene. These facts make Musyimi distinguishable.
17
thus presented more evidence of the City’s subjective awareness of his injuries than

did the plaintiffs in Jones or Cervantes, or even in Sharyland. Accordingly, viewing

the evidence in favor of Huff, as we must, we hold that Huff raised a fact issue about

whether the City had actual subjective awareness of his injuries.

b. Knowledge of Fault

The City also contends that Huff failed to raise a fact issue about whether the

City had subjective awareness of that it may be responsible for the injuries in the

manner ultimately alleged by Huff. See Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 77. The City

appears to argue that the crash report did not provide the City with subjective

awareness of its fault because it is a routine safety report that is generated after every

car accident in Texas and that HPD’s vehicular crimes division is required to conduct

an initial investigation into all police-involved car accidents, regardless of the

circumstances. The City then cites to several cases in which courts have held that

there was no evidence in the record that raised a fact question as to the appellant’s

subjective awareness of its alleged fault.10 Each of the cases the City cites is

10
See, e.g., Harris Cnty. Sports & Convention Corp. v. Cuomo, 604 S.W.3d 149, 157–
58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (stating, “[w]hen a report gives
no indication that the governmental unit has been at fault in an incident, the unit has
no actual notice as a matter of law” and concluding that neither incident report of
slip-and-fall nor request to forward representation letter to liability carrier contained
factual allegations placing governmental entity on notice of fault); Needham Fire &
Rescue Co. v. Balderas, No. 14-16-00211-CV, 2017 WL 1416219, at *4–5 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that
governmental entities did not have actual notice where, among other things, the
investigative report assigned fault to plaintiff); City of San Antonio v. Herrera, No.
18
distinguishable, however, because the incident or accident reports either did not

assign fault at all, did not assign fault to the governmental entity, or assigned fault

to either the plaintiff or some other party. That is not the case here.

Officer Rangel concluded in the crash report that Officer Miller improperly

turned from the wrong lane and that this improper turn was the sole contributing

factor to the accident. The report does not assign any fault to Huff or to any other

party—other than Miller. Thus, the report in this case does more than just imply

Miller’s fault—it expressly assigns fault to him.11

An incident that triggers an investigation and accident report will impute

actual notice where there is evidence to connect the accident to an action or omission

by the governmental unit such that it should have known of its potential culpability.

Chavana, 120 S.W.3d at 427. “The critical inquiry is the governmental unit’s actual

04-13-00304-CV, 2013 WL 5653311, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 16,
2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (nothing in police report or traffic signal work reports
expressly or impliedly referred to any fault by city for claimant’s alleged injury);
Rojas v. Cnty. of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.)
(investigating officer’s report noted that motor vehicle accident resulted because
stop sign had been knocked down, but there was no evidence that County knew of
sign’s condition before accident, and report did not state that County had any duties
regarding stop sign or that plaintiffs’ injuries resulted from County’s failures
regarding such duties).
11
See, e.g., Ortiz-Guevara, 2014 WL 1618371, at *5 (holding plaintiff presented fact
issue on issue of City’s subjective awareness of its fault in producing or contributing
to her claimed injury where police report indicated officer failed to control speed
and listed this failure to control speed as “the sole factor or condition contributing
to the accident”).
19
anticipation of an alleged claim rather than subjective confirmation of its actual

liability.” Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 68. “The issue is not whether the City should

have made the connection between injury and responsibility as alleged, but whether

the City made the connection or had knowledge that the connection had been made.”

Id. at 66.

Accordingly, actual notice requires information sufficient to “alert the

governmental unit to something impending.” Id. at 70; see Reyes v. Jefferson Cnty.,

601 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (“The actual-notice standard does not

require proof that the County believed it was liable.”). Here, there is evidence that

the City had such information.

Taking all the evidence favorable to Huff and indulging every reasonable

inference in his favor, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists

regarding whether the City had actual notice of Huff’s claim under section

101.101(c) of the TTCA. The trial court therefore did not err in denying the City’s

motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds. We overrule the City’s sole

issue.12

12
Because of our disposition, we do not reach the City’s additional argument that its
awareness of Huff’s property damage was insufficient to confer notice of his
personal injuries. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
20
 Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s summary judgment

motion in all things.

Terry Adams
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

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