2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
No. 2-23-0389
Order filed January 2, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 23-CF-2182
)
DAVID CONTRERAS, ) Honorable
) Salvatore LoPiccolo,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court did not err in entering an order denying defendant pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant, David Contreras, appeals the October 12, 2023, order of the circuit court of
Kane County granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to article 110, section
6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 (West 2022)) 1 and
ordering him detained. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1
Section 110-6.1 of the Code was amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1,
2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 12, 2023, defendant was charged with the following offenses in Kane County:
(1) aggravated battery to a pregnant or handicapped person (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(2) (West
2022)), a class 3 felony; (2) domestic battery (making physical contact), enhanced based on prior
convictions (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022)), a class 4 felony; (3) domestic battery (causing
bodily harm), enhanced based on prior convictions, (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2022)), a class
4 felony; and (4) interfering with the reporting of domestic violence (720 ILCS 5/12-3.5(a) (West
2022)), a class A misdemeanor.
¶5 The same day, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial release pursuant to
section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) and the circuit court held a hearing
on that petition. At the hearing, the State proffered a police synopsis from the instant case. The
State indicated that Officer Peter Bangs of the Aurora Police Department responded to a domestic
battery. Upon arrival, Bangs made contact with defendant’s girlfriend, Katie Arellano, who
advised him that she and defendant had gotten into a verbal argument. Defendant had been drinking
earlier in the evening and “was out of control.” The argument turned physical, and defendant
grabbed Arellano’s phone out of her hand, preventing her from calling emergency services.
Arellano stated that a struggle ensued over the phone, resulting in numerous calls and hangups.
Bangs verified this by checking the 911 call log. Further, Arellano advised that defendant told her
that he was “going to give [her] a reason to call the cops” before striking her in the mouth with his
hand. Bangs observed Arellano to have visible bleeding and swelling to the inside of her lower lip.
2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) or Safety, Accountability, Fairness and
Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act.
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Arellano was five months pregnant on the date of the incident; post-Miranda, defendant stated that
he was aware Arellano was pregnant. Defendant denied that any physical altercation had occurred.
¶6 The State also proffered by way of synopsis two other reports where defendant was charged
with domestic battery. People’s exhibit 2 contained a synopsis from the Aurora Police Department
associated with Kane County Case No. 20-CM-2887. In that matter, Officer Andrew Petry
interviewed Selina Cantu-Luyando, with whom defendant has a child in common. On the date of
the offense, Cantu-Luyando went to defendant’s residence to pick up diapers. When she arrived,
defendant was extremely intoxicated. He entered Cantu-Luyando’s vehicle and began to argue
with her before he grabbed her by the hair, punched her multiple times with closed fists, and pushed
her head into the windshield. Cantu-Luyando reported losing consciousness twice when defendant
pushed her head into the windshield and stated that when defendant pushed her head, it cracked
the windshield. Petry observed Cantu-Luyando to have multiple contusions on her face and stated
that her lips were extremely swollen, making it difficult for Cantu-Luyando to speak. People’s
exhibit 3 was a synopsis from Kane County Case No. 21-CF-1502. There, officers responded to a
call after defendant grabbed the hair of his sister, Alexa Contreras, with one hand, and hit her on
the top of her head two to three times with his other. Alexa stated that defendant ripped out some
of her hair in the process, which officers observed at the scene. Alexa also indicated that defendant
was intoxicated when the offense occurred. Alexa further stated that she was 26 weeks pregnant
when the battery occurred and defendant was aware she was pregnant because the two were living
together at the time and had spoken about the pregnancy.
¶7 The State presented an additional synopsis from Kane County Case No. 23-CF-1761, for
which defendant was currently on pretrial release after having posted cash bond. According to that
report, officers from the Aurora Police Department self-initiated a warrant call for service based
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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
on defendant’s failure to appear in court for case No. 21-CF-1502. Defendant was searched, and
officers found on his person a loaded firearm and a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery
substance that field tested positive for cocaine. Defendant did not have a FOID card at the time of
his arrest, as he was barred from owning or possessing firearms based on his prior domestic
violence convictions. Defendant was charged with armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West
2022)), unlawful use of a weapon (no FOID card) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2022)), and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2022)). Additionally, the State
proffered a non-compliance of conditions of bond report for case No. 23-CF-1761. The report,
dated October 6, 2023, stated that defendant had been released from Kane County custody on
September 19, 2023, on pretrial supervision level 4, but had failed to contact pretrial services since
his release. The report indicated that pretrial services had called and left a voicemail for defendant
instructing him to contact pretrial services.
¶8 After considering the State’s exhibits and the arguments of counsel, the trial court entered
a written order of pretrial detention. In reaching its decision, the court carefully considered the
factors for determining dangerousness set forth in the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West
2022). The court noted that defendant had two prior domestic batteries, which it deemed a history
of violence or abusive behavior by defendant. The court also observed that at the time of the instant
offense, defendant was on pretrial release or conditions of bond in case No. 23-CF-1761. Further,
it found that defendant posed a real and present threat to Arellano and that the police synopsis
provided clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident that the offense was committed
by defendant. The court found it relevant that the observations by officers corroborated Arellano’s
account of the incident. The injuries observed were “more than just her word.” Finally, the court
found that the State met its burden in proving that no condition or combination of conditions would
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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant if he were to be granted pretrial release.
The court based that in part on the fact that defendant had been given conditions of pretrial release
in case No. 23-CF-1761 with which he had not complied, noting the “20-plus days” in which
defendant had not even contacted pretrial services as ordered. The court also found that defendant
demonstrated an inability to follow court rules based on his charges in case No. 23-CF-1761, as
defendant had a firearm, which he was not legally allowed to possess. Finally, the court found that
the only potential pretrial condition it could order would be electronic home monitoring, but
rejected it “based on his history of noncompliance.” Defendant timely appeals.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 In his Notice of Appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that he
committed the offenses charged, that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, that
the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of
conditions would mitigate this threat, and that he was denied an opportunity for a fair hearing. We
affirm.
¶ 11 Under the Act, a trial court may deny a defendant pretrial release if the State proves by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1)the proof is evident or the presumption great that a
defendant has committed a qualifying offense; (2) the defendant constitutes a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or the community (or, not pertinent here, a flight risk); and (3) no
less restrictive conditions would mitigate that risk. 720 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Decisions
on such matters “must be individualized, and no single factor or standard may be used exclusively
to order detention.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2022). We review the trial court’s factual
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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
findings—including whether the defendant poses a threat and whether any conditions would
mitigate that threat—using the manifest-weight standard of review. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL
App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if an
opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re Marriage of Kavchak, 2018 IL App (2d) 170853,
¶ 65. The ultimate question of whether a defendant should be detained is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion; thus, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court.
Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Moreover, it is well established that we review the result
at which the trial court arrived rather than its reasoning and may affirm on any basis apparent in
the record. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003); People v. Munz, 2021 IL App (2d)
180873, ¶ 27.
¶ 12 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the offenses charged. In support,
defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden because it indicated that victim was
contacted by police regarding the hearing rather than the State’s Attorney’s office. However, this
has no merit. Section 110-6.1(m)(1) provides that “crime victims shall be given notice by the
State’s Attorney’s office of [the detention] hearing as required in paragraph (1) of subsection (b)
of Section 4.5 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act [725 ILCS 120/4.5(b) (West
2022)].” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(m)(1) (West 2022). However, this clause “was adopted with only
one focus, victims.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 41. “Nothing in [the Rights of Crime
Victims and Witnesses] Act shall create a basis *** or a ground for relief requested by the
defendant in any criminal case.” 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 2022). Therefore, defendant’s arguments
that he was deprived of a fair hearing and that the State failed to meet its burden of proof on the
grounds that it may not have contacted Arellano prior to the hearing are unavailing.
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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
¶ 13 Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he committed the offenses charged because the State presented synopses from the instant case
and defendant’s other cases rather than presenting live testimony. He posits the same argument for
his belief that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. These arguments are also
without merit. The Act plainly states that the State “may present evidence at the hearing by way
of proffer based on reliable information.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2022). See also People
v. Robinson, 2023 IL App (2d) 230345-U (providing that the State was not required to present any
testimony to support its petition); People v. Mendoza-Camargo, 2023 IL App (2d) 230330-U, ¶ 18
(“we decline to require the State to present any more evidence than required by the Act”). We note
that the synopsis from the instant matter contained the reporting officer’s corroboration of physical
injury to Arellano. Two of the other three synopses were for cases in which defendant had pleaded
guilty for domestic battery. Accordingly, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence
for the trial court to find that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant
committed the offenses charged and that defendant posed a real and present threat to Arellano
based on the synopses presented by the State.
¶ 14 Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in finding that the State proved by clear and
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the real and
present threat posed by his pretrial release. He suggests that electronic monitoring and a condition
that he refrain from the use or possession of alcohol and intoxicating substances would mitigate
any threat posed. But, as the trial court observed, defendant was already on pretrial release with
bond conditions when the instant offense occurred and had not been compliant. And the trial court
had concerns regarding defendant’s history of violence and demonstrated inability to cooperate
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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
with conditions of probation and the law. Based on this record, the decision that nothing would
mitigate the threat is hardly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.
¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 17 Affirmed.
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