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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EDWARD REYNOLDS :
:
Appellant : No. 408 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0000444-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 3, 2024
Appellant Edward Reynolds appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction for possession of a firearm prohibited.1
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts in this matter as follows:
Officer Farida Kingsboro testified that she was working on July 30,
2020, when she came into contact with Appellant. She was
patrolling her jurisdiction when she observed a male that
appeared to be possibly unconscious on the stoop of a building
located on the 100[] block of South 17th Street, at around 2:00
a.m. Officer Kingsboro waited for backup and when the second
officer[, Officer Garrett Miller,] arrived, the two approached the
individual. The individual awoke, and Officer Kinsgboro asked for
his identification. As the individual, identified as Appellant,
searched for his identification in a plastic bag, Officer Kingsboro
saw what appeared to be the butt of a pistol in the bag. Officer
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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
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Kingsboro shined her light on the bag and when she confirmed it
was a gun, she quickly grabbed it as it was within close proximity
to Appellant.
Trial Ct. Op., 4/27/23, at 2 (unpaginated) (citations to the record omitted).
Officer Kingsboro took Appellant’s identification card to her patrol car, and she
began “running [Appellant’s] information to see if he had a conceal permit.”
N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 23. The trial court continued:
[Officer] Miller testified that he has been a police officer with
Harrisburg City for 22 years. On July 30, 2020, he was Officer
Kingsboro’s backup, and he responded when she called out a
subject stop. Officer Miller arrived at the scene in a marked police
car and was in full uniform. The red and blue lights on Officer
Miller’s vehicle were activated when he arrived; however, he did
not have his gun drawn. Officer Miller made conversation with
Appellant while Officer Kingsboro returned to her police vehicle
with Appellant’s identification. Officer Miller testified that he
asked where Appellant lived. At some point, Appellant “[w]as just
rambling on about, you know, he found [the gun] and hope[d]
there was no bodies on it and said maybe there was [sic] some
cowboys on it[,] it was so old.” [N.T., Suppression Hearing,
9/19/22, at 33.] Officer Miller did ask [Appellant] if the gun was
a .22 [caliber] but did not ask any other questions about the gun.
Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (unnumbered)(formatting altered and some citations
omitted).
After running Appellant’s information, Officer Kingsboro learned that
Appellant did not have a permit to carry a concealed firearm. See N.T.,
Suppression Hearing, 9/19/22, at 23-25, 28-29. Officer Kingsboro then
walked back over to Appellant and Officer Miller, she asked Appellant what he
was doing on the sidewalk and if he had ever been arrested, Appellant
responded that he had been arrested before, and Officer Kingsboro read
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Appellant his Miranda2 warnings and placed him under arrest. Trial Ct. Op.,
4/27/23, at 3-4 (unnumbered); see also N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at
23-25, 28-29.
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress “any and all statements”3
he made because Appellant was questioned during a custodial detention and
the officers did not provide Miranda warnings. See Mot. to Suppress,
9/16/22, at 2-3. Immediately prior to trial, the trial court conducted a
suppression hearing and denied Appellant’s motion. See N.T. Suppression
Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 45. Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of possession
of a firearm prohibited. See N.T. Trial, 9/19/22, at 160-61. The trial court
subsequently sentenced Appellant to a term of seven and one-half to fifteen
years of incarceration. Sentencing Order, 12/1/22.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court
denied. Appellant did not file a direct appeal, and on February 24, 2023,
Appellant filed a timely petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 4
(PCRA) requesting the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The trial court
granted Appellant’s PCRA petition and reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal
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2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Appellant filed a motion to suppress only the statements he made to police,
and he did not challenge the seizure of the firearm. See Mot. to Suppress,
9/16/22, at 2-3.
4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a timely appeal, and both the trial court
and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred in holding that [Appellant] was only
detained pursuant to an investigative detention, depriving him of
the protection of Miranda, when [Appellant] was not free to
leave, and officers had seized a handgun prior to questioning him?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed Appellant’s
statements to the police officers. Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. Appellant
contends that “[o]nce Officer Kingsboro seized [Appellant’s] identification, as
well as the firearm involved in this case, he was subject to custodial
interrogation.” Id. at 11. Appellant asserts that during this custodial
interrogation, the police failed to provide Miranda warnings or inform
Appellant of his constitutional rights, and he argues that he was “allowed to
ramble by police and asked questions specifically about the firearm.” Id. at
16-18. Appellant also contends that the order denying the motion to suppress
was not harmless error. Id. at 19-21.
The Commonwealth responds that the police officers were not obligated
to provide Miranda warnings until Officer Kingsboro placed Appellant under
arrest because, until that point, Appellant was not subjected to a custodial
detention. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Specifically, the Commonwealth
asserts that under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s initial
detention was not so coercive that it became the functional equivalent of an
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arrest. Id. at 10-11. The Commonwealth notes that the police officers
engaged Appellant in a mere encounter when they approached and asked for
identification, Officer Kingsboro then saw the firearm in plain view while
Appellant looked in his bag for identification, and Officer Kingsboro secured
the weapon because of its proximity to Appellant. Id. It was not until Officer
Kingsboro learned that Appellant did not possess a concealed-carry permit for
the firearm that she placed him under arrest. See id. at 10. Moreover, the
Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s spontaneous statements regarding
the firearm were not made in response to police questioning. See id. Finally,
the Commonwealth contends that any hypothetical error was harmless
because the Commonwealth established Appellant’s possession of the firearm
beyond a reasonable doubt even without Appellant’s statement. See id. at
11. The Commonwealth notes that Officer Kingsboro found the firearm in the
bag where Appellant carried his identification, and therefore, the
Commonwealth proved at least constructive possession of the gun. See id.
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a
suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d
649, 654 (Pa. 2010). Our scope of review “is limited to the evidentiary record
that was created at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Barnes,
296 A.3d 52, 55 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa.
2013)).
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Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only
if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression
court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,
whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly
applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the
courts below are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution both protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence
arising under both charters has led to the development of three
categories of interactions between citizens and police. The first,
a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or
carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an
“investigative detention,” permits the temporary detention of an
individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. The third is an
arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by
probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must
articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion
existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be
answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual
stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court
must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the [stop] warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate.
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Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted). To conclude that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion, the
officer “must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d
765, 768-69 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Further, a mere encounter escalates into an investigative detention
where there is an investigation that causes the subject to believe that he is
not free to leave. See Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1005 (Pa.
2012).
To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has
been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an
objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all
surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the
circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means of
physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s
movement in some way has been restrained. In making this
determination, courts must apply the totality-of-the
circumstances approach, with no single factor dictating the
ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.
Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted). Moreover, “[a]n investigative detention may develop into a
custodial detention.” Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59. “The key difference between
an investigative and a custodial detention is that the latter involves such
coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. This
Court considers the totality of circumstances to determine if an encounter is
investigatory or custodial.” Id. (citations omitted).
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The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the
circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as to
constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis for
the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was
transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether
restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer
showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative methods
employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.
Id. (citations omitted).
Statements made during custodial interrogation are
presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of
Miranda rights. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent. Thus, interrogation
occurs where the police should know that their words or actions
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. In evaluating whether Miranda warnings were
necessary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on
whether the person is physically denied of his freedom of action
in any significant way[,] or is placed in a situation in which he
reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is
restricted by the interrogation. Moreover, the test for custodial
interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent of the
law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on
whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his
freedom of action is being restricted.
Said another way, police detentions become custodial when,
under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or
duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the
functional equivalent of arrest. Thus, the ultimate inquiry for
determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda
purposes is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.
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Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 167 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887-88 (Pa. Super. 2009))
(citations omitted and formatting altered).
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
Here, at the close of the testimony, the [trial] court found that on
the date in question, Officer Kingsboro stopped to check on an
individual she observed sleeping on the stoop at 2 a.m. When
backup arrived, the officers approached the individual (who was
ultimately identified as Appellant). While initially sluggish and
confused, Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated to any point
where he did not understand what was going on. Appellant
interacted with Officers Kingsboro and Miller and was compliant
and cooperative during the brief encounter. Appellant provided
his identification to Officer Kingsboro, and she then observed a
gun and took it into custody.
During this time, Appellant and Officer Miller had a casual
conversation about where Appellant lives. Appellant then segued
into a conversation about the gun and the only question asked by
Officer Miller was what caliber the gun was. When Officer
Kingsboro returns, she asked Appellant whether he has ever been
arrested. The court found at this point Appellant was being
detained, was not free to leave, and no reasonable person under
the circumstances would believe they were free to leave, nor did
Appellant attempt to leave. However, the court further found that
a custodial interrogation did not take place. The conversation that
took place between the officers and Appellant was routine in
nature, asking him where he lived, whether he had been arrested,
and what caliber the gun was. The court opined that this line of
questioning did not rise to any level of custodial interrogation and
denied the motion to suppress.
* * *
In the instant matter, the contact between the officers and
Appellant was initiated by Officer Kingsboro’s observation of an
individual, who she believed might be unconscious, on the stoop
of a building at 2:00 a.m. Officer Kingsboro did not activate her
police lights or siren, nor did she or Officer Miller draw their
weapons. As she and Officer Miller approached the individual, he
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awoke, and Officer Kingsboro asked to see identification. None of
the evidence presented indicated that the officers were acting in
an aggressive or intimidating manner. There was nothing to
suggest that failure to produce the identification would result in a
consequence to Appellant. Neither officer told Appellant that he
was not free to leave, and he was not physically restrained,
preventing him from leaving. To the contrary, the encounter was
described as relaxed and casual.
* * *
While Officer Miller acknowledged that he asked Appellant where
he lived, this inquiry does not rise to the level of a custodial
interrogation. Further, Appellant, of his own volition, brought up
the gun and that he had found it. In effect, he volunteered that
statement. As such, Miranda was not required. Given the time
of night and the fact that Appellant was possibly unconscious on
the stoop of a building in a high crime area, it was not
unreasonable for the officers to approach Appellant and ask for
identification. . . .
Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5; 6-7 (unnumbered)(formatting altered and citations
omitted).
After review, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances,
the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and without legal error,
therefore the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
See Jones, 988 A.2d at 654; see also Green, 168 A.3d at 184.
As stated, Officer Kingsboro testified that it was 2:00 a.m. in a high
crime area when police saw Appellant, who appeared to be unconscious on a
building stoop. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 17. When Officer
Kingsboro initially approached Appellant and asked for identification, the
interaction was a mere encounter, which required no level of suspicion and
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carried no official compulsion to stop or respond. See McAdoo, 46 A.3d at
784.
During the initial mere encounter and request for identification, Officer
Kingsboro saw that Appellant had a firearm in his bag. See N.T., Suppression
Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 19-23. After Officer Kingsboro secured the firearm and
obtained Appellant’s identification, she walked back to her car to determine if
Appellant had a permit to carry the firearm. Id. at 20, 23, 28. At that point,
we agree with the trial court that the mere encounter escalated into an
investigative detention because, under these facts, a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave. See McAdoo, 46 A.3d at 784; see also
Commonwealth v. Cost, 224 A.3d 641, 651 (Pa. 2020) (stating that in
determining whether there was an investigative detention, “retention by police
of an identification card to conduct a warrant check will generally be a material
and substantial escalating factor within the totality assessment”).
Further, on this record, we agree with the trial court that there was
reasonable suspicion to support the investigative detention. See McAdoo, 46
A.3d at 784. Officer Kingsboro testified that she encountered Appellant in a
high crime area at 2:00 a.m., at which time she observed a concealed firearm
in Appellant’s open bag. Accordingly, based on the totality of these
circumstances,5 we conclude that Officer Kingsboro, articulated specific
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5 We are cognizant that possession of a firearm alone is not sufficient to create
reasonable suspicion; however, it is a factor to be considered when
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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observations from which she drew reasonable inferences based on her law
enforcement training and experience, that criminal activity was afoot. See
Green, 168 A.3d at 184.
Finally, we agree with the trial court that Appellant was not subject to a
custodial interrogation. As noted previously, Officer Kingsboro checked on
Appellant’s welfare because he appeared to be unconscious on a city street at
2:00 A.M. and ultimately discovered that Appellant had a gun. See N.T.,
Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 19-20. Additionally, the conversation that took
place between the officers and Appellant was routine and included questions
concerning where Appellant lived, whether he had been arrested, and what
caliber the gun was. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Further, the detention was for
investigative purposes, was not coercive or lengthy, did not involve any
physical restraint or use of force, and did not involve transporting Appellant
to a separate location for questioning. See Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59. Based
on the totality of these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that
because Appellant made statements to police during an investigative
detention, no Miranda warnings were required. See Sloan, 303 A.3d at 167.
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determining whether there is reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the
circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 331 n.4 (Pa.
Super. 2022); see also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 938-39
(Pa. 2019) (providing that law enforcement officers may consider contextual
factors, such as one’s presence in a high crime area, to reasonably suspect
that a person’s possession of a firearm is unlawful).
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On this record, we discern no error by the trial court in denying
Appellant’s suppression motion.6 For these reasons, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/03/2024
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6 In light of our conclusion, we need not address Appellant’s claim that the
trial court’s error was not harmless error.
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