Salyers v. Chater, Commissioner

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LEE A. SALYERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
No. 96-2030
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap.
James C. Turk, District Judge.
(CA-95-143-B)

Submitted: January 28, 1997

Decided: February 20, 1997

Before HALL and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Joseph E. Wolfe, WOLFE & FARMER, Norton, Virginia, for Appel-
lant. James A. Winn, Acting Chief Counsel, Region III, Shawn C.
Carver, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia; Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Julie C. Dudley,
Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order accepting the recom-
mendation of the magistrate judge and granting summary judgment to
the Secretary in this action challenging the denial of Child's Supple-
mental Security Income. We affirm.

Appellant first contends that the administrative law judge (ALJ)
erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the assessment of her treat-
ing physician. We have held that the opinion of a treating physician
is entitled to great weight and may not be disregarded absent contra-
dictory evidence. Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir.
1983). Moreover, a treating physician's opinion can be given control-
ling weight if it "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in [the] case." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)
(1995).

Our review reveals that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
decision not to give controlling weight to the treating physician's
assessment of Appellant's mental condition. The physician's opinion
was both inconsistent with his own reports concerning Appellant's
progress and inconsistent with the assessments of other practitioners
who examined Appellant.

Appellant next maintains that her treating physician's assessment
of her mental condition mandates a finding of disability because of
the number of mental functions he rated as "seriously limited but not
precluded." See Cruse v. United States Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., 49 F.3d 614 (10th Cir 1995). This contention lacks merit, how-
ever, because the ALJ did not err in declining to give controlling
weight to the treating physician's opinion.

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Finally, Appellant takes issue with the ALJ's statement that she
suffers from an anxiety disorder with "probable" panic attacks. Appel-
lant contends that the ALJ evidently failed to properly consider all the
evidence in the record because several medical practitioners clearly
diagnosed her with panic disorder. While the record discloses that
Appellant has indeed been diagnosed with panic attacks, the ALJ
found both Appellant and her mother to lack credibility, based on
their testimony at the hearing and due to comments from practitioners
concerning Appellant's "systemwise" and "coached" manner of dis-
cussing her symptoms.

The ALJ's credibility findings, which evidently influenced his
doubt concerning Appellant's condition, are entitled to substantial
deference. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 1994).
We find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility find-
ings and so reject Appellant's contention. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting summary
judgment to the Secretary. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.

AFFIRMED

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