USCA11 Case: 23-11738 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/08/2024 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11738
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
BRIAN D. SWANSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00152-JRH-BKE
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11738
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brian D. Swanson, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal
of his suit against the Georgia Secretary of State (Secretary),
alleging that the 2022 United States Senate runoff election in
Georgia was unconstitutional because the Seventeenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply in
Georgia.
“We review standing determinations de novo.” Tanner
Advert. Grp., L.L.C. v. Fayette Cnty., 451 F.3d 777, 784 (11th Cir. 2006)
(en banc). When plaintiffs lack Article III standing, “we lack
jurisdiction to consider the merits of their claims.” Gardner v. Mutz,
962 F.3d 1329, 1344 (11th Cir. 2020).
A plaintiff who invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court
bears the burden to show the Constitutional limitations on
standing: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the
injury and the causal conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. Tanner Advert. Grp.,
L.L.C., 451 F.3d at 791. “An injury in fact consists of an invasion of
a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized
and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Trichell
v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quotation marks omitted). “A concrete injury must be de facto;
that is, it must actually exist, as opposed to being hypothetical or
speculative.” Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir. 2019)
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23-11738 Opinion of the Court 3
(quotation marks omitted). A “particularized” injury must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way; the injury must be
“distinct from a generally available grievance about government.”
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018).
Here, Swanson claims he was “issued an illegal ballot”
authorized by the Secretary, which could subject him to criminal
prosecution for casting a “potentially illegal vote” in violation of 52
U.S.C. § 10307(c). Swanson further states he could be penalized in
the form of a $10,000 fine and up to five years of imprisonment
“due to the [Defendant]’s illegal actions.” Swanson urges us to
recognize that the runoff election was unconstitutional, and that
he indeed has a “concrete and particularized injury traceable to the
[Defendant]”—namely, the possibility of a fine and imprisonment
for violating 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c). This simply cannot be so.
The district court did not err in concluding that Swanson
lacked standing because he failed to show that he suffered an injury
in fact. Swanson’s allegation that the runoff election was
unconstitutional amounts to nothing more than a generalized
grievance against the government; he cannot describe how his
desire to defend the Constitution differs from any of his fellow
citizens. Even assuming arguendo the runoff election was
unconstitutional and Swanson could face prosecution as a result of
participating, Swanson has not described how the possible criminal
prosecution is a grievance undifferentiated from everyone else
who voted in the election. In sum, Swanson’s alleged injuries do
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11738
not create standing because the alleged injuries are not concrete
and particularized.
Because Swanson lacks standing, we lack jurisdiction to
address issues surrounding the merits of his complaint.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.