NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 22-1602
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CHARLES BELLON,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT BENNER TOWNSHIP SCI
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:15-cv-00131)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
________________
Argued on November 9, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed January 12, 2024)
Michael Wiseman [ARGUED]
Wiseman & Schwartz
718 Arch Street, Suite 702
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant
Ronald Eisenberg
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Christopher J. Schmidt [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Appeals & Legal Services
Strawberry Square, 16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Counsel for Appellee
__________
OPINION*
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FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Charles Bellon filed a motion seeking to enforce the District Court’s order
partially granting his petition for habeas relief. The District Court denied the motion, and
Bellon timely appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we will dismiss the appeal as
moot.
I
In 2006, a jury in Blair County, Pennsylvania, convicted Bellon of numerous
offenses related to his role in a cocaine trafficking organization. He was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 31 to 62 years’ imprisonment. That sentence included consecutive
terms of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment on each of eleven counts of possession with intent
to deliver controlled substances (PWID).
After unsuccessfully challenging his judgment of sentence in state court, Bellon
filed a habeas petition in 2015. Among other claims, he argued that the sentence imposed
on ten of the PWID counts exceeded the statutory maximum term of 10 years’
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
imprisonment. A magistrate judge recommended relief on this claim, and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not object to the Report and Recommendation
(R&R). The District Court adopted the R&R, and in September 2019 it entered an order
that stated, in pertinent part: “A writ of habeas corpus shall issue if within 120 days the
Court of Common Pleas of Blair County does not impose a new judgment of sentence in
which the maximum sentence as to [ten of the PWID counts] is 10 years.” App. 26
(“September 2019 Order”). The District Court denied relief on Bellon’s other claims.
In January 2020, the Court of Common Pleas reduced Bellon’s maximum sentence
on each of the relevant PWID counts to 10 years’ imprisonment. App. 50 (“[W]e
resentence as follows: As to [the relevant PWID counts], the maximum sentence is
reduced from fourteen (14) years of incarceration to ten (10) years of incarceration (the
statutory maximum) for each of the above mentioned counts.”). It did so without
conducting a resentencing hearing or making other changes to the initial judgment of
sentence. Bellon appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court and argued that the
sentence imposed in January 2020 was illegal because (1) it reimposed a seven-year
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to a statute that is no longer constitutional, and
(2) the court was required to hold a new sentencing hearing. In February 2021, the
Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.
In March 2021, Bellon filed a motion in his habeas corpus action that he captioned
“Rule 70 Motion for Enforcing the Judgment of Immediate Release.” W.D. Pa. No. 15-
cv-00131, Dkt. 99. He argued that the District Court’s September 2019 Order required
the Court of Common Pleas to vacate his judgment of sentence and conduct a plenary
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resentencing hearing. He contended that the Common Pleas Court had failed to comply
when it merely altered his sentence, so he asked the District Court to order his release
from custody. A magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied because it
was based on a misreading of the September 2019 Order. The District Court agreed and
denied relief. Bellon timely appealed.
II
We directed the parties to address whether a certificate of appealability was
necessary to proceed with this appeal. Ordinarily we would need to resolve that
jurisdictional question at the outset. But we need not do so here because we dismiss the
appeal for a distinct jurisdictional reason: It is moot. See Donovan ex rel. Donovan v.
Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that mootness
divests us of jurisdiction to consider an appeal); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1999) (stating that there is no mandatory “sequencing of
jurisdictional issues” and courts can “choose among threshold grounds for denying
audience to a case on the merits”).
In the September 2019 Order, the District Court gave the Court of Common Pleas
120 days to “impose a new judgment of sentence” in which the maximum sentence on
each of the relevant PWID counts is 10 years’ imprisonment. App. 26. As Bellon’s
counsel conceded at argument, the Court of Common Pleas imposed a new judgment of
sentence when it issued its January 2020 order. Oral Argument at 00:23:45-49,
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/221602Bellonv.SuperintendentBen
nerTwpSCI.mp3 (acknowledging that the January 2020 order “is a new judgment of
4
sentence”). Because the Court of Common Pleas already complied with the District
Court’s September 2019 Order, Bellon’s motion to enforce is now moot. See In re
Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that a case is moot, and presents no
case or controversy, “if the issues presented are no longer ‘live.’” (quoting In re Kulp
Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1128 (3d Cir. 1982)).1
Bellon also argues in his appellate brief that the January 2020 judgment of
sentence is unlawful, both because of the sentence imposed and because of the
procedures the court used (or failed to use) before imposing the judgment. But any
claims challenging the January 2020 judgment of sentence must be raised in a new
habeas petition that challenges that judgment. Cf. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320,
331–33 (2010) (holding that a habeas petition challenging a new judgment of sentence is
a first habeas petition).2 We cannot address those claims here.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.
1
Bellon contends that the Court of Common Pleas was required to vacate his sentence.
But the District Court’s September 2019 Order did not require that. Cf. De Ritis v.
McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444, 453 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A]n appeal is taken with respect to
‘the definitive order or judgment which follows the opinion,’ not the opinion itself.”
(quoting In re Chelsea Hotel Corp., 241 F.2d 846, 848 (3d Cir. 1957)).
2
In March 2022, Bellon filed a habeas petition challenging his new judgment. That
petition is stayed in the District Court.
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