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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10819
____________________
In re: DONALD H. BAILEY
Debtor.
________________________________________
KAI HANSJURGENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DONALD H. BAILEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00105-RSB-CLR,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10819
Bkcy No. 4:07-bk-41381-EJC
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and ABUDU,
Circuit Judges.
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
Baseball Hall of Famer Frank Robinson famously said that
“[c]lose only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.” 1 To that
list we add one more thing: close—as long as it’s close enough to
qualify as “substantial compliance”—also counts when it comes to
following a state’s rules for reviving a judgment in federal court un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a).
More than a decade ago, Appellee Donald Bailey obtained a
bankruptcy judgment against Appellant Kai Hansjurgens for tor-
tious interference with contract. That judgment included punitive
damages based on Hansjurgens’s “malice and intent to injure” and
“cavalier attitude toward [his] duties as [a] litigant[].” Bailey v. Hako-
Med USA, Inc., No. 09-4002, at 8–9 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2011).
Hansjurgens has not paid Bailey a cent.
Georgia state law gave Bailey ten years to collect. But before
Bailey’s judgment expired irretrievably, Bailey filed—and the bank-
ruptcy court granted—a motion to revive that judgment. Hansjur-
gens does not dispute that the underlying judgment is valid, but he
1 Nick Acocella, More Info on Frank Robinson, ESPN CLASSIC (last visited Jan. 12,
2024), https://www.espn.com/classic/000728frankrobinsonadd.html
[https://perma.cc/5ATF-87HL].
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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 3
still seeks to keep his streak of dodging payment intact. This time,
Hansjurgens claims that Bailey didn’t strictly comply with Georgia
state-law procedures to revive his judgment. But the district court
found—and Bailey argues on appeal—that Bailey did enough to sat-
isfy the Georgia judgment-revival procedure under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 69(a). We agree. So after careful consideration,
and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Original Bankruptcy Proceedings and Related Appeals
Bailey and Hansjurgens’s dispute originated with a business
arrangement. Bailey leased medical equipment to physicians. To
obtain some of his leasing inventory, Bailey entered into a distrib-
utorship agreement with Hansjurgens and his medical device com-
pany Hako-Med USA, Inc. Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc. (In re Bai-
ley), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6300, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010). Under
this agreement, Bailey bought several Hako-Med PRO Elec DT
2000 and VasoPulse 2000 devices. Healthcare professionals use
these machines to non-invasively treat lower back pain. Id. Unfor-
tunately for Bailey, though, he had trouble selling the devices. In
Bailey’s view, his sales problem arose because Hansjurgens and
Hako-Med recommended billing codes that resulted in lower reim-
bursement rates than they had touted. Id. at *3–4.
After the distributorship agreement expired, a medical-
equipment rental company, New River, offered to pay Bailey $1,000
each month per device to lease the devices to physicians’ offices.
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Id. at *5. But Hansjurgens and Hako-Med threatened (unfounded)
legal action against physicians who were negotiating with Bailey
and New River. Id. at *6. So Bailey stopped marketing the devices,
and New River shut down its operations. Id. at *9.
Bailey filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In bankruptcy court,
Bailey brought an adversary proceeding against Hansjurgens and
Hako-Med for tortious interference with contract.
The bankruptcy court held a trial and entered an interlocu-
tory order in favor of Bailey. Id. at *27. It concluded that Hansjur-
gens had indeed tortiously interfered “to bully the Potential Pur-
chasers out of negotiations” and “to advance his own pecuniary in-
terest.” Id. at *18–19.
After finding that Hansjurgens and Hako-Med “acted with
malice and intent to injure,” the bankruptcy court ordered post-
judgment discovery on punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Id.
at *21, *27. Bailey’s post-judgment discovery requests went
“largely unanswered,” so Bailey moved to compel. Bailey, No. 09-
4002, at 2. The bankruptcy court ordered Hansjurgens and Hako-
Med to submit discovery responses for the court’s inspection, but
they did not do so. Id. at 2–3.
In the meantime, the bankruptcy court proceeded with its
trial on punitive damages and attorney’s fees. In April 2011, the
bankruptcy court entered judgment for Bailey and awarded
$893,973.64 total: $277,336.13 in compensatory damages,
$554,672.26 in punitive damages, and $61,965.25 in attorney’s fees.
Id. at 12. In support of its ruling, the court characterized
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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 5
Hansjurgens’s trial testimony as “evasive and uncooperative” and
noted his “cavalier attitude toward [his] duties as [a] litigant[]”
throughout the discovery process. Id. at 3, 9. And it found that
Hansjurgens’s failure to produce post-judgment discovery was “in-
tentional” and “possibly motivated by a desire to perpetrate a fraud
on the Court.” Id. at 10.
Hansjurgens repeatedly and unsuccessfully appealed.
First, before the bankruptcy court entered final judgment,
Hansjurgens sought to appeal the partial-liability determination to
the district court. But the district court dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because Hansjurgens never obtained leave to
appeal the interlocutory order. Hansjurgens v. Bailey (In re Bailey),
489 F. App’x 425, 425 (11th Cir. 2012). We affirmed. Id.
Hansjurgens then moved to reopen his appeal. The district
court denied the motion. Because the bankruptcy court later is-
sued a final judgment, we dismissed as moot Hansjurgens’s appeal
of that denial. Hansjurgens v. Bailey, No. 12-12465, at 4 (11th Cir.
2013).
In his third effort on appeal, Hansjurgens appealed the final
judgment to the district court. But the district court found that
Hansjurgens’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and he failed to
show excusable neglect as Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
8002(c)(2) requires. Hansjurgens v. Bailey, No. CV411-202, 2012 WL
3289001, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2012). We affirmed the dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction. In re Bailey, 521 F. App’x 920, 922 (11th Cir.
2013).
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Around the same time, Bailey moved the bankruptcy court
to hold Hansjurgens in contempt based on his and Hako-Med’s
continued failure to produce post-judgment discovery. Hansjur-
gens did not appear at the contempt hearing. So the bankruptcy
court submitted a proposed contempt order to the district court.
Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc. (In re Bailey), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5424
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011). The proposed order directed that Hansjur-
gens “be placed under arrest and imprisoned for his continuing
noncompliance” and that Hansjurgens reimburse Bailey’s reasona-
ble expenses incurred. Id. at *19.
The district court eventually adopted the bankruptcy court’s
proposed order in its entirety, specifying that an arrest warrant
would issue after 30 days if Hansjurgens did not comply with the
discovery order. Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119697, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2014). The court also ordered Hansjurgens
to pay Bailey’s reasonable expenses arising from the contemptible
conduct, including attorney’s fees, but it left calculation of those
expenses to the bankruptcy court. Id. at *3–4. Once again,
Hansjurgens did not comply. But the district court never issued an
arrest warrant.
Hansjurgens again appealed to this Court, and we dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re Bailey, No. 14-14905 (11th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 820 (2016). In our opinion, we noted
that both we and the U.S. Marshals “tried and failed to contact”
Hansjurgens about his own appeal. Id. at 5.
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B. Revival Proceedings
Under Georgia state law, the judgment against Hansjurgens
became dormant on April 7, 2018, and was due to become unen-
forceable on April 7, 2021. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-61 (2020). 2
Before that could happen, though, in November 2020, Bailey re-
quested a status conference with the bankruptcy court. The bank-
ruptcy court set the conference for March 18, 2021. To inform
Hansjurgens of the status conference, the Bankruptcy Noticing
Center sent notice of the telephonic status conference to Hansjur-
gens’s Hawaii address and to Hako-Med’s registered agent
On March 12, 2021, Bailey filed an “Emergency Motion to
Revive Dormant Judgment” in the same adversarial proceeding as
the original judgment. In his motion, Bailey alleged that the judg-
ment “remains unsatisfied,” as Hansjurgens and Hako-Med “have
refused to pay any of the award.”
The bankruptcy court conducted its status conference, set a
telephonic hearing on the motion for March 30, and determined
that process would be served by mail. Bailey and the Bankruptcy
Noticing Center mailed notice of the hearing to Hansjurgens,
Hako-Med, and Hako-Med’s registered agent at their Nevada and
Hawaii addresses. At the court’s direction, Bailey filed an amended
certificate of service attesting that he had mailed the motion and
2 Throughout this opinion, we cite the 2020 statute, the version in effect when
the judgment against Hansjurgens became dormant and Bailey filed the mo-
tion to revive.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10819
notice of hearing to Hansjurgens, Hako-Med, registered agents
(EastBiz.com, Inc. and Alive, Inc.), and Hansjurgens’s attorney,
Craig Marc Rappel, at additional addresses in Nevada, Hawaii, and
Florida. Bailey’s counsel also called Rappel the day before the hear-
ing. But Hansjurgens failed to appear at the hearing or otherwise
contact the court.
On April 1, 2021, the bankruptcy court granted Bailey’s mo-
tion. It found that the judgment remained unpaid and that Bailey
timely moved to revive within the limitations period. As a result,
the bankruptcy court concluded, Bailey had satisfied Georgia’s pro-
cedural requirements and was entitled to revival of the judgment
against Hansjurgens.
Hansjurgens, proceeding pro se, appealed to the district
court. He raised four objections: (1) the bankruptcy court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him; (2) Bailey failed to comply with
Georgia procedures for revival of judgments; 3 (3) Bailey did not
state good cause to warrant issuance of an “emergency” order; and
(4) Bailey failed to properly notify him of the proceedings and serve
him with a summons, violating his due-process rights.
3 Hansjurgens contends that Bailey did not strictly comply with Georgia’s scire
facias procedures. We discuss Georgia’s scire facias procedures in more detail
later in this opinion, but for now, we note simply that scire facias “resembles
a summons and directs the” judgment debtor “to appear in the issuing court
on a certain date and to show cause why the identified judgment should not
be revived and an execution be issued.” Popham v. Jordan, 628 S.E.2d 660, 662
(Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-63.
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The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order.
Hansjurgens now appeals to this Court.
II. JURISDICTION
The district court exercised bankruptcy appellate jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291 because the revival judgment is a
final order.
To be final, an order “must end the litigation on the merits,
leaving nothing to be done but execute the judgment.” Barben v.
Donovan (In re Donovan), 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008). We
take a functional approach to the finality inquiry, “looking not to
the form of the” order “but to its actual effect.” Thomas v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). And we treat finality more flexibly in
the bankruptcy context. Donovan, 532 F.3d at 1136. To that end, a
final order generally must resolve the adversary proceeding or con-
troversy in question but need not resolve the bankruptcy proceed-
ings in their entirety. Id.
For postjudgment proceedings, we determine finality
through a two-step inquiry. First, we “‘treat the postjudgment pro-
ceeding as a free-standing litigation, in effect treating the final judg-
ment as the first rather than the last order in the case.’” Mayer v.
Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (quot-
ing Thomas, 594 F.3d at 829). Second, we ask whether the order
“disposes of all the issues raised in the motion that initially sparked
the postjudgment proceedings” and whether the order is
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“apparently the last order to be entered in the action.” Id. (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Under this framework, the revival judgment is a final order
over which we have appellate jurisdiction. Bailey’s emergency mo-
tion to revive the judgment “initially sparked the postjudgment
proceedings,” and the bankruptcy court’s order granting that mo-
tion “dispose[d] of all the issues raised” therein. See id. At the same
time, the district court’s order “dispose[d] of all the issues” in the
revival proceedings and was “the last order to be entered in the ac-
tion.” See id. And there is no further merits determination to be
made, since scire facias proceedings do not permit review on the
merits. See Heslen v. Heslen, 404 S.E.2d 592, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
(“A grant of a writ of scire facias does not authorize the examina-
tion of the original judgment’s validity.” (citation omitted)). In
short, the revival judgment qualifies as a final order over which we
have appellate jurisdiction.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In bankruptcy cases, we sit as a “‘second court of review.’”
Ga. Dep’t of Revenue v. Mouzon Enters., Inc. (In re Mouzon Enters., Inc.),
610 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Finova Cap. Corp. v. Lar-
son Pharm. Inc. (In re Optical Techs., Inc.), 425 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2005)). In this capacity, we “‘examine[] independently the fac-
tual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and em-
ploy[] the same standards of review as the district court.’” Id. We
review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and
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factual findings for clear error. Carrier Corp. v. Buckley (In re Globe
Mfg. Corp.), 567 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The district court retained personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens
for the revival proceedings.
First, Hansjurgens claims that the bankruptcy court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him for the revival proceedings. 4 The
threshold question we must address in considering this issue is
whether the bankruptcy court needed to re-establish personal ju-
risdiction. We conclude that it did not.
Bailey did not file a new action against Hansjurgens. Rather,
he filed, with the same bankruptcy court and under the same case
caption as the adversary proceeding, an emergency motion for re-
vival that the bankruptcy court and district court construed as a
motion seeking revival in the form of scire facias. “Scire facias to
revive a judgment is not an original action but is the continuation
of the action in which the judgment was obtained.” GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-12-62; see also Mitchell v. Chastain Fin. Co., 233 S.E.2d 829,
832 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (scire facias to revive a judgment “is merely
a supplementary step in the original action”). So if the bankruptcy
court had personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens for the adversary
proceeding—and neither party contests that it did—the
4 Bailey moved to dismiss based on the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. We
carried that motion with the case. But because the merits require affirmance
in any case, we DENY AS MOOT Bailey’s motion to dismiss.
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bankruptcy court did not need to re-establish that jurisdiction for
the continuation of that proceeding. In other words, the bank-
ruptcy court retained personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens from
the original bankruptcy adversary proceeding for the purposes of
the revival judgment.
B. The district court properly revived the judgment against
Hansjurgens.
Hansjurgens raises two objections to how Bailey revived the
judgment against him: (1) the procedure failed to strictly comply
with Georgia law governing scire facias proceedings; and (2) it vio-
lated due process. We find neither availing.
1. Rule 69 does not require strict compliance with
Georgia scire facias procedures.
We begin by identifying the relevant rules of procedure in a
judgment-revival proceeding in federal bankruptcy court. Rule
81(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings “to the extent provided by
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” And Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 7069, in turn, provides that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 69 “applies in adversary proceedings.” Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7069.
So we turn to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69. Rule 69
provides that the execution of judgments in adversary proceedings
“and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or
execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where
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the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it
applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (incorporated into bankruptcy ad-
versary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7069). 5 That requires us to
reconsider the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. But no
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure “governs” revival of judg-
ments. So under Rule 69, the creation, dormancy, and execution
of the judgment against Hansjurgens must “accord with” Georgia
state procedures.
We begin, as always, with the Rule’s text. See United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). Rule 69’s key phrase
is “accord with.”
In its original form, Rule 69 provided,
5 The bankruptcy and district courts concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 81(b) abolishes scire facias in federal court, and under that rule, Bailey
could obtain relief previously available through scire facias by “appropriate
action or motion.” So the courts determined that Bailey needed to substan-
tially comply with Georgia’s scire facias procedures, and filing the motion to
revive sufficed. On appeal, for the first time, Hansjurgens objects to the appli-
cation of Rule 81(b), relying on our decision in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV,
LLC, 818 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Rosenberg held that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “only apply” in bankruptcy cases “to the extent they have
been explicitly incorporated by the Federal Bankruptcy Rules,” id. at 1288, and
Hansjurgens asserts that Rule 81 has not been explicitly incorporated. We
need not decide this issue regardless of whether Hansjurgens preserved it.
Hansjurgens argues that the bankruptcy court should have issued an adversar-
ial summons after Bailey initiated the revival proceeding by motion. Although
bankruptcy courts may issue adversarial summonses, see Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 7004, we reject the argument that the failure of the bankruptcy court to
issue one here violated Rule 69(a).
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The procedure on execution, in proceedings supple-
mentary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceed-
ings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance
with the practice and procedure of the state in which
the district court is held, existing at the time the rem-
edy is sought, except that any statute of the United
States governs to the extent that it is applicable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) (1938) (emphasis added). In 2007, Rule 69(a)
was amended as part of a broader effort to simplify the language
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without changing their sub-
stance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 advisory committee’s note to 2007 Amend-
ment; see also Mills v. Foremost Ins., 511 F.3d 1300, 1308 n.11 (11th
Cir. 2008). The phrase “accord with” replaced the phrase “in ac-
cordance with.” Because these phrases are substantially the same,
we look to dictionary definitions from the time of initial adoption
of the “accordance” language, 1938. See Bostock v. Clayton County,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–39 (2020); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 40, at 257 (2012) (ex-
plaining that “new language” in a “legislative restyling exercise[]”
like the revised Rule 69(a) “does not amend prior enactments un-
less it does so clearly”).
At that time, “accord” meant “to agree or concur,” Accord,
Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933), or “to agree, be in harmony,
be consistent,” Accord, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1933). See
also Accord, Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1938)
(“To bring into agreement; to reconcile; to . . . harmonize”). Those
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definitions do not require revival proceedings in federal court to
strictly follow state-law procedures, however impractical or arcane.
Rather, they suggest that revival proceedings in federal court must
only “agree” or “be in harmony”—in other words, substantially
comply—with state-law procedures. And “when the meaning of
the [Rule’s] terms is plain, our job is at an end.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct.
at 1749. 6
Still, though, as we explain after we describe Georgia’s scire
facias procedures, practicalities reinforce the natural meaning of
“accord.” Under Georgia law, a “judgment shall become dormant
and shall not be enforced . . . [w]hen seven years shall elapse after
the rendition of the judgment before execution is issued
thereon[.]” GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-60. The judgment creditor may
“renew[] or revive[]” the dormant judgment “by an action or by
scire facias, at the option of the holder of the judgment, within
three years from the time it becomes dormant.” Id. § 9-12-61.
These two statutory provisions “operate in tandem as a ten-year
statute of limitation for the enforcement of Georgia judgments.”
Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 636 S.E.2d 39, 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
The 2011 judgment against Hansjurgens became dormant on April
7, 2018, and would have expired on April 7, 2021.
6 Even if we look to dictionary definitions from 2007, when the current version
of the Rule was adopted, our interpretation does not change. See, e.g., Accord,
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (“To agree”); Accord, Merriam-Web-
ster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007) (“to be consistent or in harmony:
AGREE”); Accord, American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2006) (“To be in
agreement, unity, or harmony”).
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Scire facias “resembles a summons and directs the” judg-
ment debtor “to appear in the issuing court on a certain date and
to show cause why the identified judgment should not be revived
and an execution be issued.” Popham, 628 S.E.2d at 662. “Scire fa-
cias to revive a judgment is not an original action but is the contin-
uation of the action in which the judgment was obtained.” GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-62. To that end, “[i]n no case and under no cir-
cumstances can the merits of the original judgment be inquired
into” in scire facias proceedings. Mitchell, 233 S.E.2d at 833.
If the judgment debtor resides outside the state, the “judg-
ment may be revived . . . by such process as is issued in cases in
which the defendant resides in this state, provided that” he “shall
be served with scire facias by publication in the newspaper in which
the official advertisements of the county are published[.]” GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-67. Neither “record[ing] the judgment on the
general execution docket” nor “mak[ing] any efforts to collect the
judgment” is a “prerequisite to reviving a dormant judgment.”
Bowers v. Jim Rainwater Builder & Props., Inc., 416 S.E.2d 832, 832
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
Hansjurgens asserts that Bailey and the bankruptcy court
did not strictly comply with these state-law procedures. He is right
about that. It is undisputed that Bailey did not file a new judgment
to seek revival. It is also undisputed that Bailey did not strictly fol-
low traditional scire facias procedures. These traditional proce-
dures include issuance from “the court of the county in which the
judgment was obtained” and service “by the sheriff of the county
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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 17
in which [the judgment debtor] resides” twenty days prior to the
hearing, or service by publication for two months before the hear-
ing. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-63, 9-12-67.
But, again, we do not interpret Rule 69(a) to require strict
compliance—only that federal revival proceedings “accord,” or
substantially comply, with state procedures. See Chambers v. Blickle
Ford Sales, Inc., 313 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that an en-
forcement hearing in lieu of a state scire facias action “accords with
the spirit of the Rules and seems to be a sufficiently close adherence
to state procedures”); Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr. v. Buster, 95
F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1996); 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 3012 (3d ed. 2023); 13
Moore’s Federal Practice Civil § 69.03[3]. As the Seventh Circuit has
opined, “[w]e do not think the draftsmen of Rule 69 meant to put
the judge into a procedural straitjacket, whether of state or federal
origin.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Ruiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir.
1993) (citation omitted). And as we’ve explained, the Rule’s plain
text does not compel a “procedural straitjacket” in the form of a
strict-compliance requirement. We will not impose one here.
What’s more, Georgia scire facias procedures do not
squarely fit within the federal court system. Under Georgia state
law, the clerk of the state court in which the judgment was ob-
tained must issue scire facias, and that county’s sheriff must serve
it. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-63. But Georgia federal courts do not
control county sheriffs. Requiring strict compliance with scire fa-
cias procedures in a federal forum that cannot order the state-
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10819
mandated relief makes little sense. And insisting on county-specific
procedures in federal court, especially in a state with 159 counties,
is impractical. Rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
apply uniformly in federal court, require one procedure for obtain-
ing relief: filing a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (incorporated
into bankruptcy adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007).
That is exactly what Bailey did here.
We conclude that Bailey substantially complied with Geor-
gia’s scire facias statute, so revival was proper. Scire facias provides
notice of court proceedings and the opportunity “to show cause
why the identified judgment should not be revived and an execu-
tion be issued.” Popham, 628 S.E.2d at 662. Service here accom-
plished the same goal. Hansjurgens received at least twelve notices
of the revival hearing, and his participation in these proceedings
has provided him an opportunity to object to the revival judgment.
In other words, the purposes of scire facias have been served. Cf.
Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir.
1990) (upholding a default judgment when the summons omitted
a return date but substantially complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)
and the defendant was not prejudiced by the defect); Chambers, 313
F.2d at 256.
Indeed, as a purely practical matter, there is nothing more
that can be accomplished by remanding for strict compliance. Re-
manding would not change the ultimate result of the revival pro-
ceedings. To be sure, the district court could require personal ser-
vice on Hansjurgens. But a revival motion may be timely even if
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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 19
service is not perfected during the dormancy period, so long as the
motion is filed before the judgment expires. Stahle v. Jones, 3 S.E.2d
861, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939). And here, Bailey timely filed his re-
vival motion. So even if the district court ordered Bailey to person-
ally serve it on Hansjurgens, the revival proceedings would still go
forward.
Personal service could not accomplish more than what this
record demonstrates has already occurred: Hansjurgens’s actual
notice of the proceedings. Plus, under Georgia law, parties may
not challenge “the merits of the original judgment” in scire facias
proceedings to revive it. Bowers, 416 S.E.2d at 832–33. So since Bai-
ley’s revival motion was timely, and since we dispose of Hansjur-
gens’s procedural objections in this appeal, Hansjurgens has no
other basis for a challenge to the revival proceedings.
Put simply, the only outcome on remand would be to reach
the same result: the entry of a valid revival judgment, though after
even more time and expense. Because service here was in “accord”
with Georgia’s scire facias procedures, and because remanding for
personal service would not change the outcome of the revival pro-
ceedings, we hold that the bankruptcy court properly revived the
dormant judgment.
2. The revival proceedings did not violate due process.
Finally, Hansjurgens argues that the bankruptcy court vio-
lated his due-process rights when it did not require personal service
through an adversarial summons, contrary to Georgia state law.
Hansjurgens does not claim that Bailey mailed the revival motion
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10819
and notice of hearing to the wrong addresses—addresses that
Hansjurgens had provided to the court. Instead, Hansjurgens com-
plains that, despite delivery to the addresses he provided and a call
to his former (and later) attorney advising him of the proceeding,
Hansjurgens was unaware of the proceeding until after the judg-
ment was revived.
Our precedent does not require service in one particular
form to satisfy due process—rather, “[d]ue process is a flexible con-
cept that varies with the particular circumstances of each case, and
myriad forms of notice may satisfy” its requirements. Arrington v.
Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). Under this “flexible”
framework, “notice must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’”
Id. at 1349–50 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
Both the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service by mail. First, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 5 applies in bankruptcy adversary pro-
ceedings. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7005. Under that rule, “mailing” the
motion and notice of hearing “to the person’s last known address—
in which event service is complete upon mailing”—accomplishes
service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Separately, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure authorize service by mail “to the individ-
ual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode or to the place where
the individual regularly conducts a business or profession” or to “an
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22-10819 Opinion of the Court 21
agent of such defendant authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(1), (8).
Bailey certified that he mailed the motion to revive and no-
tice of hearing to Hansjurgens at three Hawaii and Nevada ad-
dresses, including the address that Hansjurgens has since used in
his appellate filings. Bailey also mailed the motion and hearing no-
tice to two registered agents of Hako-Med (EastBiz.com, Inc. and
Alive, Inc.) and Hansjurgens’s attorney, Craig Marc Rappel. 7 The
Bankruptcy Noticing Center certified that it too mailed notice to
of the hearing to three Nevada addresses. Not only that, but Bai-
ley’s counsel called Rappel in yet another attempt to inform
Hansjurgens of the revival proceedings. And as Hansjurgens’s par-
ticipation in the appellate process reflects, Hansjurgens had actual
notice of the revival proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
To be sure, Bailey could have attempted service personally
or by publication, but due process did not require him to do so. See
Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1350 (due process does not require notice that
is “ideal under all the circumstances, but rather” notice that “is rea-
sonable under all the circumstances”). We conclude that service by
mail to the six addresses here was “reasonably calculated . . . to ap-
prise” Hansjurgens of the revival proceedings and to allow him to
present objections. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
7 At the time, Hansjurgens was proceeding pro se, but Rappel had represented
him in prior proceedings. Rappel resumed representing Hansjurgens for his
appeal in this Court until Rappel passed away in January 2023 and current
counsel took over.
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-10819
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons we have explained, we affirm the district
court’s revival order.
AFFIRMED.