Williams Sports Rentals Inc. v. Marian Willis

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: COMPLAINT AND PETITION No. 22-16928
OF WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS,
INC. AS OWNER OF A CERTAIN D.C. No.
2004 YAMAHA WAVE RUNNER 2:17-cv-00653-
FX 140 (CF 5408 LE) FOR KJM-JDP
EXONERATION FROM OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY,
______________________________ OPINION

WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS
INC., as Owner of a Certain 2004
Yamaha Waverunner FX 140,
Petitioner-counter-
respondent-Appellee,
v.

MARIAN LATASHA WILLIS, on
behalf of the Estate of Raeshon
Williams,
Respondent-counter-
claimant-Appellant,
v.

THOMAS SMITH; KAI PETRICH;
BERKELEY EXECUTIVES, INC.;
ZIP, INC.,
Third-party-defendants.
2 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2023
San Francisco, California

Filed January 16, 2024

Before: Eric D. Miller and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit Judges,
and Barbara M. G. Lynn,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Miller

SUMMARY**

Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act

In an action under the Shipowner’s Limitation of
Liability Act, the panel vacated the district court’s order
granting a jet ski owner an injunction against a state-court
lawsuit concerning a fatal accident and remanded with
instructions to narrow the injunction so that it barred only
claims against the owner, not claims against other parties.
The Limitation Act limits the liability of vessel owners
for accidents that occurred without their privity or

*
The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 3

knowledge to “the value of the vessel and pending freight.”
When a vessel owner files suit under the Limitation Act,
injured parties must file their claims against the owner in the
federal limitation proceeding.
Here, after the jet ski owner initiated the federal
limitation proceeding, the district court enjoined all other
lawsuits arising from the jet ski accident. Only the
decedent’s mother filed a claim against the owner in the
limitation proceeding. She also filed a wrongful-death
lawsuit against other defendants in California state court,
and she asked the district court to dissolve its injunction so
that she could add the jet ski owner to her state-court lawsuit.
The district court denied the motion. In prior appeals, this
court vacated and then reversed with instructions to dissolve
the injunction. State-court defendants subsequently filed
cross-complaints against the jet ski owner for indemnity and
contribution, as well as attorney’s fees, and the district court
again enjoined the “continued prosecution of any legal
proceedings of any nature, except in the present proceeding,
in respect to any claim arising from” the accident.
The panel held that, in general, a district court has broad
discretion in deciding whether to dissolve or reinstate an
injunction issued under the Limitation Act, but the district
court must allow a state-court lawsuit to proceed when there
is only a single claimant, and that claimant enters a
stipulation protecting the vessel owner’s limitation right.
The panel declined to take a position on a circuit conflict
regarding whether parties seeking indemnity or contribution
count as separate claimants because, apart from such claims,
the state-court defendants also brought claims for attorney’s
fees, and, absent a stipulation, a party seeking attorney’s fees
is a separate claimant. The panel held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting an injunction because,
4 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

with a limitation fund of only $5,000 to cover pending
claims for wrongful death, survival, indemnity, contribution,
and attorney’s fees, the district court could fairly conclude
that an injunction was necessary to protect the jet ski owner’s
limitation right.
The panel further held, however, that the injunction was
overbroad because, on its face, it prohibited the decedent’s
mother from proceeding in state court on her claims against
any party. The panel concluded that, under the Anti-
Injunction Act, which prohibits a federal court from granting
an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments, the district court could not enjoin the decedent’s
mother from proceeding against anyone other than the vessel
owner.

COUNSEL

John R. Hillsman (argued), McGuinn Hillsman & Palefsky,
San Francisco, California; Anthony L. Label and Steven A.
Kronenberg, The Veen Firm, San Francisco, California; for
Respondent-counter-claimant-Appellant.
Brian O. Felder (argued) and Ian Stewart, Wilson Elser
Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Los Angeles,
California, for Petitioner-counter-respondent-Appellee.
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 5

OPINION

MILLER, Circuit Judge:

The Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act (the
Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq., allows the owner
of a vessel to limit its liability for accidents and to enjoin
lawsuits that threaten its right to do so. After a fatal accident
involving a jet ski, the district court granted the jet ski’s
owner an injunction against a state-court lawsuit. We
previously ordered the district court to dissolve the
injunction, but the addition of new claims arising from the
accident prompted the district court to reinstate it. We hold
that the district court had the authority to grant an injunction
but that the injunction it imposed is overly broad. We vacate
and remand with instructions to narrow the injunction so that
it bars only claims against the owner, not claims against
other parties.
I
On August 13, 2016, during a corporate retreat in South
Lake Tahoe, California, Raeshon Williams went for a ride
on a jet ski with a co-worker, Thomas Smith. Smith allegedly
turned into another vessel’s wake at high speed, throwing
Williams off the jet ski and into Lake Tahoe, where he
drowned.
The jet ski had been rented from Williams Sports Rentals
(WSR), which is not related to Raeshon Williams.
Anticipating a lawsuit, WSR filed a complaint in federal
district court under the Limitation Act. That statute limits the
liability of vessel owners for accidents that occurred without
their privity or knowledge to “the value of the vessel and
pending freight.” 46 U.S.C. § 30523(a). Congress enacted
6 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

the statute in 1851 “primarily to encourage the development
of American merchant shipping.” Lake Tankers Corp. v.
Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957); see Martz v. Horazdovsky,
33 F.4th 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2022). But courts have long
recognized that it covers a wide range of vessels, including
pleasure craft such as jet skis. See, e.g., In re Hechinger, 890
F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1989); Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893
F.2d 1225, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 1990). The parties agree that
the jet ski is a “vessel” to which the Limitation Act applies.
When a vessel owner files a lawsuit under the Limitation
Act and posts security for the limitation amount, “all claims
and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in
question shall cease.” 46 U.S.C. § 30529(c); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. Supp. R. F(3). Injured parties must file their claims
against the owner in the federal limitation proceeding. Fed.
R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(4). After the claims are filed, the
district court, sitting without a jury, decides whether the
owner is liable and, if so, whether the owner can limit its
liability. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,
448 (2001). If liability is limited and the limitation amount
is insufficient to cover all claims, the district court distributes
the limitation amount to the valid claimants in proportion to
their losses. 46 U.S.C. § 30525; see Fed. R. Civ. Supp. R.
F(8). This procedure, sometimes referred to as a
“concursus,” “provides for all claims against an owner to be
aggregated and decided at one time under a single set of
substantive and procedural rules, thereby avoiding
inconsistent results and repetitive litigation.” In re Paradise
Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1986).
In this case, WSR stipulated that the jet ski was worth
$5,000 and posted security in that amount. The district court
then enjoined all other lawsuits arising from the accident and
issued a notice directing anyone who had a claim against
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 7

WSR to file it with the court. Only Williams’s mother,
Marian Latasha Willis, filed a claim. She asserted causes of
action for wrongful death and survival, alleging that WSR
was negligent in renting the jet ski to Smith and to Kai
Petrich, the CEO of Williams’s employer, Zip, Inc.
Although the Limitation Act gives vessel owners the
right to limit their liability in an exclusive proceeding in
federal court, claimants have a competing right to bring
certain maritime claims in a forum of their choice. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1), federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.” The saving-to-suitors clause
“preserves remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state
courts over . . . admiralty and maritime claims” that are
brought in personam, that is, against a person rather than a
vessel. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 445; see County of San Mateo v.
Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2022). Trial
by jury is the classic example of a remedy that limitation
actions lack and that the saving-to-suitors clause protects.
Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454–55; Newton v. Shipman, 718 F.2d
959, 962 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
As permitted by the saving-to-suitors clause, Willis also
filed a lawsuit in California state court. As with the claim she
filed in the limitation proceeding, her state-court lawsuit
asserted wrongful-death and survival claims, both of which
are maritime claims over which California state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has recognized
a maritime cause of action for wrongful death—that is, a
cause of action asserted by the decedent’s family members
to compensate them for the injuries they suffered because of
the death. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375, 409 (1970); see also Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
8 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820 (2001). The Supreme
Court has not decided whether there is a maritime survival
cause of action—that is, a claim for injuries to decedents that
survives their death and that may be asserted by their
representatives on behalf of their estate. Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.7 (1996)
(“[W]e assume without deciding that Moragne also provides
a survival action.”). We have recognized one, however, as
have several other courts of appeals. See Evich v. Connelly,
759 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985); Barbe v. Drummond,
507 F.2d 794, 799 (1st Cir. 1974); Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki
Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1093–94 (2d Cir. 1993);
Casaceli v. Martech Int’l, Inc., 774 F.2d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir.
1985); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., & Assocs., Inc., 466
F.2d 903, 909–10 (8th Cir. 1972).
We look to state law to determine who is entitled to
assert wrongful-death and survival claims. See Evich, 759
F.2d at 1433; see also Ortega Garcia v. United States, 986
F.3d 513, 523 (5th Cir. 2021). The parties do not dispute that
under California’s wrongful-death and survival statutes,
Willis is a proper plaintiff to assert such claims because she
is Williams’s mother and the representative of his estate. See
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60(a) (wrongful death); id.
§ 377.34(a) (survival).
Willis’s state-court complaint named Smith, Petrich, and
Zip as defendants, but it did not name WSR. Willis asked the
district court to dissolve its injunction so she could add WSR
to her state-court lawsuit. The district court denied the
motion, and Willis appealed.
In that appeal, we held that “[t]he district court abused
its discretion by failing to consider whether Williams Sports
Rentals’s limitation right would be prejudiced if the
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 9

injunction were lifted.” In re Williams Sports Rentals, Inc.,
770 F. App’x 391, 392 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). When
the proceedings outside a limitation action involve “a single
claim,” we explained, a court’s discretion to enjoin them is
“narrowly circumscribed and the injunction must be
dissolved unless the owner can demonstrate that his right to
limit liability will be prejudiced.” Id. (quoting Newton, 718
F.2d at 961). We vacated the judgment and remanded “for
the district court to conduct the proper prejudice
inquiry . . . in the first instance.” Id.
On remand, the district court did not conduct a prejudice
inquiry, so Willis appealed again. In the second appeal, we
reversed and remanded with instructions to dissolve the
injunction. In re Williams Sports Rentals, Inc., 786 F. App’x
105, 106 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). We held that the
district court must allow the state-court lawsuit to proceed
because “[t]he record reflects that this is a single claim case;
Willis has entered formal stipulations protecting WSR’s
right to limit liability; and WSR has not demonstrated
prejudice to its right to limit liability.” Id. On remand, the
district court dissolved its injunction and Willis then
amended her state-court complaint to add WSR as a
defendant.
Since then, the state-court lawsuit has expanded. Petrich
filed a cross-complaint against WSR seeking indemnity and
contribution, as well as attorney’s fees. Zip’s insurers
intervened and filed a cross-complaint against WSR seeking
indemnity and contribution, as well as attorney’s fees.
Neither Petrich nor the insurers entered stipulations
protecting WSR’s right to limit its liability to the value of
the vessel.
10 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

Based on those developments, the district court
concluded that “the state court action has morphed into a
multiple claimant action” because Willis, Petrich, and the
insurers had each brought “separate claims for damages.”
The district court entered an injunction barring “[t]he
continued prosecution of any legal proceedings of any
nature, except in the present proceeding, in respect to any
claim arising from” the accident.
Willis now appeals the grant of that injunction, which
she may do “as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1).” In re Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d 595, 597
(9th Cir. 1983).
II
Willis argues that the district court erred in reinstating
the injunction against her state-court lawsuit. In general, a
district court has “broad discretion” in deciding whether to
dissolve or reinstate an injunction previously issued under
the Limitation Act. Newton, 718 F.2d at 961; cf. Lewis, 531
U.S. at 449 (“[W]here, as here, the District Court satisfies
itself that a vessel owner’s right to seek limitation will be
protected, the decision to dissolve the injunction is well
within the court’s discretion.”). But we have recognized two
contexts in which a state-court lawsuit poses no threat to the
owner’s limitation right, and in which the district court must
allow the state court to proceed.
First, a district court may not enjoin a state-court lawsuit
when “the limitation fund exceeds the value of all the
claims” against the vessel owner. Newton, 718 F.2d at 962;
see Lewis, 531 U.S. at 451–52. An injunction in that instance
“would transform the Act from a protective instrument to an
offensive weapon by which the shipowner could deprive
suitors of their common-law rights, even where the
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 11

limitation fund is known to be more than adequate to satisfy
all demands upon it.” Lake Tankers Corp., 354 U.S. at 152.
Willis does not argue that this is such a case. The limitation
fund is only $5,000, and as Willis told the district court, that
sum “is a pittance which will not cover the court costs in this
case.”
Second, a district court may not enjoin a state-court
lawsuit when there is only a “single claimant”; that claimant
enters a stipulation protecting the vessel owner’s limitation
right; and “nothing appears to suggest the possibility of
another claim.” Newton, 718 F.2d at 962 (citation omitted);
see Lewis, 531 U.S. at 451. The required stipulation
concedes that the value of the limitation fund equals the
value of the vessel and its freight, accepts the district court’s
exclusive jurisdiction to decide the limitation of the owner’s
liability, and waives the right to claim res judicata based on
any judgment rendered outside the limitation action. See
Newton, 718 F.2d at 962. Because such a stipulation fully
protects the limitation right, several courts of appeals have
held that a state-court action should proceed, even if there
are multiple claimants, so long as they all enter equivalent
stipulations. See In re Dammers & Vanderheide &
Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 756 (2d
Cir. 1988); Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 519, 526 (3d Cir.
1993); Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74
F.3d 671, 674–75 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Illinois Marine
Towing, Inc., 498 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2007); Jefferson
Barracks Marine Serv., Inc. v. Casey, 763 F.2d 1007, 1009–
11 (8th Cir. 1985); Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86
F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 1996).
We previously held that this case involved a single
claimant. Williams Sports Rentals, 786 F. App’x at 106.
Willis alone had brought a claim, and she had entered the
12 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

necessary stipulation. Id. Since then, however, the state-
court lawsuit has expanded. Petrich and Zip’s insurers have
asserted cross-claims against WSR seeking indemnity,
contribution, and attorney’s fees. And while Willis
stipulated that she would not seek damages from WSR
beyond any limitation imposed by the federal court, the other
parties have made no such promises. According to WSR,
both the indemnity and contribution claims, as well as the
claims for attorney’s fees, independently, mean that this is
no longer a single-claimant case.
Courts of appeals have disagreed over whether parties
seeking indemnity or contribution count as separate
claimants. The minority view, held by the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits, is that they do not because those claims are “merely
derivative” of the claim for injury. Universal Towing Co. v.
Barrale, 595 F.2d 414, 419 (8th Cir. 1979); see S & E
Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d
636, 645 (6th Cir. 1982). The party seeking reimbursement
can recover only as much as the injured claimant was entitled
to recover, those courts reason, and that amount “cannot
exceed the owner’s statutory limit.” Universal Towing, 595
F.2d at 419; see S & E Shipping, 678 F.2d at 645.
The majority view is that unless a party seeking
indemnity or contribution enters a stipulation of its own, it is
a separate claimant whose threat to the owner’s limitation
right may justify an injunction. See Dammers, 836 F.2d at
757 (2d Cir.); Gorman, 2 F.3d at 526 (3d Cir.); Odeco, 74
F.3d at 675 (5th Cir.); In re Holly Marine Towing, Inc., 270
F.3d 1086, 1090 (7th Cir. 2001); Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at
1042 (11th Cir.); see also S & E Shipping, 678 F.2d at 648
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the result). The courts taking that
view reason that although indemnity and contribution claims
cannot exceed the injury claims, they may well exceed the
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 13

limitation amount. Suppose the state court awarded Willis a
$1 million judgment against Petrich, who in turn recovered
$1 million in contribution from WSR. Having never agreed
to respect WSR’s limitation right or its $5,000 fund amount,
Petrich could then try to assert the state court’s judgment as
res judicata in the limitation proceeding. See Holly Marine
Towing, 270 F.3d at 1088–89. At a minimum, WSR would
have to “await the outcome of state-court litigation to obtain
[its] protection.” Id. at 1090. But “the Limitation Act entitles
the shipowner to obtain limitation upon the filing of his
petition for limitation in federal district court and his
satisfying the requirements of the Act, not, possibly much
later, upon the completion of state-court proceedings.” Id. at
1089–90. The limitation right requires assurances at the
outset from everyone whose claims could obstruct it, those
courts reason, and that includes other tortfeasors no less than
the tort victims.
We need not take a position in that circuit conflict
because even apart from the indemnity and contribution
claims, Petrich and the insurers are also additional claimants
because of their claims for attorney’s fees. The courts of
appeals are in agreement that, absent a stipulation, a party
seeking attorney’s fees is a separate claimant. See Dammers,
836 F.2d at 756 (“It is . . . well settled that the potential for
claims for attorneys’ fees or costs against a shipowner by a
claimant or a third party creates a multiple claimant
situation . . . .”); accord Gorman, 2 F.3d at 525; In re Port
Arthur Towing Co., 42 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam); S & E Shipping, 678 F.2d at 646; Universal Towing,
595 F.2d at 419; Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1040. Attorney’s
fees are “separate from any claims for liability,” so they are
not derivative of the injured party’s claim. S & E Shipping,
14 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

678 F.2d at 646. They simply add to the sum that the
claimants seek.
Despite the presence of new claimants, Willis contends
that she is still the only claimant because we previously
decided that she was, and that decision is law of the case.
The law-of-the-case doctrine “precludes a court ‘from
reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court,
or a higher court in the identical case.’” Manufactured Home
Cmtys., Inc. v. County of San Diego, 655 F.3d 1171, 1181
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Lummi Indian
Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000)). But the doctrine
does not apply where, as here, “the evidence on remand is
substantially different.” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
795 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States
v. Renteria, 557 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also
Manufactured Home Cmtys., 655 F.3d at 1181. When we
held that this case involved a single claimant, that was
because only Willis had asserted a claim, so “the record
reflect[ed] that this is a single claim case.” Williams Sports
Rentals, 786 F. App’x at 106. The record no longer reflects
that, and we are not required to pretend that it still does.
Willis also argues that we should disregard the new
claimants because she considers their claims to be “shams.”
But the merits of the state-court claims are not before us. The
limitation right attaches “upon the filing of [the] petition for
limitation in federal district court,” not “upon the completion
of state-court proceedings.” Holly Marine Towing, 270 F.3d
at 1089–90. Whether or not the state-court litigation
produces an outcome in WSR’s favor, the proceedings
would obstruct its limitation right along the way.
Because the state-court lawsuit leaves the prospects of
limitation uncertain, the district court did not abuse its
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 15

discretion in granting an injunction. With a limitation fund
of $5,000 to cover pending claims for wrongful death,
survival, indemnity, contribution, and attorney’s fees, the
district court could fairly conclude that an injunction was
necessary to protect WSR’s limitation right.
III
The remaining question is the scope of the injunction.
The district court enjoined “[t]he continued prosecution of
any legal proceedings of any nature, except in the present
proceeding, in respect to any claim arising from the 2016
incident described in the complaint” until the conclusion of
the limitation action. On its face, the injunction prohibits
Willis from proceeding in state court on her claims against
any party. She contends that this restriction is overbroad.
Under the Anti-Injunction Act, she argues, the district court
could not enjoin her from proceeding against anyone other
than the vessel’s owner, WSR. We agree.
The Anti-Injunction Act provides: “A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The
statute is “an absolute prohibition against enjoining state
court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within” one of
the statutory exceptions. Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of
N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)).
WSR relies on the exception for injunctions “expressly
authorized by Act of Congress,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283, arguing
that the Limitation Act provides such authorization. But
although Limitation Act injunctions fall within the
16 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

exception, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234 & n.13
(1972), the Limitation Act does not authorize the breadth of
the injunction here. Instead, it provides for an injunction
whereby “all claims and proceedings against the owner
related to the matter in question shall cease.” 46 U.S.C.
§ 30529(c) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
R. F(3) (“On application of the plaintiff the court shall enjoin
the further prosecution of any action or proceeding against
the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property with respect to any
claim subject to limitation in the action.” (emphasis added)).
Thus, the Limitation Act authorizes an injunction only of
proceedings “against the owner,” and the only owner here is
WSR.
WSR argues that Smith and Petrich also qualify as
owners because the statute defines “owner” to “include[] a
charterer that mans, supplies, and navigates a vessel at the
charterer’s own expense or by the charterer’s own
procurement.” 46 U.S.C. § 30501(2). But although Smith
and Petrich rented the jet ski, they were not charterers under
the terms of the statute. Petrich in no way “navigate[d]” the
jet ski involved in the accident; the rental covered two jet
skis, and he rode the other one. Id. And neither Smith nor
Petrich “supplie[d]” the jet ski with gas, life jackets, or any
other equipment. Id.; see also Calkins v. Graham, 667 F.2d
1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that an agent of a
vessel’s owner was not a statutory charterer when there was
“no evidence” that the agent “manned, victualled or
navigated” the vessel); In re American Milling Co., 409 F.3d
1005, 1007, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a contractor
was not a statutory charterer when it “did not provide ship-
related supplies, parts for repairs, or fuel”); cf. In re United
States, 259 F.2d 608, 609 (3d Cir. 1958) (holding that a
contractor was a statutory charterer when he agreed to
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 17

“equip, fuel, supply, maintain, man, victual and navigate the
tankers”).
Nor does the rental agreement present the “clear picture
of exclusive possession and management” characteristic of a
Limitation Act charterer. In re United States, 259 F.2d at
609; see also 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty &
Maritime Law § 11:3, at 10 (6th ed. 2018) (explaining that
an “essential characteristic” of a covered charter “is that the
entire command and possession of the vessel be turned over
to the charterer”); id. § 15:2, at 190–91. The agreement
bound Smith and Petrich to comply with “all of Williams
Sports Rentals, Inc. requirements, rules and instructions
governing the use of [the company’s] vessels.” According to
WSR, those requirements dictated who could ride the jet ski
and how and where they could do so. Essentially, Smith and
Petrich paid to participate in a tourist activity that WSR
designed. WSR did not surrender “complete control and
dominion” of the jet ski to the renters by empowering them
to decide where within a restricted area to ride. Admiral
Towing Co. v. Woolen, 290 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1961);
see also American Milling, 409 F.3d at 1014 (“[W]e should
not ascribe owner status to a party merely based on the fact
that it performed functions of master or crew.”).
WSR also argues that, even if the state-court litigants are
not owners, the district court may still enjoin proceedings
against them under our decision in Paradise Holdings. In
that case, we affirmed the grant of an injunction that stayed
state-court proceedings against both the owner of a vessel
and its captain, who had a common insurance policy. 795
F.2d at 762–63. We acknowledged that the text of the
Limitation Act did not clearly support that result. Id. at 761–
62. But we explained that a “major purpose” of the statute
“is to permit the shipowner to retain the benefit of his
18 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS

insurance.” Id. at 762; see also Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1954) (plurality opinion)
(enjoining a separate lawsuit by claimants against the insurer
of a vessel owner to preserve the owner’s “right to
indemnification” in the limitation proceeding). We therefore
upheld the injunction to prevent a state-court judgment
against the captain from depleting the coverage available to
the owner in the limitation proceeding. 795 F.2d at 762–63.
Paradise Holdings has no application here. WSR does
not claim to have an insurance policy with Smith, Petrich,
Zip, or any other party to the state-court action. A judgment
against those parties would not deplete WSR’s insurance or
impair WSR’s right to limit its liability. The only way that
the state-court parties could deplete any of the funds
available to WSR is through their claims against WSR. An
injunction that prohibits the adjudication of those claims
outside the limitation action gives WSR all the protection
that the statute provides.
The broader injunction that the district court imposed
prevents Willis from pursuing her claims against parties that
have not established or even attempted to assert any right to
limitation in federal court. That restriction would “transform
the Act from a protective instrument to an offensive weapon
by which the shipowner could deprive suitors of their
common-law rights.” Lake Tankers Corp., 354 U.S. at 152.
It would also contravene the traditional limits on the
remedial authority of federal courts. We have long
understood that our role is to “render a judgment or decree
upon the rights of the litigant[s].” Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838). We “may
not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the
court,” nor may we redress their potential injuries. Zepeda v.
INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Lewis v.
 WILLIAMS SPORTS RENTALS INC. V. WILLIS 19

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“The remedy must of
course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury
in fact that the plaintiff has established.”); DHS v. New York,
140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in the grant of stay) (“Equitable remedies, like remedies in
general, are meant to redress the injuries sustained by a
particular plaintiff in a particular lawsuit.”). The only
plaintiff in the federal lawsuit is WSR, so the district court
could redress the injury only to WSR’s limitation right, not
the limitation rights that WSR professes others to have. WSR
could not “rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests
of third parties.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991).
Nor could the district order relief on behalf of parties who
never asked for it.
The non-party-specific injunction that the district court
awarded exceeds its authority, so we vacate and remand with
instructions to narrow the injunction to proceedings against
WSR, the only plaintiff in the limitation action. Willis is
allowed to “pursue [her] common law remedy, hampered to
the extent only of the limitation on the liability of the
opposing party.” The Helen L., 109 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir.
1940).
VACATED and REMANDED.