Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA

JORGE LUIS ESTRADA et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

S274340

Fourth Appellate District, Division Three
G058397, G058969

Orange County Superior Court
30-2013-00692890

January 18, 2024

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and
Evans concurred.
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
S274340

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The Courts of Appeal have reached contrary conclusions
as to whether trial courts have the inherent authority to strike1
a Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA;
Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)2 claim on manageability grounds.
(Compare Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 685, 697 (Estrada) [concluding that trial courts
lack such inherent authority] with Wesson v. Staples the Office
Superstore, LLC (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 746, 766–767 (Wesson)
[concluding that trial courts possess such inherent authority];
see also Woodworth v. Loma Linda University Medical Center
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1047, review granted Nov. 1, 2023,
S281717 (Woodworth) [agreeing with Estrada that “trial courts
may not strike or dismiss a PAGA claim for lack of
manageability”].) We granted review to consider the issue.3

1
By “strike,” we mean to dismiss with prejudice.
2
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory
references are to the Labor Code.
3
After we granted review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit resolved a similar split among
federal district courts applying California law and held, “In light
of the structure and purpose of PAGA, we conclude that
imposing a manageability requirement in PAGA
cases . . . would not constitute a reasonable response to a
specific problem and would contradict California law by running

1
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We now conclude that trial courts lack inherent authority
to strike PAGA claims on manageability grounds. In reaching
this conclusion, we emphasize that trial courts do not generally
possess a broad inherent authority to dismiss claims. Nor is it
appropriate for trial courts to strike PAGA claims by employing
class action manageability requirements. And, while trial
courts may use a vast variety of tools to efficiently manage
PAGA claims, given the structure and purpose of PAGA,
striking such claims due to manageability concerns — even if
those claims are complex or time-intensive — is not among the
tools trial courts possess.4
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment as
that court reached the same conclusion we reach here. (See
Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 697.)5

afoul of the key features of PAGA actions.” (Hamilton v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 39 F.4th 575, 587 (Hamilton);
id. at p. 590 [“The [manageability] requirement cannot be
imposed in PAGA actions under the guise of a court’s inherent
powers”].)
4
We disapprove the Wesson court’s conclusion that “trial
courts . . . if necessary, may preclude the use of this procedural
device [i.e., a PAGA claim].” (Wesson v. Staples the Office
Superstore, LLC, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 767.)
5
As we explain in part II.E., post, we also conclude that
defendant Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (Royalty) has not
demonstrated any potential violation of its right to due process
occasioned by the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the trial court’s
striking of plaintiffs’ representative PAGA claim. However, we
do not decide the hypothetical questions of whether a
defendant’s right to due process can ever support striking a
PAGA claim, and if so, the circumstances under which such
striking would be appropriate.

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND6
Royalty operated two facilities relevant here: one located
on Derian Avenue (Derian) and the other on Dyer Road (Dyer)
in Orange County. (Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.)
Plaintiff Jorge Luis Estrada worked at Derian. (Estrada,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.) Estrada filed a complaint
against Royalty alleging various claims, including one asserting
that Royalty violated Labor Code provisions requiring that it
provide first and second meal periods,7 and one seeking PAGA
penalties for various alleged Labor Code violations. (Estrada,
at p. 698.)
Estrada and plaintiff Paulina Medina, a former Royalty
employee who worked at Dyer, filed a second amended
complaint that realleged Estrada’s individual claims as class
claims and retained the PAGA claim from the original
complaint. (Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.)
Thereafter, Estrada, Medina, and 11 other plaintiffs filed the
operative third amended complaint. (Id. at p. 699.) The third
amended complaint alleged a total of seven class claims, one

6
Our factual and procedural background is drawn
primarily from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. (See Estrada,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 698–703.)
7
A California employer must generally provide “a first meal
period no later than the end of an employee’s fifth hour of work,
and a second meal period no later than the end of an employee’s
10th hour of work.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1041 (Brinker).) In Brinker, we clarified
that an “employer satisfies this obligation if it relieves its
employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities
and permits them a reasonable opportunity to take an
uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does not impede or
discourage them from doing so.” (Id. at p. 1040.)

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

which was based on the failure to provide first and second meal
periods, and one which sought PAGA penalties for various Labor
Code violations, including those related to meal periods. (Ibid.)
Several named plaintiffs moved for class certification in
June 2017. (Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 700.) As
relevant here, the trial court certified a Dyer/Derian class
composed of former nonexempt hourly workers who worked at
the two facilities between December 13, 2009, and June 14,
2017. (Ibid.) The court also certified three Dyer/Derian
subclasses, including a meal period subclass to determine
whether “class members were provided timely first meal periods
and/or deprived of second meal periods.” (Ibid.)
The trial court held a bench trial on plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs presented “live testimony from 12 of the 13 named
plaintiffs, deposition testimony from four different managers
and officers of Royalty, live testimony from two of Royalty’s
human resources employees, and live testimony from an expert
witness.” (Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 701.) In
defense, Royalty presented testimony from two former
employees and an expert witness. (Ibid.)
Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court
entered an order decertifying the two Dyer/Derian meal period
subclasses alleging the first and second meal period violations,8
on the ground that there were too many individualized issues to

8
The Court of Appeal noted, “Though the court’s initial
certification order created a single meal period subclass, the
court’s decertification order appears to treat the first and second
meal period issues as two separate subclasses.” (Estrada, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 719, fn. 10.) Thus, we refer to these “as
separate subclasses.” (Ibid.)

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

support class treatment. (Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 702.)9 In the same order, the trial court dismissed the PAGA
claim seeking penalties for the alleged Dyer/Derian meal break-
related violations with respect to persons other than the named
plaintiffs as being unmanageable. (Estrada, at p. 702.)10 The
trial court subsequently entered judgment. (Estrada, at p. 703.)
Plaintiffs appealed from the decertification order and the
judgment. (Ibid.)
In the Court of Appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the trial
court abused its discretion by decertifying the Dyer/Derian meal
period subclasses and erred in dismissing the subclasses’ PAGA
meal period claims on manageability grounds. (Estrada, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 709–714, 719–727.) The Court of Appeal
agreed with plaintiffs on both issues. (Id. at pp. 714, 726.) The
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order that had
decertified the Dyer/Derian meal period subclasses and
dismissed that portion of the Dyer/Derian PAGA claim based on
meal period violations. (Id. at p. 731.) The Court of Appeal
directed the trial court to hold a new trial on both claims on
remand, and added, “[a]s to both, we leave it in the court’s
discretion to determine whether additional witnesses or other
evidence will be allowed in light of the principles set forth in this
opinion.” (Ibid.)

9
In explaining the nature of these individualized issues, the
trial court’s decertification order noted that “employee choice
was a significant factor with respect to taking meal breaks.”
10
However, with one exception, the trial court “found the
named Dyer/Derian plaintiffs had established individual PAGA
violations” and therefore awarded them penalties. (Estrada,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We granted Royalty’s petition for review to resolve the
issue dividing the appellate courts: whether trial courts have
inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim on manageability
grounds.
II. DISCUSSION
Royalty and amici curiae11 claim that California trial
courts have inherent authority to strike PAGA claims on
manageability grounds. In support of this assertion, Royalty
and amici curiae raise two primary arguments that differ in
their conception of the scope of a trial court’s inherent authority.
Specifically, Royalty and amici curiae argue that a trial court
may strike: (1) any claim that is unmanageable for reasons of
judicial economy; or, at a minimum, (2) any representative claim
that is unmanageable, as with class claims and representative
claims brought under a former version of the unfair competition
law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 17200 et seq.). Royalty
also suggests that retrial of the plaintiffs’ representative PAGA
claim would violate Royalty’s right to due process and that trial
courts must have discretion to strike PAGA claims in order to
preserve the due process rights of defendants generally. After
providing an overview of the relevant law, we consider each
argument in turn.

11
We have received amicus curiae briefs supporting Royalty
from: (1) the Board of Trustees of the California State
University; (2) the Employers Group and California
Employment Law Counsel; and (3) the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America, California Chamber of Commerce,
National Retail Federation, and Retail Litigation Center, Inc.
(Chamber of Commerce).

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

A. Governing Law
We begin with an overview of the three areas of law upon
which Royalty’s and amici curiae’s arguments are primarily
based: California courts’ inherent authority, the PAGA statute,
and the concept of manageability.
1. Courts’ Inherent Authority
This court has identified two primary sources of California
courts’ inherent authority: “equitable power derived from the
historic power of equity courts [citation], and supervisory or
administrative powers which all courts possess to enable them
to carry out their duties.” (Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d
626, 635 (Bauguess).)
These two sources of power have translated into two
principal ways in which California courts have exercised their
inherent authority, namely: (1) to address gaps in the law by
applying procedures contained in related statutory provisions
(see, e.g., People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 707 [courts
may “ ‘ “create new forms of procedures” in the gaps left
unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court’ ”]; In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446–447 [courts have inherent authority
to apply Pen. Code, § 1203.01 to preserve evidence of youth-
related factors for a hearing to be held pursuant to People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261]); and (2) to adopt procedures
necessary to perform essential judicial functions (see, e.g.,
Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 813
(Citizens Utilities) [courts have inherent power to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation for inverse
condemnation]; James H. v. Superior Court (1978)
77 Cal.App.3d 169, 175 (James H.) [courts have the inherent
power to determine a minor’s mental competence]).

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

On the other hand, “Courts . . . do not have the authority
to adopt procedures or policies that conflict with statutory
law . . . .” (Weiss v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2020)
9 Cal.5th 840, 857 (Weiss).) “ ‘[I]nherent powers should never
be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation
or frustrate legitimate legislative policy.’ ” (People v. Municipal
Court (Runyan) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 523, 528 (Runyan), italics
omitted.)
More specifically, where the Legislature has provided for
certain procedures in one context, courts generally lack inherent
authority to apply the procedure in an inapposite context. (See
Weiss, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 865 [courts lack inherent authority
to import certain eminent domain procedures into inverse
condemnation actions]; Kraus v. Trinity Management Services,
Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 137 (Kraus) [courts lack inherent
authority to “fashion a fluid recovery remedy [in a
representative UCL action] when the action has not been
certified as a class action” in part because “the Legislature has
not expressly authorized monetary relief other than restitution
in UCL actions, but has authorized disgorgement into a fluid
recovery fund in class actions”]; Bauguess, supra, 22 Cal.3d at
p. 637 [“It would be both unnecessary and unwise to permit trial
courts to use fee awards as sanctions apart from those situations
authorized by statute”].)
And, with respect to the form of authority at issue here,
the power to strike a claim, while “[t]here may be cases in which
the use of a nonstatutory motion procedure to dismiss a cause of
action before trial is called for, . . . courts should be wary of such
requests.” (Weiss, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 865.)

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

2. PAGA
In 2003, the Legislature enacted PAGA to remedy
“systemic underenforcement” of the Labor Code. (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 (Williams).) PAGA
provides for civil penalties for various Labor Code violations and
authorizes “aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys
general, to recover [those] penalties.” (Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 379
(Iskanian) abrogated in part on other grounds in Viking River
Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1906, 213
L.Ed.2d 179] (Viking River).) Under the statute, an “ ‘aggrieved
employee’ ” is “any person who was employed by the alleged
violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations
was committed.” (§ 2699, subd. (c).)
The term “ ‘[a]ggrieved employee’ . . . . governs not just
who has standing to bring a PAGA claim, but also who may
recover a share of penalties.” (Kim v. Reins International
California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87 (Kim).) And a PAGA
plaintiff may seek penalties for violations involving aggrieved
employees other than the PAGA plaintiff. (ZB, N.A. v. Superior
Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185 (ZB).) We have sometimes
referred to this as a “ ‘representative’ ” (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1118, italics omitted,
quoting Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 384) or “non-
individual” PAGA claim (Adolph, at p. 1114).
Civil penalties recovered on a PAGA claim are split
between the state and aggrieved employees. (Iskanian, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 382; see § 2699, subd. (i) [75 percent of civil
penalties go to state labor law enforcement agency, 25 percent
go to aggrieved employees].) “[C]ivil penalties recovered on the

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

state’s behalf are intended to ‘remediate present violations and
deter future ones,’ not to redress employees’ injuries.” (Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 86.)
“PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the procedural
characteristics of class actions.” (Viking River, supra, ___ U.S.
___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1920]; see also Hamilton, supra, 39 F.4th at
pp. 583, 588 [summarizing distinctions].) “A class-action
plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she
represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff,
by contrast, represents a single principal, the [Labor and
Workforce Development Agency] LWDA, that has a multitude of
claims.” (Viking River, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1920.) Thus, because
PAGA actions do not adjudicate individually held claims, the
due process rights of third parties are not paramount. (Viking
River, at p. 1921.) While “nonparty employees as well as the
government are bound by the judgment” in a PAGA action as to
a claim for civil penalties, nonparty employees are not bound
with respect to “remedies other than civil penalties.” (Arias v.
Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986–987 (Arias).)
Moreover, “PAGA does not make other potentially aggrieved
employees parties or clients of plaintiff’s counsel, does not
impose on a plaintiff or counsel any express fiduciary
obligations, and does not subject a plaintiff or counsel to
scrutiny with respect to the ability to represent a large class.”
(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 546–547.)
3. Manageability
The term “manageability” and variants thereof encompass
two related but distinct concepts. First, the term refers
generally to the degree to which techniques may be used (both
before and during trial) to fairly and efficiently adjudicate an

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

action. (See, e.g., Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1132, 1154 [“defendants raise legitimate concerns regarding the
unmanageability of claims”], italics added; Platypus Wear, Inc.
v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 778 [stating that an
anti-SLAPP motion might provide a way of making the case
more “ ‘manageable’ ”], italics added; City of King City v.
Community Bank of Central California (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
913, 938 [stating that discovery renders “more
manageable . . . the points of legal controversy” in an action],
italics omitted and added.)
Second, the term “manageability” and its variants may be
used more specifically to refer to a factor utilized in determining
whether a class may be certified. This factor looks to whether
issues pertaining to individual putative class members may be
fairly and efficiently adjudicated. Under federal law,
manageability refers to the rule that a court consider “the likely
difficulties in managing a class action” in determining whether
the class action certification requirements of predominance and
superiority are met. (Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 23(b)(3)(D),
28 U.S.C.; see Hamilton, supra, 39 F.4th at p. 586.)12
Similarly, in discussing California law, we have instructed
courts to consider the manageability of a class action in
determining certification. For example, in Duran v. U.S. Bank
National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 (Duran), we stated: “In
certifying a class action, the court must also conclude that
litigation of individual issues, including those arising from
affirmative defenses, can be managed fairly and efficiently.
[Citation.] ‘[W]hether in a given case affirmative defenses

12
All subsequent references to “Rule 23” and its subparts are
to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.).

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

should lead a court to approve or reject certification will hinge
on the manageability of any individual issues. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] In wage and hour cases where a party seeks class
certification based on allegations that the employer consistently
imposed a uniform policy or de facto practice on class members,
the party must still demonstrate that the illegal effects of this
conduct can be proven efficiently and manageably within a class
setting.” (Id. at pp. 28–29.)
B. Trial Courts Lack Inherent Authority to Strike a
PAGA Claim on Manageability Grounds Based
on Judicial Economy
Royalty and some amici curiae claim that trial courts have
broad inherent authority to strike any type of claim, irrespective
of its nature, to foster judicial economy. Specifically, Royalty
broadly asserts, the power to strike a claim “is . . . an inherent
power of the court in every case.” (Italics added.) According to
Royalty, trial courts may exercise such power to strike claims to
“preserve judicial resources [and to] prevent trials from
becoming excessively complex and time-consuming.”
Contrary to Royalty’s contention that trial courts possess
a broad and general power to dismiss claims in the name of
judicial economy, our case law has recognized that the inherent
authority of trial courts to dismiss claims is limited and operates
in circumstances that are not present here. We explained the
limits of a court’s “inherent discretionary power to dismiss
claims with prejudice” in Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d
911, 915 (Lyons). There we explained that the inherent power
of a trial court to dismiss claims “has in the past been confined
to two types of situations: (1) the plaintiff has failed to prosecute
diligently [citation]; or (2) the complaint has been shown to be
‘fictitious or sham’ such that the plaintiff has no valid cause of

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

action.” (Ibid.) In concluding that a trial court lacked inherent
authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s action for failing to participate
in a judicial arbitration proceeding, we emphasized in Lyons
that “although the discretionary power to dismiss with prejudice
has been upheld in this state, its use has been tightly
circumscribed.” (Id. at p. 916, italics added; see also 6 Witkin,
Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2023) Proceedings Without Trial, § 329
[citing Lyons and stating “[t]he trial court’s inherent power to
dismiss is circumscribed”].)13
Our holding in Lyons that trial courts possess only a
“tightly circumscribed” inherent power to dismiss with prejudice
(Lyons, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 916) is consistent with this court’s
refusal to recognize even lesser forms of inherent power. For
example, in Bauguess, we concluded that trial courts lack
inherent authority to award attorney fees as a sanction for
misconduct, reasoning that it was “unnecessary and unwise to
permit trial courts to use fee awards as sanctions apart from
those situations authorized by statute.” (Bauguess, supra,
22 Cal.3d at p. 637.) We observed, “If this court were to hold
that trial courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions in

13
Royalty relies on Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney
Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, where the court held “that
when the plaintiff has engaged in misconduct during the course
of the litigation that is deliberate, that is egregious, and that
renders any remedy short of dismissal inadequate to preserve
the fairness of the trial, the trial court has the inherent power
to dismiss the action.” (Id. at p. 764.) But nothing in Stephen
Slesinger supports a broad inherent judicial power to dismiss a
claim to “preserve judicial resources [and to] prevent trials from
becoming excessively complex and time-consuming,” as Royalty
contends. On the contrary, the Stephen Slesinger court
“emphasize[d] that dismissal is always a drastic remedy to be
employed only in the rarest of circumstances.” (Id. at p. 764.)

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

the form of attorney’s fees for alleged misconduct, trial courts
would be given a power without procedural limits and
potentially subject to abuse.” (Id. at p. 638.)
In sum, there is no inherent authority that sweeps as
broadly as Royalty would have us hold. Contrary to Royalty’s
claim that all courts have broad inherent powers to dismiss
claims on judicial economy grounds, we held in Lyons that trial
courts possess only a narrow inherent authority to dismiss
claims based on limited circumstances undisputedly not present
in this case (e.g., cases involving a failure to prosecute, frivolous
claims, or egregious misconduct).
None of the cases cited by Royalty or by amici curiae
supports the contention that courts have broad inherent
authority to strike claims to serve judicial economy. Notably,
aside from Stephen Slesinger, discussed in footnote 13 ante,
none of these cases addressed whether a court had the inherent
power to strike a claim. (See, e.g., Cohn v. Corinthian Colleges,
Inc. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 523, 531 [considering a court’s
inherent authority to accept an oral application to expedite
discovery prior to a motion for summary judgment]; Asbestos
Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 23
[considering a court’s inherent power to appoint defense
counsel]; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988)
200 Cal.App.3d 272, 289 [discussing a court’s inherent power to
preclude the presentation of evidence as a sanction for litigation
abuse]; Adamson v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 505,
509 [considering a court’s inherent power to grant rehearing];
James H., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 172 [considering a court’s
inherent power to order a competency hearing for a juvenile];
Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Assn. v. Superior Court
(1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, 680 [discussing a court’s inherent

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

power to require the posting of a bond].) And, in some of the
cited cases, this court declined to conclude that the trial court
possessed the inherent authority to take the action at issue in
the case. (Bauguess, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 638; Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [stating “ ‘trial
judges have no authority to issue courtroom local rules which
conflict with any statute’ or are ‘inconsistent with law’ ”].)
Our cases holding that courts possess some limited
amount of inherent authority in other respects do not support
Royalty’s contention that trial courts possess broad inherent
authority to strike a claim for judicial economy reasons. In
Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, we
“appl[ied] the well established doctrine of ‘equitable tolling’ ” (id.
at p. 316), which we explained had grown from our power to
“formulate rules of procedure where justice demands it,” to
ensure that “technical forfeitures . . . [do not] unjustifiably
prevent a trial on the merits” (id. at p. 319). And, in Citizens
Utilities, we upheld a limited inherent power of courts to devise
a procedure to assess the value of condemned property as of the
date of trial and not merely as of the date of the summons (as
provided by statute) after noting that constitutional provisions
for the payment of the taking of public property were “self-
executing,” and that it had “been held, in inverse condemnation
cases, that inherent power is reposed in the trial court to provide
for the assessment of just compensation in situations not within
the purview of existing statutory provisions.” (Citizens Utilities,
supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 812.) This court’s formulation of rules of
procedure to facilitate the trial of causes on the merits
(Addison), and to devise a procedure to adjudicate certain claims
(Citizens Utilities) bear no resemblance to the broad power to

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 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

strike a claim for judicial convenience that Royalty and amici
curiae argue for here.
Similarly, none of the statutes cited by Royalty and amici
curiae reveals the broad inherent authority that Royalty and
amici curiae claim trial courts possess. For example, while
Royalty cites Code of Civil Procedure sections 128 and 187, 14
neither statute refers to a court’s inherent power to strike a
claim due to manageability concerns, and Royalty does not offer
any argument demonstrating that this sort of power is implied
by such statutes.15

14
Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)
specifies a series of powers that every court possesses, including
“[t]o preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence,” “[t]o
enforce order in the proceedings before it,” “[t]o provide for the
orderly conduct of proceedings before it,” “[t]o compel obedience
to its judgments,” “[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial officers,” “[t]o compel the attendance
of persons to testify,” “[t]o administer oaths,” and “[t]o amend
and control its process and orders so as to make them conform
to law and justice.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides, “When
jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other
statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise
of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically
pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this Code.”
15
Royalty also cites California Standards of Judicial
Administration, standard 3.10(a), which provides, “In complex
litigation, judicial management should begin early and be
applied continuously and actively, based on knowledge of the
circumstances of each case.” However, this standard neither
identifies any inherent authority nor establishes that courts
have the power to strike claims to foster judicial management.

16
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The statutes cited by amici curiae are also inapposite.
(See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 583.150, 581, subd. (m).) While Code of
Civil Procedure section 583.150 states that it “does not limit or
affect the authority of a court to dismiss an action or impose
other sanctions . . . under inherent authority of the court,” that
provision does not purport to describe the extent of such
inherent authority in any manner. Code of Civil Procedure
section 583.150 also pertains to the dismissal of a case for delay
in prosecution, which, as discussed ante, is one of the narrow
grounds upon which courts do have inherent dismissal
authority.
The other statute cited by amici curiae, Code of Civil
Procedure section 581, enumerates specific bases for which a
trial court may dismiss an action, complaint, or cause of action.
(See, e.g., id., subd. (b)(3) [specifying that action may be
dismissed “[b]y the court, without prejudice, when no party
appears for trial following 30 days’ notice of time and place of
trial”].) Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (m),
which amici curiae specifically reference, includes a caveat
providing that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section
581 are not the exclusive grounds for dismissal.16 However,
neither the statute generally, nor subdivision (m) in particular,
confers a broad discretionary power to dismiss upon trial courts.
Thus, we are not persuaded that Code of Civil Procedure
section 581, subdivision (m) demonstrates that courts possess
the inherent authority to strike claims advanced here.

16
Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (m)
provides, “The provisions of this section shall not be deemed to
be an exclusive enumeration of the court’s power to dismiss an
action or dismiss a complaint as to a defendant.”

17
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Royalty also offers two hypothetical actions to support its
claim that trial courts have inherent authority to strike claims
on manageability grounds. Neither hypothetical advances
Royalty’s argument.
First, Royalty posits a hypothetical case involving a
plaintiff who, in a single action, seeks to join multiple claims
arising out of different facts, premised on different legal
theories, against several different defendants. Royalty asserts
that while “[f]acially, there is no bar” against joining such claims
in an action, a “court would likely, sua sponte, dismiss certain
claims and defendants without prejudice” pursuant to its
inherent power to manage the action. Contrary to Royalty’s
assertion, there is a bar against the joinder proposed in its
hypothetical. Code of Civil Procedure section 379 requires that
“at least one of the causes of action joined must affect all of the
defendants.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 6:269 (Civil
Procedure Before Trial).)17 Thus, a trial court would be
authorized to dismiss such unrelated claims against different
defendants pursuant to a statute, rather than pursuant to an
inherent authority to manage the action.

17
Code of Civil Procedure section 379 provides in relevant
part: “(a) All persons may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them: [¶] (1) Any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
these persons will arise in the action; or [¶] (2) A claim, right,
or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy which
is the subject of the action.” (Italics added.)

18
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Royalty offers a second hypothetical of a plaintiff bringing
unrelated claims against the same defendant. Again, Royalty
contends that a court could exercise its inherent authority to
require that such claims be brought as “separate actions” and
that a court could dismiss such claims without prejudice if the
plaintiff refused to do so. However, a statute would govern a
trial court’s joinder determination in this instance as well. Code
of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) specifically
authorizes a trial court to order “a separate trial of any cause of
action . . . or of any number of causes of action” in the
“furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.” 18
Royalty contends that its hypotheticals “demolish[] the
idea” that courts lack a broad inherent power to dismiss any
claim on manageability grounds. However, rather than
demonstrating that trial courts possess a freewheeling inherent
authority to develop joinder rules for each action they face,
Royalty’s hypotheticals reveal only that California statutory law
provides the applicable procedural rules governing the joinder
issues that Royalty presents.
Finally, at oral argument, while Royalty’s counsel argued
that PAGA cases should “not be treated differently,” and that

18
Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b)
provides, “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause
of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-
complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes
of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required
by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United
States.”

19
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

this court should “leave trial courts . . . with their full toolbox,”
counsel did not refer to any cases in which courts have
recognized a broad inherent power to strike a claim to foster
judicial economy. And, as noted ante, neither Royalty nor
supporting amici curiae have cited in their briefs, nor has our
research uncovered, any other circumstance in which we have
concluded that trial courts possess such an inherent power to
strike a claim. Thus, contrary to Royalty’s contention that this
case is about “tak[ing] away” a power that trial courts generally
possess, Royalty would have this court sanction a broad new
power that we have never before recognized. For the reasons
discussed above, we decline to do so.
C. Class Action Manageability Requirements
Cannot Be Grafted onto PAGA Claims
We also reject Royalty’s narrower argument that trial
courts possess the power to dismiss PAGA claims, in particular,
on manageability grounds — just as they do with class claims.19
1. Structural Differences
We conclude that class claims differ significantly from
PAGA claims in ways that make it inappropriate to impose a
class action-based manageability requirement on PAGA actions.
First, manageability bears upon questions of superiority
and the predominance of common issues, requirements unique

19
As Royalty puts it, “Just because PAGA suits ‘are not class
actions’ [(Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 697)] — a
statement with which no-one can disagree — does not mean that
they are exempt from all requirements that class actions are
subject to . . . . There are good reasons why both class actions
and PAGA suits can and should be subject to overlapping
requirements — such as . . . manageability.”

20
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to the class action context. Under federal law, manageability
had its primary origin as a factor in determining whether the
Rule 23(b)(3) class action requirements of predominance and
superiority have been met.20 (See Hamilton, supra, 39 F.4th at
p. 588 [“The manageability requirement, a subsidiary
component of the predominance and superiority inquiries, was
thus specifically devised to address concerns arising from the
aggregation of individual claims for money damages”]; accord,
7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2023)
Civil, § 1780 [discussing the manageability criterion and its
ability to help the court “in determining whether questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate”];
2 Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions (6th
ed. 2022) § 4:72 [“The manageability factor ‘encompasses the
whole range of practical problems that may render the class
action format inappropriate for a particular suit,’ ” and is “by the
far, the most critical concern in determining whether a class
action is a superior means of adjudication”].)21

20
Rule 23(b) provides in relevant part: “A class action may
be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
[¶] . . . [¶] (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”
(Italics added.)
21
Class actions may be brought for purposes other than
those enumerated in Rule 23(b)(3), including where prosecuting
separate actions would either risk inconsistent adjudications
among class members or would substantially impede individual
class members’ ability to protect their interests (Rule 23(b)(1))

21
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Similarly, under California law, in determining whether a
class action may be maintained, courts consider whether
common issues predominate and whether a class action is a
superior method of adjudication. (See Washington Mutual Bank
v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913–914 (Washington
Mutual).) Manageability is considered in connection with such
inquiries. (See Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 29 [“In
considering whether a class action is a superior device for
resolving a controversy, the manageability of individual issues
is just as important as the existence of common questions
uniting the proposed class”]; Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra,
¶ 14:11.10 [“The proponent of class certification must
demonstrate that the proposed class action is manageable,”
which “requires the trial court ‘to carefully weigh the respective
benefits and burdens of a class action, and to permit its
maintenance only where substantial benefits will be accrued by
both litigants and the courts alike’ ”].)
In contrast, “an employee’s representative action against
an employer . . . seeking civil penalties under [PAGA]” need not
“satisfy class action requirements.” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 975.) Specifically, there is no requirement that a plaintiff
establish predominance of common issues to state a PAGA
claim. (See Wesson, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 766.) Likewise,
there is no authority suggesting that superiority is a
requirement for a representative PAGA action. On the contrary,
PAGA is based on the Legislature’s intent to maximize the

and where a party is requesting indivisible injunctive or
declaratory relief (Rule 23(b)(2)). In the Ninth Circuit, class
actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are not subject to a
manageability requirement. (Hamilton, supra, 39 F.4th at
p. 588.)

22
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

enforcement of labor laws. (ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 184.)
PAGA’s legislative history also reveals that the Legislature
wanted to seek to “achieve maximum compliance with state
labor laws.” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 980; see Wood v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 742, 758
(Wood) [explaining that the Legislature was concerned with
massive underenforcement of labor laws causing state revenue
losses].) A legislative intent to maximize the enforcement of
labor laws is in tension with the class action superiority
requirement, which requires a court to “ ‘ “carefully weigh
respective benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the
class action only where substantial benefits accrue both to
litigants and the courts.” ’ ” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000)
23 Cal.4th 429, 435 (Linder).)
Thus, we are not persuaded by amici curiae’s argument
that “if class action plaintiffs cannot manageably prove their
claims on a classwide basis, there is no rational basis for
allowing PAGA plaintiffs to demand that trial courts try
unmanageable PAGA claims.” As outlined above,
manageability in the class action context is a factor in
demonstrating that class-wide issues predominate and that a
class action is superior to individual actions. Given that a PAGA
plaintiff need not demonstrate that common issues predominate
or that a representative or non-individual PAGA claim is
superior to other forms of adjudication, the requirement that a
plaintiff demonstrate the manageability of a class claim does not
establish a similar manageability requirement for any related
PAGA claim.
Further, manageability, when considered as a factor in
determining the propriety of class certification, is considered in
connection with other factors. (See 2 Rubenstein, Newberg and

23
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Rubenstein on Class Actions, supra, at § 4:72 [“the question that
courts consider when they analyze manageability is not whether
a class action is manageable in the abstract but how the
problems that might occur in managing a class suit compare to
the problems that would occur in managing litigation without a
class suit”].) However, while a trial court may deny certification
or decertify a class if it would not be feasible to manage the
individual issues in a class action trial, denial of certification or
decertification is not an option for a trial court when
adjudicating a PAGA claim. Further, imposing “a freestanding
manageability requirement” as to PAGA claims “ ‘would invite
courts to consider the administrative burdens’ of the action ‘in a
vacuum.’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 39 F.4th at p. 589.) In other
words, while a manageability determination in the class action
context is part of the consideration of the costs and benefits of
class adjudication as opposed to other methods for resolving the
controversy (Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017)
844 F.3d 1121, 1128), to apply a separate manageability
requirement in the PAGA context apart from a consideration of
any other factors that might favor representative litigation
would be to apply the manageability criterion in a way it does
not apply in the class action context. And, applying a
manageability requirement in such a unidirectional fashion in
the PAGA context could predictably lead to “the dismissal of
many PAGA cases” (Hamilton, at p. 589) in contravention of the
Legislature’s intent to have the statute maximize the
enforcement of labor laws (see ZB, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 184).
In this case, the trial court ruled that the Dyer and Derian
meal break subclasses had to be decertified because “Plaintiffs
fail to satisfy their burden to establish commonality or
predominance.” Then, notwithstanding that commonality and

24
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

predominance are not PAGA requirements, the trial court
summarily concluded, “The meal break-related claims that
Plaintiffs bring for the Dyer and Derian locations under [PAGA],
are also dismissed because, for the various reasons noted above,
there are numerous individualized issues that render Plaintiffs’
PAGA meal break claims unmanageable.” We reject a rule that
would likely result in courts relying on class action
manageability determinations in striking PAGA claims, even
where the primary factors driving the class manageability
determination (e.g., predominance and superiority) have no
applicability in the PAGA context.
Our decision in Williams did not impose a manageability
requirement on PAGA actions. While in Williams we stated that
a PAGA plaintiff’s ability to offer evidence of uniform policies “is
one way a plaintiff might seek to render trial of the action
manageable” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 559, italics
added), we did not hold that a court could strike a PAGA claim
for manageability reasons. Rather, Williams stands for the
unremarkable proposition that trial participants should
endeavor in all cases (including PAGA cases) to ensure that a
case is efficiently adjudicated. We unequivocally endorse that
proposition. However, stating that all trial participants must
endeavor to fairly and efficiently adjudicate an action is distinct
from concluding that trial courts may strike a PAGA claim for
manageability reasons. (See ante, at p. 10 [noting that the “term
‘manageability’ and variants thereof encompass two related but
distinct concepts”].) While trial courts shall endeavor to
efficiently manage PAGA cases, just as they must manage any
complex case, it makes little sense to impose a class action
manageability requirement on PAGA claims when such a

25
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

requirement is relevant to the class certification procedure but
has no applicability to a PAGA claim.
Second, unlike class claims, PAGA claims are effectively
administrative enforcement actions, and imposing a
manageability requirement would impede the effectiveness of
such actions. “Hurdles that impede the effective prosecution of
representative PAGA actions undermine the Legislature’s
objectives.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 548; see also Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 89 [“the very reason the Legislature
enacted PAGA was to enhance enforcement of provisions
punishable only through government-initiated proceedings”].)
Royalty contends that such reasoning “overlooks the very
different incentives that exist in privately-brought PAGA
actions as compared to LWDA enforcement actions.”
Specifically, Royalty maintains that PAGA’s one-way attorney
fees provision incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring PAGA
claims in ways that differ from “a state agency with ‘scarce
resources [for] an investigation.’ ” We are not persuaded by this
reasoning, which focuses on the wisdom of PAGA’s attorney fees
provision — a concern better addressed to the Legislature.22

22
Differences of opinion regarding PAGA’s attorney fees
provision are not new. (See Simmons et al., California Private
Attorneys General Act (PAGA) Litigation and Compliance
Manual (Cont.Ed.Bar. 3d ed. 2023) § 1.2 [discussing PAGA’s
attorney fees provision and stating, “The perception of PAGA
thus varies based on the prism through which it is examined”];
compare Deutsch et al., California’s Hero Labor Law: The
Private Attorneys General Act Fights Wage Theft and Recovers
Millions from Lawbreaking Corporations (Feb. 1, 2020) UCLA
Labor Center Rep., p. 7 [“PAGA expands enforcement capacity

26
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Third, unlike with class actions, a court’s authority to
provide relief under PAGA is subject to specific statutory
provisions that make it inappropriate to impose a manageability
requirement on PAGA claims.
Specifically, section 2699, subdivision (e)(1) links a court’s
authority to “assess a civil penalty” to the LWDA’s authority to
“assess a civil penalty” by specifying that a court’s authority is
“subject to the same limitations and conditions” as those placed
upon the LWDA. 23 We are aware of no authority that imposes
a manageability limitation on the LWDA’s authority to assess a
civil penalty. Thus, the text of section 2699, subdivision (e)(1)
further supports our conclusion that a PAGA plaintiff should not

by tapping the expertise of private attorneys and increasing
California Labor Code compliance”] [as of January 18, 2024] with
Simmons et al., California Private Attorneys General Act
(PAGA) Litigation and Compliance Manual, supra, Preface
[“plaintiffs are able to leverage PAGA’s one-way attorney’s fee
provision and penalty structure to their advantage because they
have no concern regarding an adverse fee award,” and “[a]s a
result, many employers encounter pressure to settle PAGA
cases, even when they believe they have done nothing wrong,
because they wish to avoid the substantial costs of defending
litigation that presents a risk of paying both sides’ attorney’s
fees”].) This internet citation is archived by year, docket
number, and case name at .
23
Section 2699, subdivision (e) provides in relevant part:
“(1) For purposes of this part, whenever the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency, or any of its departments,
divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, has
discretion to assess a civil penalty, a court is authorized to
exercise the same discretion, subject to the same limitations and
conditions, to assess a civil penalty.”

27
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

be subject to such a requirement when it seeks a penalty on the
LWDA’s behalf.
We are not persuaded by amici curiae’s argument that
section 2699, subdivision (e)(1) should be interpreted to “mean
that if the LWDA has discretion to not take enforcement action
after investigation, then trial courts have discretion to do so as
well.” (Citing Painting & Drywall Work Preservation Fund, Inc.
v. Aubry (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 682, 687 [“the Labor
Commissioner has discretion to determine which investigations
to conduct”].) The judicial and administrative authority that is
linked in section 2699, subdivision (e)(1) is discretion in
“assess[ing] a civil penalty.” While courts and the LWDA share
discretion in assessing a civil penalty, amici curiae point to
nothing in PAGA’s text or legislative history suggesting courts
have the power to shape which cases can be investigated and
enforced. These types of enforcement decisions are matters
within the LWDA’s discretion, not that of the courts. The fact
that LWDA can exercise a form of prosecutorial discretion in
determining whether to take enforcement action does not mean
that courts can exercise judicial power to strike a PAGA claim
on manageability grounds. We decline to interpret section 2699,
subdivision (e)(1) in such a counterintuitive fashion.
In sum, these three structural differences between class
actions and PAGA claims support the conclusion that importing
the class action manageability requirement into the PAGA
context would be improper because it would “ ‘frustrate
legitimate legislative policy.’ ” (Runyan, supra, 20 Cal.3d at
p. 528, italics omitted.)

28
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

2. Differing Jurisprudential Histories
The differing jurisprudential histories of class actions and
PAGA claims also support application of a manageability
requirement as to the former but not the latter. (See Kraus,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 138 [recognizing that the jurisprudential
basis of an action is an important characteristic in determining
the scope of a court’s inherent powers in stating that “because a
UCL action is one in equity,” the court could “decline to
entertain the action as a representative suit”].)24
We have previously described Code of Civil Procedure
section 382 as “authorizing” class actions. (Arias, supra,
46 Cal.4th at p. 978.) However, the history of class actions in
California is considerably more complicated. Code of Civil
Procedure section 382 “is based upon the equitable doctrine of
virtual representation which ‘ “rests upon considerations of
necessity and paramount convenience, and was adopted to
prevent a failure of justice.” ’ ” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967)
67 Cal.2d 695, 703–704 (Daar); see Hernandez v. Restoration
Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 266 (Hernandez) [stating
that “[t]he class action is codified in [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 382,” and “is a product of the court’s equitable
jurisdiction that rests on considerations of necessity,
convenience, and the belief that in large cases, the class action
will prevent a failure of justice”].)

24
Thus, we are not persuaded by Wesson’s suggestion that
the adoption of a manageability requirement in the class action
context — notwithstanding the fact that “Code of Civil
Procedure section 382 . . . contains no such requirement” —
supports imposing a manageability requirement as to PAGA
claims. (Wesson, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 764.)

29
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

As the Court of Appeal in Farrar v. Franchise Tax Bd.
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 10 observed, “Its general but limited
codification in Code of Civil Procedure section 382
notwithstanding, the class action retains the essence of its
origins as an invention of equity. [Citations.] Our Supreme
Court has reinforced this heritage by urging trial courts to adopt
flexible and innovative procedures from common law sources
and analogous statutes.” (Id. at p. 17, fn. omitted; cf. Fireside
Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 (Fireside
Bank) [“As class actions are originally creatures of equity
[citation], so the rules for administering them must be
equitable”].)
The common law equitable basis of class actions in
California explains why this state’s class action jurisprudence
has not been limited by the literal terms of Code of Civil
Procedure section 382. As Justice Werdegar observed in her
concurrence in Arias, “[Code of Civil Procedure]
section 382 . . . says nothing about [several] important
requirements such as the existence of common questions of law,
the typicality of claims, the ability of the named plaintiff to
provide fair and adequate representation, the superiority of a
class action over other methods of adjudication, the likely
difficulties of managing a class action, and the requirement of
notice.”25 (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 989, fn. 3 (conc. opn. of
Werdegar, J.), italics added.)

25
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 provides in full, “If the
consent of any one who should have been joined as plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason
thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question is

30
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In addition, Code of Civil Procedure section 382 contains
but a single sentence that provides scant legislative guidance
regarding the multitude of procedural questions that arise in
such complex actions. 26 The statute’s brevity, when considered
in light of the inherent complexities of class suits, supports the
need for courts to exercise inherent authority in this context.
(See, e.g., Weiss, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 863 [stating that trial
courts’ inherent authority “ ‘ “arises from necessity where, in the
absence of any previously established procedural rule, rights
would be lost or the court would be unable to function” ’ ”].)
Unlike class actions, PAGA actions are not “originally
creatures of equity” (Fireside Bank, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 1084), and PAGA does not “codif[y]” a preexisting common
law equitable doctrine (Hernandez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 266;
cf. LaFace, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 400 [concluding that

one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all.”
Even when this single sentence does provide apparently
clear answers, we have concluded that such text does not
necessarily govern class action procedure. For example,
notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure section 382’s use of the
disjunctive term “or,” this court explained that “[a]lthough the
statute [Code of Civil Procedure section 382] appears to speak
in the alternative, it uniformly has been held that two
requirements must be met in order to sustain any class action:
(1) there must be an ascertainable class [citations]; and (2) there
must be a well defined community of interest in the questions of
law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.”
(Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 704, italics added.)
26
The Judicial Council has adopted rules governing some
aspects of class action procedure. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.760 et seq.)

31
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

PAGA is “unlike any pre-1850 common law action”]). The
statute and the rights it creates have been described as
unique.27 And, in contrast to the inexhaustive nature of Code of
Civil Procedure section 382, the Legislature provided
comparatively detailed statutory requirements for maintaining
a PAGA claim. (See Lab. Code, §§ 2699, 2699.3.)
Manageability, however, is not one of the requirements and we
see little reason to presume that the Legislature would intend
for courts to have broad extra-statutory inherent authority to
strike PAGA claims that the Legislature has itself authorized.
“[A]s a general practice, we leave to the Legislature the adoption
and amendment of statewide rules governing trial court
proceedings.” (Weiss, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 857.)
Further, under PAGA, “[e]mployees who were subjected to
at least one unlawful practice have standing to serve as PAGA
representatives even if they did not personally experience each
and every alleged violation” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 85) and
a PAGA plaintiff may seek to recover civil penalties from an
employer based on violations committed against the plaintiff
and other employees without demonstrating that the violations
stem from a uniform policy (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 559). Thus, our precedent makes clear that PAGA permits a
plaintiff to have representational standing to seek penalties on
behalf of individuals who have allegedly suffered violations that
vary widely in nature. To permit the striking of such claims
merely because they require individual determination would

27
For example, one Court of Appeal observed that there are
“some unique aspects to the PAGA agency relationship.” (Wood,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 753, fn. 8.) PAGA penalties have
also been described as “unique.” (Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc.
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 982, 991.)

32
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

deprive the State of the very remedy the Legislature has
authorized and would thereby defeat the purpose of the statute.
This too supports the conclusion that courts lack the inherent
power to strike PAGA claims on manageability grounds. (See
Weiss, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 857 [courts lack inherent authority
to act in ways that conflict with statutes].) In addition, the
Legislature’s choice to authorize civil penalties rather than
damages for a PAGA violation may help to lessen the
manageability concerns inherent with these actions. For
although some individualized assessment is required to
determine whether a violation occurred and the number of
aggrieved employees, a PAGA penalty is not keyed to the degree
or quality of an individual’s injury, as is often the case with a
damages remedy. (See § 2699, subd. (f).)
Class actions and PAGA actions also differ with respect to
the relevance of federal law. California class action
jurisprudence has long looked to federal law. (See, e.g., Brinker,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1021 [“Drawing on . . . federal precedent,
we have articulated clear requirements for the certification of a
class”]; In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 318 [“This
is demonstrated by federal law, to which we look when seeking
guidance on issues of class action procedure”]; Washington
Mutual, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 922 [“we may look to the
procedures governing federal class actions under [Rule 23] for
guidance”]; Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 821
[“In the event of a hiatus, [Rule 23] prescribes procedural
devices which a trial court may find useful”].) And federal class
action law contains an express manageability requirement for
Rule 23(b)(3) actions that instructs courts to consider “the likely
difficulties in managing a class action.” (Rule 23(b)(3)(d).)

33
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In contrast, there is no federal PAGA analogue. Rather,
PAGA case law is exclusively rooted in the application of our
Legislature’s enactment, which, as noted above, lacks a
manageability requirement.
In sum, class action requirements, including
manageability, developed in large measure from California
courts’ assertion of their inherent equitable powers as informed
by federal law. In contrast, a PAGA claim is a pure statutory
claim arising under California law. This differing doctrinal
basis for class and PAGA actions serves as an additional reason
to conclude that trial courts lack inherent authority to impose a
manageability requirement in PAGA actions.
For all these reasons, we conclude the Court of Appeal
properly determined that a trial court’s authority to limit class
claims on manageability grounds does not support the
conclusion that trial courts also possess inherent authority to
strike PAGA claims on manageability grounds.
D. Representative UCL Claims Are Inapposite
Royalty and amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce claim
that appellate courts have recognized that trial courts have the
broad inherent authority to strike pre-2004 UCL representative

34
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

claims,28 and that courts have similar inherent authority to
strike PAGA claims.29 We are not persuaded by this argument.
Like class actions, but unlike PAGA claims, the right to
bring a pre-2004 UCL representative claim arose out of courts’
exercise of their inherent equitable powers. Specifically, in
People v. Superior Court (Jayhill Corp.) (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, this
court concluded that courts had inherent equitable powers to
award restitution as ancillary relief in an action seeking an
injunction under the UCL as it then existed. (See Jayhill Corp.,
at p. 286 [“In particular, in an action by the Attorney General
under [Business and Professions Code] section 17535 a trial
court has the inherent power to order, as a form of ancillary
relief, that the defendants make or offer to make restitution to
the customers found to have been defrauded”].)
In Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank (1979)
23 Cal.3d 442, we recognized that a trial court also had the
concomitant power to decline to exercise such inherent powers
to permit a non-class representative UCL action and could

28
By “pre-2004 UCL representative claims,” we refer to
representative claims brought under a former version of the
UCL that were not class actions. In 2004, the voters enacted
Proposition 64 and amended the UCL to require that “private
plaintiffs bringing representative actions comply with class
actions procedures and requirements developed under Code of
Civil Procedure section 382.” (California Medical Assn. v. Aetna
Health of California Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1075, 1092, citing
Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 977–980.)
29
While Royalty alludes to this argument by citing one case
involving a pre-2004 UCL representative claim, South Bay
Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th
861 (South Bay), the Chamber of Commerce’s amicus curiae
brief fully develops the argument.

35
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

instead require the case to “proceed[] as a class action.”
(Fletcher, at p. 454.) We explained, “Before exercising its
discretion, the trial court must carefully weigh both the
advantages and disadvantages of an individual action against
the burdens and benefits of a class proceeding for the underlying
suit.”30 (Ibid.; see also Kraus, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 138 [“We
note, moreover, that, because a UCL action is one in equity, in
any case in which a defendant can demonstrate a potential for
harm or show that the action is not one brought by a competent
plaintiff for the benefit of injured parties, the court may decline
to entertain the action as a representative suit”].)
Thus, in considering whether to permit pre-2004 UCL
representative claims, courts were free to exercise their inherent
equitable powers without concern about unduly truncating
legislative power authorizing such claims. In contrast, as
already explained, the right to bring a statutory claim under
PAGA is not rooted in a court’s inherent equitable powers.31
Rather, the private right of action provided in PAGA was
specifically authorized by the Legislature to counter systematic
underenforcement of labor laws. Thus, the jurisprudential
history that serves as the basis for exercising judicial inherent

30
Such requirement closely parallels the superiority
requirement in our class action jurisprudence. (See Linder,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 435 [trial courts are required to
“ ‘ “carefully weigh respective benefits and burdens and to allow
maintenance of the class action only where substantial benefits
accrue both to litigants and the courts” ’ ”].)
31
In LaFace, the Court of Appeal concluded that there is no
right to a jury trial in a PAGA action, in part, because it is
equitable in nature. (LaFace, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
However, LaFace does not suggest that a PAGA action arose
from the courts’ exercise of their inherent equitable powers.

36
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

powers with respect to pre-2004 UCL representative claims is
lacking for PAGA claims.32
E. Royalty Has Not Demonstrated Any Potential
Violation of Its Right to Due Process, and We
Decline To Decide Any Hypothetical Due
Process Claims Not Presented in This Case
Royalty’s brief also could be read to raise the claim that
the retrial of the plaintiffs’ representative PAGA claim
mandated by the Court of Appeal will violate its right to due
process. We are unpersuaded.
Royalty argues that defendants, including employers in
class or representative actions, have a due process right to
present an affirmative defense. (Citing Duran, supra,
59 Cal.4th at p. 33.) We agree. In discussing class actions in
Duran, we said that “defendants must have an opportunity to
present proof of their affirmative defenses.” (Id. at p. 38.) There

32
At oral argument, counsel for amicus curiae Chamber of
Commerce noted that the Wesson court perceived South Bay,
supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 861, a decision involving a pre-2004 UCL
representative claim, as persuasive authority regarding the
PAGA issue before us. We conclude otherwise. In South Bay,
the Court of Appeal upheld a trial court’s exercise of its inherent
equitable powers in determining a plaintiff car dealership had
failed to show that the harm the defendant allegedly had caused
was “sufficiently uniform” to support adjudication in a
representative action under the UCL. (South Bay, at p. 897.)
However, since a “uniform policy . . . is not a condition” of a
statutory claim under PAGA (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 559, italics added), the significance that the South Bay court
accorded to the lack of a “sufficiently uniform” harm makes that
decision inapposite. (South Bay, at p. 897.) Accordingly, we
conclude that the Wesson court’s reliance on South Bay, echoed
by Royalty (see fn. 29, ante) and amicus curiae, is unpersuasive.

37
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

is no reason to think defendants have lesser due process rights
in defending against representative PAGA claims.
However, we reject Royalty’s and amici curiae’s suggestion
that a defendant’s right to present an affirmative defense as
recognized in Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at page 27, carries with
it a concomitant right to present the testimony of an unlimited
number of individual employees in support of such affirmative
defense. Indeed, in Duran, immediately after stating that
“defendants must have an opportunity to present proof of their
affirmative defenses,” we added that such adjudication is to
occur “within whatever method the court and the parties fashion
to try these issues.” (Id. at p. 38.)
In fact, we suggested that class action defendants do “not
have an unfettered right to present individualized evidence in
support of a defense.” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 34, italics
added.) We also added, “No case, to our knowledge, holds that
a defendant has a due process right to litigate an affirmative
defense as to each individual class member.” (Id. at p. 38.)
Further, we emphasized that courts may exercise discretion
regarding how to adjudicate such defenses, so long as the
defendant is permitted “to introduce its own evidence, both to
challenge the plaintiffs’ showing and to reduce overall
damages.” (Ibid.) In particular, if plaintiffs seek to prove their
claims using a statistical model, we explained that the
defendant “must be given a chance to impeach that model or
otherwise show that its liability is reduced.” (Ibid.)
Royalty fails to demonstrate why these limitations on the
right to present an affirmative defense in class actions do not
also apply to the defense of representative PAGA claims.
Accordingly, we reject Royalty’s and amici curiae’s contention

38
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that certain affirmative defenses to representative PAGA claims
require the testimony of nearly all alleged aggrieved employees
in a case. We further reject their contention that to limit the
presentation of individual employees’ testimony in such cases
necessarily amounts to an abridgment of the meaningful right
to present an affirmative defense and a violation of an
employer’s right to due process under Duran.
In light of these principles, we are unpersuaded by
Royalty’s suggestion that retrial of plaintiffs’ representative
PAGA claim would violate its right to due process. Royalty
argues that “where determining whether employees’ late or
missed meal periods were violations of the Labor Code will
require testimony from each one, the Court of Appeal’s only
response is ‘limit witness testimony and other forms of
evidence.’ [Citation.] This will deprive the PAGA defendant of
any meaningful ability to present the affirmative defense that
the employee group whom the plaintiff is representing (or many
individuals within it) are not ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of
the statute.”
In this case, however, it bears emphasis that Royalty
presented the testimony of just two former employees and one
expert witness at the initial trial. The trial court did not
prohibit Royalty from calling additional witnesses. It was only
after the presentation of evidence at trial that the trial court
struck the plaintiffs’ representative PAGA claim.33 Under these

33
As noted in part I, ante, the Court of Appeal stated that
the trial court had discretion whether to allow “additional
witnesses or other evidence” on remand. (Estrada, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 731.) Royalty raises no claim in this court
as to this aspect of the Court of Appeal’s disposition.

39
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

circumstances, Royalty has not established that it has a due
process right to present the individual testimony of each
allegedly aggrieved employee. And it has not established that
the retrial of plaintiffs’ representative PAGA claim would
violate its right to due process by failing to permit such
testimony.34
Royalty and amici curiae also appear to raise the broader
claim that trial courts have inherent authority to strike a PAGA
claim to protect a defendant’s due process rights generally.
While certain characteristics of some PAGA claims, occasioned
by the statute’s broad standing rules and the lack of need for
common proof or class certification, may present trial courts
with challenges in ensuring that a defendant’s due process
rights are preserved, we express no opinion as to the
hypothetical questions of whether, and under what
circumstances, a defendant’s right to due process might ever
support striking a PAGA claim.
We also emphasize that trial courts have numerous tools
that can be used to manage complex cases generally, and PAGA
cases in particular, that do not involve striking a PAGA claim.
All of those case management tools remain undisturbed by our
decision in this case.35 To that end we note that the Judicial

34
By the same token, plaintiffs also do not have an
unfettered right to present an unlimited number of witnesses.
Indeed, in the Court of Appeal below, it was plaintiffs who
claimed that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow them
to call all their proposed witnesses with respect to the
Dyer/Derian meal period subclasses.
35
We have concluded that manageability is an improper
basis upon which to strike a PAGA claim and that any striking

40
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Council has described many of the tools that courts may use in
managing discovery, other pretrial proceedings, and the trial of
complex cases, including cases involving PAGA claims. (See
generally Judicial Council of Cal., Deskbook on the
Management of Complex Civil Litigation (2016) (Deskbook); see
id. at ch. 5.I. [discussing PAGA litigation].)36
Indeed, in cases involving many employees or distinct
types of violations over a long period of time or in different
locations, the adjudication of PAGA claims may benefit from
evidence other than, or in addition to, individual testimonies.
With respect to the alleged Labor Code violation at issue in this
case, we have recently held that, when adjudicating the
affirmative defense of waiver to a meal break claim in the class
action context, “ ‘Representative testimony, surveys, and
statistical analysis,’ along with other types of evidence, ‘are
available as tools to render manageable determinations of the
extent of liability.’ (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1054 (conc.
opn. of Werdegar, J.).)” (Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021)
11 Cal.5th 58, 77 (Donohue).)37

of a PAGA claim to protect a defendant’s due process right would
derive from a narrow authority of last resort to protect a
constitutional right rather than the broad discretionary
authority recognized by the Wesson court.
36
Among the sources that the Deskbook cites is the Federal
Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth
Edition (2004). (See, e.g., Deskbook, supra, § 2.03.) This 786-
page treatise contains numerous case management techniques
for complex cases. We express no opinion regarding the use of
these techniques in any particular case.
37
In Donohue, which we decided after the trial court
decertified the Dyer/Derian meal period subclasses (see

41
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Such tools may also be used to help efficiently adjudicate
PAGA cases, including affirmative defenses to alleged PAGA
violations. Indeed, given that the purpose of the recovery of civil
penalties in a PAGA action is to “ ‘remediate present violations
and deter future ones’ ” rather than to “redress employees’
injuries” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 86), statistical methods
“designed to reveal generalized characteristics of a population”
seem particularly appropriate for use in adjudicating such
claims. (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 55 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)
In other words, evidence that reveals the “generalized
characteristics” of a population (ibid.) may be useful to estimate
the number of aggrieved employees, even if such evidence
cannot demonstrate the extent of any particular injury.
We also emphasize that our holding that trial courts lack
inherent authority to strike a PAGA claim on manageability
grounds does not preclude trial courts from limiting the types of
evidence a plaintiff may present or using other tools to assure
that a PAGA claim can be effectively tried. (See Estrada, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 [“courts may, where appropriate and
within reason, limit witness testimony and other forms of
evidence when determining the number of violations that
occurred and the amount of penalties to assess”]; Woodworth,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070, review granted [courts “may

Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 719), we concluded that
“time records showing noncompliant meal periods raise a
rebuttable presumption of meal period violations at summary
judgment.” (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 74.) The Court of
Appeal in this case “reverse[d] the [trial] court’s decertification
order [as to the Dyer/Derian meal period subclasses] and
remand[ed] this case so these claims may be retried in light of
the Donohue presumption.” (Estrada, at p. 719.)

42
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

limit the evidence to be presented at trial or otherwise limit the
scope of the PAGA claim, but they may not strike the claim
altogether”].)38
In addition, as the Court of Appeal observed, since the
plaintiff has the burden of proving a PAGA claim and the trial
court may limit the presentation of evidence, it behooves the
PAGA plaintiff to ensure that trial of the action is manageable
so the maximum number of potential violations may be
established. (See Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 713
[noting that a trial court’s power to limit the presentation of
evidence may “encourage plaintiffs’ counsel to be prudent in
their approach to PAGA claims and . . . ensure they can
efficiently prove alleged violations to unrepresented employees,”
since “[i]f a plaintiff alleges widespread violations of the Labor
Code by an employer in a PAGA action but cannot prove them
in an efficient manner, it does not seem unreasonable for the
punishment assessed to be minimal”].)
And, of course, a trial court may issue substantive rulings,
including those on demurrer, or on motions for summary
judgment or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for
in the Code of Civil Procedure to fairly and efficiently adjudicate
an action in cases in which a plaintiff pleads the claim in such
an overbroad or unspecific manner that the plaintiff is unable to
prove liability as to all or most employees. 39

38
Plaintiffs also acknowledge that “the trial court is not
powerless to manage the entire Estrada action, including the
PAGA claims.”
39
Our discussion of the types of tools that a trial court may
use to manage a PAGA claim is illustrative rather than
exhaustive.

43
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In sum, Justice Tobriner once said that “[n]o class action
is inherently unmanageable,” because “a court always has
access to a variety of techniques” to render the action
manageable, and “[t]he critical question . . . is whether the
techniques necessary to render . . . [the] action manageable are
unconstitutional, or so distort the values a particular cause of
action is meant to further that class suit would be improper.”
(Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Ct. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 390,
fn. 3 (conc. opn. of Tobriner, J.).) The same is true with PAGA
claims. Trial courts face the sometimes difficult task of
employing case management techniques in a way that preserves
the parties’ statutory and constitutional rights.40 For the
reasons we have explained ante, striking a PAGA claim on
manageability grounds alone, as the trial court did in this case,
is inconsistent with a plaintiff’s statutory right to bring such a
claim and is beyond a trial court’s inherent authority. And while
we do not foreclose the possibility that a defendant could
demonstrate that a trial court’s use of case management
techniques so abridged the defendant’s right to present a
defense that its right to due process was violated, that showing
has not been made here.41

40
In considering the potentially large amount of judicial
resources that it may take to manage a single representative
PAGA action, one must also bear in mind that such action may
reduce the judicial resources that would otherwise be expended
to manage many individual PAGA claims and prevent the
underenforcement of California law.
41
Similarly, it may also be possible for a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the use of such case management techniques
so abridged the right to present the plaintiff’s case that the trial
court will have erred. However, we have no occasion to address
this issue in this case.

44
 ESTRADA v. ROYALTY CARPET MILLS, INC.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

F. Conclusion
We acknowledge the challenges presented by complex
cases, including representative PAGA actions, and we leave
undisturbed various case management tools designed to ensure
that these cases are efficiently, fairly, and effectively tried.
Nonetheless, there are limits to a trial court’s discretion when
determining how to balance the interests of the parties before it.
We hold that the Court of Appeal properly concluded that a trial
court “cannot dismiss a PAGA claim based on manageability.”
(Estrada, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 709.) Accordingly, we
further conclude that the Court of Appeal properly reversed the
trial court’s order dismissing, on manageability grounds, that
portion of the plaintiffs’ Dyer/Derian PAGA claim based on meal
period violations and properly remanded for a new trial on this
claim. (Id. at p. 731.)
III. DISPOSITION
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.

45
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 76 Cal.App.5th 685
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S274340
Date Filed: January 18, 2024
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Randall J. Sherman
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Ginez, Steinmetz & Associates, Rudy Ginez, Jr.; CE Smith Law Firm
and Clifton E. Smith for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Baker & Hostetler, Joseph L. Chairez, Daniel F. Lula, Vartan S.
Madoyan, Joseph S. Persoff, David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Andrew M.
Grossman for Defendant and Appellant.

Shaw Koepke & Satter and Jens B. Koepke for Board of Trustees of the
California State University as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant
and Appellant.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Malcolm A. Heinicke, Katherine M. Forster
and Minkee Sohn for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, California Chamber of Commerce, National Retail Federation
and Retail Litigation Center Inc. as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
DLA Piper, Julie Dunne and Matthew Riley for Employers Group and
California Employment Law Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Clifton E. Smith
CE Smith Law Firm
1117 Village Drive
Oceanside, CA 92057
(760) 754-5472

Daniel F. Lula
Baker & Hostetler LLP
600 Anton Boulevard, Suite 900
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
(714) 966-8890

Malcolm A. Heinicke
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105-2907
(415) 512-4029