ADAM RICE v. FULTON COUNTY

FOURTH DIVISION
DILLARD, P. J.,
RICKMAN and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

January 18, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A23A1646. ADAM RICE et al. v. FULTON COUNTY et al.

PIPKIN, Judge.

Appellants, a group of Fulton County tax payers, filed a proposed class action

lawsuit against Fulton County and many of its municipalities1 (collectively

“Appellees”) alleging that Appellees had utilized an illegal method for assessing

property taxes on homes sold in 2015. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion for

class certification, holding that the proposed class failed to meet the commonality and

predominance requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2) and (b) (3). Appellants allege

that this was error; we agree, and we reverse.

1. Factual and procedural history

1
The municipalities include the cities of Atlanta, Johns Creek, Roswell,
Alpharetta, and Milton.
 This is the second iteration of this case to come before this Court for appellate

review. As we explained in our prior decision, see Rice v. Fulton County, 358 Ga. App.

1 (852 SE2d 860) (2020) (Rice I), Appellants filed this action seeking a refund of ad

valorem property taxes under OCGA § 48-5-380 from Appellees based on alleged

illegal property tax assessments. Id. at 1. In Rice I, this Court reversed the trial court’s

grant of Appellees’ motion to dismiss Appellants’ second amended complaint for

failure to state a claim. After the case was returned to the trial court, Appellants

amended their complaint two more times and moved the trial court for class

certification under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) and (b) (3).

In its motion for class certification, Appellants alleged that, in 2016 and 2017,

the Fulton County Board of Assessors (“FCBA”) used an illegal method for assessing

property taxes on homes sold in 2015.2 Appellants contended that the FCBA illegally

overrode the fair market value assessments generated by FCBA’s Computer Assisted

Mass Appraisal (“CAMA”) system and replaced those assessments with the higher

purchase price that the taxpayer paid for the property the year before. Appellants

2
The original motion to certify the class included homes sold in 2015 and 2016.
But Appellants later withdrew their claims concerning homes sold in 2016, and the
lone class member representing that group voluntarily dismissed his claims.
2
alleged that properties that did not sell in 2015 did not have their CAMA values

overridden. Appellants contended that this scheme, called “sales chasing”3 was used

by the FCBA in order to intentionally target certain properties and assess higher taxes,

which, Appellants argued, “resulted in taxes that were not uniform or fairly and justly

equalized,” violating Article 7, § 1, Para. 3 of4 the Georgia Constitution and OCGA

§ 48-5-306 (a)5.

2. Trial Court’s Ruling

3
As explained in Rice I, “[s]ales chasing, also known as selective reappraisal, is
the practice of selectively changing values for properties that have been sold, while
leaving other values alone. [T]he practice of sales chasing creates inequities between
properties and, unless adjusted for, renders sales ratio studies invalid.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) 358 Ga. App. at 6 n.8
4
Also known as the Uniformity Clause, this constitutional provision requires
all property taxation to be “uniform upon the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” See also Buckler v. DeKalb County
Bd of Tax Assessors, 263 Ga. App. 305, 307 (587 SE2d 797) (2003) (“Realty and
tangible personal property are of the same class, and the constitutional rule of
uniformity in taxation requires that both be taxed alike.” (Citation omitted.)).
5
This provision states that “[t]he board shall see that all taxable property within
the county is assessed and returned at its fair market value and that fair market values
as between the individual taxpayers are fairly and justly equalized so that each taxpayer
shall pay as nearly as possible only such taxpayer’s proportionate share of taxes.”
3
 The trial court determined that Appellants could not meet the commonality or

predominance prongs for class certification under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2) and (b) (3).

Specifically, the trial court determined that: Appellants “have not articulated a viable

legal or classwide factual theory for how they will prove lack of uniformity of

assessments and equalization of values without getting into individualized analysis of

comparable properties and values”; all that Appellants can show on a classwide basis

“is that a computer program exists that generated a different (lower) value than the

purchase price that was actually used as the property’s assessment”; the use of

different methods to calculate the appraisals would “not suffice to prove lack of

uniformity of assessments or equalization of values”; and that, in this case, “the

existence or lack of uniformity can only be evaluated by reference to the properties’

values, which is an individualized factual issue.”

Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that “liability for a tax refund

based on lack of uniformity of assessments or equalization is an individualized issue,

not a common question susceptible of being answered by classwide common proof.”

The trial court denied class certification and Appellants appealed.

3. Analysis

4
 “Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing their right to class certification, and

we review the trial court’s decision in certifying or refusing to certify a class action for

an abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted.) Doe v. Vest Monroe, LLC, 368 Ga. App.

572, 572 (1) (890 SE2d 439) (2023). Generally speaking, while an abuse of discretion

standard “is deferential, it is not toothless. An abuse of discretion occurs where a

ruling is unsupported by any evidence of record or where that ruling misstates or

misapplies the relevant law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Eagle Jets, LLC

v. Atlanta Jet, Inc., 347 Ga. App. 567, 576 (2) (c) (820 SE2d 197) (2018).

“In determining the propriety of a class action, the first issue to be resolved is

not whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or may ultimately prevail on the

merits but whether the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 have been met.”

(Punctuation and citation omitted.) SunTrust Bank v. Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. 794,

800 (2) (824 SE2d 717) (2019). Thus, in order to certify a class, a trial court must find

that the putative class satisfies the four prongs of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a), which are: (1)

numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequate representation. After

meeting these factors, a plaintiff must then “satisfy at least one of the three

requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) in order to show that class certification is

5
appropriate.” (Footnote omitted). Bowden v. Med. Center Inc., 309 Ga. 188, 193-194

(1) (b) (845 SE2d 555) (2020). Relevant here is OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3), also called the

“predominance and superiority” prong, which requires “[t]he court find[] that the

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any

questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to

other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Id.

“To satisfy these requirements, it [is] not enough for the plaintiffs simply to [allege]

that they were satisfied. Rather, the plaintiffs [have] to come forward with evidence

to prove their satisfaction of the statutory requirements.” (Citations and punctuation

omitted.) Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner, 295 Ga. 524, 526 (1) (762

SE2d 419) (2014). With these principles in mind, we address Appellants’

enumerations.

(a) Commonality

Appellants allege that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined

that they failed to meet the commonality requirement, finding that the putative class

6
presented a legal theory that would require individual analysis. We agree that this was

error.6

It is well settled that commonality is “a relatively low bar” of proof and “even

a single common question will do.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Doe, 368 Ga.

App. at 576 (2) (a). Still, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that “[t]here are questions

of law or fact common to the class.” OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2). “The common

contention must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which

means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to

the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” (Citations and punctuation

omitted) Bowden, 309 Ga. at 194-195 (1) (c). Indeed,”[w]hat matters to class

certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common

answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted; emphasis in original.) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (II)

(A) (131 SCt 2541, 180 LE2d 374) (2011). Generally, this “requires the plaintiff to

6
On appeal, the City of Roswell argues that the class representative for the City
of Roswell subclass does not meet the requirements of typicality, commonality, or
adequacy. But the trial court did not rule on these issues, so we cannot review them
on appeal.
7
demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Bowden, 309 Ga. at 194 (1) (c).

Here, the trial court found that Appellants failed to establish commonality

because Appellants’ only claim of common proof is “that a computer program exists

that generated a different (lower) value than the purchase price that was actually used

as the property’s assessment.” But the record shows that Appellants identified a

different and broader common question that may be answered on a classwide basis –

whether the method used by Appellees to calculate the Appellants’ property taxes was

legal. See OCGA § 48-5-380 (providing that each county and municipality shall refund

taxes “[w]hich are determined to have been erroneously or illegally assessed and

collected from the taxpayers under the laws of this state or under the resolutions or

ordinances of any county or municipality”). The answer to this question will not vary

with each class member because it is binary - either the method used by Appellees to

calculate the putative class members’ property taxes was legal or it was not. “Thus,

a classwide proceeding in this case has the capacity to generate common answers that

will drive the resolution of this litigation and renders a class action superior to other

8
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”

Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. at 802. See also Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (II) (A).

Still, Appellees argue that we should affirm the decision of the trial court

because Georgia law allows county boards of tax assessors to use different methods to

arrive at the fair market value of any given property. See, e.g., Sherman v. Fulton

County Bd. of Assessors, 288 Ga. 88, 91 (701 SE2d 472) (2010). This case law is

inapposite, however, because Appellants do not contend that they are entitled to a

specific valuation method. Instead, they contend that the alleged sales chasing method

used by Appellees was so arbitrary that it was not an appraisal method at all. See, e.g.,

OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (defining “fair market value” and listing eight criteria that a

tax assessor “shall” apply when determining fair market value); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs.

560-11-10-.09 (4) (a-c) (detailing the three methods for appraising real property - the

direct sales comparison approach, the cost approach, and the income approach). See

also Dade County. v. Eldridge, 229 Ga. App. 401, 401 (494 SE2d 106) (1997) (“[I]t is

illegal for a taxing authority simply to pick and choose particular pieces of property to

assess and reassess without regard to uniformity, proportionality and equalization

among properties of the same class.”).

9
 Simply put, Appellants have alleged that the class members all suffered the

same injury (having their property taxes calculated by an illegal method of valuation)

based upon the same instance of Appellees’ injurious conduct (overriding the CAMA

system’s fair market value assessment with the purchase price of the property).

Although there will likely be differences in Appellants’ damages in this case, “no

matter how individualized the issue of damages may be, determination of damages

may be reserved for individual treatment with the question of liability tried as a class

action.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Doe, 368 Ga. App. at 578 (2) (a) (“[T]he

legal requirement that class members have all suffered the same injury can be satisfied

by an instance of the defendant’s injurious conduct, even when the resulting injurious

effects — the damages — are diverse.”). See also Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. at 802

(“[I]t is well established that the need for individual damage calculations does not

defeat class certification, so long as the liability inquiry presented common legal

issues.”) (Citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Appellants have met the

“relatively low bar” of proving commonality under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2).

(b) Predominance

10
 Appellants also contend that the trial court erred when it found that they did

not meet the predominance requirement. Specifically, the trial court determined that

the only way Appellants could prove their Uniformity Clause claim was to compare

the assessed values of their properties with the values of other individual properties.

This, the trial court concluded, made individual questions predominate over common

ones. Based upon the record currently before this Court, however, we conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion on the issue of predominance.

OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3) requires a court to determine whether “questions of

law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” As to this, “[c]lass

plaintiffs may satisfy this requirement by showing that issues subject to classwide

proof predominate over issues requiring proof that is unique to the individual class

members.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) City of Roswell v. Bible, 351 Ga. App.

828, 831 (2) (833 SE2d 537) (2019). “Thus, common issues may predominate when

liability can be determined on a classwide basis, even when there are some

individualized damage issues.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brenntag Mid

11
South, Inc. v. Smart, 308 Ga. App. 899, 906 (2) (b) (i) (710 SE2d 569) (2011). In order

“[t]o determine whether the requirement of predominance is satisfied, a court must

first identify the parties’ claims and defenses and their elements. The court should

then classify these issues as common questions or individual questions by predicting

how the parties will prove them at trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ansley

Walk, 362 Ga. App. at 195-196.

In its fourth amended complaint, the putative class alleged that the FCBA used

an illegal method to assess their property taxes which led to unequal and nonuniform

taxation and higher taxes for the class members. In support of their motion for class

certification, Appellants offered affidavit testimony from a Georgia tax assessor stating

that the FCBA uses the CAMA system to appraise residential properties; that the

Chief Appraiser of the FCBA instructed an employee to replace the CAMA generated

value with the sales price for all properties sold in 2015 but not 2016; that “no

individual analysis” was done for “any property whose value was overridden and

increased to its sales price”; that, after the overrides were applied, “the FCBA took

no steps to equalize values between taxpayers who purchased their homes in 2015. . .

and those who did not[,] or otherwise ensure that taxpayers were paying only their fair

12
share of property taxes”; and that the overrides caused those taxpayers to pay more

in taxes than they would have had the overrides not occurred.7 In other words,

Appellants’ Uniformity Clause claim centers around their allegation that Appellees

used an illegal method to assess the property taxes of the putative class and this

method automatically impacted equalization and uniformity of their subsequent taxes.8

This common issue of liability predominates over individual issues of damages

because the answer to that common claim will determine Appellees’ liability for all

putative class members. And, any individualized issue of damages would not require

the application of different facts or legal principles to answer the overall common

question. Once again, “[t]he fact that there may be differences in the damages for the

members of the class does not prevent certification.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Bickerstaff, 349 Ga. App. at 803 (2). Cf. Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,

7
To the extent that Appellees argue that this evidence is not credible or not
admissible, these are issues we do not consider at the class certification stage. See City
of Roswell v. Bible, 351 Ga. App. 828, 831-833 (1), (2) (833 SE2d 537) (2019) (noting
that “the rules of evidence are not strictly enforced at the class action stage” and that
“merits-based disputes are not ripe for resolution” either).
8
This was underscored by Appellants’ counsel at oral argument who argued
that the illegal method used by the FCBA was arbitrary, automatically led to inequity
in the tax assessments, and that the FCBA took no steps to equalize the tax
assessments after overriding the CAMA system.
13
855 F2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.1988) (“[W]here the defendant’s liability can be

determined on a class-wide basis because the cause of the disaster is a single course of

conduct which is identical for each of the plaintiffs, a class action may be the best

suited vehicle to resolve such a controversy.”). Accordingly, the trial court abused its

discretion by finding that Appellants failed to establish predominance for the purposes

of class certification.

Judgment reversed. Dillard, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur.

14