UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-4801
RONALD LEE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-96-191-A)
Submitted: June 19, 1997
Decided: July 7, 1997
Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
J. Casey Forrester, ECONOMOU, FORRESTER & RAY, Alexan-
dria, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney,
Michael E. Rich, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Lee Jones appeals his conviction for carrying a firearm dur-
ing and in relation to a drug trafficking offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (1994), claiming that in light of Bailey v. United States,
___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), his conviction should be vacated
because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he carried a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. We affirm.
Jones was arrested while assisting in the sale of two kilograms of
cocaine to an undercover operative. Jones had paid a co-conspirator
to drive him to the transaction. During the drive, Jones handled the
revolver, which lay on the transmission hump in the passenger com-
partment, and asked his co-conspirator where his co-conspirator's gun
was. At the time of the arrest, Jones was behind the wheel of an auto-
mobile after moving the car at an undercover officer's request, and
law enforcement officers discovered a revolver on the front seat.
A jury found Jones guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), possession
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1994), carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994), and possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(1994). The court sentenced Jones to a total of 322 months incarcera-
tion. Jones timely appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his § 924(c)(1) conviction.
We find, contrary to Jones's assertion, that the evidence was suffi-
cient to establish that he carried the firearm during and in relation to
a drug trafficking crime. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence,
this court considers whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have
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found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant
carries a firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime
if the firearm facilitates or has the potential to facilitate the drug traf-
ficking offense. See United States v. Mitchell , 104 F.3d 649, 654 (4th
Cir. 1997) (stating that firearm is carried under§ 924(c)(1) if it has
"some purpose or effect with respect to drug trafficking crime" and
"if its presence was not `result of accident or coincidence'") (quoting
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1993)).
The evidence reveals that Jones carried the gun during and in rela-
tion to a drug trafficking crime when he transported the loaded fire-
arm in the passenger compartment of the automobile to the drug
exchange. Jones's firearm provided the potential to facilitate the drug
transaction and its presence in the automobile was not coincidental.
Because we find that any rational trier of fact could have found Jones
guilty of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm his conviction under
§ 924(c)(1).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conclu-
sions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not significantly aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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