In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-23-00226-CR
__________________
CRAIG BAREFIELD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 1A District Court
Tyler County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 14,042
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Craig Barefield appeals the trial court’s revocation of his
community supervision. Under a plea bargain agreement, Barefield pleaded guilty
to the offense of manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance, namely
phencyclidine (PCP), in an amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred
grams, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(d). On
September 22, 2022, the trial court accepted the plea, but the trial court deferred
adjudication of guilt and placed Barefield on community supervision for five years,
1
imposed a $500 fine, and ordered Barefield to pay $180 in restitution. The Order
Imposing Conditions of Community Supervision ordered Barefield to comply with
the following provisions, in relevant part:
2. Defendant shall avoid injurious or vicious habits; you are forbidden
to use, possess, or consume any controlled substance, dangerous drugs,
marijuana, alcohol or prescription drug not specifically prescribed to
you by lawful prescription.
...
6. Defendant shall work faithfully at suitable employment as far as
possible.
...
14. Defendant shall perform 40 hours of Community Service
Restitution at a governmental, charitable, or non-profit organization as
assigned by the Community Supervision Officer in charge of the case,
at a rate of no less than 16 hours per month, beginning within thirty (30)
days of today’s date and be responsible for any costs of supervision.
On March 2, 2023, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt and revoke
Barefield’s community supervision, alleging Barefield: (1) violated Condition 2 of
the terms of his community supervision because he admitted to the usage of PCP
and alcohol on February 22, 2023; (2) violated Condition 6 of the terms of his
community supervision because he failed to obtain employment; and (3) violated
Condition 14 of the terms of his community supervision because he failed to comply
with the court’s order to perform community service and was forty hours in arrears.
At a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate and revoke Barefield’s community
supervision, Barefield pleaded “not true” to the allegations in the motion. After
hearing evidence, the trial court adjudicated Barefield guilty, and found the
2
allegations in the motion to revoke “true.” After hearing punishment evidence, the
trial court sentenced Barefield to thirty years of confinement. On appeal, Barefield
argues in three issues that the evidence was insufficient to support revocation on
each of the alleged violations of his community supervision and that the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing Barefield to thirty years of confinement. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Standard of Review
When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question
before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State,
202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In a revocation proceeding, the State
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Id. at 763-
64; Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In the context of a
revocation proceeding, “a preponderance of the evidence” means “th[e] greater
weight of [] credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the
defendant has violated a condition of his [community supervision].” Rickels, 202
S.W.3d at 764.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Jones v. State, 589
S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The trial court abuses its discretion only
3
if its decision “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which
reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990) (op. on reh’g)). Revocation is appropriate when a preponderance of the
evidence supports at least one of the State’s allegations that the defendant violated a
condition of his community supervision. See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 576
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A single violation of a term of community supervision is
sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision. See
Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The trial court is the
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks v.
State, 153 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
Issues on Appeal
In his appellate brief, Barefield states his issues as follows:
ISSUE # 1: The Trial Court erred in finding that the allegations in the
First Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt are true, concerning
Condition 6 “Failed to work faithfully at suitable employment”,
because the State failed to meet its burden of proof on this allegation.
ISSUE #2: The Trial Court erred in finding that the allegations in the
First Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt are true, concerning
Condition 14 “Failed to perform 40 hours community service”, because
the State failed to meet its burden of proof on this allegation.
ISSUE #3: The Trial Court’s finding that the allegations in the First
Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt are true, concerning the
4
allegations regarding Condition 2 “failure to abstain from the use of
narcotic or habit forming drugs”, and the subsequent judgment that
Appellant was sentenced to 30 years in TDCJ, were an abuse of
discretion.
Analysis
First, we will address his third issue. In his third issue, Barefield argues the
trial court abused its discretion in finding true the allegations in the State’s motion
to revoke regarding Condition 2. At the hearing, Jamie Glawson, Barefield’s
probation officer, testified. Glawson testified that she was Barefield’s probation
officer in April of 2023, when Barefield admitted to using PCP and alcohol in
violation of his probation. According to Glawson, Barefield signed an “Admittance
of Use” on May 22, 2023, and that form is a regular record Glawson keeps in the
probation office. Glawson testified that on the form Barefield, the defendant at trial,
admitted to using PCP and alcohol, and both Barefield and Glawson signed the form.
The “Voluntary Admittance of Controlled Substance Usage” form was admitted as
State’s Exhibit 2 without objection. The form reflects Barefield’s hand-written
initials next to hand-written checks next to the form’s choices of “PCP” and
“Alcohol” under the category for “Controlled Substances Used” and the hand-
written date of “2-16-23” next to both substances “PCP” and “Alcohol[.]” The form
appears to have been signed and dated “2-22-23” by both Barefield and Glawson.
Just above the signatures the form states the following typed language:
5
I understand that the use of the above illegal substance is not only a
direct violation of my terms and conditions of community supervision,
but also a violation of statutory law. This admittance is given freely and
voluntarily. No promises of any kind were offered to me in exchange
for this admittance. Furthermore, my Community Supervision Officer
has thoroughly explained to me the consequences of continued use of
illegal substances, and that treatment and reporting requirements may
be increased, if deemed appropriate.
Although no drug test results were admitted into evidence, Glawson testified that
Barefield failed a drug test. Glawson agreed that after Barefield admitted to using
drugs in February, a violation report was filed with the District Attorney’s Office.
As to the revocation based on the violation of Condition 2, Barefield argues
on appeal that “the UA testing reports were not provided to the court[,]” this alleged
violation “was supported by the voluntary statement of Appellant only[,]” and the
voluntary statement “which Appellant was apparently encouraged to sign” did not
notify him “that such admission would result in his incarceration for 30 years.” As
part of issue three, Barefield also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it “took a zero tolerance approach[]” and sentenced Barefield to thirty years of
confinement.
“[A] defendant’s voluntary confession to violating the terms of his or her
community supervision is, by itself, sufficient evidence to support a trial court’s
decision to revoke community supervision.” Briggle v. State, No. 06-15-00041-CR,
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 25,
2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant’s admission, by
6
way of a signed admission of drug use admitted at trial with no objection, that she
used methamphetamine while on community supervision and in violation of one of
the conditions of her community supervision, was sufficient to support trial court’s
decision to revoke community supervision) (citing Wade v. State, 83 S.W.3d 835,
839-40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (defendant’s confession to failing to
pay fines and fees, without explanation of inability to pay, was sufficient to support
trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision)); see also Cunningham v.
State, 488 S.W.2d 117, 121-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (holding testimony of
probation officer that defendant admitted using narcotics was sufficient to revoke
probation for violation of condition that he abstain from use of narcotics);
Whisemant v. State, No. 07-22-00288-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 863, at **3-5
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 9, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (admission of exhibits signed by defendant in which he admitted to
using amphetamine, methamphetamine, marihuana, and alcohol provided sufficient
evidence that defendant violated the conditions of community supervision); Swallow
v. State, Nos. 14-21-00160-CR & 14-21-00161-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4614,
at **6-10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (two forms defendant signed admitting he used
controlled substances on two occasions and his probation officer’s testimony that
the defendant admitted to using controlled substances was sufficient evidence that
7
the defendant violated the conditions of his community supervision by using the
controlled substances on two occasions); Keelin v. State, No. 07-13-00420-CR, 2014
Tex. App. LEXIS 8936, at **5-7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 13, 2014, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (in-person admission to supervision
officer and signed admission of methamphetamine use sufficient to revoke
community supervision); Hampton v. State, No. 07-00-0078-CR, 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4721, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 18, 2000, no pet.) (oral admission
of a violation of a term or condition of community supervision made to a
probationer’s probation officer is, by itself, sufficient evidence to support a
revocation of community supervision); Anthony v. State, 962 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (testimony of probation officer and social worker
that defendant admitted to using cannabinoids was sufficient to support revocation
on that basis); Hernandez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986,
no pet.) (evidence that defendant admitted to his probation officer that defendant had
been drinking alcohol supported revocation of probation on that ground).
The trial court heard the probation officer’s testimony that while on
community supervision, Barefield failed a drug test, confessed to using PCP and
alcohol in violation of the terms of his community supervision, and that Barefield
signed an admission of the violation. Barefield did not object to the testimony or the
admission of the “Voluntary Admittance of Controlled Substance Usage” form or
8
argue that he signed it involuntarily. As part of his guilty plea, Barefield signed
Written Plea Admonishments that stated the following:
DEFERRED ADJUDICATION: If the Court defers adjudicating your
guilt and places you on probation, a violation of any condition of
probation may result in proceedings being initiated whereby you are
arrested and detained, as provided by law, for a hearing by the Court
limited to a determination of whether to proceed with an adjudication
of guilt on the original charge. No appeal may be taken from this
determination. After adjudication of guilt, all proceedings including
pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation and your right to
appeal continue as if adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. In
addition, after adjudication of guilt, the punishment assessed may be
any term within the range for the offense and is not limited to the term
of probation.
Barefield also signed the Order Imposing Conditions of Community Supervision that
provided the terms of his community supervision and advised him that the trial court
had “the authority to revoke [Barefield’s] community supervision at any time during
the period of supervision for any violation of the conditions.”
On this record, Barefield’s voluntary confession to violating the term of his
community supervision order prohibiting him from “us[ing], possess[ing], or
consum[ing] any controlled substance [or] alcohol” is, by itself, sufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Barefield’s community supervision.
See Briggle, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21; see also
Cunningham, 488 S.W.2d at 121-22; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246; Hernandez, 704
S.W.2d at 910. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Barefield
violated Condition 2 of his community supervision as alleged in the State’s motion
9
to revoke. See Briggle, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10045, at **13-14, 20-21; see also
Cunningham, 488 S.W.2d at 121-22; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246; Hernandez, 704
S.W.2d at 910. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, we conclude that the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Barefield violated one or more conditions of his community supervision. See
Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763; Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 874.
We next address Barefield’s argument in issue three that the trial court abused
its discretion by not considering placing Barefield in drug treatment or continuing
him on community supervision instead of revoking his community supervision and
sentencing him to thirty years of confinement. Once sufficient evidence was
presented of a violation of a condition as set forth in the order the trial court used
when it placed Barefield on community supervision, the trial court had broad
discretion in choosing whether to continue, modify, or revoke his community
supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42A.751(d), 42A.752(a),
42A.755(a); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1979). Because there was sufficient evidence to support revocation as outlined
above, the trial court had broad discretion in choosing the sentence, and we conclude
the sentence the trial court imposed was within the trial court’s discretion. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 12.32(a) (first-degree felony offense of manufacture or delivery
10
of a controlled substance carries a punishment range of confinement from five to
ninety-nine years). We overrule Barefield’s third issue.
Because a single violation of a term of community supervision is sufficient to
support the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision, we need not
address Barefield’s remaining issues on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence that he failed to work faithfully at suitable employment and he failed to
perform forty community service hours, as alleged in the State’s motion to revoke.
See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); see also Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Barefield’s
unadjudicated community supervision and sentencing him to thirty years of
confinement and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on November 28, 2023
Opinion Delivered January 24, 2024
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
11