People v. Enere CA2/1

Filed 1/30/24 P. v. Enere CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B327284

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA090487)
v.

YORDIN ENERE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed in part
and remanded with directions.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
 Defendant Yordin Enere was convicted of one count of
carrying a loaded unregistered handgun in violation of
Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (a) (count 1),1 and one
count of carrying a firearm in a public place while masked in
violation of section 25300. After trial, the trial court orally
sentenced Enere to the high term of three years in county jail for
the unregistered handgun conviction; the minute order and
abstract of judgment reflect the court imposed a two-year jail
term for that count. Although the reporter’s transcript does not
disclose the trial court’s sentence for the other count, the minute
order indicates the court imposed, but stayed, a two-year jail
term for that conviction.
On appeal, Enere argues (1) the trial court erred in
ordering him to be restrained during the trial with a seatbelt not
visible to the jury; (2) during their rebuttal argument, the People
indirectly commented on Enere’s decision not to testify in his
defense, thereby violating Enere’s Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, which violation was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the court failed to instruct the
jury properly on the charge of carrying a firearm in a public place
while masked. Enere argues the cumulative effect of these errors
deprived him of a fair trial. Finally, he contends his convictions
violated his right to keep and bear arms secured by the Second
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.
We reject Enere’s claims of error. First, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in restraining Enere because his
disciplinary reports revealed that while he was in custody, Enere
repeatedly failed to follow law enforcement’s instructions and

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2
was involved in two group beatings. Second, even assuming the
People impliedly referenced Enere’s right to remain silent during
their rebuttal argument, the trial court’s instructions and
admonitions ensured that Enere suffered no prejudice from that
brief purported reference. Third, Enere fails to show the court
erred in giving the jury an instruction that mirrored the text of
the statute proscribing the carrying of a firearm in a public place
while masked. Because Enere has not demonstrated the
existence of more than one trial error, his claim of cumulative
error necessarily fails.
We reject Enere’s Second and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges as well. His facial constitutional challenge concerning
the conviction for carrying a loaded unregistered handgun fails
because the unconstitutional good cause requirement in the
related licensing statute is severable from other licensing
requirements that Enere does not contend violate his
constitutional right to bear arms. His as-applied challenge to his
conviction fails because Enere does not demonstrate that the
unconstitutional good cause requirement in the licensing statute
resulted in his conviction. As to the facial challenge to his other
conviction, Enere fails to demonstrate that the statute
prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in a public place while
masked operates in an unconstitutional manner in the generality
or great majority of cases. Enere’s as-applied challenge to that
conviction fails because there was no evidence he was carrying
the firearm for self-defense purposes.
Although we affirm Enere’s convictions, we exercise our
discretion to remand the case to the trial court to clarify its
sentence for each offense.

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 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts relevant to this appeal.

1. The second amended information
On September 12, 2019, the People filed a second amended
information charging Enere with one count of carrying a loaded
unregistered handgun, in violation of section 25850,
subdivision (a) (count 1); and one count of carrying a firearm in a
public place while masked, in violation of section 25300 (count 2).

2. A summary of the People’s trial evidence
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on February 21, 2018, Officers
Bojorquez and Bueno saw a man standing near fresh graffiti; the
man was wearing a dark bandana that was covering his nose and
the lower half of his face. As the officers approached the man in
their patrol car, the man looked startled, held his waistband
area, and began to run away.
Officer Bueno exited the patrol car and began chasing the
man. Officer Bueno saw a handgun in the man’s hand but
noticed that the bandana was no longer covering the man’s face;
Officer Bueno believed that the bandana was around the man’s

2 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from admissions made by the parties in their appellate
briefing. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d
666, 668, 674 [“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is
frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point,
controlling in the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party.’ ”].)

4
neck area. Officer Bueno radioed that he needed assistance in
apprehending a man with a gun.
Officer Bojorquez got out of the car and saw a man with a
handgun in his hand. The man thereafter threw the handgun
and a backpack.
Officer Bojorquez and Officer Bueno subsequently
apprehended Enere, who was wearing a bandana around his
neck. In his appellate briefing, Enere appears to concede that the
officers found him approximately 40 feet away from where Officer
Bojorquez saw a man discard the handgun and his backpack.3
Enere further acknowledges Officer Bojorquez “testified that
[Enere’s] clothing—including the bandana around [Enere’s]
neck—was consistent with what he saw on the initial suspect
and . . . that [Enere] was similar in stature to the initial suspect,”
although Enere complains that Officer Bojorquez did not
elaborate further on the alleged similarities between Enere and
the initial suspect.
Officer Bueno recovered a handgun. Enere acknowledges
that Officer Bojorquez testified that the weapon Officer Bueno
recovered was the same gun Officer Bojorquez had seen earlier.
The handgun was loaded and appeared to be in working order.
The weapon was not registered to Enere.

3 Specifically, Enere states, “[T]he two officers converged
on a man approximately 40 feet away from where Officer
[Bojorquez] saw a man discard the handgun and his
backpack. . . . [¶] [Enere] was the man they ultimately arrested.”

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3. The jury’s verdict, the trial court’s sentence, and
Enere’s notice of appeal
The jury found Enere guilty on counts 1 and 2. As to
count 1, the jury found that the firearm was not registered to
Enere.
On November 21, 2022, the trial court conducted a
sentencing hearing. As we explain in Discussion, part F, post,
the record contains certain discrepancies regarding Enere’s
sentence.
Enere timely appealed the judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Ordering Enere to Be Restrained With a Seatbelt
During the Trial
“ ‘ “In general, the ‘court has broad power to maintain
courtroom security and orderly proceedings’ [citation], and its
decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] However, the court’s discretion to impose physical
restraints is constrained by constitutional principles. Under
California law, ‘a defendant cannot be subjected to physical
restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s
presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such
restraints.’ [Citation.] Similarly, the federal ‘Constitution
forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that use is “justified
by an essential state interest”—such as the interest in courtroom
security—specific to the defendant on trial.’ ” ’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1024 (Govan).)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial
court may ‘take into account the factors that courts have

6
traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and
the risk of escape at trial.’ [Citation.] These factors include
evidence establishing that a defendant poses a safety risk, a
flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the proceedings or otherwise
engage in nonconforming behavior.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Govan,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024.) “[E]vidence that [the
defendant] had acted violently in custody or in court, disrupted
the court proceedings, or harbored an intent to escape” is
pertinent to this analysis. (See id. at p. 1025.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[W]e will not overturn a trial court’s decision to
restrain a defendant absent “a showing of a manifest abuse of
discretion.” ’ [Citation.] To establish an abuse of discretion,
defendants must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was
so erroneous that it ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Govan, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024.)
Furthermore, “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate
law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed
correct and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
In a September 2019 pretrial hearing, the trial court
ordered Enere to be restrained during the trial with a seatbelt
that was not visible to the jury.4 The court noted two murder
charges were pending against Enere in other cases, and “[t]he
sheriff’s department believe[d Enere was] a safety risk during the
trial.” Regarding the latter point, the court indicated it had been

4 Although not essential to our analysis, we observe the
trial court ordered counsel for each party not to stand when the
jury entered the courtroom to avoid drawing attention to Enere’s
inability to stand by virtue of the seatbelt restraint.

7
provided disciplinary reports showing: (1) on several occasions
while in custody, Enere failed to follow the directions of law
enforcement, including one instance when Enere “[s]imply
refused” to “follow the directions of deputy sheriffs” to “come up
from the ground floor to the fourth floor” in order to go to the
court; (2) on May 1, 2018, Enere “was . . . involved in a 10-on-1
group beating” in the county jail; and (3) on June 1, 2019, Enere
was involved in a “10-on-1 group beating” in the county jail.
On appeal, Enere argues his pending murder charges and
the disciplinary reports did not give rise to a manifest need for
the seatbelt restraint.5 Although he admits “[i]t is unclear at
how many [of the 17 court appearances before trial Enere] was
present,” he contends “there is no evidence . . . of [Enere] ever
causing any problems in court or during transport to and from
court.” Enere also claims that even though he “appeared in court
on three separate occasions” after a June 26, 2019 incident in
which he failed to follow law enforcement’s instructions, “[t]he
record does not reflect any evidence of [Enere] being restrained
during that time[ or] any need for [Enere] to be restrained . . . .”
He maintains, “[T]here is no evidence in the record of [Enere]
ever threatening witnesses, attorneys, or the judge,” or of him
“ever being aggressive or belligerent towards the bailiff, other
sheriffs, or bystanders in court.” He further asserts, “[T]he

5 Enere further argues, “[T]he trial court failed to state on
the record the grounds on which the Sheriff’s Department found
[Enere] to be a safety risk . . . .” Yet, the trial court mentioned
the disciplinary reports immediately after it stated the sheriff’s
department believed Enere was a safety risk. Thus, the record
suggests that the sheriff’s department’s conclusion that Enere
posed a safety risk was predicated on those reports.

8
record does not reflect” he had made “any plans or attempts to
escape . . . .” Enere claims that his “repeated and continued good
behavior at all his numerous prior appearances undermined the
trial court’s finding of manifest necessity.”
Although we agree with Enere that his pending murder
charges alone would not have warranted the imposition of the
seatbelt restraint,6 Enere still has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court abused its discretion. The court’s decision to restrain
Enere with a seatbelt device that was not visible to the jury fell
within “ ‘ “ ‘the bounds of reason’ ” ’ ” because there is no dispute
that Enere had “ ‘ “ ‘engage[d] in nonconforming behavior’ ” ’ ”
while in custody (see Govan, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024), to
wit, he was involved in two group beatings and had failed to
follow instructions from law enforcement.
That the trial court had not previously restrained Enere
does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Enere has not
directed us to any evidence that the court had been informed of
Enere’s violent and concerning in-custody behavior at any point
before the September 2019 hearing at which the court decided to
restrain him. We thus presume the court was previously
unaware of Enere’s disciplinary reports. (See People v. Arter
(2017) 19 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6 [“[A]ll intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of [the judgment’s]
correctness, and . . . appellant bears the burden of providing an
adequate record affirmatively proving error.”].) Second, the court
could reasonably expect that Enere would pose more of a safety

6 (See Govan, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025 [“ ‘ “The
mere facts that the defendant is an unsavory character and
charged with a violent crime are not sufficient to support a
finding of manifest need.” ’ ”].)

9
risk during trial than he did during prior, shorter in-court
proceedings at which no juror was present.
In sum, Enere has not shown the trial court erred in
restraining him with a concealed seatbelt during the trial.

B. Assuming Arguendo the Prosecutor Indirectly
Commented on Enere’s Decision Not To Testify, Any
Such Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt
“The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself,’ and the high court has
interpreted this provision to ‘forbid[ ] either comment by the
prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt.’ [Citation.] The
constitutional prohibition against compelled self-incrimination is
a right that has been incorporated to apply against the states
[citations], and we have accordingly held ‘ “a prosecutor is
prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on an accused’s
invocation of the constitutional right to silence” ’ [citation].”
(People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1117 (Thompson),
citing, inter alia, Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615
(Griffin).) This type of constitutional violation is called “Griffin
error” and is subject to the standard of prejudice set forth in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (See Thompson, at
p. 1118 & fn. 14.) That standard “requires reversal unless the
error is harmless ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (See
People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195–196.)
At trial, defense counsel contested the issue of identity and
argued that the People’s “failure to produce the bandana”
undermined their case. In their rebuttal argument, the People

10
contended: “Some of you might think, well, you know, any other
items collected from [Enere] is relevant. We don’t need to
produce it. You heard the testimony of the officers. If the
defense felt it was necessary or relevant to produce it, failure to
call logical witness[es] or present logical evidence, they would
have presented that.”
Defense counsel objected, and the parties and the trial
court held a discussion at sidebar. The defense argued that the
People were attempting to shift the burden of proof, and the trial
court agreed with the defense. The court thereafter admonished
the jury as follows: “So I’m going to sustain the objection and
give you a little bit of instruction. [¶] So it’s improper for the
prosecution to suggest what the defense might have brought into
evidence in a case where the defense is resting on the state of the
evidence. [¶] So I’m going to order the jury to disregard any
suggestion by [the prosecutor] that he is shifting the burden by
suggesting what the defense could have or should have brought
into evidence. [¶] So the objection is sustained.”
On appeal, Enere argues the People’s remark constituted
“an indirect and impermissible comment on [Enere’s] right [not]
to testify” because (1) “the jury knew that there were only three
people involved who would have any knowledge of whether or not
[Enere] had a bandana: the two police officers [who testified] and
[Enere] himself”; and (2) “[s]ince the jury [was] . . . aware that
there [was] no video or photograph of [Enere] carrying the
firearm, whether or not [he] did so could only be known to the two
officers or [Enere].” Enere further contends the People’s alleged
Griffin error prejudiced him. In particular, Enere asserts that
“the officers’ testimony was the main evidence in support of both
charges” because there was no other evidence that Enere was

11
masked or carrying a gun (e.g., no evidence of fingerprints on the
gun); “[b]oth officers . . . failed to provide specific identifying
detail of the masked man they saw by the fresh graffiti and
[Enere], the man ultimately arrested”; Officer Bojorquez
admitted he initially obtained only a glimpse of the man he was
chasing for “a brief second”; and “the officers lost track of the man
they were chasing on at least three different occasions.”
Assuming arguendo that (1) the People did in fact commit
Griffin error by indirectly commenting on Enere’s decision not to
testify, and (2) Enere’s characterizations regarding the state of
the trial evidence are accurate, we conclude this error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “[W]hen faced with a
prosecutor’s utterance of comments of this type (i.e., short,
isolated statements not clearly calling for improper consideration
of a defendant’s silence), [our high court has] generally found
such comments harmless.” (See Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 1118.)
The trial court mitigated any prejudice resulting from the
People’s alleged oblique reference to Enere’s decision not to
testify. Specifically, the trial court sustained defense counsel’s
objection to the allegedly improper remark and ordered the jury
to disregard it. Enere claims this admonition was insufficient
because it “did not specifically instruct the jury to not consider
[Enere’s] silence . . . .” Yet, Enere’s suggested curative
instruction could have drawn further attention to the People’s
alleged indirect reference to Enere’s invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Notably, Enere
ignores the fact the trial court had also instructed the jury that
Enere had “an absolute constitutional right not to testify,” and
that the jury should “not consider, for any reason at all, the fact

12
that [Enere] did not testify.” “[A]bsent some indication to the
contrary, we assume a jury will abide by [the] trial court’s
admonitions and instructions.” (People v. Seumanu (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1293, 1336.)
Given these circumstances, we conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that notwithstanding the People’s alleged
indirect comment on Enere’s right to remain silent, the jury drew
no adverse inference from Enere’s decision not to take the stand.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Instructing the Jury
on Count 2
Recall that count 2 charged Enere with violating
section 25300. Section 25300, subdivision (a) provides: “A person
commits criminal possession of a firearm when the person carries
a firearm in a public place or on any public street while masked
so as to hide the person’s identity.” (§ 25300, subd. (a).)
The trial court issued a special instruction on count 2,
which was titled “carrying firearm while masked” (special
instruction). (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) The
instruction provides: “The defendant is charged in Count 2 with
carrying a firearm in a public place while masked. In order to
prove this charge, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant carried a firearm in a public place; [¶] 2. The
defendant knew he was carrying a firearm; AND [¶] 3. The
defendant was masked so as to hide his identity. [¶] The term
firearm is defined in another instruction.”
The trial court also issued an instruction entitled “union of
act and intent: general intent” (general intent instruction).
(Capitalization & boldface omitted.) The instruction states: “The
crimes charged in this case require proof of the union, or joint
operation, of act and wrongful intent. [¶] For you to find a

13
person guilty of the crimes charged, that person must not only
commit the prohibited act, but must do so with wrongful intent.
A person acts with wrongful intent when he or she intentionally
does a prohibited act; however, it is not required that he or she
intend to break the law. The act required is explained in the
instruction for that crime.”
Enere argues the trial court erred in issuing the special
instruction because it “omitted the requisite mens rea—that
defendant specifically intended to hide his identity,” and that, by
issuing the general intent instruction, the court “told the jury it
could convict [Enere] on section 25300 on general intent alone.”
As a preliminary matter, we note the Attorney General
maintains Enere forfeited this claim of instructional error. Enere
acknowledges, “When the trial court asked defense counsel what
more is required [vis-à-vis the special instruction], defense
counsel responded that it is not his responsibility to create an
instruction.” Enere argues his attorney preserved Enere’s
challenge to the instruction by raising an objection below, and
that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
properly on every material element of the offense. We need not
determine whether Enere forfeited this claim of error because we
conclude that his claim fails on the merits.
“ ‘A trial court must instruct the jury, even without a
request, on all general principles of law that are “ ‘closely and
openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ [Citation.] . . . . [¶] We review . . .
claims of instructional error de novo. [Citations.] ‘In conducting
this review, we first ascertain the relevant law and then
“determine the meaning of the instructions in this regard.”
[Citation.] [¶] The proper test for judging the adequacy of

14
instructions is to decide whether the trial court “fully and fairly
instructed on the applicable law . . . .” [Citation.] “ ‘In
determining whether error has been committed in giving or not
giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a
whole . . . [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons
and capable of understanding and correlating all jury
instructions which are given. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.]
“Instructions should be interpreted, if possible, so as to support
the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably
susceptible to such interpretation.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Johnson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 702, 707 (Johnson).)
Here, the text of section 25300 and of the special
instruction reveals, and Enere acknowledges, that the “special
instruction . . . mirrored the language of section 25300 in the use
of ‘so as to.’ ” Enere argues the special instruction should have
stated that Enere could be convicted on count 2 only if he had
“specifically intended to hide his identity.”
“ ‘ “[T]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense
is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction,
and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request
amplification. . . .” ’ [Citation.] . . . ‘When a word or phrase “ ‘is
commonly understood by those familiar with the English
language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law,
the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in
the absence of a request.’ ” [Citations.] A word or phrase having a
technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one
that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Singh (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 175, 181
(Singh).)

15
 Enere concedes in his opening brief, and we agree, that
“[t]he plain usage and meaning of ‘so as to’ is to denote
‘purpose[.]’ ” He further admits in his opening brief that the
“common sense and . . . plain meaning” of this statutory text is a
requirement that “a defendant . . . harbor a specific intent to
conceal identity.” Because there is no dispute that the meaning
of “so as to hide his identity” from the special instruction “ ‘ “ ‘is
commonly understood by those familiar with the English
language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the
law,’ ” ’ ” the trial court had no sua sponte obligation to define
that phrase further for the jury.7 (See Singh, supra,
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 181, italics omitted.) We further note that
the court properly instructed the jury on the manner in which it
should interpret an undefined word or phrase: “Words and
phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be
applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.”
Enere also argues, “[T]he failure to include language [in the
special instruction] telling the jury that specific intent is required
is error because the trial court also gave [the general intent
instruction], which told the jury it could convict [Enere] on
section 25300 on general intent alone.”
We need not address this argument because Enere does not
support his interpretation of the general intent instruction with

7 Contrary to the position he takes in his opening brief,
Enere suggests for the first time in his reply that the jury would
be unable to “extrapolat[e] the requirement of specific intent from
the words, ‘so as to.’ ” Enere forfeited this contention. (See
People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 642–643 [concluding
that a defendant had forfeited a contention by raising it for the
first time in a reply brief].)

16
any analysis of its text. (See People v. Evans (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 735, 756, fn. 12 [declining to address an argument
that a party failed to support adequately].)
In any event, the general intent instruction merely
required the jury to find Enere “commit[ted] the prohibited
act . . . with wrongful intent” in order to convict him, the latter of
which the instruction defines as “intentionally do[ing] a
prohibited act . . . .” The general intent instruction does not state
that this “wrongful intent” element supplants the “so as to hide
his identity” language from the special instruction. Indeed, by
instructing the jury to “[p]ay careful attention to all of [the trial
court’s] instructions and consider them together” (italics added),
the court told the jury to give effect to both the special instruction
and the general intent instruction. Because we “ ‘ “ ‘assume that
the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding
and correlating all jury instructions which are given’ ” ’ ” (see
Johnson, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 707), we reject Enere’s
assertion that the jury could have ignored the “so as to” language
from the special instruction.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Enere has failed to
demonstrate the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
count 2.

D. Enere’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails
Enere argues that if each alleged error analyzed in
Discussion, parts A, B, and C, ante, respectively, does not
individually warrant reversal, “[t]he cumulative prejudicial effect
of those errors [nevertheless] . . . deprived [him] of a fair trial.”
We have already concluded there was no error regarding the

17
seatbelt restraint and the instruction on count 2.8 Enere’s
remaining assertion of Griffin error we have assumed without
deciding but have concluded that any such error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Discussion, part B, ante.)
Accordingly, there are no errors to cumulate. (See People v.
Kocontes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787, 891 [indicating that a
necessary predicate of a cumulative error claim is the existence of
“ ‘a series of trial errors’ ”].)

E. Enere Fails To Demonstrate That His Convictions
Violate the Right To Keep and Bear Arms Secured by
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments
The Second Amendment to the federal Constitution
provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) The
United States Supreme Court has “recognized that the Second
[Amendment] . . . protect[s] the right of an ordinary, law-abiding
citizen to possess a handgun in the home” and “publicly for . . .
self-defense,” and that this “individual right[ is] . . . made
applicable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .” (See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc.
v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1, 8, 37 (Bruen).)
Enere raises facial and as-applied challenges to
section 25850 on the ground that his conviction violates his
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.9 Enere also contests

8 (See Discussion, parts A and C, ante.)
9 In his opening brief, Enere does not expressly raise an
as-applied challenge to section 25850, although he claims in his
reply that we can infer that he did from the language in his

18
the constitutionality of his conviction under section 25300,
although he fails to clarify whether he is raising a facial or an as-
applied challenge to the legality of that statute. As explained
below, Enere fails to demonstrate that these statutes are
unconstitutional on their face or as applied to him.

1. Relevant aspects of California’s firearm licensing
scheme
Section 25850, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “A
person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person
carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any
public place or on any public street in an incorporated city . . . .”
(§ 25850, subd. (a).) “Section 25850 does not apply to the
carrying of any handgun by any person as authorized pursuant to
Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 26150) of Division 5.”
(§ 26010.) Thus, “section 25850 is in effect the enforcement
mechanism of a regulatory regime that grants licenses to those
who may lawfully carry firearms and withholds licenses from
those who may not.” (See In re T.F.-G. (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 893, 915 (T.F.-G.), review den. Nov. 15, 2023,
S282091.)
At the time Enere violated section 25850 in 2018 (see
Factual & Procedural Background, part 2, ante [indicating the
People’s evidence showed the offense occurred in Feb. 2018]),
section 26150, subdivision (a) provided: “When a person applies
for a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of

opening brief. The Attorney General argues Enere has forfeited
an as-applied challenge. Even if Enere arguably forfeited an
as-applied challenge, we exercise our discretion to address the
issue and reject it on the merits. (See Discussion, part E.4, post.)

19
being concealed upon the person, the sheriff of a county may
issue a license to that person upon proof of all of the following:
[¶] (1) The applicant is of good moral character. [¶] (2) Good
cause exists for issuance of the license. [¶] (3) The applicant is a
resident of the county or a city within the county, or the
applicant’s principal place of employment or business is in the
county or a city within the county and the applicant spends a
substantial period of time in that place of employment or
business. [¶] (4) The applicant has completed a course of training
as described in Section 26165 [(i.e., a firearm safety course)].”
(Stats. 2015, ch. 785, § 2; see also In re D.L. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 144, 155 (D.L.) [indicating that § 26165 requires
applicants to complete a firearm safety course], review den.
Oct. 11, 2023, S281412.)
The Legislature thereafter made substantive changes to
subdivision (a) of section 26150 that went into effect on
January 1, 2024, including the elimination of the good cause
requirement of subdivision (a)(2) and the insertion of language
providing that the sheriff “shall” issue the license if the statutory
criteria are satisfied. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 249, § 10 [filed with
the Sec’y of State on Sept. 26, 2023]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8,
subd. (c)(2) [providing that Jan. 1, 2024 is the effective date for
these legislative revisions].) Neither party argues these
legislative revisions impact our analysis of Enere’s constitutional
claims attacking the prior version of the statute.
For the sake of clarity, we refer to the version of
section 26150, subdivision (a) that was in effect when Enere
committed his offenses as the “pre-January 1, 2024 version” of
the statute.

20
 2. Pertinent constitutional jurisprudence and standards
of review
“In 2008, for the first time since ratification of the Bill of
Rights over 216 years before, the United States Supreme Court
identified a constitutionally protected right to possession of
handguns in the home in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)
554 U.S. 570, 635.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 150.) “Two
years after Heller, the United States Supreme Court decided
McDonald v. Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742. The majority in
McDonald held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right
recognized in Heller.” (D.L., at p. 151.)
“The Second Amendment landscape changed further in
June 2022 with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Bruen. The plaintiffs in Bruen had applied in New York for
unrestricted licenses to carry a handgun in public for self-
defense, which were denied. [Citation.] Under New York law, a
person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when they
possess ‘ “any firearm” ’ without a license, whether inside or
outside the home. [Citation.] . . . An individual must obtain an
unrestricted license to ‘ “have and carry” ’ a concealed ‘ “pistol or
revolver” ’ to carry a firearm outside his or her home or place of
business [in New York].” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.)
“Prior to Bruen, an applicant had to prove ‘ “proper cause
exists” ’ to issue the license. [Citation.] In other words, an
applicant had to ‘demonstrate[ ] a special need for self-defense.’
[Citation.] Bruen noted that six other states, including
California, had similar ‘proper cause’ requirements in their
concealed carry licensing frameworks.” (D.L., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) The Bruen plaintiffs sued New York

21
state officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging these
officials “violated their Second and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by denying their unrestricted license applications on the
basis that they had failed to show ‘proper cause,’ i.e., had failed to
demonstrate a unique need for self-defense.” (Bruen, supra,
597 U.S. at p. 16.)
“The Bruen majority stated that, ‘when the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its
regulation, . . . . the government must demonstrate that the
regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation. . . .’ [Citation.] In other words, conduct that
falls within the ‘plain text’ of the Second Amendment may be
protected unless the government can identify an ‘American
tradition’ justifying the regulation.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at p. 152.)
Applying the first prong of that two-part test, the high
court concluded, “The Second Amendment’s plain text . . .
presumptively guarantees [the plaintiffs] a right to ‘bear’ arms in
public for self-defense.” (See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 33.)
“The Bruen majority [also] concluded that New York did not meet
its burden to identify an ‘American tradition’ justifying its ‘proper
cause’ language, and concluded the requirement was
unconstitutional.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
Because the Bruen majority’s analysis established that the
plaintiffs had a viable constitutional challenge to New York’s
proper-cause requirement, the high court reversed the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a federal district court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, and remanded the matter
for further proceedings. (See Bruen, at pp. 16–17, 71.)

22
 The Bruen court emphasized that “nothing in [its] analysis
should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of”
licensing regimes that “issue concealed-carry licenses whenever
applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without
granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a
perceived lack of need or suitability.” (See Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.
at pp. 13, 38 & fn. 9.) The high court noted that jurisdictions
with these regimes “often require applicants to undergo a
background check or pass a firearms safety course,” and
remarked that these measures seem “designed to ensure only
that those bearing arms . . . are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible
citizens’ ” constitutionally entitled to “carry handguns publicly for
self-defense.” (See id. at pp. 8–9, 38 & fn. 9.)
“On June 24, 2022, the day after Bruen was released, the
California Attorney General issued a legal alert recognizing that
the good cause requirement in section[ ] 26150 . . . was no longer
constitutional. [Citation.] The alert instructed local officials not
to require proof of good cause for issuing a public-carry license
effective immediately. [Citation.] Officials were directed to
continue to apply the other licensing requirements, including
proof of ‘ “good moral character.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 408 (Mosqueda).)
Facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to a statute
require different showings. “ ‘A facial challenge to the
constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance considers only the
text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual. [Citation.] “ ‘To support a
determination of facial unconstitutionality, voiding the statute as
a whole, [the party challenging the statute] cannot prevail by
suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation

23
constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular
application of the statute . . . .’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (See T.F.-G.,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.) “ ‘[T]he “minimum” our
[Supreme Court’s] cases have accepted [to prevail on a facial
challenge] is a showing that the statute is invalid “in the
generality or great majority of cases.” ’ [Citation.]” (See id. at
p. 911.) “Put another way, ‘a facial challenge must fail where the
statute has a “ ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”10 (See
D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)
“In contrast, ‘[a]n as applied challenge may seek . . . relief
from a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance
to an individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly
impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the
manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has
been applied.’ [Citation.] Such a challenge ‘contemplates
analysis of the facts of a particular case or cases to determine the
circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied
and to consider whether in those particular circumstances the
application deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a
protected right. [Citations.] When a criminal defendant claims
that a facially valid statute or ordinance has been applied in a
constitutionally impermissible manner to the defendant, the
court evaluates the propriety of the application on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether to relieve the defendant of the

10 Although a “statute [that] punishes constitutionally
protected conduct as well as acts that may be validly prohibited”
may, in certain circumstances, be “subject to facial invalidation”
based on “the objection of overbreadth” (see 7 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2023) Constitutional Law, § 452, italics
omitted), Enere does not invoke the overbreadth doctrine here.

24
sanction.’ [Citation.]” (T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 911–
912.)
A “facial constitutional challenge . . . presents a pure
question of law subject to de novo review.” (T.F.-G., supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 908, fn. 11.) “When reviewing an as-applied
constitutional challenge on appeal, we defer to the trial court’s
findings on historical facts that are supported by substantial
evidence, and then independently review the constitutionality of
the statute under those facts.” (People v. Mitchell (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1378.)

3. We reject Enere’s facial challenge to section 25850
because the good cause requirement is severable from
the remaining licensing requirements
Enere argues that the pre-January 1, 2024 version of
section 26150, subdivision (a) “contain[ed] a good cause
requirement that the United States Supreme Court found in
Bruen to be analogous to New York’s ‘proper cause’ standard.”
Enere further contends, “Since [this version] of section 26150,
subdivision (a), is unconstitutional, it follows that [Enere’s]
conviction for violating section 25850 must be overturned.” In
support of this position, Enere argues he “cannot be criminalized
for exercising his right” “to carry a handgun at public places for
self-defense” “when the only statute that would authorize him to
carry a concealed firearm in public is unconstitutional.” Enere
does not contest the validity of any of the other statutory
prerequisites for issuance of a license to carry under the
pre-January 1, 2024 version of section 26150, subdivision (a) (e.g.,
the completion of a firearm safety course).
The Attorney General concedes Bruen “made clear that
California’s . . . ‘good cause’ requirement is unconstitutional.”

25
The Attorney General maintains that Enere’s facial challenge to
section 25850 still fails because the good cause requirement is
severable from the other licensing requirements of the pre-
January 1, 2024 version of section 26150, subdivision (a). We
agree with the Attorney General that the good cause requirement
is unconstitutional for the reasons set forth in Bruen,11 and that
the good cause requirement is severable from the other statutory
requisites.
“In the absence of express language confirming or
prohibiting severability, we consider three criteria to determine
whether we may save a statute by severing an unconstitutional
provision in it: whether the provision is (1) ‘ “grammatically,” ’
(2) ‘ “functionally,” ’ and (3) ‘ “volitionally separable.” ’[12]

11 (See T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 899
[“California’s ‘good cause’ licensing requirement is undisputedly
unconstitutional under Bruen”]; Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 408 [“The Bruen court made clear that California’s . . . ‘good
cause’ requirement in section 26150 was unconstitutional.”].)
12 Neither party claims that at the time Enere violated
section 25850, there was a provision expressly confirming or
prohibiting severability of the “good cause” licensing
requirement. (See also D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 162–
163 [indicating that when the opinion was issued on July 3, 2023,
“section[ ] 26150 . . . lack[ed] any provision discussing
severability one way or another”].) We note that newly-enacted
section 25350 now provides, “If any section, subdivision,
paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, clause, or phrase of any
provision in [D]ivision [5, the division which contains
sections 25850 and 26150,] is for any reason held
unconstitutional, that decision does not affect the validity of any
other provision in the division.” (See Stats. 2023, ch. 249, § 7
[§ 25350, subd. (a), enacted on Sept. 26, 2023]; §§ 25350, 25850,

26
[Citation.] ‘Grammatical separability . . . depends on whether the
invalid parts “can be removed as a whole without affecting the
wording” or coherence of what remains.’ [Citation.] ‘Functional
separability depends on whether “the remainder of the statute ‘
“is complete in itself . . . .” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Volitional separability
depends on whether the remainder “ ‘would have been adopted by
the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial
invalidation of the statute.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (D.L., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.)
In the wake of Bruen, our colleagues in the First, Third,
and Sixth Districts have held that the good cause requirement
imposed by the pre-January 1, 2024 version of section 26150,
subdivision (a)(2) is severable from the remainder of the licensing
scheme. (See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 144, 148;
Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 403; T.F.-G., supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 893, 916.) In particular, the Courts of
Appeal have found the requirement is “grammatically separable
because it is contained in a discrete subdivision”; “the provision is
functionally separable because the remaining provisions are
‘complete’ in and of themselves, and ‘capable of independent
application’ ”; and the requirement is volitionally separable
because the Legislature manifested its intention to retain the
other licensing requisites, e.g., by reorganizing a prior version of
the statute from “a single paragraph into distinct paragraphs.”
(See D.L., at pp. 163–164; see also T.F.-G., at p. 916 [adhering to
D.L.’s analysis]; Mosqueda, at pp. 409–410 [same].) Our
colleagues thus rejected facial constitutional challenges to

& 26150 [all three provisions appear in Division 5 of Title 4 of
Part 6 of the Penal Code]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(2)
[providing that Jan. 1, 2024 is the effective date for § 25350].)

27
section 25850, the enforcement mechanism of the state’s licensing
regime. (See D.L., at pp. 147–148; T.F.-G., at p. 899; Mosqueda,
at pp. 403–404, 414.)
Enere has not directed us to any authority arriving at a
different conclusion regarding the facial validity of section 25850,
and our research has not disclosed the existence of any contrary
published California authority. Because we find our colleagues’
analysis persuasive, Enere’s facial challenge fails. (See The
MEGA Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1529 [“ ‘[W]e ordinarily follow the
decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree.’ ”].)
Enere attempts to distinguish our sister districts’ decisions.
First, Enere points out that D.L., T.F.-G., and Mosqueda each
involved “only facial challenges to the statute.” Because Enere
also raises a facial challenge to section 25850, we fail to discern
how Enere’s observation detracts from the reasoning of these
cases.
Second, Enere asserts the defendants in D.L. and T.F.-G.
“were minors and [Enere] is an adult,” and that the defendant in
D.L. was a felon whereas Enere had not been convicted of a
felony when he violated section 25850. Because we “ ‘consider[ ]
only the text of the measure itself’ ” in assessing Enere’s facial
challenge to section 25850, “his challenge does not turn on his
personal characteristics,” e.g., his age and criminal record. (See
T.F.-G, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 911–912.)
Third, Enere seems to argue his facial challenge is viable
because the “unconstitutional good-cause requirement” of the
pre-January 1, 2024 version of section 26150, subdivision (a)(2)
“was not yet severed” from the remainder of the licensing statute
when he possessed the firearm at issue. This argument is

28
perplexing. “ ‘The general rule [is] that judicial decisions are
given retroactive effect[,]’ ”13 and Enere does not identify any
reason to depart from that general rule here. Additionally, the
D.L. decision explicitly recognized “severability [is] an analytical
tool” that may be used “to evaluate [a] facial constitutional
challenge . . . to a pre-Bruen conviction under section 25850.”
(See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 148.) We join D.L. and
T.F.-G. in holding that the severability doctrine defeats a facial
constitutional challenge to a pre-Bruen violation of section 25850.
(See D.L., at pp. 147–148; T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 899–902, 915–916 [indicating the offense occurred before the
high court decided Bruen in 2022, and adhering to D.L.’s
severability analysis].)

4. Enere’s as-applied challenge to section 25850 fails
because he does not claim he applied for a license or
that the sheriff could not have denied him a license
based on other licensing requirements
As explained earlier in Discussion, part E.2, ante, to
succeed in an as-applied challenge, Enere must show that, in the
“ ‘particular circumstances’ ” of this case, the “ ‘application’ ” of
the statute “ ‘deprived’ ” him “ ‘of a protected right.’ ” (See
T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.) The good cause
requirement of the pre-January 1, 2024 version of section 26150,

13 (See People v. Scott (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1183,
review granted on other grounds Sept. 27, 2023, S280776; see
also Lazarin v. Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1560, 1580
[“Unlike statutes, which normally operate prospectively absent
an express legislative direction, judicial decisions are generally
given retroactive effect.”].)

29
subdivision (a)(2) is the only aspect of the licensing scheme Enere
claims is constitutionally infirm. Enere does not claim to have
applied for a license for the firearm in question, or that the
sheriff could not have denied any such application for a reason
independent of the good cause requirement, e.g., the failure to
complete a firearm safety course. Because Enere has not shown
that former subdivision (a)(2) abridged his right publicly to carry
a weapon for self-defense, Enere’s as-applied challenge to
section 25850 fails. (See D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165
[concluding that “[e]ven if” the defendant “had asserted an as
applied challenge,” the court would have rejected that claim
because his “conviction[ ] had nothing to do with the ‘good cause’
licensing requirement”]; T.F.-G., at p. 912 [indicating that in
order to prevail on an as-applied challenge, the defendant must
“demonstrate that the hypothetical denial of a license . . . would
have offended the Second Amendment”].)

5. Enere fails to demonstrate that section 25300 is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him
To recap, section 25300, subdivision (a) provides: “A person
commits criminal possession of a firearm when the person carries
a firearm in a public place or on any public street while masked
so as to hide the person’s identity.” (§ 25300, subd. (a).)
Enere argues, “Section 25300 criminalizes any individual
carrying a firearm while masked to hide his or her identity.”
Enere claims the statute “encompasse[s]” the following “course of
conduct”—“carry[ing] a firearm while masked to hide the person’s
identity for self-defense.” (Italics added.) He further contends, “It
is unconstitutional for a law to destroy an individual’s right to
self-defense simply because he or she was masked for perhaps an
innocuous purpose—such as attending a masquerade, dressing

30
up for Halloween, et cetera—even if the intent was to hide one’s
identity.”
Assuming arguendo that the plain text of the Second
Amendment covers the “course of conduct” that Enere identifies,
Enere’s facial challenge to the statute nevertheless fails. The
statutory text does not target individuals who are masked and
armed for the purpose of defending themselves. (See § 25300,
subd. (a).) Instead, it prohibits armed individuals from wearing
masks in order to hide their identities. (See ibid.) Enere makes
no effort to show, despite the fact the statute does not explicitly
criminalize what he characterizes as constitutionally protected
conduct, that section 25300 operates in an unconstitutional
fashion “ ‘ “in the generality or great majority of cases.” ’ ” (See
T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 911.) That failure is fatal to
his facial challenge. Merely “ ‘ “ ‘suggesting that in some future
hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise
as to the particular application of the statute’ ” ’ ” is insufficient.
(See ibid.)
Enere’s as-applied challenge also fails. Enere does not
direct us to any evidence that he wore the bandana or carried the
firearm in self-defense. It necessarily follows that applying
section 25300 to Enere did not violate his constitutional right to
keep and bear arms. (See T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 911–912 [indicating that in order to successfully raise an as-
applied challenge, the defendant must show that the statute
“ ‘has been applied in a constitutionally impermissible manner to
[him]’ ”].)

31
F. We Remand the Matter to the Trial Court To Clarify
Enere’s Sentences on Counts 1 and 2
The reporter’s transcript for the November 21, 2022
sentencing hearing shows that the trial court imposed “the high
term of three years . . . . to be served in county jail” on count 1.14
Absent from the transcript is an oral pronouncement of sentence
on count 2 and the court’s rationale for imposing the high term on
count 1. The latter omission is problematic for two reasons:
(1) section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides that “[t]he court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial”; and (2) subdivision (b)(5) obligates the court to “set forth on
the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence
imposed.”15 (See § 1170, subds. (b)(2) & (b)(5).)

14 The Attorney General asserts, “The trial court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence [on count 1] was initially for the
‘midterm of three years.’ ” In the portion of the reporter’s
transcript cited by the Attorney General, however, the trial court
was actually sentencing Enere to the midterm of three years for a
conviction in a different case, to wit, for a violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11379.
15 Senate Bill No. 567, which had added subdivisions (b)(2)
and (b)(5) to section 1170, went into effect prior to the
November 21, 2022 sentencing hearing. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3 [Senate Bill No. 567, which was filed with the Sec’y of State
on Oct. 8, 2021 and added, inter alia, § 1170, subds. (b)(2) &
(b)(5)]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(2) [providing that Senate

32
 Contrary to the reporter’s transcript, the minute order for
the sentencing hearing and the abstract of judgment both show
the trial court imposed the midterm of two years in county jail on
count 1. The minute order also indicates the trial court imposed,
but stayed pursuant to section 654, the midterm sentence of
two years in county jail on count 2. Although the abstract of
judgment indicates that the midterm was imposed (but stayed)
on count 2, the abstract does not specify the duration of the
sentence for that count.
Section 1260 provides that we “may, if proper, remand the
cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be
just under the circumstances.” (See § 1260.) We exercise our
discretion to remand this matter to the trial court to hold a new
hearing for the purpose of clarifying which sentences it intended
to impose for counts 1 and 2. (See People v. Garcia (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 834, 838–839 [indicating that an appellate court
may remand a case to the trial court to clarify its intended
sentence].)

Bill No. 567 became effective on Jan. 1, 2022]; People v. Flores
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038–1039 [agreeing with the
Attorney General that “the amended version of section 1170,
subdivision (b) that became effective on January 1, 2022, applies
retroactively . . . as an ameliorative change in the law applicable
to all nonfinal convictions”].)

33
 DISPOSITION
Defendant Yordin Enere’s convictions are affirmed. We
remand this matter to the trial court to hold a new hearing to
clarify its sentences for counts 1 and 2.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.

34