[Cite as In re E.A.G., 2024-Ohio-315.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
:
E.A.G. : Case Nos. 23CA7
: 23CA8
:
:
:
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
:
: RELEASED 1/16/2024
APPEARANCES:
Alana Van Gundy, Bellbrook, Ohio, for Appellant Rodney Gillespie.
Julie Dreher, Killbuck, Ohio, for Appellant Brienne Gibson.
Kelsey R. Riffle, Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta,
Ohio, for Appellee.
Smith, J.
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, Appellants, Rodney Gillespie and Brienne
Gibson, appeal the trial court’s decision that granted permanent custody of their
seven-year-old child, E.A.G., to Appellee, Washington County Children Services
(“the agency”). For the reasons that follow, we do not find any merit to
Appellants’ assignments of error. Therefore, we overrule Appellants’ assignments
of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 2
FACTS
{¶2} On July 10, 2020, the Marietta Police Department contacted the
agency to report that they had responded to the family’s home due to a domestic
violence disturbance between the child’s father and an uncle. Police officers
subsequently arrested the father, and they took the mother to the hospital because
she was making suicidal statements. Officers advised the caseworker that “the
conditions of the home were unfit for the child to live in.”
{¶3} When the caseworker arrived, she found the home “to be in extremely
bad conditions with every bit of flooring covered in trash and other debris.” The
home “did not have any working sewage disposal,” and the child, who was five
years old at the time, was wearing “pullups.” Moreover, the child had been
sleeping on a bed that had trash on it. Due to these circumstances, the agency
asked the court to place the child in its emergency custody, and the trial court
subsequently entered an ex parte emergency removal order.
{¶4} On July 13, 2020, the agency filed a complaint that alleged the child is
a dependent child and that requested temporary custody of the child. The parents
later admitted the dependency allegation, and the trial court placed the child in the
agency’s temporary custody.
{¶5} The agency developed a case plan for the family to help them reunify.
The agency worked with the family for nearly two years and started to work on a
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 3
plan to transition the child to the home. During this time frame, the agency
caseworkers worked with the parents to try to help them understand the importance
of maintaining a safe home environment for the child and advised them to store
hazardous items such as knives, lighters, and medications out of the child’s reach.
After the first overnight visit, however, the agency caseworker discovered that the
parents had left a bottle of medication in a location that the child could have
accessed. Thus, the agency did not believe that the parents had learned to
implement the skills that they need to maintain a safe home environment for the
child.
{¶6} Consequently, on June 7, 2022, the agency filed a permanent custody
motion. The agency alleged that the child has been in its temporary custody for 12
or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that placing the child in its
permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.
{¶7} On December 7, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to consider the
agency’s permanent custody motion. Patricia Smith, a field nurse with Quality of
Life Home Care, testified as follows. Between June and September 2022, she
visited the parents’ home twice per day to “pass medications, check vitals, check
glucometer readings, her blood sugars, any kind of education that might be needed
based on vitals and blood sugars, and just an overall assessment, make sure that
they were doing okay.” On a date in September 2022, Smith had been attempting
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 4
to obtain the father’s vital signs when the mother entered the room “with two cups
of pills.” Smith asked the mother what medications the parents were taking, and
the mother stated that she had vitamins. Smith informed the mother that Smith
might need to talk to the case manager, “[a]nd at that point it completely
escalated.” Smith explained that “[t]here was a lot of screaming, a lot of
profanity.” She asked the parents to stop yelling at her. The mother then “threw”
the vitamin bottles at her. As a result of this incident, the parents were discharged
from the program.
{¶8} Caseworker Alisha Riddle offered the following testimony. She has
been the caseworker since February 2022. On July 10, 2020, the child was
removed from the home due to a domestic violence incident and the deplorable
conditions of the home. The child, who was five years old, was nonverbal and was
not potty trained. The child also “had boils and rashes from wearing diapers far
too long.” Additionally, “[h]is skin had such a smell soaked into it that it had
actually taken almost two weeks to get that kind of exfoliated from his skin.”
Shortly after the child’s removal, the parents were evicted from their apartment.
The mother initially stayed with some family. The father stayed at a motel, the
Salvation Army, a homeless shelter, and a camper.
{¶9} The agency developed a case plan that required the parents to
demonstrate that they can provide for the child’s basic needs and maintain safe,
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 5
stable, and clean housing that is free of any safety hazards. In August 2021, the
parents obtained a one-bedroom apartment, and they remained living in this
apartment through the date of the permanent custody hearing.
{¶10} In February 2022, the agency started working on a transition plan to
return the child to the parents’ custody. While working on this transition plan,
Riddle visited the parents’ apartment 38 times. The parents have improved their
ability to keep the home clean. However, the caseworkers sometimes found “old
containers with food on the floor” and “pieces of food on the floor.” Furthermore,
the “litter boxes have come to a state where you know, there’s been litter or cat
feces on the ground, things like that.” Other times, the apartment “looked very
good.” When caseworkers noticed cleanliness issues, they explained to the parents
what they needed to do to fix it.
{¶11} During some of the unannounced home visits, caseworkers discovered
“things like butane torch lighters,” or knives or other sharp objects in locations
where the child could reach them. Caseworkers also saw alcohol and “bottles of
medication within [the child’s] reach.” The caseworkers stressed to the parents the
need to keep these types of items in locations where they would not be accessible
to the child.
{¶12} The caseworkers additionally informed the parents to use a lock for a
balcony door so that the child, who is “very high, high energy to say the least,”
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 6
would not be able to exit this door. Riddle expressed concern that the child “could
fall off the balcony, he could jump off, [or] he could run away.” Riddle advised
the parents that they need to ensure that the child cannot reach the door, but “that
doesn’t always happen.” When she reminded them, the parents explained that they
forgot. Riddle then emphasized to the parents that they “always have to practice
what we know are best safety measures all the time as if [the child] was here.”
{¶13} The parents’ failure to keep the home in a safe condition for the child
has been an ongoing concern that has “not really ever went away.” Riddle stated
that out of her 38 home visits, “three to four, maybe five of them have been
perfect, you know, condition of no safety concerns.”
{¶14} The case plan also required the parents to complete a mental health
assessment and to follow any treatment recommendations. Both parents completed
mental health assessments, and each works with an Integrated Services worker.
The father attends an anger management program, and the parents continue to
attend their mental health appointments.
{¶15} The case plan further required the parents to complete a domestic
violence course. They completed the course work, but the father continues to
struggle with controlling his anger. He has been in verbal altercations with staff.
Riddle has “witnessed [the parents] in Domestic Violence altercations with staff,
representatives, Integrated Services * * * workers, our Agency, [or] a mixture of
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 7
all of the above.” One time, the father was “escalated for stealing from [the
mother] in a visit.” Another time, the agency had to call the police after learning
that the father “had been masturbating outside of our Agency at the picnic table.”
{¶16} Other times, Riddle has been in the parents’ home, and the father “has
been like this close to my face (indicating), screaming at me, shaking his hands at
me.” The mother would try to step in between Riddle and the father. The father
then would go into another room and punch the wall or the door. The mother
would try to calm him down, “and then they both have hands on each other.”
{¶17} In October 2022, when Riddle learned that Quality of Life had
terminated its services, she went to the parents’ home to ask them about the
incident with the nurse. The father started yelling at her. He then went into the
bedroom and “like punched the door and punched the wall” and “slammed the door
shut.” The parents were physically fighting with each other, and the mother asked
Riddle to leave, which she did.
{¶18} At times, the parents have had “good visits” with the child, meaning
they did not need help from any caseworkers. Other visits were “a little more
rough.” During some visits, the father and the child “have fought over toys.”
Other times, the child became upset when the father ate some of the child’s food.
These types of incidents caused the child to become “escalated,” and the father to
become upset. The mother tried to “parent” the child and “to calm” the father.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 8
Shorter, in-home visits, required “the continuous service of an Integrated Services
provider being in the home still supervising those visits, and trying to do hands-on
implemented parenting in their home while [the child] was visiting.”
{¶19} In 2022, when the agency began working on a transition plan to return
the child to the home, the agency started by having two-hour visits with an
Integrated Services worker. The agency later increased the length to four hours
and then further increased the length to eight hours. The parents “did well as far as
their actual day visits when a provider was present.”
{¶20} In June 2022, the parents had an overnight visit with the child. When
Riddle arrived to retrieve the child the next morning, the father answered the door.
She asked if she could enter the home, and the father allowed her inside. Once
inside, she saw “an entire bottle of their Trazodone medication left” on a table that
would have been within the child’s reach. Riddle spoke with the parents and
reminded them that they should not leave medication in a location where the child
could reach it. She explained that “this type of medication is a concern” for the
child. Riddle is concerned that if the child consumed any of the parents’
medication and had a reaction to it, the parents may not be able to recognize the
reaction and, thus, would not understand the need to seek medical treatment.
{¶21} After this overnight visit, the agency continued to work with the
family so that the child could be returned to the parents’ custody. Both parents
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 9
have made significant strides to improve their own lives. However, “the bigger
concern is with the inability to maintain some of the hazardous items that could in
a split second, cause [the child] physical harm as well as these two parents
escalating one another to the point where they’re physically unsafe with each
other.” Additionally, the child has his “own mental health concerns” and “delays
or disability.” The child “has no understanding sometimes of the incident or the
pain or the * * * don’t touch the stove because it’s hot type thing.” The child also
“has a lot of behavioral concerns.” He has outbursts “where he’ll hit, kick, throw
things, flip desks at times.”
{¶22} She stated that the combination of these facts caused the agency to
question whether the parents could maintain the home in a safe condition, “or if it
would be something where tragically he could get very seriously hurt.” The
agency continued to work with the parents even after filing for permanent custody,
but the parents did not reach a point where the agency felt that the child would be
safe if placed in their care.
{¶23} The child’s foster mother testified as follows. The child has been in
her home for 28 months. When the child first entered her care, he “had a lot of
odor” that did not dissipate for about two weeks. He also had some boils, wore
diapers, and was nonverbal. He now is verbal and potty trained.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 10
{¶24} The child receives counseling for his behaviors and requires frequent
supervision. He “gets very mad, like, really fast, like you don’t even know why,
and he would hit his head on the floor, hits his hands, hits the kids real hard, and
just I mean, he’ll scream.” The foster mother has concerns for the child’s future.
She explained that “sometimes he has more bad days than he does good.” The
foster mother has been waiting for a referral to take the child to be evaluated. He
currently takes medication to help keep him calm, but she is waiting to speak to a
doctor to discuss adjusting the dose because the medicine’s effect seems to be
waning.
{¶25} Although the foster mother is not planning to adopt the child, she is
prepared to keep the child in her home until the agency is able to transition him to
a new home. She said that she “love[s]” the child and that the child is bonded with
her.
{¶26} The foster care caseworker, Sabrina Buchanan, testified that she
visited the foster home every month. She explained that “[i]t is rare even during
[her] short visits to the home that” she does not observe a tantrum. During her
visits, the child has hit and kicked her, slammed doors, and hurt the other children.
An individual from Journey Home works with the foster mother to give her ideas
for managing the child’s behaviors. The foster parents provide “a lot of structure”
and the “same routine” for the child, which seems to help.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 11
{¶27} The child receives therapy at Mid-Ohio Behavioral Health and has
been diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder. He started taking medication
for his behavior, and it seemed to work for about two weeks. However, the child
currently is waiting to be evaluated to see if the dosage should be increased. The
child also has been on a waiting list to be evaluated for autism and will continue to
need ongoing care.
{¶28} Linda Copeland testified on behalf of the mother. She works for
Integrated Services and started working with the parents in April 2022. Copeland
visits the parents’ home about every other day and talks to them almost every day.
She helps the parents “with their anger, budgeting, just anything.”
{¶29} Copeland observed four visits between the parents and the child. She
reported that the mother’s “parenting is very good” and that the mother is capable
of parenting the child. Copeland also stated that the parents have made their home
safer by placing safety locks on every door. She has not noticed any major
cleanliness issues, and the parents have improved their ability to manage the cat
litter. During her visits to the parents’ home, she did not observe hazardous items
located in places where the child could reach them.
{¶30} Brad Seevers, another Integrated Services worker, stated that he
started working with the parents in late 2021. He visits the parents’ home at least
once per week and talks to the parents nearly every day. Seevers has found that the
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 12
parents are able to maintain a clean home, and he helped the parents lock up
hazardous items like kitchen knives and lighters.
{¶31} Seevers observed two visits between the parents and the child and
reported that their interaction was “great,” i.e., the parents were engaged with the
child.
{¶32} The maternal grandmother testified that the mother is capable of
caring for the child. The mother testified and likewise stated that she can provide
proper care for the child.
{¶33} The child’s guardian ad litem stated that the parents have made
progress. He nevertheless recommended that the court grant the agency permanent
custody of the child. The guardian ad litem explained that the agency had worked
with the parents for nearly two years and repeatedly emphasized the importance of
keeping hazardous items out of the child’s reach, yet the first overnight visit ended
with a bottle of medication being left in a location where the child could have
reached it.
{¶34} The guardian ad litem spoke with the child, and the child indicated
that he would like to return home. However, the child was “unable to state a
reason as to why he wants to go home other than he likes his parents’ cats.” The
guardian ad litem does not believe that the child possesses the maturity to articulate
“a reasoned position about support and structure and all the things that are at issue
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 13
in this case.” He stated that the child needs “a home where he’s going to get the
structure, reinforcement, assistance that he needs on a minute by minute basis, not
just a daily basis.”
{¶35} On March 28, 2023, the trial court granted the agency permanent
custody of the child. The court found that the child has been in the agency’s
temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and
that placing the child in the agency’s permanent custody is in the child’s best
interest. With respect to the child’s best interest, the court noted that the
caseworker testified that even though “the parents have made great improvements
to better themselves and their home,” the child still would be “in danger and could
get hurt.” The court found that the child is doing well in “foster care and has made
great improvements.” The child now is “verbal and potty trained.” He receives
counseling for behavioral and anger issues. The caseworker stated that “the child
will require an ongoing high level care to deal with his special needs and issues.”
{¶36} The court recognized that the child informed the guardian ad litem
that he would like to return home and that the guardian ad litem recommended that
the court place the child in the agency’s permanent custody. The court noted that
the guardian ad litem indicated that the parents are incapable “of taking care of the
child without the continued and constant help of others, due to their own issues and
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 14
the child’s issues.” The guardian ad litem stated that “the child needs structure,
reinforcement and assistance,” which the parents are unable to provide.
{¶37} The court also pointed out that when the agency filed its permanent
custody motion, the child had been in its temporary custody for more than 20
months and, by the time of the permanent custody hearing, he had been in the
agency’s temporary custody for more than two years.
{¶38} The court additionally found that the child needs a legally secure
permanent placement and that he cannot attain this type of placement without
granting the agency permanent custody. The court thus granted the agency
permanent custody of the child. The parents’ separate appeals followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
CASE NO. 23CA7
I. THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILD, WHEN THAT FINDING WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
II. RULE 48 WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE GAL DID NOT
OBSERVE THE PARENT AND THE CHILD.
CASE NO. 23CA8
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT
CUSTODY TO THE AGENCY AND TERMINATING
MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT’S JUDGMENT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 15
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT THE CHILD
AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT
GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE AGENCY
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶39} For ease of discussion, we have combined our review of the father’s
and the mother’s first assignments of error.
{¶40} In his first assignment of error, the father argues that the trial court’s
decision to place the child in the agency’s permanent custody is not supported by
sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. More
particularly, he contends that the evidence fails to show that he would be unable to
appropriately parent the child. Appellant asserts that he completed the case plan
requirements and promptly remediated any hazards that the agency identified. He
further claims that the evidence fails to support the trial court’s finding that placing
the child in the agency’s permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.
{¶41} In her first assignment of error, the mother similarly argues that the
trial court’s decision to grant the agency permanent custody of the child is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. She asserts that the agency did not present
clear and convincing evidence to establish that placing the child in its permanent
custody is in the child’s best interest. The mother contends that the parents share a
strong and loving bond with the child and have demonstrated their commitment to
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 16
him by attending nearly all of their visitations and by working to improve not only
their own lives but also the condition of their home. She additionally notes that the
child’s guardian ad litem stated that the child wishes to return to his parents’ care.
{¶42} The mother also claims that although the child has been in the
agency’s temporary custody for more than 12 months, the agency’s refusal to
return the child to the parents’ care was based upon “unfounded and unreasonable
fears and speculation.” She further faults the agency for summarily dismissing the
maternal grandmother as a placement.
{¶43} The mother next argues that the evidence fails to support the court’s
finding that the child needs a legally secure permanent placement and that he
cannot achieve this type of placement without granting the agency permanent
custody. She claims that the trial court’s finding that the parents failed to maintain
safe, stable, and clean housing is contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing.
The mother asserts that the agency appeared to hinge its decision to seek
permanent custody on the father’s “singular error” in failing to secure prescription
medicine. The mother further argues that although the trial court recited the
guardian ad litem’s statement that the child needs structure, reinforcement, and
assistance, none of the evidence presented at the hearing “explained what
assistance the Child actually needs.” She contends that the evidence supports a
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 17
finding that the parents are able to provide the child with “an adequate permanent
home.”
{¶44} The mother additionally faults the trial court for seeming to rely upon
any cognitive delays that caused the court and the guardian ad litem concern. In
sum, the mother alleges that the trial court’s best interest findings “are unsupported
conclusory statements.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶45} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court’s permanent
custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, 997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.). When an
appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ “ ‘weighs the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” ’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328,
2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio
App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th Dist.2001), quoting State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 18
{¶46} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing
court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings * * * were supported by clear and
convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895
N.E.2d 809, ¶ 43. In determining whether a trial court based its decision upon
clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to
determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the
requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54
(1990). “Thus, if the children services agency presented competent and credible
evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief
that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.” R.M. at ¶ 55.
{¶47} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may
reverse the judgment only if it appears that the factfinder, when resolving the
conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at
175. A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent custody decision
against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’ ” Id., quoting Martin at
175.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 19
{¶48} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is
“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’
demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v.
Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997); accord In re
Christian, 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA10, 2004-Ohio-3146, ¶ 7. As the Ohio
Supreme Court long ago explained:
In proceedings involving the custody and welfare of children the power of
the trial court to exercise discretion is peculiarly important. The knowledge
obtained through contact with and observation of the parties and through
independent investigation can not be conveyed to a reviewing court by
printed record.
Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952).
{¶49} Furthermore, in a permanent custody case, a trial court judge may
have had significant contact with the parties before a permanent custody motion is
even filed. Thus, “it is not unreasonable to presume that the trial court judge had
far more opportunities to evaluate the credibility, demeanor, attitude, etc., of the
parties than this court ever could from a mere reading of the permanent custody
hearing transcript.” In re K.W., 2018-Ohio-1933, 111 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.).
PERMANENT CUSTODY FRAMEWORK
{¶50} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) specifies that a trial court may grant a children
services agency permanent custody of a child if the court finds, by clear and
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 20
convincing evidence, that (1) the child’s best interest would be served by the award
of permanent custody, and (2) any of the following conditions applies:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one
or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies
for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as
described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the
child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.
(b) The child is abandoned.
(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
are able to take permanent custody.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or
more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of
section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.
(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an
abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any
court in this state or another state.
{¶51} In the case at bar, the trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)
applies.1 Neither the father nor the mother has challenged this finding. Instead,
the father argues that R.C. 2151.414 requires a trial court “to find by clear and
1
We observe that the trial court’s decision appears to contain a typographical error. The court
recited the substance of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), but it cited to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(c).
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 21
convincing evidence * * * that the child cannot be placed with either parent within
a reasonable period of time.” As we have noted in previous cases, however, “R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a), by its terms, is inapplicable when a child has been in a children
services agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-
month period.” In re S.W., 2023-Ohio-793, 210 N.E.3d 36, ¶ 31. Therefore, the
court was not required to consider whether the child cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable time in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). E.g.,
In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 21.
Accordingly, once the court found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applied, the statute
authorized the court to grant the agency permanent custody of the child so long as
the court determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that placing the child in
the agency’s permanent custody is in his best interest.
{¶52} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a trial court to consider all relevant, as
well as specific, factors to determine whether a child’s best interest will be served
by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The specific factors
include: (1) the child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents,
siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly
by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the
child’s maturity; (3) the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a legally
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 22
secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved
without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors
listed under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.
{¶53} Determining whether granting permanent custody to a children
services agency will promote a child’s best interest involves a delicate balancing of
“all relevant [best interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory
factors.” In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 57,
citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56;
accord In re C.G., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24097 and 24099, 2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28;
In re N.W., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 07AP-590 and 07AP-591, 2008-Ohio-297, ¶
19. However, none of the best interest factors requires a court to give it “greater
weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57. Instead, the trial court considers
the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest determination. In re
K.M.S., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-15-37, 9-15-38, and 9-15-39, 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24;
In re A.C., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27328, 2014-Ohio-4918, ¶ 46. In general, “[a]
child’s best interest is served by placing the child in a permanent situation that
fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos.
15CA18 and 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66, citing In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61
Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055 (1991).
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 23
{¶54} In the case at bar, we do not believe that the trial court’s best interest
determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The agency
presented substantial clear and convincing evidence that placing the child in its
permanent custody would serve the child’s best interest.
Child’s Interactions and Interrelationships
{¶55} The evidence shows that the parents adore their child and have
attended a remarkable 102 out of 104 visits. By all accounts, the parents share a
bond with their child. However, when the agency removed the child from the
home, he was nonverbal and not potty trained. He also had boils and rashes from
wearing his diapers for too long, and his skin had a soaked-in smell that took about
two weeks to dissipate. This evidence suggests that the parents had not been
providing the child with a level of interaction that would help the child develop
age-appropriate skills. Additionally, the agency had responded to the home due to
reports of domestic violence, which means that the parents exposed the child to
violent behavior. Thus, although the parents deeply love their child, the
interactions that the child had while in their home indicate that the parents have not
always been able to protect the child from physical, mental, and emotional harm.
{¶56} The evidence also shows that during some of the parents’ visits with
the child, the father and the child fought over toys, and during other visits, the
father ate some of the child’s food. These behaviors caused the child and the
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 24
father to become upset. This evidence illustrates that not all of the parents’
interactions with the child have been positive experiences.
{¶57} The evidence indicates that the foster mother deeply cares for the
child and provides him with structure and routine to help manage his behavioral
issues.
Child’s Wishes
{¶58} The guardian ad litem stated that the child expressed a desire to return
home. However, the guardian ad litem clarified that he was uncertain whether the
child possessed the maturity to accurately convey his wishes. The guardian ad
litem noted that the child made the statement in reference to the family’s cat.
{¶59} The guardian ad litem recommended that the court grant the agency
permanent custody of the child. See, e.g., In re I.A.-W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
111217, 2022-Ohio-1766, ¶ 37; In re S.M., 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA4, 2014-
Ohio-2961, ¶ 32 (both recognizing that R.C. 2151.414 permits juvenile courts to
consider a child’s wishes as child directly expresses or through the guardian ad
litem).
Custodial History
{¶60} The child has been in the agency’s temporary custody since he was
five years old and has remained in the same foster home throughout the case. The
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 25
child also has been in the agency's temporary custody for well over 12 months out
of a consecutive 22-month period.
Legally Secure Permanent Placement
{¶61} “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the term ‘legally
secure permanent placement,’ this court and others have generally interpreted the
phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be
met.” In re M.B., 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56, citing In
re Dyal, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 01CA12, *9 (Aug. 9, 2001) (implying that “legally
secure permanent placement” means a “stable, safe, and nurturing environment”);
see also In re K.M., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 15AP-64 and 15AP-66, 2015-Ohio-
4682, ¶ 28 (observing that legally secure permanent placement requires more than
stable home and income but also requires environment that will provide for child’s
needs); In re J.H., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-126, 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 95 (stating
that mother unable to provide legally secure permanent placement when she lacked
physical and emotional stability and that father unable to do so when he lacked
grasp of parenting concepts); In re J.W., 171 Ohio App.3d 248, 2007-Ohio-2007,
870 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (stating that a legally
secure permanent placement means “a placement that is stable and consistent”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 1354 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure” to mean, in part,
“not exposed to danger; safe; so strong, stable or firm as to insure safety”); Id. at
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 26
1139 (defining “permanent” to mean, in part, “[c]ontinuing or enduring in the same
state, status, place, or the like without fundamental or marked change, not subject
to fluctuation, or alteration, fixed or intended to be fixed; lasting; abiding; stable;
not temporary or transient”). Thus, “[a] legally secure permanent placement is
more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable
environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults
who will provide for the child’s needs.” M.B. at ¶ 56.
{¶62} Moreover, a trial court that is evaluating a child’s need for a legally
secure permanent placement, and whether the child can achieve that type of
placement, need not determine that terminating parental rights is “not only a
necessary option, but also the only option.” Schaefer at ¶ 64. Rather, once a court
finds the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) factors, R.C.
2151.414(D)(1) requires the court to weigh “all the relevant factors * * * to find
the best option for the child.” Id. “The statute does not make the availability of a
placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling
factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more
heavily than other factors.” Id. Instead, as we recognized earlier, a child’s best
interest is served by placing the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth,
stability, and security. C.B.C. at ¶ 66.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 27
{¶63} In the case before us, the evidence shows that placing the child in the
agency’s permanent custody will foster his growth, stability, and security.
Throughout the agency’s involvement, the parents displayed difficulty maintaining
their home so that it continuously would be free of items hazardous to a young,
high-energy child who displays behavioral issues. The agency worked with the
family to alleviate this concern and even progressed to an overnight visit.
Unfortunately, when the caseworker returned in the morning to retrieve the child,
the caseworker discovered a medication bottle within the child’s reach. She
explained that the parents had this recurring problem of being unable to
consistently maintain the home environment so that it would be safe for the child
to return. Thus, despite the parents’ progress, the agency caseworkers continued to
observe hazards in the home even after giving the parents approximately two years
to show that they could maintain a home free from hazards. The parents did not
establish that they would be able to consistently provide the child with a safe
environment, and the agency remained fearful that returning the child to the
parents’ care could result in harm to the child.
{¶64} Plus, the child was nonverbal and not potty trained at five years of
age, which raises questions whether the parents would be able to provide the child
with a level of care that will help foster age-appropriate growth. Furthermore, the
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 28
father continued to have outbursts of anger, and the parents sometimes were
“physically unsafe with each other.”
{¶65} Although the parents presented evidence to show that they were able
to maintain their home free of hazards, the trial court was free to weigh the
testimony and could have determined that even if the parents sometimes were able
to keep the home free from hazards, they were not consistently able to do so.
{¶66} We also recognize the evidence indicates that both parents have made
significant strides to improve their lives and well-being and completed many of
their case plan activities. As we have observed several times in the past, however,
a parent’s case plan compliance may be a relevant, but not necessarily a
conclusive, factor when a court considers a permanent custody motion. In re E.R.,
4th Dist. Athens No. 22CA16, 2023-Ohio-1468, ¶ 45; In re B.P., 4th Dist. Athens
No. 20CA13, 2021-Ohio-3148, ¶ 57; In re T.J., 4th Dist. Highland No. 2016-Ohio-
163, ¶ 36, citing In re R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214 and 27233, 2014-Ohio-
3117, ¶ 34 (“although case plan compliance may be relevant to a trial court’s best
interest determination, it is not dispositive of it”); In re S.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 102349, 2015-Ohio-2280, ¶ 40 (“Compliance with a case plan is not, in and of
itself, dispositive of the issue of reunification”); accord In re K.M., 4th Dist. Ross
No. 19CA3677, 2019-Ohio-4252, ¶ 70, citing In re W.C.J., 4th Dist. Jackson No.
14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5841, ¶ 46 (“[s]ubstantial compliance with a case plan is not
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 29
necessarily dispositive on the issue of reunification and does not preclude a grant
of permanent custody to a children’s services agency”); In re N.L., 9th Dist.
Summit No. 27784, 2015-Ohio-4165, ¶ 35 (“substantial compliance with a case
plan, in and of itself, does not establish that a grant of permanent custody to an
agency is erroneous”). “Indeed, because the trial court’s primary focus in a
permanent custody proceeding is the child’s best interest, ‘it is entirely possible
that a parent could complete all of his/her case plan goals and the trial court still
appropriately terminate his/her parental rights.’ ” W.C.J. at ¶ 46, quoting In re
Gomer, 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-03-19, 16-03-20, and 16-03-21, 2004-Ohio-
1723, ¶ 36; accord In re K.J., 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA14, 2008-Ohio-5227, ¶ 24
(“when considering a R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the focus
is upon the child’s best interests, not upon the parent's compliance with the case
plan”). Thus, a parent’s case plan compliance will not preclude a trial court from
awarding permanent custody to a children services agency when doing so is in the
child’s best interest. Id. Consequently, even though the parents have made
significant improvements in their lives, those improvements do not override the
child’s best interest.
{¶67} The mother additionally alleges that the agency should have
considered whether the maternal grandmother would be an appropriate placement
for the child. The record indicates that early in the case, the maternal grandmother
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 30
asked the agency about obtaining custody of the child. The agency advised the
grandmother that she would not pass the home study, and the grandmother did not
further pursue her request. Nothing in the record indicates that the maternal
grandmother filed a motion for legal custody of the child. We also observe that
courts are not required to favor relative placement if, after considering all the
factors, it is in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted permanent
custody. In re M.H., 4th Dist. Pike No. 17CA882, 2017-Ohio-7365, ¶ 116; In re
T.G., 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA24, 2015–Ohio–5330, ¶ 24; In re V.C., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 102903, 2015–Ohio–4991, ¶ 61 (stating that relative’s positive
relationship with child and willingness to provide an appropriate home did not
trump child's best interest). Moreover, “[i]f permanent custody is in the child’s
best interest, legal custody or placement with [a parent or other relative]
necessarily is not.” In re K.M., 9th Dist. Medina No. 14CA0025–M, 2014–Ohio–
4268, ¶ 9. Here, the trial court determined that placing the child in the agency’s
permanent custody is in his best interest. Thus, placing him in the maternal
grandmother’s legal custody necessarily is not.
{¶68} The mother further charges that the trial court based its decision to
grant the agency permanent custody based solely upon her limited cognitive
abilities. To support this argument, the mother relies on In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d
88, 2007–Ohio–1105, 862 N.E.2d 829.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 31
{¶69} In D.A., the Ohio Supreme Court held that a trial court may not base
its best interest determination “solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the
parents.” Id. at syllabus. In that case, the trial court “found that, although [the
parents] love their son very much and were willing to do anything necessary to
bring him home, returning D.A. to them was not in his best interest, because they
have ‘very low cognitive skills that hinder their day to day functioning’ and
‘demonstrate no ability to engage in the type of complex thinking necessary to
parent a child.’ ” Id. at ¶ 5.
{¶70} The trial court additionally “expressed its concern that [the parents]
function as the child’s peers instead of as his parents” and determined that allowing
“ ‘a normally functioning child like [D.A.] to be parented by two parents with the
severe limitations demonstrated by [the parents] is to seriously jeopardize his
healthy, successful future.’ ” Id. The trial court concluded that the child could not
be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
either parent because the parents “ ‘have failed continually and repeatedly for a
period of six months or more to substantially remedy the conditions causing
removal.’ ” Id. The trial court thus placed the child in the agency’s permanent
custody.
{¶71} The parents appealed the trial court’s judgment, and the appellate
court affirmed. On further appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the parents argued
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 32
that the trial court terminated their parental rights based solely upon “their limited
cognitive abilities.” Id. at ¶ 19. The parents asserted that “their low IQ scores
were the only objective evidence to support a finding that D.A. could not or should
not be placed with them and that it was in his best interest to terminate their
parental rights.”
{¶72} The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the parents and concluded that
the trial court had not applied the proper statutory factors before placing the child
in the agency’s permanent custody. The court noted that the trial court relied on
R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), but it “did not find that [the parents] were unable to provide
an adequate home for D.A. due to their mental retardation, a finding that is
required to satisfy R.C. 2151.414(E)(2).”2 Id. at ¶ 33.
{¶73} The court also determined that the trial court did not consider the
appropriate best interest factors but, instead, “focused on [the] parents’ limited
cognitive abilities.” Id. at ¶ 35. The court explained that the trial court should not
have considered the parents’ intellectual disability. Rather, “the court should have
2
At the time of the D.A. court’s decision, R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) stated that a trial court could find
that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with either parent if it found the existence of “[c]hronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness,
mental retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that
it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present
time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the [disposition] hearing * * *.”
D.A. at ¶ 23.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 33
considered factors such as their relationship with their child, whether they had ever
harmed him, and where the child wished to live.” Id., citing R.C. 2151.414(D).
The court pointed out that “there was no evidence that [the parents] have harmed
D.A. either physically, emotionally, or mentally.” Id. at ¶ 36. Additionally, the
evidence showed that the child “has done well in school, and his behavior is
appropriate.” Id.
{¶74} The court ultimately held: “when determining the best interest of a
child under R.C. 2151.414(D) at a permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may
not base its decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents.” Id.
The court recognized that other cases had upheld decisions that placed a child in an
agency’s permanent custody based upon a parent’s intellectual disability. The
court distinguished those cases by noting that “objective evidence existed to show
that the statute was satisfied.” Id., citing In re C.E., 12th Dist. Butler Nos.
CA2006–01–015 and CA2006–02–024, 2006-Ohio-4827 (the mother needed
constant supervision and prompting to meet child’s basic needs and had inadequate
housing); In re King, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 05 CA 77, 2006-Ohio-781 (the mother
consistently relied on others to meet many of her basic needs and lost her housing).
{¶75} D.A. does not control the outcome of the case before us. Instead, the
trial court relied upon “objective evidence” to support its decision. It did not rely
solely on the parents’ limited cognitive abilities. In the previous paragraphs, we
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 34
outlined some of the facts that support the trial court’s decision. And as we have
noted in prior cases, a parent’s cognitive abilities may be relevant to determining
the child’s best interests when “objective evidence” shows that a parent’s
“cognitive status impeded [the parents’] ability to care for [the] children in that [the
parent was] unable to recognize or protect [the] children from harm.” In re M.N.,
4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA9, 2008-Ohio-4821, ¶ 23.
{¶76} Here, as we discussed above, the agency presented objective evidence
that the parents’ cognitive status impedes their ability to care for the child and that
they are unable to protect him from physical, emotional, or mental harm.
Moreover, as in C.E. and King, the evidence here likewise shows that the parents
need daily assistance meeting their own needs. Additionally, unlike the child in
D.A., who did not have behavioral issues, the child in the case before us displays
difficult behavioral issues at home and at school. Thus, the trial court relied upon
some facts, other than the parents’ apparently limited cognitive abilities, to support
its decision. Furthermore, the trial court considered the appropriate best interest
factors, unlike the trial court in D.A. See M.N. at ¶ 23.
{¶77} To the extent the mother asserts that the trial court’s decision is too
conclusory, the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a trial court must
detail its findings regarding the best interest factors. In re M.M., 4th Dist. Pike No.
20CA907, 2021-Ohio-2287, ¶ 50, citing In re A.M., 166 Ohio St. 3d 127, 2020-
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 35
Ohio-5102, 184 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31. Instead, the A.M. court stated that the record
simply must show that the trial court “considered” (i.e., reflected upon or thought
about with a degree of care or caution) the best interest factors. In the case before
us, the record shows that the trial court considered the best interest factors.
{¶78} Accordingly, based upon all of the foregoing reasons, we overrule the
father’s and the mother’s first assignments of error.
CASE NO. 23CA7
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶79} In his second assignment of error, the father asserts that the guardian
ad litem did not comply with Sup.R. 48.03. He contends that the guardian ad litem
failed to observe the child with the parents and that this failure discredits the
guardian ad litem’s recommendation regarding the child’s best interest.
{¶80} We initially observe that, during the trial court proceedings, the father
did not assert that the guardian ad litem failed to comply with Sup.R. 48.03. It is
well-settled that a party may not raise new issues or legal theories for the first time
on appeal. Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629
(1975). Thus, a litigant who fails to raise an argument before the trial court forfeits
the right to raise that issue on appeal. Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty.
Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 30 (“an
appellant generally may not raise an argument on appeal that the appellant has not
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 36
raised in the lower courts”); State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-
4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 21 (defendant forfeited constitutional challenge by failing
to raise it during trial court proceedings); Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy, 88 Ohio
St.3d 201, 204, 724 N.E.2d 787 (2000) (party waived arguments for purposes of
appeal when party failed to raise those arguments during trial court proceedings);
State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 175, 177,
602 N.E.2d 622 (1992) (appellant cannot “present * * * new arguments for the first
time on appeal”); accord State ex rel. Jeffers v. Athens Cty. Commrs., 4th Dist.
Athens No. 15CA27, 2016-Ohio-8119, fn.3 (“[i]t is well-settled that failure to
raise an argument in the trial court results in waiver of the argument for purposes
of appeal”); State v. Anderson, 4th Dist. Washington No. 15CA28, 2016-Ohio-
2704, ¶ 24 (“arguments not presented in the trial court are deemed to be waived
and may not be raised for the first time on appeal”).
{¶81} Appellate courts may, however, in certain circumstances, consider a
forfeited argument using a plain error analysis. E.g., State v. Jones, 160 Ohio St.3d
314, 2020-Ohio-3051, 156 N.E.3d 872, ¶ 17 (“[a]n appellate court has discretion to
notice plain error”); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct.
1897, 1904, 201 L.Ed.2d 376 (2018) (court has discretion to recognize plain error);
State v. Jones, 7th Dist. No. 06-MA-109, 2008-Ohio-1541, ¶ 65 (the plain error
doctrine “is a wholly discretionary doctrine”). For the plain error doctrine to
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 37
apply, the party claiming error must establish (1) that “ ‘an error, i.e., a deviation
from a legal rule” occurred, (2) that the error was “ ‘an “obvious” defect in the trial
proceedings,’ ” and (3) that this obvious error affected substantial rights, i.e., the
error “ ‘must have affected the outcome of the trial.’ ” State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio
St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio
St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002); Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio
St.2d 207, 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (1982) (“A ‘plain error’ is obvious and
prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively waived which, if
permitted, would have a material adverse affect on the character and public
confidence in judicial proceedings.”). For an error to be “plain” or “obvious,” the
error must be plain “under current law” “at the time of appellate consideration.”
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718
(1997); accord Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240.
{¶82} The plain error doctrine is not, however, readily invoked in civil
cases. Instead, an appellate court “must proceed with the utmost caution” when
applying the plain error doctrine in civil cases. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio
St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). The Ohio Supreme Court has set a “very
high standard” for invoking the plain error doctrine in a civil case. Perez v. Falls
Financial, Inc., 87 Ohio St.3d 371, 721 N.E.2d 47 (2000). Thus, “the doctrine is
sharply limited to the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 38
where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the
basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby
challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss, 79
Ohio St.3d at 122, 679 N.E.2d 1099; accord Jones v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 161
Ohio St.3d 337, 2020-Ohio-3780, 163 N.E.3d 501, ¶ 24; Gable v. Gates Mills, 103
Ohio St.3d 449, 2004-Ohio-5719, 816 N.E.2d 1049, ¶ 43. Moreover, appellate
courts “should be hesitant to decide [forfeited errors] for the reason that justice is
far better served when it has the benefit of briefing, arguing, and lower court
consideration before making a final determination.” Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio
St.3d 330, 332, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2; accord Mark v. Mellott Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 106 Ohio App.3d 571, 589, 666 N.E.2d 631 (4th Dist.1995) (“Litigants must
not be permitted to hold their arguments in reserve for appeal, thus evading the
trial court process.”). Additionally, “[t]he plain error doctrine should never be
applied to reverse a civil judgment * * * to allow litigation of issues which could
easily have been raised and determined in the initial trial.” Goldfuss, 79 Ohio
St.3d at 122.
{¶83} In the case sub judice, the father did not argue that the trial court
obviously erred by considering the guardian ad litem’s recommendation. “We
further point out that this court, along with other Ohio appellate courts, has refused
to recognize purported [superintendence rule] violations as reversible error.” In re
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 39
A.P., 4th Dist. Gallia No. 21CA14, 2022-Ohio-1577, ¶ 46; e.g., In re K.L., 11th
Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0022, 2021-Ohio-3080, ¶ 63 (“the failure to comply with
the Rules of Superintendence, even if a technical error, is not reversible”); In re
E.W., 4th Dist. Washington No. 10CA18, 2011-Ohio-2123, ¶ 12 (superintendence
rules are internal housekeeping rules that do not create any substantive rights);
Pettit v. Pettit, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-08-018, 2012-Ohio-1801, ¶ 12
(superintendence rules are “administrative directives only, and are not intended to
function as rules of practice and procedure”); accord Gupta v. Sharan, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 22AP-81, 2022-Ohio-4479, ¶ 44; State v. Clark, 9th Dist. Medina No.
20CA0020-M, 2021-Ohio-3397, ¶ 39; State v. Klayman, 4th Dist. Hocking No.
17CA13, 2018-Ohio-3580, ¶ 17; see State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd, 160 Ohio
St.3d 141, 2020-Ohio-2766, 154 N.E.3d 57, ¶ 41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), quoting State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 110, 362
N.E.2d 1216 (1977) (“ ‘[t]he Rules of Superintendence are not designed to alter
basic substantive rights’ ”).
{¶84} Moreover, the father has not shown that the result of the trial court
proceedings would have been different if the guardian ad litem had observed the
child with the parents. The father did not argue, for example, that if the guardian
ad litem had observed the child with the parents, the trial court would have rejected
the agency’s permanent-custody motion. Consequently, we do not believe that the
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 40
father can establish that the trial court plainly erred by considering the guardian ad
litem’s recommendation.
{¶85} Therefore, we overrule the father’s second assignment of error.
CASE NUMBER 23CA8
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶86} In her second assignment of error, the mother asserts that the trial
court erred by failing to appoint an attorney to represent the child. She contends
that the record establishes that the child’s wishes conflicted with the guardian ad
litem’s recommendation and that this conflict required the trial court to appoint
independent counsel to represent the child.
{¶87} We initially observe that the mother did not request the trial court to
appoint independent counsel for the child when she became aware that the child
had told the guardian ad litem that he would like to return home. Therefore, the
mother failed to preserve the issue for purposes of appeal. In re B.J.L., 2019-Ohio-
555, 130 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 41 (4th Dist.), citing In re C.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 231, 2011-
Ohio-2899, 951 N.E.2d 398, ¶ 18. We nevertheless may review this assignment of
error for plain error. See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of
Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 27 (stating that
reviewing court has discretion to consider forfeited constitutional challenges). As
we explain below, we do not believe that the trial court committed an error, plain
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 41
or otherwise, by failing to appoint—or by failing to inquire whether to appoint—
independent counsel for the child.
{¶88} “[A] child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding to
terminate parental rights is a party to that proceeding and, therefore, is entitled to
independent counsel in certain circumstances.” In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d
398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110, syllabus, citing R.C. 2151.352, Juv.R.
4(A), and Juv.R. 2(Y). Williams does not mandate that a child always have
independent counsel in a juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental rights.
Instead, a child is entitled to independent counsel in a parental-rights termination
proceeding only when “certain circumstances” exist. Id.
{¶89} The Williams court did not explicitly explain the “certain
circumstances” that would warrant the appointment of independent counsel.
Instead, the court offered the following guidance for juvenile courts to follow when
ascertaining if “certain circumstances” exist: “courts should make a determination,
on a case-by-case basis, whether the child actually needs independent counsel,
taking into account the maturity of the child and the possibility of the guardian ad
litem being appointed to represent the child.” Id. at ¶ 17. Furthermore, a juvenile
court must appoint independent counsel for a child “when a guardian ad litem who
is also appointed as the juvenile’s attorney recommends a disposition that conflicts
with the juvenile's wishes.” Id. at ¶ 18.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 42
{¶90} Consequently, a trial court ordinarily should appoint independent
counsel for a child “ ‘when the child has consistently and repeatedly expressed a
strong desire that differs and is otherwise inconsistent with the guardian ad litem’s
recommendations.’ ” In re V.L., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-03-045, 2016-
Ohio-4898, ¶ 39, quoting In re B.K., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-12-324, 2011-
Ohio-4470, ¶ 19; accord In re Hilyard, 4th Dist. Vinton Nos. 05CA600 through
05CA609, 2006-Ohio-1965, ¶ 36. However, a trial court generally need not “
‘consider the appointment of counsel based upon a child’s occasional expression of
a wish to be with a parent or because of a statement made by an immature child.’ ”
In re N.P., 2016-Ohio-3125, 65 N.E.3d 319 (11th Dist.), ¶ 14, quoting In re
Williams, 11th Dist. Geauga Nos. 2002-G-2454, 2002-Ohio-6588, ¶ 24 (Williams
I); accord In re E.S., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-36, 2017-Ohio-219, ¶ 49.
{¶91} In the case before us, “certain circumstances” do not exist. The record
does not show that the child consistently and repeatedly expressed a strong desire
to live with his parents. Rather, the record shows that on one occasion, the child
told the guardian ad litem that he would like to return home. The child’s singular
statement does not show that he consistently and repeatedly expressed a desire that
conflicted with the guardian ad litem’s recommendation. See In re V.L. at ¶ 43
(concluding that foster mother’s testimony that child talked about returning home,
and caseworker’s statement that early in the case, child asked “a lot” when she was
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 43
going home to her parents did not show that child “consistently and repeatedly”
expressed a strong desire that conflicted with guardian ad litem’s
recommendation).
{¶92} The guardian ad litem’s testimony further suggests that the child may
not possess the maturity to accurately convey his wishes. The guardian ad litem
explained that the child was “unable to state a reason as to why he wants to go
home other than he likes his parents’ cats.” He further stated that he does not
believe that the child is “old enough to come up with a reasoned position about
support and structure and all the things that are at issue in this case to do that.”
{¶93} Furthermore, any mandatory duty to investigate that might exist arises
“ ‘when a child consistently expresses a desire to be with a parent.’ ” Williams at ¶
6, quoting Williams I, 2002-Ohio-6588, at ¶ 26; accord In re B.J.L., 2019-Ohio-
555, 130 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.). As we determined above, the child did not
consistently express a desire to live with his parents. Thus, even if trial courts have
a duty to investigate when a child consistently expresses a desire to be with a
parent, that circumstance does not exist in the case at bar. Consequently, we do
not agree with the mother that the trial court erred by failing to appoint
independent counsel to represent the child.
{¶94} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule the
mother’s second assignment of error.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 44
CONCLUSION
{¶95} Having overruled the father’s and the mother’s assignments of error,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. Nos. 23CA7 and 23CA8 45
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellants.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J., & Wilkin, J., Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
____________________________________
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.