UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7754
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHORYA A. STATON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District
Judge. (CR-93-49)
Submitted: August 26, 1997 Decided: September 10, 1997
Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chorya A. Staton, Appellant Pro Se. Arenda L. Wright Allen, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Chorya A. Staton of attempting to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of heroin with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846
(1994). Staton appealed, arguing that his prosecution on the
charges contained in the superseding indictment violated the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994) ("Act"). We remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to determine on what
date it received a copy of the Supreme Court’s order denying
Staton's petition for a writ of certiorariCa date critical to the
speedy trial calculation. See United States v. Staton, No. 95-
5355, 1996 WL 465841 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1996) (unpublished). On
remand, the district court determined that it received the Supreme
Court's order on December 14Cthe date on which it was filedCand
that no violation of the Act occurred. Staton appeals from that
order.
Staton contends on appeal that the district court had notice
of the Supreme Court's denial of his petition for a writ of certio-
rari on October 18, thereby making his trial untimely under the
Act. He failed to show, however, that the district court's factual
finding that the court received notice of the Supreme Court's
denial on December 14 was clearly erroneous. Because Staton's trial
began within the seventy-day period provided by the Act, we affirm.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
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tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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