UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRUCE E. LUDWICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-2205
PREMIER BANK NORTH,
INCORPORATED; PREMIER BANKSHARES
CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
James C. Turk, District Judge.
(CA-95-189-A)
Submitted: June 30, 1997
Decided: September 9, 1997
Before HALL, MURNAGHAN, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Edward G. Stout, BRESSLER, CURCIO & STOUT, Bristol, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. William R. Rakes, Paul G. Klockenbrink, GEN-
TRY, LOCKE, RAKES & MOORE, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellees.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Bruce Ludwick, the former president of a small bank in southwest
Virginia, appeals the district court's order of summary judgment in
his civil suit alleging wrongful termination and fraud. Specifically,
Ludwick claims that the Appellees, his former employers, Premier
Bank North, Inc. (Premier North), and Premier's holding company,
Premier Bankshares Corp. (Bankshares), terminated his employment
as the president of Premier North in violation of public policy and
committed fraud when they recruited him by misleading him about
the bank's financial condition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm
the district court's order.
Ludwick's wrongful termination claim is without merit. First, Lud-
wick was not terminated against his will. Ludwick chose to resign his
position as the president of Premier North after being informed that
Bankshares would merge Premier North with another small bank, and
Ludwick was not selected as the new bank's president. Bankshares
requested that Ludwick remain president of Premier North until com-
pletion of the merger and then accept a position in the new bank as
a senior vice-president; however, Ludwick chose to resign. Although
Ludwick asserts that his resignation was conditioned upon Bank-
shares' acceptance of his proposed severance package, the claim is
without merit. The parties did not have to agree on conditions for
Ludwick's employment to cease. Ludwick did not have an employ-
ment contract; thus, he was inarguably an at-will employee, and, in
Virginia, at-will employment is terminable by either party at any time.1
However, Ludwick asserts that the district court erred because his
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1 See Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys., 247 Va. 98, 102, 439
S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc. , 234 Va. 462, 362
S.E.2d 915 (1987).
2
termination violated a purported public policy of Virginia to prevent
banking irregularities. The public policy exception to at-will employ-
ment provides a cause of action for an at-will employee who is dis-
charged for a reason which violates the policy underlying a specific
state statute designed to protect the public interest.2 Ludwick's asser-
tion fails because he cannot identify a specific Virginia statute sup-
ported by this policy, nor can he specify what precise statute the
Appellees purportedly contravened.3 When no statute is implicated,
the discharge of an at-will employee is lawful, and the employee's
wrongful discharge suit must be dismissed.
Finally, Ludwick fails to present a prima facie case of fraud. While
Ludwick claims that the Appellees fraudulently induced him into
accepting the position of president at Premier North, Ludwick cannot
establish that they concealed a material fact upon which he relied.
None of the alleged misstatements involved a promise by the Appel-
lees to employ Ludwick for a set period of time, or that Premier North
would not merge with another bank.4 In fact, Ludwick concedes in his
deposition that he received an honest response when he inquired into
the possibility of an employment contract. Thus, Ludwick's conclu-
sory allegations of misrepresentation are insufficient as a matter of law.5
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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2 Lockhart, 247 Va. at 102, 439 S.E. 2d at 330.
3 See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 98-99,
465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1996).
4 See Sea-Land Serv. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 353-54, 297 S.E.2d 647,
652-53 (1982).
5 See Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 439 S.E.2d
387 (1994).
3