STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A23-0915
Hennepin County Chutich, J.
Ronald Lewis Greer,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: February 7, 2024
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
________________________
Ronald L. Greer, Moose Lake, Minnesota, pro se.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________
SYLLABUS
The district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying appellant’s
petition for postconviction relief when the petition was time-barred under Minnesota
Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4 (2022).
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
1
OPINION
CHUTICH, Justice.
In this postconviction proceeding, appellant Ronald Lewis Greer challenges his
conviction of first-degree murder. The district court denied Greer’s petition without a
hearing, and Greer appealed. Because the petition is time-barred, we affirm.
FACTS
Just after midnight on July 26, 1998, Kareem Brown was shot and killed in south
Minneapolis. State v. Greer (Greer I), 635 N.W.2d 82, 85 (Minn. 2001). At least five
witnesses implicated Greer in Brown’s murder, and, after his arrest, Greer made several
incriminating statements to the police. Id. at 85–86. On October 15, 1998, a grand jury
indicted Greer, charging him with one count of first-degree murder and one count of
second-degree murder in connection with Brown’s death. 1
At trial, the State argued that Greer murdered Brown in retaliation for an alleged
theft. Id. at 85. In his defense, Greer claimed that he was at a friend’s house when Brown
was killed, and he named a different man as the shooter. Id. On May 13, 1999, a jury
found Greer guilty of first- and second-degree murder. The district court convicted Greer
of both offenses and sentenced him to life in prison. In October 1999, the district court
filed a corrected judgment to reflect that Greer was only sentenced on the first-degree
murder conviction, stating “Count 2 merged.”
1
For a more detailed recitation of the facts surrounding Brown’s death and Greer’s
conviction, see Greer I, 635 N.W.2d at 85–87. Here, we limit our discussion to those facts
relevant to the petition.
2
On direct appeal, we rejected three of Greer’s arguments as meritless, but we
remanded his fourth argument to the chief judge of the judicial district to determine
whether a Schwartz hearing 2 was required to evaluate the propriety of the district court
judge’s ex parte contacts with jurors. Id. at 92–94. The case returned to us after remand,
and we concluded that the way the chief judge conducted the Schwartz hearing was not an
abuse of discretion and affirmed the order denying Greer a new trial. State v. Greer
(Greer II), 662 N.W.2d 121, 123–25 (Minn. 2003). Over the next decade, Greer filed three
petitions for postconviction relief. The district court denied each, and we affirmed each
denial. Greer v. State (Greer III), 673 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. 2004) (affirming the denial
of Greer’s first petition); Greer v. State (Greer IV), 836 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Minn. 2013)
(consolidating, and affirming the denial of, Greer’s second and third petitions). 3
In 2021, Greer filed a motion to correct his sentence under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9. He advanced several reasons why his sentence
was unlawful, including that he was sentenced to two degrees of the same crime in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1 (2020). Although the district court
granted Greer’s motion in part, vacating his second-degree murder conviction, it did so
2
A Schwartz hearing takes place if jury impartiality is questioned. Schwartz v.
Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960). During the hearing,
juror examination occurs on the record, with counsel present for all parties. Id. The
hearing’s purpose is to determine whether misconduct influenced the jury’s verdict. Id.
3
Greer also filed a motion to correct his sentence in 2014, requesting 276 days of jail
credit against his life sentence for time spent in pretrial custody. The district court granted
that motion.
3
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.04 (2020). 4 Greer appealed, claiming in part that the
court erred in failing to hold a sentencing hearing when it vacated his second-degree murder
conviction. Greer v. State (Greer V), 973 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 2022). We affirmed,
holding that no hearing was required because the district court’s order “neither imposed an
initial sentence, nor modified the previously imposed life sentence.” Id. at 924–25.
In February 2023, Greer filed this fourth petition for postconviction relief, asking
the district court to vacate his first-degree murder conviction, reinstate his previously
vacated second-degree murder conviction, and resentence him accordingly. The State
countered that Greer’s petition is time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01,
subdivision 4(a) (2022), procedurally barred under the rule announced in State v. Knaffla,
243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), 5 and meritless. The district court summarily denied Greer’s
petition, finding his claims time-barred by statute and, alternatively, procedurally barred
under Knaffla. Because Greer’s allegations failed to establish his entitlement to relief, the
district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Greer then brought this appeal.
4
In response to Greer’s motion, the State acknowledged an error, not raised by Greer,
that the district court convicted Greer of both first- and second-degree murder, in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, which permits a defendant to be “ ‘convicted of
either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.’ ” Greer v. State (Greer V),
973 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.04). The State noted that
section 609.04 is related to Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subd. 1, which prohibits
sentencing a defendant more than once for a single behavioral incident. Id.
5
In Knaffla, we held that after a defendant has directly appealed their conviction, “all
matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a
subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” 243 N.W.2d at 741.
4
ANALYSIS
Minnesota’s postconviction statute requires that courts “liberally construe”
postconviction petitions and “look to the substance thereof and waive any irregularities or
defects in form.” Minn. Stat. § 590.03 (2022). Similarly, courts should read pro se
petitions “with an understanding eye.” Jackson v. State, 919 N.W.2d 470, 472–73
(Minn. 2018) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We interpret Greer’s petition in light of these principles. Greer claims that he is
entitled to postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes sections 609.04 and 611.02
(2022). Section 609.04 provides that a defendant “may be convicted of either the crime
charged or an included offense, but not both” and defines “included offense” as “a lesser
degree of the same crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1. Section 611.02 provides that
“when an offense has been proved against the defendant, and there exists a reasonable
doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be
convicted only of the lowest.” Minn. Stat. § 611.02. Greer claims that these statutes
require that his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder be vacated, and that his
second-degree murder conviction be reinstated. He posits that our obligation to apply the
“most favorable” standard of review in assessing his postconviction claims further supports
his petition.
We review the summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion
and reverse only if the district court erred in its application of law or made clearly erroneous
factual findings. Rossberg v. State, 932 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Minn. 2019). The district court must
hold an evidentiary hearing unless “the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
5
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1
(2022). “Accordingly, a postconviction court may summarily deny a claim that is untimely
under the 2-year statute of limitations.” Rossberg, 932 N.W.2d at 9 (citing Colbert v. State,
870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 2015)). Because we conclude that the district court properly
applied the statutory time-bar in section 590.01, subdivision 4 (2022), to Greer’s petition,
we do not address whether Greer’s claims are also barred by Knaffla and have no need to
reach the merits of Greer’s claims.
Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), limits a petitioner’s time to
seek postconviction relief. A petition is untimely if filed “more than two years after the
later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or
(2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(a)(1)–(2). This statutory, 2-year time limit took effect on August 1, 2005. For
petitioners like Greer, whose conviction for first-degree murder became final before that
date, “the deadline for filing a petition for postconviction relief was July 31, 2007.”
Greer IV, 836 N.W.2d at 522 (citing Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005
Minn. Laws 901, 1098). 6
There are exceptions to the 2-year time-bar. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)
(listing five exceptions to the time-bar). For example, the time-bar does not apply where
“a petitioner’s disability prevents a timely petition, where newly discovered scientific
6
The Act specifies: “This section is effective August 1, 2005. Any person whose
conviction became final before August 1, 2005, shall have two years after the effective date
of this act to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, § 13,
2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1908.
6
evidence clearly and convincingly establishes innocence, where a change in the law applies
to the petitioner’s case, or where ‘the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of
justice.’ ” Moua v. State, 778 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2008)). “But if the petitioner does not invoke any of the exceptions,
we need not consider them.” Griffin v. State, 941 N.W.2d 404, 410 (Minn. 2020) (citing
Clifton v. State, 830 N.W.2d 434, 438 n.2 (Minn. 2013)). Additionally, a petition invoking
an exception “must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises,” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c), determined by when a petitioner “knew or should have known” the
claim existed. See Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Minn. 2012).
Applying these statutory provisions here shows that Greer’s fourth petition for
postconviction relief is time-barred. On direct appeal, we affirmed Greer’s conviction for
first-degree murder on May 29, 2003. Greer II, 662 N.W.2d at 121–22. The conviction
became final 90 days thereafter. See Berkovitz v. State, 826 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 2013)
(“When an appellant does not file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the
United States following our decision on direct appeal, the appellant’s conviction becomes
‘final’ 90 days after our decision for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2).”);
Moua, 778 N.W.2d at 288 (“Moua’s direct appeal was decided on April 22, 2004. His
conviction became final 90 days thereafter. Because his conviction was final before
August 1, 2005, Moua had until July 31, 2007—two years after the effective date of the
amending act—to file his petition for postconviction relief.” (citations omitted)).
Because Greer’s conviction for first-degree murder became final before August 1,
2005, he had until July 31, 2007, to bring a postconviction relief petition. Greer IV,
7
836 N.W.2d at 522. But Greer filed his February 2023 petition approximately 16 years
after his statutory filing deadline expired. See id. (“The petitions Greer filed in May 2012
and August 2012 were brought approximately five years after the deadline in subdivision
4(a) had expired.”). Nor does Greer raise an exception to the time-bar. And even if Greer
had raised an exception, any such claim likely arose more than 2 years ago, meaning it
would also be barred. See id. at 523 (rejecting Greer’s interests-of-justice claim because it
“arose more than two years before he filed his petitions for postconviction relief”).
Greer claims, however, that when the district court vacated his second-degree
murder conviction in 2021, that order was the final disposition of his case. He argues that
this order provided him an additional 2 years within which to bring a petition for
postconviction relief. We disagree.
As we recognized in Greer V, the district court’s 2021 order vacating Greer’s
second-degree murder conviction merely clarified a 1999 order that sought to achieve the
same disposition. 973 N.W.2d at 925. In the 2021 order, the district court “order[ed] that
the record accurately reflect that [Greer’s] sentence and conviction on Count 2, Murder in
the 2nd Degree-Intentional, are vacated. The guilty verdict for Count 2 shall remain intact
and a disposition of no adjudication, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.04, shall be entered.”
On appeal, we defined that order’s contours, stating:
The August 2021 order simply clarified the disposition intended by the
district court when it used the language “Count 2 merged” in its October 1999
order: specifically, that the conviction for the lesser-included offense of
second-degree intentional murder be vacated. . . . [T]he August 2021 order
neither imposed an initial sentence, nor modified the previously imposed life
sentence for the conviction of first-degree premeditated murder[.]
8
Greer V, 973 N.W.2d at 925. Thus, Greer’s claim that the district court’s 2021 order
finalized his conviction for postconviction relief purposes is unavailing.
In sum, Greer’s time to file a petition for postconviction relief ended on July 31,
2007, none of the statutory exceptions apply, and there is no merit to his claim that his time
to file restarted in August 2021. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in summarily denying Greer’s petition as time-barred because his allegations, even taken
as true, are legally insufficient to justify relief. 7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.
7
Because Greer’s petition is time-barred, we need not reach the merits of his claim.
We note, however, that even if his petition were not time-barred, section 611.02 offers him
no relief. Greer alleges that he should be convicted of only second-degree, rather than
first-degree, murder based on section 611.02’s text. This section provides: “[W]hen an
offense has been proved against the defendant, and there exists a reasonable doubt as to
which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be convicted only
of the lowest.” Minn. Stat. § 611.02.
This provision applies only when “there exists a reasonable doubt” as to the
defendant’s guilt. It does not, as Greer suggests, require a district court to enter a
conviction for only the lowest offense when a jury returns guilty verdicts for a greater and
lesser-included crime. Here, the jury returned guilty verdicts against Greer for first- and
second-degree murder. No reasonable doubt existed as to his guilt for either offense, and
the district court properly entered a conviction for the greater offense.
9