Knight v. Runyon

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RUTH KNIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARVIN RUNYON, Postmaster
General of the United States,
Defendant-Appellee, No. 96-2115

and

TERRY BARRY, Postmaster, Fairfield
Branch, Hilton Head Island, South
Carolina,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
Robert S. Carr, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-93-2681)

Submitted: December 9, 1997

Decided: December 31, 1997

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Jack D. Simrill, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, for Appellant. J.
Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Joseph P. Griffith, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina; R. Andrew Ger-
man, Managing Counsel, David G. Karro, Christopher Pearson,
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Ruth Knight appeals from a magistrate judge's order, 1 after a bench
trial, granting her injunctive relief for her employer's unlawful dis-
crimination but denying her back pay or other monetary relief. She
also appeals from the magistrate judge's order denying her motion to
reconsider or for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Knight, formerly a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service
("Post Office"), alleged that she was illegally discriminated against on
numerous grounds in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).2 The district
court granted the Post Office summary judgment except for Knight's
allegations that it altered her mail route (which thereby reduced her
salary) in retaliation for her prior discrimination complaints. Because
the Post Office admitted its reassignment was in fact retaliatory, the
parties proceeded to trial on the sole issue of what was the appropriate
relief for the employer's admittedly wrongful action.
_________________________________________________________________
1 The parties consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C.A. § 636(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
2 The parties do not dispute that the acts at issue occurred prior to the
effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and therefore Knight is
limited to equitable remedies. See Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (compensatory and punitive
damages not authorized prior to enactment of 1991 Act).

2
After a two day bench trial, the magistrate judge made the follow-
ing factual findings. Knight was employed with the Post Office from
August 1985 to February 13, 1991, at which point she left work for
psychological reasons and never returned. On March 9, 1991, the Post
Office, in retaliation for Knight's previous discrimination complaints,
altered her route so that had she returned to work her salary would
have been decreased by approximately $9000 per year. Knight
applied for and received compensation benefits arising out of her psy-
chological injury of February 13, 1991.3 Although the Post Office's
discriminatory route readjustment may have contributed in some way
to Knight's psychological problems, the primary cause of her inability
to work was caused by tragic personal circumstances. Finally, the
court found that Knight's testimony regarding her personal circum-
stances was "less than truthful." (Joint appendix ("J.A.") at 752).

Based upon these factual findings, the magistrate judge concluded
that because Knight was already unavailable for work at the time of
the route adjustment, the discriminatory act was not"causally linked
to [Knight's] . . . psychological condition and consequent unavaila-
bility to work." (J.A. at 753). Therefore, because the employer's ille-
gal act was unrelated to Knight's inability to work, the magistrate
judge ordered no back pay or other damages. The magistrate judge
did, however, order the Post Office to refrain from engaging in any
practice in violation of Title VII, including retaliation should Knight
ever return to work. On appeal, Knight alleges the magistrate judge
erred in his factual finding that Knight was already unavailable for
work at the time of the retaliatory reassignment and by failing to
award back pay or other monetary relief.

A district court's award of back pay is left to the discretion of the
trial judge. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp. , 48 F.3d 1343, 1358-
59 (4th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has explained that back pay
under Title VII is awarded "to make persons whole for injuries suf-
fered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). When an injury is of
_________________________________________________________________
3 Knight receives a percentage of her salary under the Federal Employ-
ees Compensation Act ("FECA"). See generally 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8101-
8151 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (FECA compensates employees totally
disabled by work-related injuries).

3
an economic nature, "[t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as
may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not
been committed." Id. at 418-19 (citation and internal quotations omit-
ted).

Thus, we do not find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion
in finding that Knight was already unavailable for work prior to the
Post Office's discriminatory conduct--and therefore had no effect on
her ability to work. There was ample evidence in the record to support
the magistrate judge's findings. See Martin, 48 F.3d at 1358. Finally,
because the Post Office's discriminatory act did not cause a loss in
pay, the magistrate judge correctly denied such relief on that basis.
See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, we affirm
the magistrate judge's order only granting injunctive relief and affirm
the order denying Knight's motion for reconsideration or for a new
trial. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con-
tentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4