NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
ISIAH HILL, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, REHABILITATION,
AND REENTRY, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 23-0477
FILED 2-13-2024
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-016378
The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Isiah Romont Hill, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michelle C. Lombino, Daniel P. Schaack
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
HILL v. ADCRR
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
C A T L E T T, Judge:
¶1 Isiah Hill (“Hill”) brought an action in the superior court
seeking an “Order To Show Cause” against the Arizona Department of
Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry (“ADCRR”). ADCRR moved to
dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. Hill moved to strike ADCRR’s
motion. The superior court denied Hill’s motion to strike and granted
ADCRR’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Hill challenges only the superior
court’s refusal to strike ADCRR’s motion to dismiss. Because the superior
court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Hill commenced an action against ADCRR by filing an “Order
To Show Cause,” requesting that the superior court vacate a 2006 conviction
and sentence and order ADCRR to pay him $1.6 billion dollars. Hill
claimed ADCRR admitted to being liable in prior litigation and argued the
judgment reflecting that liability was final because ADCRR did not appeal.
In support, he included a mostly redacted 2021 order from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granting Hill’s motion to submit a
supplemental brief and denying all other motions as moot.
¶3 ADCRR moved to dismiss, arguing Hill did not state a valid
claim for relief, ADCRR is a non-jural entity, and Hill never served ADCRR
with a notice of claim. Hill moved to strike ADCRR’s motion, contending
the court lacked jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss was “inadmissible”
because it relied on information obtained from an illegal wiretap.
¶4 The court denied Hill’s motion to strike and granted
ADCRR’s motion to dismiss. The court stated that while “Hill firmly
believes his factual allegations,” the court had “no factual or legal reason to
grant Mr. Hill’s Motion to Strike.” Hill timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
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HILL v. ADCRR
Decision of the Court
DISCUSSION
¶5 Hill challenges only the superior court’s denial of his motion
to strike ADCRR’s motion to dismiss. We review a denial of a motion to
strike for an abuse of discretion. Birth Hope Adoption Agency, Inc. v. Doe, 190
Ariz. 285, 287 (App. 1997).
¶6 In his motion to strike, Hill argued that the superior court
lacked jurisdiction over ADCRR’s motion to dismiss. Hill also claimed that
the motion to dismiss was “inadmissible” because the information therein
stemmed from an illegal wiretap placed on Hill’s phone. The superior court
denied the motion, concluding it had no legal or factual basis for granting
the motion.
¶7 The superior court did not abuse its discretion. Arizona Rule
of Civil Procedure 7.1(f)(1) provides that “a motion to strike may be filed
only if it is expressly authorized by statute or other rule, or if it seeks to
strike any part of a filing or submission on the ground that it is prohibited,
or not authorized, by a specific statute, rule, or court order.” Hill’s motion
to strike satisfied neither requirement under Rule 7.1(f)—Hill did not cite
any statute or rule expressly authorizing the motion, and he did not argue
that a specific statute, rule, or court order prohibited ADCRR’s motion to
dismiss. To the contrary, Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) expressly
authorized ADCRR’s motion to dismiss.
¶8 Even if Hill’s motion was not procedurally flawed, neither of
Hill’s reasons for striking ADCRR’s motion to dismiss had merit. The
superior court has authority to determine whether a civil action states a
claim for relief. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). And, even assuming that
information derived from an illegal wiretap cannot be used in a civil motion
to dismiss, Hill did not establish that ADCRR relied on any such
information in its motion.
¶9 Finally, on appeal, Hill argues the superior court had to grant
his motion to strike under the doctrine of res judicata. Other than
mentioning res judicata in the caption of his motion to strike, Hill did not
argue res judicata in the superior court, so the argument is now waived. See
Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utilities, LLC, 227
Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (explaining that a legal argument not raised
in the superior court is waived on appeal). But even if we reached the
merits of Hill’s res judicata argument, we would reject it because Hill has
not satisfied the requirements for claim or issue preclusion. See Cocchia v.
3
HILL v. ADCRR
Decision of the Court
Testa, 256 Ariz. 145, ___ ¶¶ 24-25 (App. 2023) (listing the requirements for
claim and issue preclusion).
CONCLUSION
¶10 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
4