United States v. Andrew Dodson

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 24a0071n.06

No. 22-3998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Feb 21, 2024
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
) DISTRICT OF OHIO
ANDREW DODSON, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. OPINION
)
)

Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Andrew Dodson appeals his conviction and sentence

of 55 months’ imprisonment for one count of obstructing justice by retaliating against a witness,

victim, or an informant in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2). Dodson raises four arguments on

appeal. First, Dodson argues that, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Counterman

v. Colorado, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 600 U.S. 66 (2023).

Second, Dodson argues that the district court erred in permitting testimony at trial related to certain

prejudicial prior acts. Finally, Dodson’s third and fourth arguments respectively contend that the

district court erred during sentencing by applying an improper 8-level enhancement pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and by imposing certain inappropriate supervised release conditions.

Only Dodson’s fourth argument related to his supervised release conditions has merit. Therefore,

the Court AFFIRMS Dodson’s conviction and sentence, except with respect to the supervised
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

release conditions; VACATES Dodson’s challenged supervised release conditions; and

REMANDS to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Prior to the events of the instant case, the Orange Police Department arrested Defendant

Andrew Dodson for an alcohol-related driving offense in 2021. During the officers’ impounding

and search of the vehicle, they found a variety of items that are commonly used to create explosive

devices, such as potassium perchlorate, potassium nitrate, batteries, powdered sugar, and Vaseline.

Dodson claimed that he used these materials to make smoke bombs, denying that he ever

constructed explosive devices. Nonetheless, due to the concerning nature of Dodson’s possession

of these items, the FBI became involved and began investigating Dodson.

To thoroughly investigate Dodson’s background, in August 2021, the FBI interviewed his

ex-partner, Sarah McNamara. Dodson and McNamara dated for over three years and shared

custody of their child. During the FBI’s interview, McNamara described her experience with

Dodson’s volatile personality, his past construction of explosive devices, and various offensive

tattoos that Dodson had. Based in part on the information provided by McNamara, Dodson

pleaded guilty to making a false statement to a federal agent of the United States.1

After Dodson’s guilty plea, the probation office prepared a presentence report dated

February 10, 2022, detailing the statements of “Witness 1” that resulted in Dodson’s conviction.

1
Specifically, Dodson previously stated that he had never constructed an explosive device,
which McNamara’s statement explicitly refuted. After being presented with this contradictory
information, Dodson pleaded guilty to the offense of lying to an agent of the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

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Based on the statements included in the 2022 presentence report, Dodson inferred that McNamara

was “Witness 1.” Shortly after, on February 15, 2022, McNamara received a number of

aggressive, threatening communications from Dodson via TalkingParents, an application that

preserves unaltered records of co-parents’ communications. These messages included the

following statements from Dodson:

So i just got the final paperwork from the FBI. You said A LOT of bad s- -t about
me. . . . You fucked me. You fucked me. You fucked me. . . .

Youre a piece of shit and i hope you fucking die slowly, very soon. Wanna
knowwhy im in trouble, becUse of you. . . .

Hopefully youll Be dead to everyone soon you fucking snitch. . . .

Youre dead. . . .

Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 33, 15–17. Fearing that Dodson would harm her due to her prior statements

to the federal agent, McNamara left her home with her four children and contacted the FBI. Based

on these messages and McNamara’s fear, the Mogadore Police Department went to Dodson’s

residence to take him into custody. At Dodson’s residence, Dodson willingly showed the police

the messages on his phone and cooperated with the arrest. Dodson was ultimately charged with

obstructing justice by retaliating against an informant, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b), as well

as transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat to injure, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 875(c).

II. Dodson’s Jury Trial

Prior to trial, the government filed several preliminary documents, including: (1) a notice

of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence as to Dodson, (2) a motion in limine to restrict mention of

certain past custody disputes at trial, (3) a trial brief, and (4) proposed jury instructions. Dodson

did not respond to any of these filings, and the jury trial commenced on July 25, 2022. After the

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jury was selected, the district court reserved ruling on these motions and advised the parties’

attorneys to raise any objections regarding character evidence during the testimony of the

respective witnesses.2

First, the government called Jennifer Kiesel, an FBI special agent who worked on Dodson’s

underlying case regarding the possession of explosive devices. In particular, Kiesel interviewed

McNamara in August 2021 and gleaned information relevant to her relationship with Dodson, as

well as Dodson’s prior possession and construction of explosive devices. The probation officer

who authorized the presentence report that sparked Dodson’s threatening messages then testified

that the report identified McNamara as the witness who provided information pertinent to

Dodson’s 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) charge.

To establish the content of Dodson’s messages and their effect, McNamara testified that

Dodson’s text stating, “I hope you fucking die slowly very soon” and “you’re dead” caused her to

fear for her safety, as prior contentious communication with Dodson did not involve similar

threats. Further, two prior acts of abuse caused her to believe that Dodson was capable of carrying

out his threats. Those past acts by Dodson included kicking her in the ribs in May 2016, and

ramming her vehicle with his in August 2016. In both instances, the police were called to the

scene, and Dodson faced charges. Both of these charges were eventually reduced to disorderly

conduct convictions. Following McNamara’s testimony, the government called the officer who

2
At this time, Dodson’s attorney made an “oral motion in limine,” objecting to the use of
prejudicial testimony related to Dodson’s explosive devices, tattoos, or bomb making. Trial Tr.
Vol. I, R. 49, Page ID #342. The district court also reserved ruling on this motion until Dodson’s
attorney raised his objection during the respective witnesses’ testimony. The objection was never
re-raised.

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responded to the 2016 incidents, who provided further context and information related to the

events.

Finally, the government called the two officers involved in the events of February 15, 2022,

following receipt of McNamara’s complaint regarding the messages. Craig Jones, a Mogadore

police detective, arrested Dodson at his residence and testified that he cooperated throughout his

detainment. Next, special agent Peter Mauro testified that he served as the case agent for Dodson’s

2021 explosive devices investigation and, accordingly, interviewed McNamara on February 15,

2022. Mauro recounted McNamara’s fear and agitation, explaining that Dodson’s messages made

her feel the need to leave her home with her four children. Additionally, Mauro reviewed the

entirety of Dodson and McNamara’s TalkingParents messages, explaining that, although the

messages evidenced contentious disputes over parenting, there were no similar threats within their

chat history.

Following closing arguments, Dodson’s attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal, which

the district court denied. After receiving instructions related to the two charges and deliberating,

the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count One (retaliating against an informant in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2)) and not guilty as to Count Two (interstate communications in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). Because the two counts essentially shared all but one element in common,

this Court can fairly conclude that the jury found that the government did not meet its burden in

proving that Dodson transmitted the communication knowing that the communication would be

viewed by McNamara as a threat, thus resulting in its not guilty verdict as to Count Two.

III. Dodson’s Sentencing

Prior to sentencing, the probation department prepared a presentence report providing a

Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment and ultimately recommending that Dodson

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No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

receive 46 months’ imprisonment. In calculating Dodson’s offense level, the presentence report

recommended an increase of 8 levels due to Defendant’s threat of physical injury to McNamara in

order to obstruct the administration of justice.

Dodson did not object to this 8-level enhancement. Instead, Dodson solely objected to the

government’s requested special conditions of supervised release and highlighted various minor

factual inaccuracies that the probation department corrected. McNamara also submitted a victim

impact statement, explaining the emotional and physical toll this case took on her, as well as stating

that she preferred to provide the court with a written statement due to her fear of attending the

sentencing hearing in person.

During sentencing, the district court made an initial finding that Dodson’s offense level

was 22 and his criminal history category was II, resulting in a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’

imprisonment. Dodson declined to make a statement but responded to the court’s questioning

regarding his extensive history of alcohol and substance abuse. After considering the Defendant’s

criminal history, historic problems with alcohol, his anger-management issues, and the nature of

the instant offense, the district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 55 months’

imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.

Turning to the conditions of Dodson’s supervised release, the district court imposed various

standard conditions, as well as three notable special conditions. First, the district court subjected

Dodson to a no-contact order, restricting him from communicating in any manner with McNamara

during imprisonment and his supervised release. Second, the district court imposed an internet

restriction, prohibiting Dodson from using the internet in any form, at any location, without prior

written approval of his probation officer. In adopting the internet restriction proposed by the

government, the district court reasoned that the condition was appropriate because Dodson

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communicated his threat to McNamara through the internet. Third, without explaining its

reasoning, the court restricted Dodson’s “viewing and possession of books, pamphlets, websites,

blogs, chat rooms, videos, and social media platforms that reflect extremist or terroristic views.”

Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 48, Page ID #260.

During the sentencing hearing, Dodson’s attorney failed to object on any grounds other

than “the part of the sentence regarding the computer restrictions and the books, pamphlets,

websites thing.” Id. at Page ID #261. The district court’s judgment was entered on November 28,

2022, and this timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal.

United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 537 (6th Cir. 2007). A sufficiency of the evidence claim

requires that the Court view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United

States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006). The question this Court must ask is whether

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 232 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

B. Analysis

Because the jury found Dodson “not guilty” as related to Count Two, only the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings as to Count One—obstructing justice by retaliating

against a witness—is in dispute. Under § 1513(b)(2),

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No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury
to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens
to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for—
(2) any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a
Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release,
parole, or release pending judicial proceedings given by a person to a law
enforcement officer;

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2). Therefore, the jury was instructed that the government must prove the

following elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction: (1) the defendant’s conduct

threatened to cause bodily injury to another person; (2) the defendant acted with a specific intent

to retaliate against that person for providing information to a law enforcement officer relating to

the possible commission of a federal offense; and (3) the defendant knowingly engaged in this

conduct. See United States v. Edwards, 321 F. App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Draper, 553 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2009). In this case, the district court further defined

“knowingly” as “voluntarily and purposely and not by intent or mistake.” Trial Tr. Vol. II, R. 50,

at Page ID #505. Therefore, the jury did not have to find that Dodson intended to carry out his

threat; instead, the jury only needed to find that Dodson sent the threat purposely with the intent

to retaliate against McNamara.

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to Count One, Dodson presents two main

arguments. Dodson argues that there was insufficient evidence “that the messages sent from Mr.

Dodson were actual threats,” and “that Ms. McNamara was a witness who provided information

related to the commission . . . of a [f]ederal offense.” Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 33, 35. We will address

each of these arguments in turn.

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1. Threatening Nature of the Messages

First, Dodson claims that no reasonable juror could find that the messages he sent through

the TalkingParents app constituted actual threats. In doing so, Dodson argues that his messages

were not sufficiently specific to be considered threats. Contrary to Dodson’s definition of a

“specific threat,” there is no requirement contained within the statute that the threats detail the

exact manner in which they will be effectuated.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Dodson messaged

McNamara various threats, including, “You’re dead,” and “You’re a piece of shit and I hope you

fucking die slowly very soon.” Trial Tr. Vol. I, R. 49, Page ID #398, 401. Dodson sent these

messages after reviewing the “final paperwork from the FBI” and initiated these communications

by stating, “You said a lot of bad shit about me. . . . You fucked me.” Id. at Page ID #393. When

questioned about these messages during trial, McNamara recounted that she felt “terrified for not

only [her] life and safety but [her] children’s as well.” Id. at Page ID #436. Therefore, after the

messages from Dodson continued to escalate, McNamara contacted the FBI, gathered her

belongings and her children, and went to stay at her fiancé’s mother’s house.

On appeal, Dodson claims that McNamara did not view all of Dodson’s speech as threats

and never disengaged from the messages. Because there “was never a specific threat,” Dodson

argues that the contentious messages exchanged did not rise to the level of violating § 1513(b)(2).

Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 33, 38. Tellingly, Dodson’s only citations to support this proposition that his

threats needed to be more specific involve a 1917 statute prohibiting knowing and willful threats

to take the life of the President, Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), and Virginia’s statute

banning cross burning with an intent to intimidate a person, Virigina v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).

Beyond these cases being factually inapposite, they do not establish the specific-threat requirement

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Dodson claims to derive from them. Instead, they stand for the proposition that the First

Amendment does not protect a “true threat,” defined as a serious expression of an intent to commit

unlawful violence, even when the “speaker [does] not actually intend to carry out the threat.”

Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60; see also Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08 (distinguishing “true threats” from

facetious or hyperbolic remarks). The jury’s decision in this case was clearly supported by this

precedent, as Dodson may not have intended to carry out his threat, but his statement could

reasonably be viewed as a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence. See

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 72 (2023) (“True threats of violence, everyone agrees, lie

outside the bounds of the First Amendment’s protection.”).

While Dodson’s initial brief, filed in May 2023, offered no supporting case law to bolster

his unconvincing contentions that his threat was not “sufficiently specific,” the Supreme Court

directly addressed the mens rea necessary to prosecute true-threat crimes in June 2023. Thus, in

further support of his argument that he never specifically threatened McNamara, Dodson submitted

a Rule 28(j) letter, informing the Court of the Supreme Court’s recent Counterman decision. 600

U.S. 66. Although Counterman presents a compelling question as to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction, Dodson’s arguments nevertheless fail both before and after

the Supreme Court’s recent decision.

In Counterman, the Supreme Court held that, for a true threat to be outside the bounds of

the First Amendment’s protection, the speaker must act recklessly—in other words, the speaker

must be subjectively “aware ‘that others could regard his statements as’ threatening violence and

‘deliver[] them anyway.’” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 79 (quoting Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S.

723, 746 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). To combat chilling speech

that should be protected, the Supreme Court adopted a subjective mental-state element for true-

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threat cases. Counterman, 600 U.S. at 72–73. Relying upon this newly instituted recklessness

standard, Dodson argues that he did not have any subjective understanding of the threatening

nature of his messages, and that his conviction was in violation of the First Amendment.

In response, the government argues that Counterman is inapplicable to Dodson’s

conviction, as § 1513(b)(2) has a mens rea of knowingly, which is even higher than the

recklessness required by Counterman. However, this argument misunderstands general intent

versus specific intent, as well as which element in § 1513 requires specific intent. See, e.g., United

States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 807 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] general intent crime requires the knowing

commission of an act that the law makes a crime. A specific intent crime requires additional ‘bad

purpose.’” (quoting United States v. Kleinbart, 27 F.3d 586, 592 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). Section

1513(b) requires that Dodson knowingly commit the actus reus—sending the threatening

messages—rather than by accident or mistake. Additionally, Dodson must possess the specific

intent to retaliate against an informant. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 783 F. App’x 540, 543 (6th

Cir. 2019) (recognizing that the specific intent to retaliate is required under § 1513(e)).

In contrast, Counterman requires something more: that the defendant be aware in some

way of the threatening nature of his communications. See Counterman, 600 U.S. at 72 n.2

(distinguishing the awareness of a communication’s contents and awareness of its threatening

nature). Indeed, the jury acquitted Dodson of Count Two, which required him to know that the

messages would be received as a threat.3 Further, when explaining the mens rea necessary for a

3
In contrast to Count One, which the district court instructed could be committed if it was
done “voluntarily and purposely and not by intent or mistake,” Count Two required the jury to find
that Dodson made a threat “knowing the communication would be viewed as a threat.” Trial Tr.
Vol. II, R. 50, Page ID #505–06. The government further explained this difference in intent in its
closing argument, noting that Count One required the defendant to “knowingly engage in conduct,”

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conviction under § 1513(b)(2) in its closing argument, the government specifically highlighted

that it “[did not] have to show [] that he intended for this [message] to be viewed as a threat.” Trial

Tr. Vol. II, R. 50, Page ID #536. Although this statement remains true post-Counterman (as the

case law does not require a mens rea of purposefully or knowingly), Counterman does require the

government to show that Dodson was aware that others could view his messages as threatening

violence and recklessly sent them anyway. Therefore, Counterman imbues “true threat”

prosecutions with a subjective intent requirement that was not previously required by the district

court in this case or the Sixth Circuit generally.

Nonetheless, Dodson does not challenge the district court’s jury instructions under

Counterman; instead, he challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence. Under the Fourteenth

Amendment, the evidence is sufficient if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The government’s

evidence was sufficient to satisfy Counterman, as Dodson’s statements that McNamara was

“dead,” and that he “hope[d] [she] fucking die[d] slowly, very soon” could constitute a reckless

disregard that others could view his statements as threatening violence in the eyes of a rational

juror. Cf. United States v. Bauer, 82 F.4th 522, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2023) (analyzing a sufficiency

of the evidence claim following a Supreme Court opinion requiring an additional element of mens

rea related to the defendant’s crime, and holding that a jury could find that the new requirement

was satisfied based on the evidence presented at trial).

Indeed, the trial included extensive evidence that Dodson acted with, at the very least,

recklessness as to the risk that his messages would be viewed as threatening violence. First, even

while Count Two required the defendant to “know[] that [the messages would] be viewed as a
threat.” Id. at Page ID #535.

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though the couple frequently exchanged contentious messages, Dodson had never sent McNamara

these types of threats of death before. Further, these messages were sparked by Dodson realizing

McNamara shared information with the government leading to his conviction, which

contextualizes the outcome Dodson hoped to obtain by sending the threats. Finally, the couple

was getting along prior to Dodson’s awareness of McNamara’s interview statements, heightening

the severity of the abrupt change in tone. Although Dodson may have been initially surprised

when the FBI agents showed up to his house to inquire about the threatening exchange, once he

realized their presence related to certain messages that he sent, Dodson knew exactly which

messages were at issue—the ones stating, “You’re dead.” Trial Tr. Vol. I, R. 49, Page ID #453–

54. Because there is no manner more direct and explicit to express this particular threat, a

reasonable juror could find that Dodson recklessly disregarded the threatening nature of his speech.

Therefore, Dodson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the recklessness element fails

in light of the Counterman decision.

2. Witness, Victim, or Informant Requirement

Dodson also argues that, because McNamara was not a witness to Dodson’s charged

federal offense, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of Count One. In his 2021 case,

Dodson was not actually convicted of illegally possessing explosives or any other related federal

crime; instead, he pleaded guilty to lying to law enforcement. Therefore, Dodson argues that

although McNamara made certain statements about him to law enforcement, “her comments did

not establish her as a witness to any federal or possible federal offense,” inasmuch as he was never

convicted of any charge related to explosives. Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 33, 36–37.

The government correctly points out that § 1513(b)(2) prohibits retaliation against any

person for “any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal

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offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2) (emphasis added). The record illustrates that McNamara told

the FBI that Dodson previously constructed and detonated an explosive device, which directly

contradicted a prior statement that he made after being arrested. Further, McNamara’s interview

contained information related to the possible commission of other criminal offenses, such as

possessing an unregistered explosive device.

In addition, the statute contains no requirement that McNamara must be a witness or

officially participate in a future proceeding related to a federal conviction, and Dodson points to

no case law or statutory interpretation stating as much. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 321 F. App’x

481, 483 (6th Cir. 2009) (confidential informant faced threats); United States v. Pullam, No. 93-

50532, 1994 WL 661214, at *5 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 1994) (recognizing that “Section 1513(a)(2)

forbids intentional retaliation against an informant”—not only intentional retaliation against

witnesses). In fact, the statute itself is entitled “Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an

informant.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (emphasis added). Therefore, based on the evidence presented at

trial, a rational trier of fact could easily find that McNamara provided information regarding

Dodson’s possible commission of a federal offense. Dodson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence on this element also fails.

II. RULE 404(b) PRIOR ACTS

A. Standard of Review

The admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) involves both questions of fact and law.

United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 750 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, this Court frequently applies

differing standards of review to the various evaluations that a district court must make in ruling on

a Rule 404(b) question. See United States v. Gibbs, 797 F.3d 416, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2015); United

States v. Mandoka, 869 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2017). However, because Dodson’s attorney failed

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to raise any argument regarding the 2016 disorderly conduct convictions, this Court reviews the

district court’s decision to admit the prior acts evidence for plain error. See, e.g., United States v.

Kelly, 204 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2000) (analyzing 404(b) claims using plain error); United States

v. Robinson, 99 F. App’x 655, 656 (6th Cir. 2004) (“But we review [defendant’s] Rule 404(b)

evidence argument for plain error because she forfeited this error by failing to raise it in the district

court.”); United States v. Heflin, 600 F. App’x 407, 411 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that plain error

review applied where defendant did not preserve his Rule 404(b) objection).

Plain error review requires the Court to consider whether there is: “(1) error (2) that was

‘obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected [the] defendant’s substantial rights’ and (4) that ‘affected the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Donadeo,

910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vonner, 516

F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

B. Analysis

Dodson argues that the district court erred by permitting McNamara and a police sergeant

to testify regarding certain alleged prior acts. Although Dodson does not dispute that the prior

acts—namely, two 2016 disorderly conduct convictions stemming from altercations between

Dodson and McNamara—took place, he argues that the misdemeanors were not admissible for a

proper purpose and substantially prejudiced the trial.

In evaluating whether the prior acts were admitted for a proper purpose, the trial court must

determine “whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” United

States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 441 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.

681, 686 (1988)). “Evidence of other acts is probative of a material issue other than character if

(1) the evidence is offered for an admissible purpose, (2) the purpose for which the evidence is

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offered is material or ‘in issue,’ and (3) the evidence is probative with regard to the purpose for

which it is offered.” United States v. Rayborn, 495 F.3d 328, 342 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United

States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2003)). The government argues both that Dodson’s

prior misdemeanor convictions illustrate Dodson’s intent and supply helpful background

information to the finder of fact under a res gestae theory. The former theory is dispositive in

addressing whether a proper purpose for admitting the evidence existed.

In this case, Dodson placed his intent at issue when he pleaded not guilty to the charges.

During closing arguments, the thrust of defense counsel’s final words to the jury highlighted that

“the one big thing in dispute” was whether the Defendant transmitted the communication for the

purpose of making a threat. Trial Tr. Vol. II, R. 50, Page ID #525, 530. Based on Dodson’s

principal theory at trial, the prior acts evidence was admissible to show intent or lack of mistake,

both of which are permissible under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d

428, 446 (6th Cir. 2017). To prove Count One, the government needed to prove that Dodson

intended to retaliate; to prove Count Two, the government needed to show that Dodson knew the

communication would be viewed as a threat. Therefore, the prior acts evidence was offered to

illustrate the reason McNamara viewed the messages as credible threats. Overall, the two offenses

at issue—disorderly conduct charges involving prior heated arguments with McNamara—are

indicative of Dodson’s specific intent to threaten McNamara in a manner that she would perceive

as a threat.

The district court fairly concluded that the probative value of the evidence of the 2016

disorderly conduct convictions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Broad discretion is given to district courts in considerations of relevance and

prejudice, and those decisions will not be lightly overruled.” LaVictor, 848 F.3d at 447. In

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assessing the district court’s balancing of the evidence, this Court “look[s] at the evidence in a

light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial

effect.” United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 455 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.

Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1979)). Dodson argues that the testimony related to his 2016

convictions was unfairly prejudicial, as the misdemeanors occurred over six years ago, and the

alleged victim lacked credibility.

Although the accounts of the 2016 convictions were prejudicial, the district court did not

plainly err in concluding that the evidence’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial impact. By

presenting the context of the couple’s past relationship, the evidence assisted in establishing

Dodson’s intent. Further, there is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate

offenses in determining the admissibility of other acts evidence. See, e.g., Whitis v. United States,

No. 94-6333, 1995 WL 462423, at *8 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1995) (concluding the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting a prior act of battery that occurred more than five years prior in

the instant serious bodily injury case). The district court also provided the jury with a limiting

instruction to solely consider past acts “as it relates to the government’s claim on the defendant’s

intent, motive, or plan,” and not for any other purpose, thus ameliorating the risk of unfair

prejudice. Trial Tr. Vol. II, R. 50, Page ID #499.

Finally, Dodson contends that district court independently erred because he did not receive

the opportunity to challenge McNamara’s credibility by “cross examin[ing] the alleged victim

about the other police reports listed in the government’s Motion in Limine.” Pet’r’s Br., ECF No.

33, 47. However, Dodson’s attorney never attempted to enter the other police reports, to cross

McNamara on other events, to impeach McNamara, or to object on these grounds during trial. The

district court had no indication that Dodson wanted any additional exhibits or reports entered and,

17
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

in fact, explicitly instructed the parties to object if needed at the time that past act evidence would

be offered. Dodson’s attorney failed to do so. Therefore, the district court certainly did not err—

much less plainly err—by failing to sua sponte provide Dodson with an opportunity “to introduce

evidence [that] he did not ask to introduce.” Gov’t Br., ECF No. 40, 42.

III. SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT UNDER U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B)

A. Standard of Review

This Court typically reviews a criminal sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion

standard for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Shannon, 803 F.3d

778, 787 (6th Cir. 2015). On appeal, Dodson argued that the district court incorrectly applied the

Sentencing Guidelines, which focuses this Court’s inquiry on the procedural reasonableness

evaluation. However, because Dodson failed to object to the challenged sentencing factor before

the district court, his challenge will be reviewed for plain error. United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d

752, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2020).

B. Analysis

Under the relevant Sentencing Guidelines, district courts may increase a defendant’s

offense level by eight points “[i]f the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical

injury to a person, or property damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.” U.S.S.G

§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). In calculating Dodson’s offense level, the presentence report recommended

applying an 8-level increase to the Guidelines’ initial recommendation of 14 based on this

provision because:

The defendant told [McNamara] that she said several bad things about him to the
FBI and further stated that he hopes she dies slowly and very soon. This text
conversation occurred before the disposition of case 1:21CR717, before the
Honorable Philip J. Calabrese.

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No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

PSR, R. 34, Page ID #187. Relying on this enhancement, the presentence report calculated

Dodson’s total offense level at 22. In conjunction with his criminal history category of II, the

report ultimately recommended a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. Dodson’s

attorney did not object to this 8-level increase in response to the presentence report, nor did he

orally object to the increase at sentencing. Therefore, the district court had no opportunity to

address this argument. See United States v. Johnson, 658 F. App’x 244, 247 (6th Cir. 2015).

On appeal, Dodson argues that this 8-level sentencing enhancement was in error, as

Dodson’s threatening messages were not sent with the purpose of obstructing the administration

of justice. Because Dodson had already pleaded guilty to the offense of lying to a federal agent

and was awaiting sentencing by the time he sent the messages, he argues that he could not have

sent the texts with the intent to obstruct justice, as there was no upcoming trial. In response, the

government claims that McNamara would have been an integral government witness had the case

against Dodson gone to trial, and she was an integral witness in the instant intimidation case.

Therefore, Dodson’s threats of death would “naturally cause[] [McNamara] to reflect on the

benefits and costs of providing testimony against Dodson.” Gov’t Br., ECF No. 40, 47.

In contrast to Dodson’s argument that he did not obstruct the investigation, prosecution, or

sentencing of his 2021 matter, the enhancement at issue does not require his actions to result in

substantial interference—it solely requires a threat to cause physical injury “in order to obstruct

the administration of justice.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). In fact, there is a separate increase for

instances where the conduct actually results in a substantial interference. See id. § 2J1.2(b)(2).

Therefore, Dodson’s arguments that McNamara never officially served as a witness and that he

never in fact prevented McNamara from making any statements fail.

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No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

Further, Dodson argues that he did not make the threat to obstruct the administration of

justice because he already pleaded guilty—instead, he simply made the threat out of anger.4 This

reasoning is also wanting, as the presentence report specifically stated that these threats were made

prior to the final disposition of his other case, and Dodson does not contest this fact.5 Therefore,

based on Dodson’s threats, McNamara could have declined to provide additional information to

the district court during sentencing. Cf. United States v. Real, 817 F. App’x 278, 280–81 (8th Cir.

2020) (holding that, where defendant inferred who the government’s confidential witness was by

reading the PSR and subsequently threatened him, there was sufficient basis to apply an

obstruction of justice enhancement, as the informant “could be a potential witness at [the

defendant’s] sentencing.”).

Importantly, just like retaliation in any other context, such action is prohibited due not only

to the risk of deterring participation in the instant offense, but also to the chilling effect that the

threats of physical injury may have on future activity. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d

4
Dodson cursorily states in his 28(j) letter that Counterman should also apply to the
sentencing enhancement and requires recklessness as to the threatening nature of the
communications. However, Dodson did not brief this argument, instead contending that he did
not intend to obstruct justice—not that he did not make true threats.
5
The district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a
finding of fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A). Dodson did not dispute the portions of the
presentence report that established the applicability of the 8-level enhancement. Therefore, in
accordance with the undisputed presentence report, Dodson’s threats occurred before the
disposition of his 2021 case. Without such an objection, the district court was not required to
explicitly find that Dodson committed the relevant conduct. See United States v. Nichols, 802 F.
App’x 172, 179 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)); United States v. Davy, 713
F. App’x 439, 448 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Accordingly, when a [party] fails to object to factual
statements contained in a PSR, those statements are no longer mere allegations but become
admissions sufficient to support factual findings relevant to sentencing without the need for any
independent factual findings.”).

20
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

212, 218 (1st Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s argument that witness retaliation is strictly past-

oriented, stating that “retaliatory act[s] [frequently] occur[] in response to conduct capable of

repetition. In such circumstances, the act often contains an aposematic component, expressing

both a backward-looking intention (designed to punish for past misdeeds) and a forward-looking

intention (designed to deter repeat performances).”); Pullam, 1994 WL 661214, at *5 (“Because

Pullam had not yet been sentenced, we conclude his conduct was within [the obstruction of justice

enhancement].”); United States v. Smith, 387 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Smith’s retaliatory

intent inevitably operated to obstruct justice, as Smith threatened a witness who would presumably

have provided additional assistance to the government as its burglary prosecution progressed.”);

United States v. Duarte, 28 F.3d 47, 49 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting defendant’s argument that he

already pleaded guilty and, thus, did not make the threats to obstruct justice by stating “we cannot

think of any reason why the guideline’s authors would have wanted to distinguish between

vengeful and instrumental retaliations and punish the former more lightly.”).6 Not only would

McNamara be deterred from testifying in the 2021 case as needed, but she also could decline to

assist the FBI in the future, fearing death threats (or abusive action) from her ex-partner. By way

of example and not limitation, the chilling effect could have prevented McNamara from providing

6
Cf. United States v. Turner, 738 F. App’x 856, 862–63 (6th Cir. 2018) (in the context of
an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which requires an obstruction of justice with respect to
the instant investigation or prosecution, the Court held that retaliation against a witness following
the defendant’s sentencing did not obstruct justice “with respect to the instant [completed]
offense.”). Not only did Dodson’s retaliation occur before sentencing, but U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2
contains no similar limitation to “the instant offense.” See United States v. Denham, 436 F. App’x
627, 630 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Admittedly, § 3C1.1 reaches obstructive conduct only with respect to
the particular offense of conviction, while § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) concerns itself with conduct intended
to obstruct the conduct of other proceedings.”).

21
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

additional information to assist the district court in sentencing in the 2021 case, deterred

McNamara from testifying in the instant witness intimidation case, or caused McNamara to alter

her prior statement to the FBI. For these reasons, the district court did not plainly err in applying

the 8-level enhancement.

IV. SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

A. Standard of Review

Where a challenge to a supervised release condition is properly preserved, “we consider

whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing [the contested] special conditions.”

United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 2012). This standard of review requires the

Court to consider the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the contested special

conditions. United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2006). Generally, the district

court has broad discretion to impose appropriate conditions of supervised release, but procedural

reasonableness requires the court to state its rationale for mandating a special condition of

supervised release. United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.

Widmer, 785 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2015).

Once the Court “determine[s] whether the district court adequately stated in open court at

the time of sentencing ‘its rationale for mandating special conditions of supervised release,’” it can

turn to the substantive reasonableness inquiry. United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 563 (6th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Carter, 463 F.3d at 528–29); see also Widmer, 785 F.3d at 204. In evaluating

the substantive reasonableness of the imposed conditions, each condition of supervised release

must be “reasonably related to the dual goals of probation, the rehabilitation of the defendant and

the protection of the public.” Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504 (quoting United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d

558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992)). The conditions must reasonably relate to the nature of the offense and

22
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

the history of the defendant, involving “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary to serve the goals of deterrence, protecting the public, and rehabilitating the defendant.”

Inman, 666 F.3d at 1004 (internal quotations omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(2). Finally, the

condition must also be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the United States

Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).

B. Analysis

The district court imposed several special conditions on Dodson’s supervised release, two

of which he challenges on appeal.7 These special conditions were not recommended by the initial

presentence investigation report, but rather requested by the government “based upon the relevant

evidence that Defendant utilized the internet and social media to communicate with other users

about the construction of destructive devices and has threatened violence [using the internet].”8

PSR, R. 34, Page ID #204. Based on the government’s recommendation, the district court adopted

the two challenged special conditions for Defendant’s supervised release, which prohibited him

from: (1) accessing the internet without his probation officer’s prior approval, and (2) accessing

extremist materials. We evaluate each of these supervised release conditions in turn.

1. Prohibition From Accessing the Internet

In imposing the internet restriction, the district court reasoned, “the internet restriction is

because this is how – you got on the internet and threatened Ms. McNamara, so you can’t get on

7
Dodson does not challenge the supervised release condition of no contact with the victim.
Instead, Dodson relies on the validity of the no-contact order to bolster his argument that the
internet restrictions were overly broad.
8
The ultimate sentencing recommendation by the probation department adopted and
recommended the internet restriction to the extent the court deemed such a restriction appropriate,
but not the extremist views restriction.

23
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

and use the internet without prior written approval of your supervising officer.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr.,

R. 48, Page ID #260. From this short statement, we can infer that the condition is at least somewhat

related to the nature of the instant offense. Thus, the main question facing this Court is the

condition’s substantive reasonableness. Namely, we must consider whether a complete ban on

internet access without permission involves “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary to serve the goals of deterrence, protecting the public, and rehabilitating the defendant.”

Inman, 666 F.3d at 1004 (cleaned up).

The district court subjected Dodson to several special conditions of supervised release not

challenged on appeal that affect our analysis. For example, Dodson must submit his person,

property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers, and other electronics to periodic searches

and seizures based on reasonable suspicion. Further, the court imposed a no-contact order for the

period of Dodson’s incarceration and supervised release. In addition to the internet ban’s

attenuation from the sentencing goals, these conditions negate the need for a complete ban on

Dodson’s internet access.

First, restricting Dodson’s internet access does not satisfy the need to protect the public

from further crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). According to the record, Dodson has never

threatened a government witness—or anyone besides McNamara—in the past. Instead, these

threatening, explicit messages were directly related to his contentious relationship with McNamara

and his feelings of anger towards her. Therefore, because Dodson’s illegal actions were clearly

pointed toward McNamara, the no-contact order suffices to deter Dodson from using the internet,

texting, calling, or engaging in any other form of communication in an attempt to resume the

behavior that resulted in his conviction. Further, if Dodson’s probation officer reasonably

suspected that Dodson was engaged in illicit online activity, he would be subject to a seizure and

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No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

search of his electronics. Even if the district court wanted to credit the government’s allegations

regarding Dodson’s alleged “extremist” social media use, it could impose a narrowly tailored,

appropriate internet restriction on Dodson in light of the variety of technological options at its

disposal.9 See, e.g., United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2009) (vacating

restrictive internet condition and remanding to the district court, noting that “[s]uch an approach

reconciles our concern that a convicted sex offender could use the internet to continue a pattern of

inappropriate behavior towards minors with the potential for legitimate uses of the internet that

might be crucial to that individual’s rehabilitation.”).

Additionally, because Dodson’s criminal behavior was targeted towards McNamara,

prohibiting Dodson from accessing the internet does not assist in his rehabilitation. Unlike the

typical case involving a complete ban on internet use, such as in the case of a repeat sex offender,10

Dodson’s past criminal history and characteristics do not involve the internet in any way; instead,

they heavily revolve around alcohol-related offenses. However, the record fails to reflect any

circumstances indicating that the broad-sweeping computer restrictions are tailored to assist

Dodson in his rehabilitation, deter repeat offenses, or protect the public. Nearly every facet of

modern life involves the internet—from communicating with family to searching for jobs to using

9
The government, in fact, requested that the Defendant “consent to [internet] monitoring
and random examinations.” PSR, R. 34, Page ID #204. This less restrictive version of the
supervised release condition could be one example of an appropriately tailored internet restriction
on Dodson, to the extent the district court finds such a restriction necessary.
10
See, e.g., United States v. Greenberg, No. 20-4318, 2021 WL 5373355, at *3 (6th Cir.
Nov. 18, 2021) (noting that the internet plainly facilitates child-sex crimes and cataloging sex-
offender cases upholding a total prohibition against internet use); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.
App’x 490, 498 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The court clearly intended the restriction on computer usage to
limit Lewis’s ability to access pornographic materials . . . from the internet. The court analyzed
and weighed Lewis’s history in imposing this condition[,] and we find no abuse of discretion.”).

25
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

Google Maps—making this a particularly harsh special condition. Greenberg, 2021 WL 5373355,

at *3 (“We acknowledge that the internet’s ubiquitous nature in today’s modern life is practically

unavoidable.”). By imposing a supervised release condition that fails to advance the sentencing

objectives in this case, and in light of Dodson’s other unchallenged supervised release conditions,

the district court abused its discretion in imposing such a broad internet ban. On remand, the

district court should either appropriately narrow the blanket internet restriction in line with the

above reasoning or remove the ban altogether.

2. Prohibition From Accessing Extremist Materials

In imposing the extremist materials restriction, the district court did not explicitly provide

its reasoning, only stating: “I’m also going to restrict your viewing and possession of books,

pamphlets, websites, blogs, chat rooms, videos, and social media platforms that reflect extremist

or terroristic views, and that’s going to be monitored by the Probation Department.” Sent’g Hr’g

Tr., R. 48, Page ID #260. Because the court neglected to provide reasoning supporting the

extremist materials standard, such an imposition constituted procedural error. See United States

v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 836 (6th Cir. 2001); Inman, 666 F.3d at 1006. Although a district

court’s failure to articulate reasons for conditions could be harmless error where the reasons are

obvious based upon the record, no such clarity exists based upon this record. See Inman, 666 F.3d

at 1005; cf. Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504–05.

This condition bears no relation to the nature of the instant offense involving threats and

witness intimidation; instead, the condition tangentially relates back to the government’s 2021

investigation of certain explosive items seized from Dodson’s vehicle. To be sure, the district

court is also permitted to select special conditions based on the Defendant’s history and

characteristics. Kingsley, 241 F.3d at 837. Although the government contends that the district

26
No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

court heard ample testimony about Dodson’s prior extremist views, the record does not reveal

which allegations the district court relied upon or credited in imposing the extremist materials ban.

Dodson was never convicted of possessing or creating explosive devices; everything seized from

his vehicle during the traffic stop mentioned at trial was legal. Dodson pleaded guilty to lying to

an agent of the United States, which is also largely unrelated to the prohibition against extremist

materials. Further, even though the jury briefly heard testimony regarding Dodson’s choices for

tattoos and his violent history with McNamara, this information alone cannot warrant a complete

prohibition on accessing extremist materials.11 The incidental past allegations and theories

regarding explosive devices are too tangential to Dodson’s criminal offense at issue to justify a

total ban on all forms of media and literature reflecting “extremist views.”

Both the district court’s procedural error in failing to explain its reasoning for this

condition, as well as the record’s failure to adequately illuminate its appropriateness, require the

Court to also vacate this special condition. The ambiguity of the “extremist materials” ban in its

current formulation prevents Dodson from understanding the precise nature of the ban. Therefore,

upon remand, the district court should either revisit the supervised release condition and specify

the exact nature of the ban and the court’s reasoning for the condition’s implementation, or else

relinquish the ban altogether. Importantly, any newly applied special condition must be “tailored

to the specific case before the court.” Inman, 666 F.3d at 1005.

11
Dodson has claimed that the swastika was forcibly tattooed on him while he was
unconscious, and the clown tattoo does not represent John Wayne Gacy, but rather a generic clown.
Where the meaning of Dodson’s distasteful tattoos is clearly disputed, the district court cannot rely
on these tattoos as propagating extremist views.

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No. 22-3998, United States v. Dodson

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court AFFIRMS Dodson’s conviction and sentence,

except with respect to the supervised release conditions; VACATES Dodson’s challenged

supervised release conditions; and REMANDS to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

28