Commonwealth v. Shepherd

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SJC-12405

COMMONWEALTH vs. RASHAD SHEPHERD.

Essex. November 7, 2023. - February 22, 2024.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ.

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Retroactivity of Judicial
Holding. Practice, Criminal, Retroactivity of judicial
holding, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor,
Questioning of witness by judge, Assistance of counsel,
Capital case. Constitutional Law, Equal protection of
laws. Evidence, Argument by prosecutor, Questioning of
witness by judge, Hypothetical question. Jury and Jurors.
Cellular Telephone.

Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on December 18, 2014.

The case was tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J.; a
motion for a new trial, filed on March 15, 2019, was considered
by Timothy Q. Feeley, J.; a second motion for a new trial, filed
on September 10, 2020, was heard by Kathleen M. McCarthy-Neyman,
J.; and a third motion for a new trial, filed on February 7,
2022, was considered by her.

Claudia L. Bolgen for the defendant.
Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Duke K. McCall, III, & Kayla Stachniak Kaplan, of the
District of Columbia, Caitlin Glass, Joshua M. Daniels, &
Vanessa M. Brown, for Boston University Center for Antiracist
Research & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
 2

Jessie J. Rossman & Isabel Burlingame, for American Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted
a brief.

WENDLANDT, J. In August 2014, Terrence Tyler, Monique

Jones, and the defendant, Rashad Shepherd, hatched a plan to rob

the victim, Wilner Parisse. The scheme involved Jones, who had

a sexual relationship with the victim and frequently purchased

marijuana from him, proposing a sexual tryst as a ruse to lure

the victim into a vulnerable position, allowing Tyler and the

defendant to enter the victim's apartment and to take the stash

of marijuana they knew he kept in his bedroom closet. But in

the early morning of August 16, 2014, when the three coventurers

set their plot in motion, the victim was not the "easy mark"

they had anticipated; he fought back. In the ensuing melee, the

victim was shot once in the chest and killed. Based on the

bullet's trajectory and Jones's retelling of the events, the

prosecution theorized that the defendant was the shooter.

Following a jury trial in April 2016, at which Jones testified

pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the defendant was convicted

of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder,

with attempted unarmed robbery as the predicate felony. He was

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

In this consolidated appeal, the defendant contends that

our decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017),
 3

cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), in which we abolished

felony-murder as an independent theory of liability for murder

in the first and second degrees, should extend to the

defendant's case retroactively, despite our determination in

Brown to apply our holding only prospectively -- a conclusion we

have reaffirmed eight times. The defendant maintains that the

determination to apply Brown only prospectively violates the

equal protection principles of arts. 1 and 10 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because the data show, inter

alia, that use of felony-murder as an independent theory of

liability for murder in the first degree disproportionately

resulted in the incarceration of Black persons and that, as a

result, more Black persons than white persons currently are

serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for

felony-murder. The defendant further urges that the trial judge

gave erroneous jury instructions, that the judge's questioning

of, and interactions with, certain witnesses biased the jury,

and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Finally, the defendant asks this court to exercise its

extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to

grant him a new trial or to reduce the conviction to a lesser

degree of guilt. Having carefully examined the record and
 4

considered the defendant's arguments, we conclude that there is

no reversible error and find no reason to disturb the verdict.1

1. Facts. a. The Commonwealth's case. The following

facts are supported by the evidence presented at trial.

i. Background. The victim shared an apartment on the

second floor of a three-story apartment building in Lynn with

his roommate and their two dogs. The victim sold marijuana from

the apartment, including to Jones. The relationship between the

victim and Jones had become sexual approximately six months

prior to the shooting. The victim sold marijuana to Jones at a

discount, and occasionally, Jones, who was unemployed, resold

the marijuana at a profit.

Jones and Tyler had known each other for at least a decade.

They had previously dated and remained very close.2

In early August 2014, prior to the killing, Tyler had

accompanied Jones to the victim's apartment; Tyler remained in

1 We acknowledge the briefs of amici curiae Boston
University Center for Antiracist Research, Massachusetts
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Families for Justice as
Healing, Felony Murder Elimination Project, Fred T. Korematsu
Center for Law and Equality, National Council for Incarcerated
and Formerly Incarcerated Women and Girls, Kat Albrecht, and The
Sentencing Project; and American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts, Inc.

2 At the time of the shooting, Jones was dating Tyler's
brother "D." Jones's sister had previously dated another of
Tyler's brothers, Reginald Tyler, who was deceased when the
shooting occurred.
 5

Jones's vehicle while she purchased marijuana. After the sale,

Tyler remarked that the victim would be "easy to rob," but Jones

"brushed off" the comment. Tyler pressed the idea of robbing

the victim several times thereafter, disclosing to Jones that

Tyler had robbed the victim several years earlier.

ii. The night before the shooting. At around 5 or 6 P.M.

on August 15, 2014, the day preceding the shooting, Jones began

drinking alcohol with a friend, who arrived at Jones's home in

Lynn already intoxicated.3

Tyler called Jones to "hang out," and at approximately 11

P.M., Jones, accompanied by her friend, drove a rental vehicle

to pick up Tyler and the defendant. Tyler and the defendant

were friends. Jones had known the defendant for about four or

five years, but she was not as close with the defendant as with

Tyler.

The four went to a restaurant in Lynn, where they would

remain until approximately 1 A.M. When they arrived, Jones's

friend went inside the restaurant, leaving Jones, Tyler, and the

defendant in the vehicle. Tyler again broached the topic of

3 Jones also had smoked marijuana and later that evening
would consume a few Percocet pills.
 6

robbing the victim, emphasizing that it would be an "easy job";

this time, Jones agreed.4

Tyler suggested exploiting Jones's sexual history with the

victim. They agreed that Jones would propose that she meet the

victim at his apartment for a promised sexual tryst. Then,

while the victim was in a vulnerable position, Tyler and the

defendant would enter the apartment and take the victim's

marijuana cache, which Jones knew he kept in his bedroom closet.

The defendant was present during the formation of the scheme,

but he remained silent.

As agreed, Jones contacted the victim by text message, and

she exchanged a series of text messages with him between 11:04

P.M and 1:03 A.M. Some of these text messages were drafted by

Tyler, pretending to be Jones. Jones, or Tyler on her behalf,

proposed a sex act, and the victim invited her to his apartment.5

Surveillance video footage from the restaurant shows the

three coventurers there that evening; the defendant did not

dispute that he was at the restaurant. The footage captures

4 Jones explained that she was "having a bad day," and was
"aggravated" and "stressed" because several of her friends had
been arrested and she had been blamed.

5 Previously that evening, the victim, his roommate, and the
roommate's six year old son were at the apartment, playing a
board game until approximately 10 or 11 P.M. The roommate and
his son retired into the roommate's bedroom and fell asleep
shortly thereafter.
 7

Tyler, who wore his hair in long dreadlocks, entering the

restaurant just prior to 12:15 A.M. The defendant, who wore a

baseball cap, a light-colored hooded sweatshirt, darker pants,

and light-colored sneakers, entered the restaurant shortly after

Tyler.

Jones entered the restaurant at approximately 12:26 A.M.,

and at 12:35 A.M., the defendant and Jones engaged in a

conversation. The footage shows Jones and the defendant walking

away from the restaurant together at 12:39 A.M. The prosecution

introduced cell site location information (CSLI) data, which

indicated that, at 12:42 A.M., the defendant's cellular

telephone connected to a cellular tower covering an area that

included the restaurant.

Telephone records show that the victim sent Jones a text

message at 1:03 A.M., apparently perturbed that Jones had not

yet arrived. In response, the defendant and Jones called Tyler

four times between 1:08 and 1:12 A.M. Shortly thereafter, Tyler

rejoined the defendant and Jones, and the three coventurers,

along with Jones's friend, got into Jones's vehicle.

iii. The botched robbery. After leaving the restaurant,

Jones, Tyler, Jones's friend, and the defendant drove to the

victim's apartment and parked nearby. While Jones's friend, who

was intoxicated, was asleep in the front passenger seat, the

three coventurers rehashed the plan.
 8

After exchanging telephone calls with the victim at 1:15

and 1:22 A.M., Jones then left Tyler, the defendant, and her

slumbering friend in the vehicle. Tyler and the defendant had

planned to wait in the vehicle for twenty minutes to allow Jones

time to execute the first stage of their plot. Jones entered

the exterior door of the victim's apartment building. She

climbed the back staircase leading to the back door of the

victim's apartment, which led to the kitchen. She left the

doors unlocked.

To her surprise, she found the victim already partially

undressed in his bedroom, which was located off the kitchen.

She stalled to give Tyler and the defendant time to execute the

next stage of the plan. Jones excused herself to the bathroom,

which was located adjacent to the kitchen. Call logs show that

she placed a telephone call to Tyler at approximately 1:32 A.M.;

Tyler told Jones that he and the defendant were on their way.

The surveillance video footage, while grainy, appears to

capture two men, dressed like the defendant and Tyler had been

in the restaurant surveillance video footage, waiting outside a

vehicle.6 It also shows that, at approximately 1:35 A.M., the

6 One man, inferably the defendant, is wearing a bulky
light-colored top, light-colored shoes, and darker pants. The
other man, inferably Tyler, has longer hair, light-colored
shoes, and patterned pants. The appearance of the two men is
consistent with the appearance of the defendant and Tyler in the
restaurant footage.
 9

two men cross the street in the direction of the victim's

apartment, consistent with Jones's testimony concerning the

scheme and its execution. The footage shows the defendant

making movements that the prosecutor suggested indicated that he

was "securing a gun in his waistband."

Meanwhile, in the apartment, Jones returned to the bedroom.

The victim locked the bedroom door behind her. Realizing the

locked door would stymie the plan to take the victim's marijuana

stashed in his bedroom closet, at 1:36 A.M. Jones sent Tyler a

text message: "He just locked the door. So I'm[] [g]oing to

act like [I] have a play[.] Wait." Jones asked the victim to

get her a drink, and when he opened the bedroom door, he

encountered Tyler.

Tyler and the victim immediately began fighting in the

kitchen. The defendant stood at the threshold of the back door,

watching. Grappling and exchanging blows with the victim, Tyler

pushed the victim back into the bedroom, and they crashed into a

dresser.7 The victim grabbed a baseball bat and swung it at

Tyler, who retreated to the kitchen, as the victim advanced. In

the kitchen, Tyler charged the victim, tackling him to the

floor. In the ensuing scrum, the victim bit Tyler's finger, and

Tyler screamed for the defendant to help.

7 Jones was sitting on the bed at this time.
 10

Jones grabbed her clothes and pocketbook and ran from the

bedroom, past the men fighting in the kitchen, and into the

bathroom. Moments later, she heard "one or two" gunshots.8

Leaving the bathroom, Jones found the victim lying on the

kitchen floor; he was bleeding. She saw Tyler fleeing out the

back door. At trial, based on the bullet's trajectory and

Jones's testimony that the defendant had been standing by the

back door, the Commonwealth's theory was that the defendant had

fired the gun, killing the victim.

Jones also fled. She gathered her belongings and ran to

her vehicle; in her panic, however, she left her cellular

telephone on the victim's bed. She drove some distance, and

then stopped. She evicted her friend9 from the vehicle.

At that time, Tyler approached Jones's vehicle; his hand

was bleeding from the bite wound the victim had inflicted. The

two fled to Boston. Tyler's blood, confirmed by

deoxyribonucleic acid analysis, subsequently was found on the

8 Physical evidence showed that the victim died of wounds
from a single bullet, and officers recovered only one bullet and
shell casing. See discussion infra.

9 By then, the friend had finally roused from her stupor and
asked Jones what had transpired.

The friend, whom Jones had testified was intoxicated during
the relevant events, could not be located and did not testify.
 11

exterior handle of the rear passenger's side door and on the

interior driver's side door frame of the vehicle.

Call logs show that the defendant spoke with Tyler by

cellular telephone at approximately 1:44 A.M., shortly after the

shooting. CSLI data indicated that the defendant's telephone

connected to a cellular tower covering an area that included the

victim's residence when he placed this call to Tyler. In the

next two hours, as call logs show, the defendant placed three

unsuccessful telephone calls to Jones, whose cellular telephone

was still at the victim's apartment. He also placed several

calls to Jones's friend and to Tyler.

iv. The aftermath and investigation. At around 1:45 A.M.,

the victim's neighbor placed a 911 call, reporting a shooting,

and Lynn police department officers were dispatched to the area.

Around this time, the victim's roommate awoke to the sound of

his and the victim's dogs10 barking. He found the victim lying

in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor and flagged down one of

the responding officers. Officers entered the apartment and

unsuccessfully administered first aid to the victim. Minutes

later, responding emergency medical technicians pronounced the

victim dead.

10The victim and the roommate kept their two dogs in a
spare bedroom when they entertained guests.
 12

Officers located Jones's cellular telephone on the victim's

bed, which at 1:51 A.M. showed an incoming call from a caller

identified as "City," the defendant's nickname.

Officers identified a spent cartridge casing in the hallway

by the back door of the victim's apartment, the location where,

according to Jones, the defendant had been standing just prior

to the shooting. A bullet also was recovered; subsequent

analysis showed that the bullet had passed through the victim's

chest, aorta, and left lung, killing him within seconds. The

bullet then exited the victim's body, crossed the kitchen,

passed through a window screen, and lodged into a neighboring

building. The bullet's path was consistent with the firearm

being discharged from the back door where Jones had testified

the defendant was standing. No identifiable prints were

recovered from the scene or from the cartridge casing, and the

firearm was not recovered.

By 8 P.M. that day, August 16, Jones had learned that

officers wanted to interview her; she complied, arriving

intoxicated at the police station. She told officers that she

had been in bed with the victim when three masked white men had

entered and shot the victim. When it became apparent to Jones
 13

that the officers found her story to be not credible, she

terminated the interview.11

By early September 2014, Jones retained counsel and

recanted her story. She reported instead that she, Tyler, and

the defendant had conspired to rob the victim. She entered into

a cooperation agreement in which she agreed, inter alia, to

testify at the defendant's trial;12 in exchange, prosecutors

agreed to recommend that she receive a sentence of from five to

seven years for her role in the victim's killing. In October,

the defendant was arrested in Boston, and later Tyler was

apprehended in Florida.13

b. The defendant's case. The defense centered on

attacking Jones's credibility and intimating that the third

coventurer was not the defendant. The defendant did not

testify; instead, the defense relied primarily on cross-

examination, casting Jones as a "coldhearted killer,"

11Later, she told Tyler that she thought the officers did
not believe her tale.

12She also agreed to testify before the grand jury and at
Tyler's trial.

13 On a recorded call that the defendant placed to his then
girlfriend from jail on October 30, 2014, the defendant learned
of Tyler's arrest. The defendant told the girlfriend that Jones
and Tyler were going "to blame this whole shit on me," and that
"[Tyler] shouldn't have even went on the run in the first
place."
 14

"unemployed . . . drug dealer," and unreliable narrator who

needed to rob the victim to fund her "lifestyle."14 The defense

also maintained that because Jones and Tyler were much closer

with each other than with the defendant, he was too far removed

from them to be brought into their scheme and that Jones

concocted the defendant's involvement to secure a deal, which

itself gave Jones a motive to lie in exchange for a lighter

sentence. See note 15, infra. The defense additionally

attempted to undermine the prosecution's forensic evidence, in

particular the CSLI analysis, emphasizing the limitations of the

technology to locate precisely a cellular telephone.

The defense also presented testimony from one of the

victim's neighbors. The neighbor testified that, on the night

of the shooting, he heard arguing between a man and a woman in

the victim's apartment, and one or two gunshots; thereafter, he

saw a woman fleeing the scene but did not see the defendant.

2. Procedural history. In December 2014, a grand jury

indicted the defendant on charges of murder in the first degree,

G. L. c. 265, § 1; home invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; and armed

14The defense elicited testimony that Jones had no income
but had substantial expenses. The defense used this information
to paint Jones as a drug dealer with a motive to rob the victim
and also to suggest that she was the shooter.
 15

assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b).15 Following

a jury trial in April 2016, the defendant was convicted of

felony-murder in the first degree with attempted unarmed robbery

as the predicate felony; he was acquitted of the other charges.

The trial occurred prior to our September 2017 decision in

Brown.

In March 2019, the defendant filed a motion for a new

trial, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. The defendant did not provide an affidavit from trial

counsel. He presented an affidavit from a CSLI expert, who

raised questions regarding the reliability of the CSLI evidence

presented at trial.16 The motion was denied in October 2019 by a

judge (second judge) who was not the trial judge, the trial

judge having retired.

In September 2020, the defendant filed a second motion for

a new trial, claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of

counsel because trial counsel did not use certain information to

impeach Jones's credibility. Again, the defendant did not

15Following a separate jury trial, Tyler was convicted of
felony-murder in the first degree in March 2016, and received a
mandatory sentence of life in prison. His appeal is pending
before this court. See Commonwealth vs. Tyler, SJC-12836.
Jones received a sentence of from five to seven years as part of
her cooperation agreement.

16The defendant also submitted his own affidavit and an
affidavit from the defendant's original appellate counsel.
 16

submit an affidavit from trial counsel. Following a

nonevidentiary hearing, the motion was denied in June 2021 by a

third judge.

In February 2022, the defendant filed a third motion for a

new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the decision not to apply

Brown retroactively violated equal protection principles. In

August 2022, the third judge denied this motion.

The defendant's timely appeals from the denials of his

motions were consolidated with his direct appeal.

3. Discussion. In this consolidated appeal, the defendant

raises four categories of claimed errors, which we address in

turn. "We review the defendant's consolidated appeal pursuant

to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, assessing preserved issues according to

the appropriate constitutional or common-law standard and

unpreserved issues for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage

of justice." Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 492 Mass. 469, 474

(2023). In analyzing the denial of a motion for a new trial, we

examine the motion judge's conclusions "to determine whether

there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of

discretion" (citation omitted). Id. at 474-475. Where, as

here, the motion judges did not preside at trial and did not

conduct evidentiary hearings, "we regard ourselves in as good a

position as the motion judge[s] to assess the trial record"
 17

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 491 Mass. 339,

346 (2023).

a. Retroactive application of Brown. On appeal, the

defendant first maintains that principles of equal protection

embodied in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require that

our decision in Brown, in which we abolished felony-murder as an

independent theory of criminal liability, be applied to his

conviction retroactively.17

i. Brief background of felony-murder. Until 2017,

Massachusetts recognized the doctrine of felony-murder as "an

independent theory of liability for murder," permitting a

defendant to be convicted of murder in the first or second

degree without requiring that the jury also find that the

defendant acted with malice. See Brown, 477 Mass. at 807-808.

Instead, the felony-murder doctrine imposed "criminal liability

'on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if

a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.'" Id., at

822, quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978),

17The defendant does not assert arguments under the Federal
Constitution. "Our 'review of an equal protection claim under
the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the
review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we
have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if
anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality
than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489
Mass. 81, 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass.
503, 505 n.5, (2015).
 18

S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder

rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute

the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice

aforethought required for murder.'" Brown, supra at 822-823,

quoting Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 307 (2013).

In Brown, we abrogated felony-murder as an independent

theory of liability. Although the felony-murder rule was

constitutional, Brown, 477 Mass. at 807, a majority of the court

concluded that the doctrine was of "questionable" historical

provenance, that developments in our joint venture and

constructive malice jurisprudence had undermined the common-law

pillars of the doctrine, and that the doctrine "erode[d] 'the

relation between criminal liability and moral culpability,'"18

id. at 826-833 (Gants, C.J., concurring), quoting Commonwealth

v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 507 (1982). After Brown,

a felony-murder conviction requires proof of actual malice;19

18We limited felony-murder to its "statutory role under
G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder,
permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree where the murder was neither premeditated nor
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty but was committed in
the course of a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Brown,
477 Mass. at 825 (Gants, C.J., concurring). In this opinion, we
use the term "felony-murder" to refer to the pre-Brown,
independent theory of liability unless otherwise indicated.

19The Commonwealth must now show "one of the three prongs
of malice: that [the defendant] intended to kill or to cause
grievous bodily harm, or intended to do an act which, in the
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would
 19

constructive malice inferred from commission of the predicate

felony no longer suffices. See Brown, supra at 825 (Gants,

C.J., concurring).

The new rule, we determined, would apply only to trials

commenced after our decision in Brown, recognizing that "a

felony-murder case might have been tried very differently if the

prosecutor had known that liability for murder would need to

rest on proof of actual malice." Brown, 477 Mass. at 834

(Gants, C.J., concurring).20 Since then, we have declined to

apply our decision retroactively on at least eight occasions,

including once in the face of an equal protection challenge.

See Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 492 Mass. 440, 453-454 (2023);

Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 224 (2022);

Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 658 n.5 (2022);

Commonwealth v. Tate, 486 Mass. 663, 674 (2021); Commonwealth v.

Chesko, 486 Mass. 314, 326-327 (2020); Commonwealth v. Martin,

484 Mass. 634, 644-646 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1519

(2021) (equal protection); Commonwealth v. Bin, 480 Mass. 665,

have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death
would result." Brown, 477 Mass. at 825 (Gants, C.J.,
concurring).

20In Brown, we also exercised our discretion, pursuant to
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the defendant's conviction to
murder in the second degree because he was involved in only the
"remote outer fringes" of the crime. Brown, 477 Mass. at 824,
quoting Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003).
 20

681 (2018); Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 120, cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018).

ii. Equal protection. Because the defendant was tried

prior to our decision in Brown, its holding did not apply to

him; instead, his trial proceeded under the felony-murder rule,

which as we stated supra, was constitutional. See Brown, 477

Mass. at 807. He asks us to revisit our decision to apply Brown

only prospectively, contending that the court's decision not to

apply Brown retroactively offends the guarantees of equal

protection.

In support of his argument, the defendant, who is Black,

relies on the racial and ethnic demographics of individuals

currently serving life without the possibility of parole for

felony-murder.21 Specifically, he asserts that Black persons are

overrepresented in the population of those serving life without

the possibility of parole for felony-murder when compared to the

population of white persons serving the same sentence.

According to the data collected by the defendant's appellate

counsel,22 of the 108 inmates currently incarcerated for murder

in the first degree on a felony-murder theory, 59.25 percent are

21The Commonwealth does not "take issue with the tenor or
the accuracy of the defendant's statistics per se," although it
points to several methodological flaws.

22 These data are from December 1, 2021.
 21

Black, while 17.59 percent are white. By contrast, the data

show that 32.51 percent of those serving life without the

possibility of parole for murder based on a malice theory are

Black persons, while 43.65 percent are white persons. Thus, the

defendant calculates that "more than three times as many Black

people . . . are sentenced to first-degree felony murder as

compared to [w]hite people," while "[r]oughly 1.34 times as many

[w]hite people . . . are sentenced to first-degree malice murder

as compared to Black people."

The data further show that, of all Black persons serving

life without the possibility of parole, eighteen percent are

doing so because of a conviction of murder in the first degree

on a theory of felony-murder; by comparison, of all white

persons serving life without the possibility of parole, only 4.6

percent are doing so for murder in the first degree on a theory

of felony-murder. And, while Black persons comprise 29.9

percent of the total population serving any sentence at

Department of Correction (DOC) facilities,23 they comprise 59.25

percent of those serving life without the possibility of parole

for felony-murder; by comparison, white persons comprise forty

percent of the total DOC population and 17.5 percent of those

23These data, supplied by the defendant, on the total
"criminally sentenced persons" are from May 1, 2022.
 22

serving life without the possibility of parole for felony-

murder.24

The data, the defendant contends, evince structural racism,

racial disparities in prosecutors' use of discretion in charging

decisions and plea offers, and implicit bias. He urges us to

apply the decision in Brown to his case to correct these

societal and prosecutorial ills.

We review the defendant's constitutional challenge de novo.

See Fernandes, 492 Mass. at 479. To begin, the decision in

Brown comports with equal protection's essential mandate that

24The defendant also presents data that show that 82.4
percent of those serving life without the possibility of parole
for felony-murder are people from historically disadvantaged
racial and ethnic groups. Additionally, 56.34 percent of those
serving life without the possibility of parole for murder based
on a malice theory are from historically disadvantaged racial
and ethnic groups. From these data, the defendant concludes
that "people of color" are roughly 1.5 times overrepresented in
the felony-murder population serving life without the
possibility of parole as compared to the demographic percentage
breakdown of the malice murder population serving life without
the possibility of parole. He also compares the racial and
ethnic makeup of those serving life without the possibility of
parole for felony-murder with that of the over-all population of
incarcerated persons, of whom sixty percent are from
historically disadvantaged groups; 29.9 percent are Black, and
forty percent are white. We have noted that such "lump[ing]
together" of members of various racial and ethnic groups is not
proper when conducting an equal protection analysis (citation
omitted). See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 600 n.5
(2018). See also Commonwealth v Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 307 n.17
(2012); Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 305-306 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 561 U.S. 1015 (2010) ("minorities," "African Americans,"
and "Hispanic" jurors not same "cognizable group"). The
defendant presents no argument to deviate from our prior
jurisprudence in this regard.
 23

"all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Moore

v. Executive Office of the Trial Court, 487 Mass. 839, 848

(2021), quoting Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Regional Sch. Dist., 468

Mass. 64, 75 (2014). This is because our decision to apply

Brown only prospectively treated all persons serving life

without the possibility of parole for felony-murder alike --

that is, regardless of race or ethnicity (or other suspect

classification) none of those incarcerated for felony-murder

received the benefit of our abolishment of the felony-murder

doctrine.

Such a "neutral" decision, even if it "'has a

disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority[,]' is

unconstitutional 'only if that impact can be traced to a

discriminatory purpose.'" Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455,

469 (2022), quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.

256, 272 (1979). Discriminatory purpose requires that the State

"selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least

in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse

effects upon an identifiable group." Feeney, supra at 279.

No such discriminatory purpose underlies the decision to

apply Brown only prospectively. More specifically, in Brown, we

recognized that the abolition of the felony-murder doctrine

"clearly involved a change in the common law of felony-murder."

Martin, 484 Mass. at 645. We also affirmed that the pre-Brown
 24

felony-murder rule itself was constitutional. See Brown, 477

Mass. at 807. Accordingly, as we have explained, because there

was no constitutional requirement that the new rule be applied

retroactively, "we [were] free to declare that our new

substantive law shall be applied prospectively." Martin, supra.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 290 (2013),

superseded on other grounds as recognized by Commonwealth v.

Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 5 (2020) (newly enacted penal statute is

presumptively prospective and repeal of statute shall not affect

any punishment incurred before repeal takes effect). And, as

discussed infra, the decision was not arbitrary.

Nor did our decision to apply Brown only prospectively

burden a fundamental right. The defendant has no right,

fundamental or otherwise, to retroactive application of new

common-law rules, so long as the rule pursuant to which he was

convicted was, as here, constitutional. See Martin, 484 Mass.

at 645. And, while in some sense the decision not to apply

Brown retroactively touches on a liberty interest (to be free of

the physical constraint of incarceration), a fundamental right

is burdened "only where State action significantly interfere[s]

with the fundamental right at issue, not simply where State

action involves a fundamental right" (quotations and citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81, 86 (2022)

(concluding fundamental right to be free from physical restraint
 25

implicated but not interfered with where statute granted

criminal defendants in District Court procedural defenses not

available to defendants in Superior Court).

We may prospectively change "our substantive common law of

murder . . . much like the Legislature may do when it revises

substantive criminal statutes." Martin, 484 Mass. at 645. "All

prospective [law making] must have a beginning date, and . . .

[t]he mere fact that some persons were at some later date

governed by a law more favorable to them than the law which

applied to the defendant is insufficient to strike down an

otherwise valid [law]" (quotations and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 507 (2015). To conclude

otherwise "would be either to eradicate all new [laws] or to

make them all retroactive." Commonwealth v. Purdy, 408 Mass.

681, 685 (1990).

Because the determination to apply Brown only prospectively

was not borne out of discriminatory animus and neither

implicates a fundamental right nor draws a suspect

classification, it would violate equal protection only if it

were not "rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate

[S]tate interest" (citation omitted). Roman, 489 Mass. at 86.

Our decision to apply Brown only prospectively readily passes

rational basis review. We reasoned that prosecutors might have

tried felony-murder cases very differently if proof of actual
 26

malice were then a required element. See Brown, 477 Mass. at

834 (Gants, C.J., concurring). See also Pfeiffer, 492 Mass. at

453; Martin, 484 Mass. at 645-646 (reaffirming wisdom of

prospective application of Brown and noting unfairness of

retroactive application where defendant was shooter and jury

were not instructed that they had to find malice, but "likely

would have found that the defendant acted with malice"). For

this reason, and because the pre-Brown rule was constitutional,

we determined not to apply Brown retroactively. Such reasoning

continues to be valid.

To be sure, the data show that the existing population of

persons serving life without the possibility of parole for

felony-murder convictions is comprised of more Black persons

than white persons. Perforce, any prospective narrowing of the

crime's scope would leave a population of inmates that was

comprised of more Black persons than persons who are white. The

defendant does not allege that we made our decision in Brown

prospective because of this effect.

Nonetheless, the defendant urges us to revisit our equal

protection jurisprudence to allow for "disparate impact alone"

to constitute an equal protection violation. The defendant

calls on us to correct structural racism, prosecutorial

discretion in charging decisions, and implicit bias that the

defendant contends results in more Black persons than white
 27

persons serving life without the possibility of parole for

felony-murder by reversing course and applying Brown

retroactively. He urges: "This [c]ourt has the opportunity to

redress part of the systemic racism and implicit bias within the

court system that has resulted in the egregious racial disparity

in persons serving felony murder [life without the possibility

of parole]." In other words, the defendant urges us to apply

Brown retroactively because of race.

Far from showing that our decision resulted in disparate

racial treatment, however, the data demonstrate that our

decision eliminated a theory of first-degree murder that may

have disproportionately affected Black persons.25 Given the

25Notably, the data are not supported by analysis from an
expert, such as a statistician, who might provide the court with
an assessment of the data's statistical significance. See,
e.g., Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 712 n.20 (2012),
quoting Tinkham, The Uses and Misuses of Statistical Proof in
Age Discrimination Claims, 27 Hofstra Lab. & Employment L.J.
357, 358 (2010) ("Standard statistical analysis in
discrimination cases generally takes the unprotected group and
compares the treatment of that group to the treatment of the
protected group to determine whether there is a statistically
significant difference. . . . Differences, if any, can be
measured in terms of absolute numbers, standard deviations or
percentages"); Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43-45 (1st Cir.
2014) (noting explanatory power of expert analysis of
statistical significance and standard deviations in employment
disparate impact case); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs.,
Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting usefulness
of regression analyses). See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996-997 (1988) (sampling types of
infirmities that may emerge when "facially plausible statistical
evidence" is scrutinized, including small or incomplete data
sets, inadequate techniques, and unsuitable control groups).
 28

disparities in incarcerated persons relative to the over-all

population of such persons within the Commonwealth, the same

data underlying the defendant's argument here could be

marshalled for nearly any change in the law that result in more

defendant-friendly rules.26 There being no supportable

distinction between any such changes and the defendant's present

claim, we decline his invitation to employ race (or ethnicity)

in this manner in our decision making as to whether to apply a

new criminal rule retroactively.

At bottom, although couched as an equal protection claim

based on our decision in Brown, the defendant's actual objection

is a claim of selective prosecution. Under the tripartite

selective prosecution test, however,

26See Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Selected Race
Statistics 2 (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.mass.gov/files
/documents/2016/09/tu/selected-race-statistics.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/3TAF-2VUE] (in 2014, Massachusetts incarcerated
people who are Black at 7.9 times the rate of people who are
white). See also E.T. Bishop, B. Hopkins, C. Obiofuma, & F.
Owusu, Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School,
Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System 1 (Sept.
2020), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2020/11
/Massachusetts-Racial-Disparity-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma
.cc/W5KA-MX3R] (same).

As of 2020, according to the data presented by amicus
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., the
Commonwealth's population was sixty-nine percent white and 6.8
percent Black; overall, thirty-one percent of the Commonwealth’s
population identified as nonwhite.
 29

"the defendant bears the initial burden to 'present
evidence which raises at least a reasonable inference of
impermissible discrimination, including evidence that a
broader class of persons than those prosecuted violated the
law, . . . that failure to prosecute was either consistent
or deliberate, . . . and that the decision not to prosecute
was based on an impermissible classification such as race,
religion, or sex'" (quotations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 168 (2009), quoting

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 894 (1978). If a

defendant makes this prima facie showing, "the Commonwealth must

rebut that inference of discrimination." Commonwealth v.

Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1, 17 (2023).

"Because a claim of selective prosecution is a collateral

attack on prosecutorial decision-making, a degree of rigor is

demanded to balance such claims against the presumption of

prosecutorial regularity." Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 168.

Here, the defendant, in essence, asks us to sidestep this

required rigor by crafting a new standard for retroactive

application of new rules to target essentially the same conduct

that the selective prosecution framework already addresses. We

decline to do so.

b. Jury instructions. The defendant next contends that

certain jury instructions were erroneous. In giving

instructions, "[a] trial judge has the duty to state the

applicable law clearly and correctly." Commonwealth v. Wall,

469 Mass. 652, 670 (2014). "In assessing the sufficiency of the
 30

jury instructions, we consider the charge in its entirety, to

determine the 'probable impact, appraised realistically . . .

upon the jury's factfinding function.'"27 Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Batchelder, 407 Mass. 752, 759 (1990). See

Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 621 (2004) ("In examining

a claim of error in jury instructions, we do not look at

individual phrases taken out of context; rather, we consider the

instructions viewed as a whole").

i. Cooperating witness instruction. The defendant asserts

that the judge's instruction concerning the jury's evaluation of

the testimony of a cooperating witness did not comply with the

requirements of Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 266

(1989). Because trial counsel timely objected,28 we examine

whether any error was prejudicial. See Commonwealth v.

27We have encouraged trial judges to follow the model jury
instructions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268,
285 (2022); Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 61 (2018).
But we also have affirmed that a judge need not use particular
words in giving an instruction "so long as the charge, as a
whole, adequately covers the issue." Commonwealth v. McGee, 467
Mass. 141, 154 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass.
719, 739 (1992).

28Contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, trial
counsel's request to "re-instruct on the model jury instruction
on the cooperating witness" because the trial judge "narrowed or
diminished some of the instructions to the detriment of the
defense" sufficiently highlighted the nature of the objection,
and the judge considered and rejected the request. See
Commonwealth v. Costa, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 750, 754 n.6 (2015)
(objection preserved where "the trial judge considered the
objection fully").
 31

Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 742 (2022); Commonwealth v. Meuse, 423

Mass. 831, 832 (1996).

"When a prosecution witness testifies pursuant to a plea

agreement containing a promise to tell the truth, and the jury

are aware of the promise, the judge should warn the jury that

the government does not know whether the witness is telling the

truth." Meuse, 423 Mass. at 832. The judge should also

"specifically and forcefully tell the jury to study the

witness's credibility with particular care." Ciampa, 406 Mass.

at 266. "[I]f the prosecutor has vouched for that witness's

credibility, such a failure to instruct is reversible error."

Meuse, supra. "Vouching can occur if an attorney expresses a

personal belief in the credibility of a witness . . . or if an

attorney indicates that [the attorney] has knowledge independent

of the evidence before the jury verifying a witness's

credibility." Ciampa, supra at 265.

Here, the Commonwealth's key witness, Jones, testified

pursuant to a cooperation agreement. The prosecutor briefly

elicited on direct examination that Jones entered into a

cooperation agreement and was receiving a reduced sentence in

exchange for her testimony against the defendant. The

prosecutor did not elicit that the agreement was contingent on

Jones telling the truth; nor did the prosecution admit a copy of

the agreement in evidence. The prosecutor neither expressed her
 32

personal belief in Jones's credibility nor suggested that she

possessed special knowledge of Jones's truthfulness. Instead,

in her closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to

believe Jones based on specific evidence that corroborated her

testimony. Contrast Commonwealth v. Meuse, 38 Mass. App. Ct.

772, 774 (1995), S.C., 423 Mass. 831 (1996) (prosecutor

emphasized in closing argument that if cooperating witness was

"not telling the truth, we have an army of police that can go

out and corroborate every detail he is giving us. If he gives

us one wrong detail . . . we will not show up for sentencing.

That’s the leverage we have . . .").

However, on cross-examination, after trial counsel

suggested that Jones was being untruthful to secure her deal,

Jones responded: "I wouldn't make up a story. It was an

agreement to be honest a hundred percent or there's no agreement

in place." Cf. Commonwealth v. Chaleumphong, 434 Mass. 70, 74-

75 (2001) (officer's testimony about methods of confirming

truthfulness of cooperating witness was not vouching where

testimony was extracted by defense's cross-examination).

After the close of evidence, the judge instructed the jury

that it should "treat [Jones's] testimony with particular care

because you know she has received a benefit from the

Commonwealth." While the judge did not caution that the

Commonwealth "could not know whether [Jones] was telling the
 33

truth," see Meuse, 423 Mass. at 832, he emphasized that the jury

were the sole ultimate arbiters of witnesses' credibility, and

that in evaluating credibility, they could take into account

bias and whether "a witness has something to win or lose by

their testimony." See Ciampa, 406 Mass. at 266. See also

Commonwealth v. Grenier, 415 Mass. 680, 687 (1993) ("The judge's

instruction on credibility, including references to witnesses'

interests in the outcome of the case and to their possible bias,

was sufficient in the circumstances"). Although, in view of

Jones's characterization of her obligation to tell the truth

under the cooperation agreement, it may have been preferable for

the judge also to specify that the prosecution had no special

method of determining Jones's truthfulness, these circumstances,

combined with the vigorous cross-examination of Jones that

elicited her prior inconsistent statements, lead us to conclude

with fair assurance that the omission did not sway the jury's

decision. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).

ii. "Lifestyle" commentary. The defendant additionally

challenges the instruction to the jury that "[w]e're not here to

judge someone's lifestyle; be it the alleged victim . . . be it

a witness, be it anybody involved here" (emphasis added). He

asserts that the instruction impermissibly bolstered Jones's

credibility and was prejudicial because the defense relied on

attacking Jones's lavish lifestyle relative to her income.
 34

In conducting a trial, a judge may not "express an opinion

on the credibility of particular witnesses," or "instruct the

jury that they must draw particular inferences from the

evidence." Commonwealth v. Sneed, 376 Mass. 867, 870 (1978).

Here, the instruction neither conveyed the judge's views of

Jones's credibility nor ordered the jury to ignore evidence

linked to her lifestyle when evaluating credibility. Rather,

the judge was clear that instead of "judg[ing] someone's

lifestyle," the jury must "coolly and calmly sift through

evidence" and "draw reasonable inferences.""29 Furthermore, the

judge repeatedly reaffirmed that the jury were the ultimate

arbiters of credibility determinations. Although it may have

been prudent to avoid altogether the use of the defense's chosen

phrase, "lifestyle," the judge did not err.

iii. Hypotheticals. The defendant also maintains that the

trial judge gave hypotheticals that too closely tracked the

facts of the case or that aligned the judge with the victim and

prosecution. A judge generally may employ hypotheticals to

29In this regard, the judge's instruction conveyed the
essence of the model instructions on the role of the jury, which
state that jurors "must be completely fair and unbiased" and
should "not let [their] emotions, any kind of prejudice, or
[their] personal likes or dislikes influence [them] in any way."
Superior Court Model Jury Instructions, Final Charge Script 5
(Nov. 2023). See Instruction 2.120 of the Criminal Model Jury
Instructions for Use in the District Court (Sept. 2022) (jurors
should not "allow bias . . . to interfere with [their] ability
to fairly evaluate the evidence").
 35

explain concepts to the jury. See, e.g., Denis, 442 Mass. at

621-622, 624-625; Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 604-605

(2002). But in doing so, the judge must "not improperly comment

on the . . . evidence or offer his opinion regarding the

defendant's guilt." Moses, supra at 605. Additionally, a judge

should not offer a "hypothetical that too closely tracks the

facts of the defendant's case." Commonwealth v. Gumkowski, 487

Mass. 314, 331 (2021). We further have discouraged "examples in

which hypothetical individuals commit crimes" (citation

omitted). Id.

Here, immediately prior to the introduction of a recording

of a telephone call made by the defendant from jail, see note

13, supra, the judge cautioned the jury not to let the

defendant's pretrial detention bias them. The judge then stated

that if he were arrested, he "would hope [his] wife would come

. . . make [his] bail," and that "people with means" can

generally "make bail." The judge added "just because someone

can't make bail, you can't hold that against them. . . . [T]hat

would be very unfair." While the judge's reference to his

wife's assistance was better left unsaid, the instruction, as a

whole, was not error.30

30Similarly, the defense complains that in explaining the
unarmed robbery charge, the judge used himself as an example
victim, thereby equating himself with the victim, and thus the
 36

Additionally, after instructing the jury to weigh Jones's

testimony with "particular care" in view of her cooperation

agreement, see part 3.b.i, supra, the judge gave one example of

how the jury could assess credibility. He told the jury that if

he said, "what a miserable, wet rainy day," but they could see

that it was sunny, the jury could conclude that he is "crazy"

because they have "contrary evidence." The defendant contends

that this statement instructed the jury to disbelieve Jones's

testimony only if they had direct contrary evidence. But the

judge did not convey that only direct evidence can lead the jury

to disbelieve testimony. Rather, he gave it as one example of

how the jury could assess credibility; he urged them to use

their "common sense" and to draw "reasonable inferences."

The defendant also asserts that the judge erred in

connection with a hypothetical the judge employed to illustrate

joint venture liability. In it, the judge and his "crazy" and

"dumb" brother-in-law conspired to rob a bank. Contrary to the

defendant's contention, the outlandish hypothetical did not

"closely mirror[] the circumstances of the defendant's case" or

"emphasize the prosecution's theory of the case" -- a death

prosecution. This claim is too attenuated and speculative to
constitute error.
 37

resulting from a botched drug heist.31 See Gumkowski, 487 Mass.

at 332. The judge made clear that he was using a hypothetical

illustratively and emphasized that the jurors were the sole

arbiters of the facts. See Moses, 436 Mass. at 605. No

reasonable juror would have been misled by the judge's example.

c. Trial judge's conduct. The defendant additionally

claims that the trial judge prejudicially injected himself into

the proceedings.

i. Questioning of witnesses. The defendant first points

to the judge's questioning of witnesses.32 "A judge may properly

question a witness, even where to do so may 'reinforce the

Commonwealth's case, so long as the examination is not partisan

in nature, biased, or a display of belief in the defendant's

guilt.'" Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 525 (2016),

quoting Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 422 (1976).

Although we have expressed concerns with an "overspeaking

judge," see Commonwealth v. Campbell, 371 Mass. 40, 45 (1976),

"[t]here exists no quantitative test for determining whether the

31The defendant also argues that the example highlighted
the defendant's decision not to testify and suggested that the
defendant was "dumb" or "crazy." We disagree. Indeed, the
judge specifically instructed the jury to draw no inferences
from the defendant not testifying and not to take cues from the
judge.

32Here, the defendant complains that the judge asked
witnesses a total of 146 questions, including sixty to Jones.
 38

judge has gone beyond the bounds which the law imposes,"

Commonwealth v. Dias, 373 Mass. 412, 416 (1977), S.C., 402 Mass.

645 (1988). The judge's actions are to "considered in the

context of the entire trial." Festa, supra at 423.

Here, the judge's questioning did not interfere "with

counsel's ability to put on a full defense." See Commonwealth

v. Sylvester, 388 Mass. 749, 751-752 (1983). And, while some of

the questions clarified facts that, in turn, benefited the

Commonwealth, none showed bias or favor toward the prosecution;

rather, the judge's questions were directed either to clarifying

information or to mitigating the risk of the jury making

unfairly prejudicial inferences. In the circumstances, while it

would have been better for the judge to interject his questions

less frequently, we discern no error in the questions he asked.

ii. Banter with witnesses. The defendant also argues that

the judge improperly engaged in extraneous social conversation

with Commonwealth witnesses, which, he contends, enhanced those

witnesses' likability and demonstrated partiality to the

Commonwealth. In particular, the judge bantered with the

victim's roommate about a board game, asked about a forensics

witness's broken leg, and thanked the telephone records

custodian for traveling from afar.33

33Additionally, the defendant complains that the judge
"plac[ed] his finger on the scales of justice in favor of the
 39

"Although we discourage gratuitous remarks by judges,"

Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 392 (1995), the judge's

"folksy" mannerism, even if error, did not result in a

substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, see

Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 664-665 (2004). None of

the remarks displayed partiality toward the prosecution or the

witnesses beyond the normal bounds of affability and courtesy.

Indeed, the judge displayed a similar chattiness with jurors

during voir dire but had little opportunity to do the same with

defense witnesses, as the defense called only one witness.

Moreover, the judge instructed the jury not to take any cues

from him in assessing credibility. See id.; Mello, supra.

d. Ineffectiveness of counsel. The defendant also asserts

that the motion judges abused their discretion in denying his

motions for a new trial because trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. "When evaluating ineffective assistance

of counsel claims in connection with the direct appeal of a

conviction of murder in the first degree, 'we review for a

substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . .'"

Kirkland, 491 Mass. at 346, quoting Commonwealth v. Don, 483

Commonwealth" by asking the prosecutor to help display a jury
instruction chalk -- rather than asking a court officer -- and
by asking the prosecutor for her opinion on the instructions.
These actions do not alter our conclusion.
 40

Mass. 697, 704 (2019).34 "In conducting this review, we accord

tactical decisions of trial counsel due deference" and reverse

only if counsel's decisions were "manifestly unreasonable"

(quotation and citations omitted). Kirkland, supra. "'[O]nly

strategy and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and

skill in the criminal law would not consider competent' rise to

the level of manifestly unreasonable." Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478

Mass. 189 (2017).35

i. Lack of CSLI expert. The defendant argues that trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to retain a

CSLI expert. "There is no requirement that trial counsel always

present expert or documentary evidence to support an argument,

especially where other evidence is presented to support it."

Commonwealth v. Hensley, 454 Mass. 721, 736 (2009). Here, trial

34This is because the "statutory standard of [G. L. c. 278,
§ 33E,] is more favorable to a defendant than is the
constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of
counsel" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass.
291, 316 (2014).

35Where a claim asks us to speculate on the strategic
decision-making of trial counsel, the absence of an affidavit
from trial counsel is significant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 809 n.10 (2005) ("It is significant
that there is no affidavit from trial counsel to inform us of
his strategic reasons for these decisions"); Commonwealth v.
Vasquez, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 533 (2002) ("Conspicuously
absent in these circumstances is an affidavit from defense trial
counsel").
 41

counsel made a strategic decision to rely on cross-examination

of the Commonwealth's expert. See Commonwealth v. Sena, 441

Mass. 822, 827-829 (2004) (no ineffective assistance for not

calling expert where counsel effectively cross-examined

Commonwealth's expert).36

On cross-examination, trial counsel effectively elicited

that the Commonwealth's CSLI evidence could provide no more than

an approximate location of the defendant's cellular telephone;

counsel evoked that the cellular telephone plausibly could have

connected to cellular towers further from the telephone's

location based on any number of factors, including call volume

and physical obstructions.37

36The defendant also maintains that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance because, in her opening statement, she
told the jury that cellular telephone records would exculpate
the defendant. Although a failure to deliver on a promise of
key evidence may constitute ineffective assistance, see
Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 109 (2001), here, counsel
delivered on her promise. The telephone records were admitted
in evidence through the Commonwealth's cellular telephone
records custodian witness. And, in closing argument, trial
counsel argued that because the defendant called Jones near the
time of the shooting, this indicated that the defendant was not
with Jones and therefore was not the third coventurer. This was
not a manifestly unreasonable tactic. See Fernandes, 492 Mass.
at 492 (defense counsel reasonably suggested that calls between
defendant and codefendant showed that they were not together).

37The affidavit submitted by the defendant's posttrial
expert showed, at most, that the possible area from which the
call could have been placed was somewhat larger than the already
sizable area the Commonwealth's expert proffered; significantly,
the larger area still encompassed the victim's home. Contrast
Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 528-529 (2003) (counsel
 42

ii. Telephone records custodian's testimony. The

defendant also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by not objecting to the cellular telephone records

custodian's qualifications to testify regarding how cellular

telephone towers function. Assuming, arguendo, that the expert

was unqualified as to that subject matter, the error does not

raise a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. As

discussed supra, the CSLI data merely corroborated an otherwise

strong case against the defendant, which also included

surveillance video footage that placed the defendant close to

the victim's home shortly before the shooting, as well as call

logs indicating that the defendant was in communication with

Jones and Tyler.

iii. CSLI exhibits. The defendant next faults trial

counsel for not objecting to the admission of two maps derived

from CSLI data that placed the defendant's cellular telephone in

the vicinity of the victim's home and the restaurant. Such

charts derived from CSLI data, for which a proper foundation is

laid, are admissible. See Bin, 480 Mass. at 679-680 (judge did

not abuse discretion in admitting computer-generated map police

officer created to plot CSLI data). See also Commonwealth v.

Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 825 (2010) ("Summaries of testimony are

failed to introduce expert who would have rebutted "the only
physical evidence used by the Commonwealth to link" defendant).
 43

admissible, provided that the underlying records have been

admitted in evidence and that the summaries accurately reflect

the records"). Therefore, counsel's lack of objection was not

manifestly unreasonable.

iv. Murder in the second degree instruction. The

defendant asserts that trial counsel should have sought an

instruction on felony-murder in the second degree. Where "the

defendant's trial strategy was to present an all-or-nothing

choice to the jury," not requesting an instruction on an

available lesser included crime is not manifestly unreasonable.

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737-739 (1990). Here,

the primary defense was that the defendant did not participate

in the robbery and that Jones fabricated her testimony. The

choice to forgo the instruction on second degree murder was not

manifestly unreasonable.

v. Adequacy of preparation. The defendant argues that his

trial counsel inadequately prepared for trial. Among the duties

of counsel are the duties "to consult with the defendant on

important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of

important developments in the course of the prosecution."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).38 Counsel

38Prior to trial, the defendant met with trial counsel in
person at least six times and was able to speak with her by
telephone "numerous times through [his] incarceration." Without
more, the defendant's claim of a failure to communicate is
 44

also has a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the

facts. Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 102 (2001). See

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). To establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must identify

with particularity how any investigation that counsel failed to

conduct would have benefited the defense. Duran, supra at 103.

"Speculation, without more, is not a sufficient basis to

establish ineffective representation." Id.

The defendant contends that trial counsel failed to give

him certain discovery materials in a timely manner, causing him

to underestimate the strength of the Commonwealth's case. The

defendant does not explain how earlier access to discovery

material would have altered his strategy.

The defendant further maintains that trial counsel failed

to contact, call, and prepare two neighbors (one of whom

testified), as well as Jones's friend and Tyler. He does not

identify any noncumulative, material exculpatory testimony that

the two neighbors could have supplied; Jones's friend was

unavailable to testify; and Tyler was himself a defendant in a

parallel case for the same crime, see note 15, supra. In the

absence of an affidavit from trial counsel, we reject the claim

unsupported. See Martin, 484 Mass. at 643-644 (no ineffective
assistance where counsel visited defendant six times and
defendant failed to articulate how more contact would have
affected strategy or verdict).
 45

that a failure to call these witnesses was not a strategic

choice. Nor will we speculate as to what these witnesses might

have said.39

vi. Firearm and drugs seized from Jones's home. The

defendant also argues that trial counsel failed to seek to

introduce information that shortly before the shooting, police

officers had seized a firearm and "crack" cocaine from Jones's

apartment and had arrested her boyfriend. "[I]mpeachment of a

witness is, by its very nature, fraught with a host of strategic

considerations to which we will, even on [G. L. c. 278, § 33E,]

review, still show deference" (citation omitted). Commonwealth

v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 190 (2014). Therefore, "a claim of

ineffective assistance based on failure to use particular

impeachment methods is difficult to establish." Commonwealth v.

Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 357 (2001). "This is particularly so

where [trial counsel] conducted a thorough impeachment . . . ."

Valentin, supra at 191.

The crux of the defense was that the defendant was not

involved in the robbery; Jones's motivation for the robbery and

her prior involvement with drugs and firearms have little

39See Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 621 (2016)
("[A] motion judge may reject a defendant's self-serving
affidavit as not credible" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v.
Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 304 (2004) (without affidavit from trial
counsel, defendant's assertions are speculative).
 46

bearing on whether the defendant also participated in the

robbery. Moreover, trial counsel vigorously cross-examined

Jones; she raised serious questions regarding Jones's version of

events and elicited that Jones initially had lied about the

robbery, that Jones needed money, and that Jones had an

incentive to testify against the defendant. Further expounding

on Jones's motivation for the robbery was unlikely to have

influenced the jury's decision.40

e. Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The defendant also

asks us to apply Brown retroactively to his case as a matter of

fairness pursuant to review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.41 Unlike

in Brown, however, the defendant here was not in the "remote

outer fringes" of the scheme that led to the victim's death.

See Brown, 477 Mass. at 824 (reducing felony-murder verdict from

first degree to second degree where defendant's involvement was

limited to supplying firearm and clothing used in robbery). We

discern no error warranting relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

40The defendant also contends that Jones's posttrial arrest
in November 2021 for possessing an illegal firearm showed that
the pretrial firearm seizure was critical to the defense.
However, this posttrial development has no bearing on decisions
trial counsel made at trial.

41The defendant contends that he preserved the issue of
whether felony-murder continued to provide an independent theory
to liability.
 47

4. Conclusion. The defendant's conviction of murder in

the first degree is affirmed. The orders denying the

defendant's first, second, and third motions for a new trial are

also affirmed.

So ordered.